Jobsite Safety Management: Potential of Navigated Inspection 现场安全管理 : 导引检查的潜力. Pin-Chao Liao,Associate Professor, Tsinghua University 廖彬超, 副教授, 清华大学

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1 Jobsite Safety Management: Potential of Navigated Inspection 现场安全管理 : 导引检查的潜力 Pin-Chao Liao,Associate Professor, Tsinghua University 廖彬超, 副教授, 清华大学

2 Pin-Chao Liao Associate Professor Research Areas: Construction Safety, Urban Resilience, Corporate Social Resp. Benchmarking, Network Analysis CIB TG87 Coordinator: Urban Resilience: Benchmarking And Metrics Director: International Construction And Project Management (ICPM)

3 SAFETY Status quo Complication & Needs Solution Remarks

4 01 Status Proverbs Safety is a commodity! Caution is the parent of safety Safety is something employee can take home Professional Safety 1998

5 Status Accidents Human or Object Fall Electrical Shock Vehicle Damage Trench or Building Collapses Lifting Injury Fires and Explosions Object Strike

6 01 Status Safety is Critical in Construction! Number of fatal work injuries Fatal work injury rate (per 100,000 full-time equivalent workers) US Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Dept. of Labor 2014

7 Status CII 2014

8 01 Status Is Safety Improving? Number of Dead worker per 100,000 Canada U.S. Hong Kong Japan China U.K. Speculation: new technologies=> more risks? Wu, 2016

9 SAFETY Status quo Complication & Needs Solution Remarks

10 02 Inspection: Pre-central Event of Safety hazards Hazard, Consequences=> Central Event H A Z A R D S C O N S E U E N C E S Visser, 1998

11 02 Inspection: First Step Of Reducing The Probability of Risks

12 02 Inspection: Pre-central Event of Safety hazards

13 02 Comprehensive Detection of Hazards is Difficult Accident Identified Hazard Hazards Unidentified This is evident when qualified inspectors still fail to detect all errors within their range of influence. Maximize Stewart (1992)

14 02 Hazard Identification Approaches Accident Near-misses Biased Reactive Approaches Hazards Biased Proactive Approaches: Fault-tree Analysis (FTA), Event-tree Analysis (ETA), Cause-consequence Analysis, Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA), Failure Mode,effect And Criticality Analysis (FMECA) Unbiased Proactive Approaches Change Analysis (Johnson, 1980; Ferry, 1988) Energy Analysis (Haddon, 1980; Johnson, 1980; Harms-ringdahl, 1993) Comparison Analysis (Harms-ringdahl, 1993) Deviation Analysis (Harms-ringdahl, 1993) Hazard And Operability (HAZOP) Studies (Lees, 1980; ILO, 1988; CPS, 1992; Harmsringdahl,1993; Bahr, 1997) Job Safety And Work Safety Analysis(suokas And Rouhiainen, 1984; Harms-ringdahl, 1993) Management Oversight And Risk Tree (MORT) (Johnson, 1980) Operation And Support Hazard Analysis (O&SHA) (Bahr,1997).

15 02 Are these approaches Effective? Limiting Inspection Performance? Time & Space 2006,Britain33% 2013,Austria43% 2014,America<60% 2012,Experience>10years,<80% Consturction50%-66.5% Critical risks?

16 Hazard Detection: A Process Model Visual information search and cognitive processing model 外界信息视觉听觉味觉嗅觉 A 搜索效率 A1 整体注视次数 A2 搜索时间 A3 注视次数比例 A4 注视时间比例 未发现目标物 搜索 / 感知 发现疑似目标 目标物不符合标准 B 信息处理效率 (AOI 平均注视时间 ) 解释与选择 复述 记忆表征注意力能力 / 资工作记忆源模板驱动 优化选择 目标物符合标准 激活 提取 更新 储存 C 正确率 行为 / 判断 长时记忆 = 经验 Wickens Woodcock Baddeley..

17 Hazard Detection: A Case Which part? Missing? Connection Error? Violated rules?

18 SAFETY Status quo Complication & Needs Solution Remarks

19 02 A proposed tool valid? 1 A Case: Process-oriented (P-O) Fatality Prevention Audit (FPA) DESIGN PROCEDURE WBS-risk Schedule 2 OUTPUT 3 TWO MAIN PARTS Chi et al. (2014)

20 03 Experiment Critical Risks: Identification performance improved? Overall performance: unaffected?

21 03 Experiment

22 03 Experiment: Preliminary Results Search Effectiveness 1. Working memory v. information proc. 2. Caters for Experienced Pract. Enhancing Situational Awareness 1. Working memory v. Search 2. Caters for Junior Pract. Information Process Effectiveness

23 04 Preliminary Results Performance improvement Critical hazards: improved All: insignificant difference Implementation Proposals Trainings For junior practitioners: classification of hazard types Inspection Policies Large projects, BIM

24 SAFETY Status quo Complication & Needs Solution Remarks

25 04 Interdependencies of Risks: A Dynamic View Check-point planning Spacial-temporal characteristics of risks Network structure v. risk occurrence

26 04 Mapping observations & rules remain challenge Inadequate barricades at hoistway openings Failure to provide overhead protection while working in the hoistway Guardrails are not adequate and no fall protection used

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