New Zealand Submission to the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action: Work-stream 1

Transcription

1 Cntext New Zealand Submissin t the Ad Hc Wrking Grup n the Durban Platfrm fr Enhanced Actin: Wrk-stream 1 Implementatin f all the elements f decisin 1/CP.17, (a) Matters related t paragraphs 2 t 6 March This submissin respnds t the invitatin cntained in dcument FCCC/ADP/2012/3, paragraph 29, fr additinal input n hw the ADP can advance its wrk in The wrk prgramme f in-sessin rundtable discussins and wrkshps this year will be guided by fcused questins set ut by the C-Chairs f the ADP, which will als take these submissins int accunt. 2. New Zealand has chsen t respnd t the invitatin t submit views n matters relating t the wrk f the ADP, by fcusing n building n the experiences and lessns learned frm ther prcesses under the Cnventin and frm ther [relevant] multilateral prcesses. Setting the scene fr the Durban Platfrm negtiatins 3. In New Zealand s 2012 submissins n the ADP, we identified the characteristics which, in ur view, wuld be necessary t underpin an ambitius and effective glbal climate change agreement, capable f securing the participatin f all Parties t the UNFCCC. Thse characteristics were summarised as: Maximum participatin. The new climate change agreement shuld, in bth substance and frm, accmmdate Parties with diverse legal and ecnmic structures. It shuld in particular enable and encurage the active participatin f all majr develped and emerging ecnmies; Applicable t all n an equal legal fting, with a cmmn rule-set as its fundatin, but als taking int accunt Parties different natinal circumstances and capabilities; Future-fcussed and durable. The agreement in its applicatin must be dynamic and evlve ver time in accrdance with changing glbal and natinal ecnmic and envirnmental realities; Fcussed n key elements. The Durban Platfrm negtiatins shuld nt renegtiate issues where relevant bdies r prcesses have already been put in place. The agreement shuld determine effective wrking arrangements with the existing r new structures addressing ther fundamental elements f the internatinal climate regime, such as adaptatin, finance, technlgy, and capacity building; Maximises mitigatin ambitin. The agreement needs t ensure Parties have cnfidence in glbal actin n climate change, in rder t facilitate dmestic plitical supprt and t enable effective engagement with the private sectr. An agreement that is framed in psitive terms, prvides incentives fr actin and lks t realise pprtunities, will fster greater ambitin; Has transparency at its cre. Transparency, including thrugh MRV, builds cnfidence that Parties are taking apprpriate and effective actin against climate change and are ding their share; An effective glbal carbn market placing a glbal price n carbn thrugh a cmmn framewrk f rules r standards that supprt envirnmental integrity. A fully functining carbn market will help decuple ecnmic grwth frm increases in 1

2 greenhuse gas emissins. Links int the glbal ecnmic and trading system need t be dne in a way that lwers barriers and influences investment decisins, including by reducing r eliminating inefficient subsidies. 4. The cntext fr the ADP is the twenty-year histry f the UNFCCC. This is nt a clean slate exercise: Parties d nt intend t re-negtiate the Framewrk Cnventin. We will als need t cnsider the Kyt Prtcl and hw the multiple wrk prgrammes, institutins and agreements that reflect the successful utcmes f the AWG-LCA will be taken int accunt in the design f the ADP. The Prtcl has served the UNFCCC well by creating a legal basis fr binding mitigatin cmmitments, but the ADP is t prduce a new legal agreement applicable t all Parties. The Kyt Prtcl was designed arund a narrwer grup f cuntries, and is nt capable f accmmdating the diversity f ecnmic and envirnmental circumstances the ADP will need t address. We shuld ensure the successful elements f the Kyt Prtcl infrm the design f the new agreement, but the Prtcl shuld nt be the blueprint fr it. Lessns frm ther multilateral agreements 5. In New Zealand s view, the three cre cmpnents f a multilateral rules-based agreement are: participatin, effectiveness and transparency/cmpliance. The inter-play between these cmpnents is the key t hw effective and therefre successful it will be. 6. Develping a multilateral agreement is driven by science, plicy, negtiating prcess and structural slutins. In cnsidering the plicy and plitical drivers fr the ADP negtiatins, New Zealand has lked utside the UNFCCC and selected three multilateral prcesses that culd give us pinters: the WTO, Mntreal Prtcl and fisheries management under UNCLOS. The reasns fr chsing these are: Althugh the UNFCCC is seeking a multilateral slutin fr a glbal envirnmental challenge, the negtiatins are abut transitining t a sustainable ecnmic develpment mdel. Ecnmic agreements, such as thse under the WTO, can therefre usefully infrm ur wrk. The Mntreal Prtcl has successfully tackled a significant glbal envirnmental issue, and has achieved universal participatin. Participatin in internatinal and reginal fisheries regimes was achieved because the ecnmic benefits f wrking cperatively t ensure the lng-term cnservatin and sustainable use f fisheries resurces were clear, and recgnised as a glbal cmmns issue. 7. New Zealand des nt cnsider there is a ready-made slutin t the design f the new ADP legal agreement. Each multilateral negtiatin is unique, with different drivers, dynamics, cst-benefit equatins, technlgies, and plicy slutins. Nnetheless, it seems clear there are reference pints in these three different agreements frm which the ADP culd draw lessns. 8. It is, perhaps, useful t cnsider questins abut the negtiating prcess first, befre turning t structural slutins. Our primary bjective shuld be t secure brad participatin in the new legal agreement, cnsistent with its mandate. Getting the prcess right is abut building the strngest pssible plitical fundatin fr a multilateral negtiatin. N gvernment will be cmpelled t cmmit t mre than it feels cnfident f ding, r mre than it cnsiders its fair share. Using the transitin t the ADP utcme t develp and bed-in plicies and measures will enable them t be cdified and cnfirmed. This was certainly the case in the Uruguay Rund, which led t the creatin f the WTO (transitining frm the GATT). 2

