IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H2360 IDA-H2560 IDA-H5050) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR37.1 MILLION (US$54.7 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

Transcription

1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Document of The World Bank IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H2360 IDA-H2560 IDA-H5050) Transport Sector Country Department AFCW1 Africa Region ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR37.1 MILLION (US$54.7 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA FOR AN EMERGENCY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT June 26, 2013 Report No: ICR2630

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2012) Currency Unit = Liberian Dollars (LRD) SDR1.00 = US$ US$l.00 = LRD FISCAL YEAR July 1 June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AfDB AGO AIDP BTC CAS CMT CRN DAC DBMOT DO EC EIA EIP EIPAF EIPSC EMP EMUS EPP ERL ESMP FM FMRs GDP GOL GEMAP IBRD ICB ICR IDA IEG IFIs IIU IMF African Development Bank Automotive Gas Oil Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project Barclay Training Center Country Assistance Strategy Central Materials Testing Country Re-engagement Note Development Assistance Committee Design Build, Maintain, Operate and Transfer Development Objectives European Commission Environmental Impact Assessment Emergency Infrastructure Project Emergency Infrastructure Project Additional Financing Emergency Infrastructure Project Supplemental Component Environmental Management Plan Emergency Monrovia Urban Sanitation Emergency Power Plants Emergency Reconstruction Loan Environmental and Social Management Plan Financial Management Financial Management Reports Gross Domestic Product Government of Liberia Governance and Economic Management and Assistance Program International Bank for Reconstruction and Development International Competitive Bidding Implementation Completion and Results Report International Development Agency Independent Evaluation Group International Financial Institutions Infrastructure Implementation Unit International Monetary Fund

3 IP ISR KM KPI LIBRAMP LLP LRDC LWSC MCC Mgd MoF MPW NGOs NPA OPRC PDO PFMU PHP PIU PPF PPP QEA QSA RAP RFNF RFTF RVP SIU TA TF TFLIB TOR TST TTLs UN UNDP UNMIL URIRP USAID USD WBG XDR Implementation Progress Implementation Status Reports Kilometer Key Performance Indicators Liberia Road Asset Management Project Limited Liability Partnership Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation Monrovia City Council Million Gallons per day Ministry of Finance Ministry of Public Works Non-governmental Organizations National Ports Authority Operational Procurement Review Committee Project Development Objectives Project Financial Management Unit Public Health Pump Project Implementation Unit Project Preparation Facility Public Private Partnership Quality at Entry Quality of Supervision Resettlement Action Plan Results Focused National Framework Results Focused Transitional Framework Regional Vice President Special Implementation Unit Technical Assistance Trust Fund (s) Trust Fund for Liberia Terms of Reference Technical Support Team Task Team Leaders United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations Mission in Liberia Urban Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project United States Agency for International Development United States Dollars World Bank Group Special Drawing Rights

4 Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Yusupha Crookes Country Manager Inguna Dobraja Sector Director Jamal Saghir Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn Project Team Leader: Kulwinder Singh Rao ICR Team Leader: John Kobina Richardson ICR Primary Author John Kobina Richardson/Ephrem Asebe

5 REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA Emergency Infrastructure Project CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes Assessment of Outcomes Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance Lessons Learned Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing Annex 2 Outputs by Component Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents MAP

6

7 A. Basic Information DATA SHEET Country: Liberia Project Name: Emergency Infrastructure Project Project ID: P L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H2360,IDA- H2560,IDA-H5050 ICR Date: 14/30/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: Original Total Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 37.10M Environmental Category: B GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA XDR 20.60M Disbursed Amount: XDR 37.10M Implementing Agencies: Infrastructure Implementation Unit, Ministry of Public Works Liberia Co-financiers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 03/23/2006 Effectiveness: 10/31/ /31/2006 Appraisal: 04/25/2006 Restructuring: 09/29/ /30/ /24/ /04/2012 Approval: 06/20/2006 Mid-term Review: 10/01/ /17/2008 Closing: 06/30/ /31/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Risk to Development Outcome: Bank Performance: Borrower Performance: Satisfactory Significant Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: i

