Features of Natural Disaster Risks and Challenges in Integrated Disaster Risk Management

Transcription

1 Features of Natural Disaster Risks and Challenges in Integrated Disaster Risk Management Institute, Kyoto University

2 Contents Natural Disaster in the World Natural Disaster in Asia Urbanization, Globalization Features of Natural Disaster Risk Lessons from the East Japan Earthquake Challenges in Integrated Disaster Risk Management

3 Great Natural Disasters in the World Source: Munich RE. 2012

4 Economic losses and insured losses with trend Source: Munich RE. 2012

5 Disasters and Impacts by Region Europe 13% Number of Disasters Occeania 6% Africa 20% Number of Killed Europe 2% Occeania 0% Africa 32% Asia 38% Number of Total Affected People Europe 1% Occeania 0% Africa 7% Americas 3% Americas 23% Asia 58% Economic Loss (2000's Value) Europe 16% Occeania 2% Africa 1% Americas 8% Americas 36% Asia Asia 45% Source: CRED-EMDAT, 2006

6 Economics of Natural Disaster, April 16, 2008 Trend of Natural Disaster in the world Larger catastrophic disaster is more likely to occur. Number of Disaster for which some international aid is executed. 60s:90s=1:3 Economic losses glowed in high rate 60s:90s= 1:9 Insured losses increased in higher rate Anti-catastrophe insurance available in highincome countries 60s:90s =1:16

7 Economics of Natural Disaster, April 16, 2008 What is happening? Increase in exposure : Population and assets are concentrating to hazardous area Vulnerability : Population and assets have not enough resistance against natural hazards

8 Economics of Natural Disaster, April 16, 2008 Natural Hazard Disaster Consequences of Human Behavior Exposure:population and asset exposed to the threat of natural hazards Vulnerability: degree of resistance of the asset & population against disaster Population & Asset Hazard: Flood, Earthquakes,etc

9 Top 10 Disasters from 1980 to 2011: Fatalities

10 Top 10 Disasters from 1980 to 2011: Economic Losses

11 Top 10 Disasters from 1980 to 2011: Insured Losses

12 Economics of Natural Disaster, April 16, 2008 Why this happens? Urbanization in vulnerable areas Risk assessment, risk communication, Mainstreaming DRR in development processes, implementation of countermeasures including insurance systems Not Sufficient Infrastructure Flood Protection, Evacuation Shelters, Early Warning Systems, etc. Not Sufficient Knowledge Risk Communication, Disaster Education

13 Economics of Natural Disaster, April 16, 2008 Urban population is dominating in the world

14 Economics of Natural Disaster, April 16, 2008 Why urbanization? Differences in opportunities. Job, Education, Income and Marriage Increase of variety of goods Equilibrium: No incentive to choose other location How do you think whether people living in slums are happier than people living in surrounding villages?

15 Economics of Natural Disaster, April 16, 2008 Globalization Globalization Specialization Critical input may be lost by a natural disaster. E.G., East Japan Quake, Thai Flood Globalization Small World SARS, Bird Flue, etc.

16 Shortage of Material Supply Compound Wood Board Plastic Vinyl Chloride Polyethylen / Polypropylene Ofunato has large share. Shinetsu Chemical and Kaneka is stopping their production. Mitsubishi Chemical group at Kashima and Chiba stops their production. heat insulator synthetic rubber A part of JSR Kashima starts production. 4/12 Nikkei 日経新聞朝刊

17 OFUNATO CITY 17

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20 20 Hirokazu 大船渡市 Tatano HP

21 Composed Wood Board For wooden building, 80% of the composed wood board are produced in Japan. Ofunato city covers about 80% share of the share in Japan. Composed wood board price rises in 30%. Disappeared from the stores in some months. 21

22 Port Kashima Apr, 26

23 提供 : 国交省港湾局

24 What happened in Kashima Port Area? Petro refinery naphtha Chemical industry A Mitsubishi Chemical JSR Co. A Co. D Co. B Co. C Co. C Co. E Shinetsu chemical Kaneka Liquefaction, ground motion and Tsunami affects production facility heavily at Kashima Port area. Cascading impact of stoppage of naphtha was critical and affected to many companies located at the port area.