3 Parties need t deliver a clear message t the private sectr ( we mean business ) abut their determinatin t negtiate an agreement, t incentivise the develpment f technlgical slutins. The Mntreal Prtcl has been able t reflect meaningful cmmitments t phase ut zne-depleting substances because industry was willing t engage very early n, and cntinues t develp alternatives. The cst-benefit equatin must stack up in favur f cperative actin. While respnding t an envirnmental threat will inevitably imply csts, the ecnmic benefits will need t utweigh them. Parties have cncluded there are clear net ecnmic benefits in jining the WTO, the Mntreal Prtcl and fisheries management agreements. A calitin f the willing must include thse whse stakes are highest. Multilateral agreements have develped using a variable gemetry prcess, with a mix f frmal and infrmal grupings. Infrmal prcesses, where ideas can be tested and different circumstances explred and understd, can cmplement and supprt a frmal negtiating prcess. The WTO has seen numerus small grup initiatives help the prcess alng ver its histry. 9. Structures are equally imprtant, nt just as the end-pint f the negtiatins, but because structural slutins can help the negtiating prcess (i.e. building the plitical fundatins fr the agreement) and deal with plitical cnstraints. 10. In New Zealand s view, the experience f the three multilateral prcesses we have analysed can prvide structural pinters fr the ADP in the fllwing ways: Participatin This is the first pririty fr the ADP: there is n pint in drafting the perfect agreement if it remains an empty shell. At the same time, while brad participatin is easily achieved (e.g. if the agreement is lse and nn-binding), there is little pint if that is at the cst f effectiveness r ambitin. While it may nt be pssible t have all states participating frm day ne, the agreement needs t be plitically and legally realistic s that thse wh matter will be n bard early, and s that thers will als be persuaded t jin. Arund 30 key cuntries initially gt tgether t develp a set f trade rules, but the WTO (like the Mntreal Prtcl) has expanded in scpe and participatin ver time. Incentives t jin can be framed psitively. An example is the reciprcity f market access rights set ut in the WTO) r negatively (relevant trade with nn-parties is restricted under the Mntreal Prtcl), but wherever pssible incentives shuld be psitive. Parties need t be cnfident f their ability t deliver n cmmitments and nt t fear failure. The strng signals t business, which made it wrth their while t invest in alternative technlgies, prvided this cnfidence in the Mntreal Prtcl cntext. Anther example f a cnfidence-creating apprach is the delayed cmpliance (10 years) with cntrl measures fr certain develping cuntries, als under the Mntreal Prtcl. Each Party must be able t cnclude the bargain is fair and that the benefits f belnging utweigh the csts. The successful multilateral prcesses we have analysed have all Parties perating within the same legal framewrk, but allw fr a spectrum f cmmitments t reflect differences in ecnmic develpment: the WTO establishes a balance f rights and bligatins, and uses negtiated schedules f cmmitments; the Mntreal Prtcl takes a basket apprach t cntrlling zne-depleting substances, with flexibility t implement the limits set; and, in the cntext f reginal fisheries management, allcatin is usually a negtiated utcme, which may include factrs such as the needs f small island develping states and castal cmmunities. 3

