Monetary Policy Experience of Pakistan. Dr. Muhammad Nadim Hanif Senior Economist State Bank of Pakistan. Monetary Policy Framework in Pakistan

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1 Dr. Muhammad Nadim Hanif Senior Economist State Bank of Pakistan Road Map Monetary Policy Framework in Pakistan Objective of Monetary Policy Monetary Policy Regime --- Targets and Instruments Independence of State Bank of Pakistan Monetary Policy Transparency and Communication What Monetary Policy Can Not Do Challenges to Monetary Policy in Pakistan Sharia h compatible Proposals for Monetary Policy ١

2 Monetary Policy Objectives in Pakistan Price Stability and Growth The State Bank of Pakistan Act 1956 Section 9(A) on Functions and Responsibilities of the Central Board of SBP, states: formulate and monitor monetary and credit policy and; in determining the expansion of liquidity, take into account the Federal government s targets for growth and inflation Monetary Policy Regime in Pakistan Monetary Targeting to an eclectic approach M2 was targeted on the basis of an estimated money demand function taking into account annul economic growth and inflation targets for the year. For targeting inflation M2 had been used as intermediate target and M0 had been used as operational target. SBP has been pursuing the goal of price stability without being prejudice to economic growth. Furthermore the operational target has been transformed from reserve money to the overnight money market repo rate effective from January ٢

3 Monetary Policy Regime in Pakistan Monetary Management With open market operations (OMOs) the movement of overnight money market repo rate is restricted within the corridor of SBP s overnight reverse repo rate (the discount rate) and the SBP s overnight repo rate. Now a day this corridor is of 300 bsp. Monetary policy stance is signaled through change(s) in discount rate; and/or cash reserve requirements; and/or statutory liquid ratio; and/or other measures like those pertaining to terms and availability of subsidized credit for export refinance, agriculture production etc. A prudent combination from the instruments of monetary policy helps SBP maintain the desired price and related availability of money and credit in the economy. Central Bank Independence The Central Board of Director of SBP is authorized to formulate and conduct credit policy by taking into account national macroeconomic targets. Recently SBP has formed a 9 member monetary policy committee (MPC) for the purpose of monetary policy related decision making. SBP enjoys complete freedom to prescribe liquidity ratio for banks and to fix their cash reserves. Central Board of the SBP determines and enforces the limit of credit to be extended by the SBP to the Federal and provincial governments and their other agencies for all purposes. Recent MPS has discussed about some proposed amendment(s) in the SBP Act, 1956 to strengthen the autonomy of the central bank by defining explicit limits on government borrowing from SBP which is in the process of going through important stages of legislation. ٣

4 Monetary Policy Communication and Transparency SBP issues Monetary Policy Statement (with information pack) on alternate months to announce its monetary policy stance for the upcoming two months. SBP has also started publishing minutes of MPC meeting including the votes (without mentioning names of the voters) to and against the announced monetary policy stance. Furthermore, a detailed analysis of the trends in prices data is regularly made by SBP in its monthly publication Inflation Monitor in addition to release of annual and quarterly reports on the state of economy, quarterly banking system review, annual financial stability report and speeches of the SBP Governor. What Monetary Policy Can Not Do Monetary policy can help control inflation up to the extent role played by money supply and by keeping stability in exchange rate. Any monetary growth surprise (growth in money supply larger than what it should be as per inflation and real income growth targets) will result in next year s inflation surprise (inflation over and above the target). Fiscal deficit and, and its financing mix, has direct implications for monetary management by central bank and inflation in the country. It falls in the domain of government to keep fiscal deficit in check and use least inflationary distribution of financing the deficit. Furthermore, whenever there are supply shocks they need to be managed with timely and proper response from the government. ۴

5 Table xx: Summary of Selected Macro Indicators for Pakistan Economy (Percent) Period Broad Money growth Inflation Real GDP growth 1950s s s s Stock of Government Borrowing as % of M2 Government Borrowing (Flow) as % of M0 1990s s (6.9) 9.8(6.8) 5.5(1.9) (4.5) 9.1(4.2) 4.3(1.9) (5.9) 7.3(5.9) 5.2(2.2) Standard deviation in the parenthesis Table xx: Liquidity Ratios in Pakistan Statutory Liquidity Requirements (SLR) Cash Reserve Requirements (CRR) w.e.f. Rate (as % of TDL) w.e.f. Rate (as % of TDL) 1-Jul Sep Sep May Jul Jul Aug Oct Aug Dec Dec-92 45* 30-Dec Oct-93 35* 5-Jan May Jul-06 7 % of DL & 3 % of TL # 02-Jan Jan-07 7 % of DL & 3 % of TL # 22-Jun Aug-07 7 % of DL & 0% of TL** 19-May Feb-08 8 % of DL & 0% of TL** 12-Jul May-08 9 % of DL & 0% of TL** 22-Jul Oct-08 8 % of DL & 0% of TL** 24-May Oct-08 6 % of DL & 0% of TL** 18-Oct % of DL & 0% of TL** 01-Nov-08 5 % of DL & 0% of TL** *: Including CRR; #: Term deposits of less than 6 month maturities are defined as DL **: Demand liabilities include all deposits of less than one year tenure, while time liabilities include time deposit with tenor 1-year and above only. ۵

6 Figure 1: 36 months Moving Average of Headline inflation 36 months Moving Average of Headline Infla on Discount rate Jul-48 Jul-50 Jul-52 Jul-54 Jul-56 Jul-58 Jul-60 Jul-62 Jul-64 Jul-66 Jul-68 Jul-70 Jul-72 Jul-74 Jul-76 Jul-78 Jul-80 Jul-82 Jul-84 Jul-86 Jul-88 Jul-90 Jul-92 Jul-94 Jul-96 Jul-98 Jul-00 Jul-02 Jul-04 Jul-06 Jul-08 Jul-10 ۶

7 Challenges to Monetary Policy in Pakistan Government Borrowing Monetary Policy Transmission in presence of informal sector Poor Governance and Procyclicality of Monetary Policy Large Banking Spread Credit Concentration Subsidized Credit ٧

8 Sharia h Compatible Proposals for Monetary Policy Linking Policy Rate for Islamic Banks (IB) with expected Nominal GDP growth rate plus/minus cycle stage premium/discount. Creation of Investment Pool in central bank for IB excess liquidity parking and providing IB LOLR facility at this pool s profit rate plus 300bsp ٨