25 Kashima port area Industrial complex (above 170 companies) Interdependent pipelines Petro chemical materials 1.8 triilion JPYen/year(productio

26 Supply Chains are affected. Micro Computer tips, critical parts production are affected. An automobile uses microcomputer tips. Large share occupied by a Japanese Firm in the affected area. Automobile production dropped to 50% for two months.

27 Features of Natural Disaster Risk Low Frequency difficulty in learning from the past experience existence of perception bias unknowns & uncertainties, ambiguities High Impact (correlation in space and time) Importance of pro-active preparation: RISK MANAGEMENT Low insurability Long-term effects and Spill-over effects in space Changes in Disaster Environment Urbanization, Globalization Sustainable Development

28 Disaster Management Cycle Preparation Disaster Immediate response (evacuation, power plant shutdown, etc.) Mitigation Search & Rescue Recovery Relief (foods, shelter, clothes, fuel)

29 Our models are based on the assumption that each segment moves separately.

30 Impacts Dead and Missing: 16,019 and 3,805 Housing: 118,821 (collapsed), 181,801(halfcollapsed) Tsunami Inundated Area: 507 km 2 Direct Damage: USD about 200 billion (16.9 trillion JPYen)(without Nuclear Power plant failure) Total Economic Loss may exceeds USD 500~600 billion

31 Economic Impact of Tsunami Direct losses Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry: USD 17 Billon ( USD 9 billion, USD 7 billion, USD 1 billion) Industries: USD Billion by Tsunami [production capital USD 900 billion (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima)] Cascading Effect through supply chain, e.g., Automobile, IT industries, even for Construction Industries Electric Power Shortage: TEPCO: 6000->3400MW (5500to be increased by summer) Insurance Payout: trillion JPN (Households Earthquake Insurance, as of Oct. 12 ) 529 billion JPN (JA Kyosai (Zenkyoren) as of July 19) Muteki bond (sponsored by Munich Re) can reduce $300 million losses. (insurance insider April )

32 Four Nuclear power plants are affected

33 Nuclear Power Plant Fukushima No.1 TEPCO assumed to have a maximum Tsunami height at 5.7m. TEPCO made a internal research draft which reported Maximum Tsunami height can reach at 15.7m in 2008 but they reported Nuclear Power Authority on March 7 th Unfortunately, TEPCO loose the chance for installing additional Tsunami Countermeasures and the Tsunami on March 11 th run-up height reached to 15m and Tsunami washed away functionality of the emergency diesel power generator.

34 Tokai Dai Ni Nuclear Power plant In , they modified the design tsunami height (4.86m 5.7m) based on revised Tsunami hazard assessment by the Ibaragi Pref. (2008.9) and had start constructing of Tsunami protection wall for emergency diesel building (6.1m). At march 11 th, two of the emergency diesel power generator was saved and kept functionality.

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36 Why we have expected surprise? Design external force is used for facility design. If the actual external force exceeds the design force, it is not a responsibility of the authority. No authority don t want to take risk by considering force exceeding the design force. This leads to cliff-edge fragility problem (Kameda 2011).

37 From Cliff-edge to Smooth Fragility (Kameda, 2011) Prob. malfunctioning Cliffedge Hazard level Allowing uncertainty of functionality of countermeasures for excess external forces, we should increase the coping capacity of the facility against natural hazards.

38 Exceeding external forces Safety is a fundamental needs of citizen. Design and evaluation standard gradually were getting considering exceeding external forces. Robust river dykes Seismic design: economic efficiency investigation

39 Development of sea walls and their damages Sea wall height determined by Tsunami Sea wall height determined by Storm surge Iwate Miyagi Fukushima 農林水産省 国土交通省

40 How sea wall collapsed?

41 Improvement of sea walls resiliency

42 Economics of Natural Disaster, April 16, 2008 CHALLENGES IN INTEGRATED DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT

43 Preparation Disaster Management Cycle Disaster Immediate response (evacuation, power plant shutdown, etc.) Mitigation Search & Rescue Recovery Relief (foods, shelter, clothes, fuel)

44 Mitigation Buildings, highways, etc. Bi-level Design Method: No damage up to the seismic forces which occurs once or twice during the life of structure. Avoid critical failure which causes collapse of the structure for a very rare event. Level 1 and Level 2 earthquake (ground motion) are specified. If the external forces exceeds, the structure can be made collapsed.