4 Effectiveness An aspiratinal gal. All three f these regimes are based n a simple ver-arching bjective, against which prgressive mves t liberalise, phase ut, r effectively cnserve and manage, can be measured. Designing a framewrk that enables increasing ambitin ver time, and encurages Parties willing t d mre t recrd and cdify their extra actin. In the WTO cntext, this has been achieved thrugh successive negtiating runds althugh these runds have becme mre cmplex and difficult t cnclude as membership has grwn and easier trade barriers have been successfully tackled. WTO Members als cnduct issue- and sectrspecific negtiatins (e.g. fr envirnmental gds) that encurage greater ambitin. Regular (fur-yearly) reviews f cntrl measures under the Mntreal Prtcl allw them t be strengthened as scientific, envirnmental and technlgical cnditins change. Multilateral prcesses are rules-based, but with safety valves f ne srt r anther because rigid applicatin f rules risks discuraging bth participatin and ambitin. The WTO has dne this in several ways: the single undertaking cmpnents meet different interests thrugh a cmmn, binding rule-set; individualised unilateral cmmitments are set ut in cuntry schedules; plurilateral agreements gvernment prcurement, trade in civil aircraft have n general bligatin t participate; and, the GATS uses a cmbinatin f psitive and negative list appraches t prvide transparency abut the sectrs in which Parties are making cmmitments and the rules they are applying. This may help us t find a hybrid slutin t the divided views in the UNFCCC abut whether the new legal agreement shuld be tp-dwn r bttm-up. Ambitin can be helped if the design f the agreement accmmdates a range f actins, s lng as these are quantifiable s that utcmes can be assessed and gals adjusted in line with prgress that has been made. The WTO has develped sectral appraches e.g. fr agriculture and textiles that take accunt f their particular circumstances. Apprpriate assistance fr thse whse limited capacities mean they are unable t fully r immediately fulfil the bligatins expected f membership. The Mntreal Prtcl prvides that develping cuntries whse annual calculated level f cnsumptin f zne-depleting substances is <0.3 kg per capita are entitled t financial and technical cperatin, t meet all agreed incremental csts f cmpliance with the cntrl measures and are entitled t delay their cmpliance with the cntrl measures fr 10 years. Technlgical alternatives will be a key t supprt ambitin in any effective climate change agreement. This is a functin f technical feasibility and cmparative affrdability. Once affrdable alternative technlgies are available, a transitin trajectry can crss a tipping pint with a cnsequent acceleratin f take-up and impact: the Mntreal Prtcl has been an effective catalyst fr nn-zne depleting alternatives, fr example. Transparency/Cmpliance Punitive measures t ensure cmpliance are nt always effective, and may discurage bth participatin and ambitin, particularly where levels f ppular and plitical supprt fr taking actin are lw. Full transparency and a review prcess are crnerstnes fr ensuring cmpliance with agreed rules and individualised cmmitments. The WTO s Trade Plicy Review Mechanism prvides fr transparent reprting and a facilitative peer review prcess that is an pprtunity t raise questins f Parties, as well as a tl fr imprving dmestic plicies and appraches. The frequency f reviews is variable, depending n shares f glbal trade. Parties t the Mntreal Prtcl regularly discuss Party reprting, scientific and technlgical infrmatin and exemptins t cntrls. The implementatin f the ICA and 4

5 IAR prcesses develped in the UNFCCC will be an imprtant cnfidence-building step in the negtiatin f the new ADP agreement. Other multilateral agreements have clearly set ut dispute settlement prcesses. In the case f the WTO, the dispute settlement rules were develped ver time befre they became binding n Parties. Cnclusin 11. In wrk-stream 1 f the ADP, ur cllective task is t develp an effective new legal agreement. We are ding s because we d nt have a fully effective agreement nw. The Kyt Prtcl has demnstrated the ptential f a rules-based apprach t mitigatin, but it has becme clear it will never attract the brad-based participatin we need t give full effect t the Cnventin. 12. The Cnventin, alng with the multiple institutins and prcesses we have develped ver the years, prvide a fundatin and sme building blcks. This wrk-stream creates the pprtunity t take a fresh lk at hw these elements can be cherently structured, and hw gaps can be filled. In New Zealand s view, the gap is the need fr all Parties t cmmit t take meaningful actin t minimise human-induced climate change and t manage its impacts. The tw-track apprach taken under the UNFCCC has hindered this, and a different slutin therefre needs t be fund, which priritises participatin but nt at the expense f ambitin and encurages Parties t deliver n their cmmitments. It is timely t lk beynd the UNFCCC t seek guidance n prcess and structural slutins that culd help t bridge ur differences. 13. Other multilateral prcesses have prved effective, t a greater r lesser extent. Nne is perfect. New Zealand is nt prpsing any f the specific appraches cited as examples in this submissin. Our intentin is t stimulate a brader discussin that mves beynd the cnfines f the UNFCCC discurse that has develped ver the years, with the view that an analysis f the plicy drivers fr a climate change agreement, pssible tls fr building negtiating mmentum, and design ptins fr an effective legally binding agreement will allw the ADP t mve t the mre fcused phase we have agreed is necessary this year. New Zealand lks frward t an indepth discussin f the scpe, structure and design f the Durban Platfrm agreement ver the cming mnths. 5