Helmerich & Payne, Inc.

Transcription

1 Helmerich & Payne, Inc.

2 Agenda Background Introduction to SIF SIF Working Group Analysis Findings Recommendations Conclusion

3 Background While H&P incident rates had remained relatively flat the severity rate had significantly increased. The ratio of potentially fatal OSHA injuries compared to total recordable injuries had steadily increased since Since 2013 there had been 3 H&P employees fatally injured in H&P operations. BST/Dekra was brought in to facilitate a SIF analysis.

4 Purpose of the Analysis Reduce the potential for fatalities and lifealtering or life-threatening incidents Identify events which may not have a serious outcome but do have a high potential for injury Identify precursors that may lead to a significant injury or fatality Develop tools to assist employees at all levels to take responsibility for reducing SIF incidents

5 SIF Defined Life-Threatening Work-related injury or illness that required immediate lifepreserving rescue action, and if not applied immediately would likely have resulted in the death of that person Life-Altering Work-related injury or illness that resulted in a permanent and significant loss of a major body part or organ function that permanently changes or disables that person s normal life activity Fatal Work-related fatal injury or illness

6 SIF Exposure Defined SIF Actual Life-Threatening Injury or Illness Life-Altering Injury or Illness Fatality SIF Potential Realistic/reasonable possibility Repeat exposure One or two things change If not for luck SIF Exposure SIF Precursor Holistic discovery Very few Actuals + many Potentials = SIF Exposure

7 SIF Precursor Defined SIF Precursor is a high-risk situation in which management controls are either absent, ineffective, or not complied with and which will result in a serious or fatal injury if allowed to continue. High Risk Situation SIF Exposure Management Control(s) Absent Ineffective Not Complied With Allowed to Continue Culture Leadership

8 Explanation of Incident Analysis Incidents selected for analysis were from January 2014 to May Team analyzed 362 incidents in total. Team analyzed data from incident classifications which had higher SIF potential. For example, more Near Misses were reviewed than First Aids. Incidents were analyzed in regard to their SIF potential, risk level, routine or not, and the precursors if they were deemed to be a SIF.

9 H&P Analysis Summary Total Events SIF Non-SIF SIF % NM % FA % OSHA % HIPO % TOTAL %

10 A New Paradigm Safety Triangle is Descriptive, Not Predictive A new way of thinking about the Safety Pyramid: Focus on the prevention of SIFs 31% SIF Potential HIGH POTENTIALS OSHA RECORDABLES FIRST AID CASES Based on analyzed dataset of 362 cases NEAR MISSES

11 Common Precursors Major Precursor Categories Frequency of Common Precursors in Dataset Supervision Failed to Recognize Hazard Failed to Follow Procedure Lacking or Inadequate Procedure Equipment or Engineering Design Improper Tool or Use of Equipment Adequate Safety Controls not Provided

12 Findings

13 Findings Change is needed Consistency is required for success Accountability How processes are applied Metrics and reporting

14 Findings Paradigm shift to POTENTIAL rather than actual outcome is a big change. What we thought was small may not be.

15 Findings Proportionate response will help us to reduce SIFs The potential for SIF events (31%) seen in our data analysis is significant Allowed to continue is a persistent and frequent factor in precursors

16 Findings We need rules to LIVE by We have many tools we need to make better use of them Improvement in corrective actions after incident is required

17 Hierarchy of Controls Elimination Complete redesign of the system to remove the exposure Substitution Switch out a process step with a less hazardous step; Use low voltage system versus high voltage; replace a toxic material with a non-toxic material Engineering Controls/Isolation Isolate hazard; install guards and/or interlocks; build barriers; use light curtain; develop new tool Exposure eliminated. Exposure significantly reduced. Exposure possible during maintenance operations or emergencies. Safety depends LEAST On employee Behavior Administrative Controls Post signs and warning; Write procedures and rules; Train employees Personal Protective Equipment Provide protective equipment for Employee (e.g., hard hats, respirators) Gimmicks; incentives; hollow threats Exposure controlled IF employees rigorously comply and IF culture supports compliance and IF leadership maintains commitment to oversight. Used when hazard is unpredictable or pervasive; control is dependent on proper selection and use. Employee seen as the cause of exposure and requiring motivation, no change in exposure. Safety depends MOST On employee behavior

18 Recommendations Introduce and use H&P Life Belts Purpose Awareness/education Accountability Recommended Life Saving Rules

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20 Recommendations Implement H&P Decision Tree Identification of SIF potential incidents Common high exposures in our work environment Alignment around a standard tool

21 Did the event involve: : An uncontrolled energy release? Not Likely A SIF Exposu re No to All Being struck by or caught between? A significant dropped object? (based on DROPS) Working at heights? LO/TO/TO? A fire or explosion? Permitted operations? A vehicle or rolling equipment? Material handling? Barricades or machine guards? Yes to An y Likely A SIF Exposu re Ye s Could a life threatening or life altering injury/illness reasonably ( 2 IFs) Nhave occurred? o Not Likely A SIF Exposu re Chemical exposure? An actual or potential SIF event?

22 Uncontrolled Energy Release Permitted Operations Well Control Electrical Confined Space Hot Work Mechanical High Pressure Fluids Personnel Hoisting LO/TO/TO Struck By or Caught Between Vehicle or Rolling Equipment Tubulars Rotary Equipment Man Lifts / Forklifts Vehicles Energized Equipment Rolling Stock/Rig Move Equip Trucking Helicopters/Boats Significant Dropped Objects (Based on DROPS) Material Handling Tubulars Rigging Failures Crane Operations Forklift Operations Suspended Loads Mismatched Elevators Pipe Handling BOP Handling Working at Heights Barricades or Machine Guards Personnel Hoisting Man Lift Operations Open Hole Barriers Temporary Hand Rails Working in Derrick Using Fall Protection System Barrier Tape or Chains Removed Machine Guards Lock Out/Tag Out/Try Out Chemical Exposure Fire or Explosion Actual or Potential SIF Outcome

23 Recommendations Improve the Incident Investigation Process Proportionate response Fact-finding investigation (Non-SIF) Must cover OSHA Non-SIFs requirements SIF investigation Root Cause Anylsis Standardize investigation process Including standardized review process

24 Recommendations Greater visibility of SIF to senior leadership SIF incident review Regular review of metrics dashboard Regular review of metrics Executive District leadership Field

25 Recommendations Implementation plan Create a communication plan Introduce H&P Life Belts Implement SIF Decision Tree Establish an Investigation Process with Proportionate Response Publish and review SIF metrics

26 Expected Outcomes Serious injuries will be reduced Employee behavior will change Better and more efficient use of resources Better quality corrective actions will result from investigations Higher level of controls (including MOCs) will result from better corrective actions Improvement of identification and sharing of lessons learned and best practices Near miss reporting will improve in quality Greater consistency across the organization Identification of SIF potential that is not captured today