45 Development of sea walls and their damages Sea wall height determined by Tsunami Sea wall height determined by Storm surge Iwate Miyagi Fukushima 農林水産省 国土交通省

46 Challenges in Mitigation External forces which exceeds the design forces. Safety margin was the only method. Integration of multiple countermeasures are now on the course of design. More emphasis is placed on non-structural countermeasures: evacuation plans, land use policies, etc. This brings about the difficulty of time consistency of policies and role share of authorities.

47 From Cliff-edge to Smooth Fragility (Kameda, 2011) Prob. malfunctioning Cliffedge Hazard level Allowing uncertainty of functionality of countermeasures for excess external forces, we should increase the coping capacity of the facility against natural hazards.

48 Renovation Plan of Sendai City( 仙台市 ) Protection against maximum Tsunami Highway Highway Park(mold) Protection against Tsunami once in one hundred and several ten years Multiple protection lines: Sea walls, river dykes, raising elevation of highways Land use regulation: Restriction of construction of houses. Land use regulation: Areas where expected Tsunami depth exceeds 2m are designated as Sakigai Kiken Kuiki (Disaster Prone Zones). In the area, construction of buildings for the purpose for living is prohibited. Evacuation Shelters and Routes: Mounded parks closer to sea shore, high-rise building as a shelter

49 Sanriku Coast has long history of Tsunami Every years, many towns and villages have been destroyed by Tsunami. Moved houses to higher places. But, to keep their livelihood drifted back to lower places (which have good access for fishing and agriculture) after some decades. Structural and Educational measures, e.g., Sea Walls, Tsunami Tendenko (Just Evacuate Now!)

50 Tsunami Sea Wall Completed in 1980 Completed in 1969 Hongo, Toni Town Kamaishi, City, Iwate Prefecture

51 Before and after the Tsunami Houses located before 1960 Sea wall Hongo, Toni Town Kamaishi, City, Iwate Prefecture

52 Preparedness Disaster Risk Reduction Planning: Regional Disaster Prevention Plan, Contingency plans for disaster response, BCP, etc. Risk information provision: Hazard map, etc. Capacity development: Disaster education, Risk communication, WS, Drills, etc.

53 Regional Disaster Prevention Plan Requested by Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act (1961) triggered by Isewan typhoon disaster Every level of public sectors shall have a plan by disaster prevention basic act (legal duty). A plan shall include long-term establishment plan on (1) forecasting system, (2) facilities for flood fighting, (3) warning criteria, (4) rescue system, and (5) communications in emergency.

54 Impacts Dead and Missing: 16,019 and 3,805 Housing: 118,821 (collapsed), 181,801(halfcollapsed) Tsunami Inundated Area: 507 km 2 Direct Damage: USD about 200 billion (16.9 trillion JPYen)(without Nuclear Power plant failure) Total Economic Loss may exceeds USD 500~600 billion

55 Hazard Map

56 Distribution of the killed people

57 Capacity building: Disaster Edication Kamaishi Miracle Prof. Katada, Gumma University and his group have spend eight years for disaster education for elementary and junior high school. All the pupils under the control of schools are saved in entire Kamaishi City. What he taught: (1) Not believe hazard scenario (map) (2) Spend best effort for survive (3) Behave as a leading evacuator

58 Immediate response Evacuation: Very few children were killed under the control of nursery. Nursery should make practice of evacuation drill once in a month. No contingency scenario for station black out. No new things can be done during disaster. Pupils of Kamaishi said, We can save our lives because of the drill and practice of evacuation before the event. We think it was a result of the practice, not miracle.

59 Relief Disaster relief act: Request base Voluntary Base Multiple Prefectures were affected: Problems are found in Leadership, Role Share and Governance.

60 Kushinoha Sakusen( くしの歯作戦 ) Operation for reopening highways Inland -> Seashore Existance of Redundant Networks: Tohoku Express Way March 18th: 97% of recovery

61 Recovery Conditions for recovery plan Support schemes Principles? Role Shares Consensus Pre-Disaster Recovery Plan: as an ideal urban plan

62 Resiliency =resistant + recover capacity 京都大学防災研究所総合防災研究部門多々納裕一

63 Lessons from the event We should look at a real and possible event. Even if its probability looks small, we should not regard its impact as smaller too. Prepare for the all the possible countermeasures seriously.

64 Thank you for your attention!