8 Overall Bank Performance: Overall Borrower Moderately Satisfactory Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Yes at any time (Yes/No): Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: No Satisfactory Quality at Entry (QEA): Quality of Supervision (QSA): None None Rating D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration Other Renewable Energy 9 9 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways Water supply Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction Regional integration Rural services and infrastructure Trade facilitation and market access Urban services and housing for the poor E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Gobind T. Nankani Country Director: Yusupha Crookes Mats Karlsson Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Project Team Leader: Kulwinder Singh Rao Petrus Benjamin Gericke ICR Team Leader: ICR Primary Author: John Kobina Richardson John Kobina Richardson/Ephrem Asebe ii

9 F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Financing Agreement) The objective of the Project was to provide the Recipient with emergency support to restore priority infrastructure through: (a) rehabilitation, repair and reconstruction of critical road and potable water supply infrastructure; and (b) strengthening the capacity of the Recipient s Ministry of Public Works and the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The objective of the Project was amended as follows: The objective of the Project is to provide the Recipient with emergency support to restore priority infrastructure through: (a) rehabilitation, repair and reconstruction of critical infrastructure; and (b) strengthening the capacity of the Recipient s Ministry of Public Works, the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation, and the Monrovia City Corporation. (a) PDO Indicator(s) 1 Indicator Indicator 1: Value (quantitative or qualitative) Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years 2 Outcome indicators Percentage average reduction in travel time on Monrovia-Buchanan corridor. 0 20% 20% Date achieved 05/19/ /30/ /31/2012 Comments (Inc % Original target was achieved 100% achievement) Indicator 2: Increase in annual Revenue of LWSC (US$ * Thousands) Value (quantitative or qualitative) ,457 Date achieved 05/19/ /30/ /31/2012 Comments Original target exceeded; revenue at the end of the project had exceeded the (Inc % target by 280%. achievement) 1 These are the final list of indicators approved after all project restructuring. 2 Achievements of some indicators are significantly higher than the set targets due to additional contributions from complementary investments. iii

10 Indicator 3:* Number of Skilled and Unskilled Labor Employed (thousands of man months) Value (quantitative or qualitative) Date achieved 09/29/ /30/ /31/2012 Comments (Inc % Original target exceeded; employment generation was 28% more than targeted achievement) Indicator 4:* Number of on-site sanitation facilities rehabilitated Value (quantitative or qualitative) Date achieved 09/29/ /30/ /31/2012 Comments (Inc % Original target was exceeded by 90%. achievement) Indicator 5:* Total volume of Solid Waste Removed from Monrovia (m 3 ) Value (quantitative or 0 130, ,000 qualitative) Date achieved 09/29/ /30/ /31/2012 Comments (Inc % achievement) Original target was exceeded by 370%. By the end of 2009, solid waste collection target had been exceeded, and funding was continued under another IDA financed project, Emergency Monrovia Urban Sanitation (EMUS) Project Indicator 6:** Container Stacking area and connecting roads rehabilitated Value (quantitative or Not done Constructed Constructed qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/ /30/ /31/2012 Comments (Inc % Original target was achieved 100% achievement) Output Indicators Indicator 7: Number of kilometer of primary roads repaired Value (quantitative or qualitative) Date achieved 05/19/ /30/ /31/ /31/2012 Comments (Inc % achievement) Indicator 8: Original target was not achieved (20.75% of original target achieved). Revised target was achieved 100%. Number of bridges repaired or constructed Value (quantitative or qualitative) Date achieved 05/19/ /30/ /31/2012 Comments Original target was not achieved. (25.5% achieved) iv

11 (Inc % achievement) Indicator 9: Daily production of potable water at White Plains in Million gallons per day (Mgd) Value (quantitative or qualitative) Date achieved 05/19/ /30/ /31/2012 Comments (Inc % Original target was exceeded by 78% achievement) * - These indicators were introduced during the first restructuring of September 26, 2006 ** - This indicator was introduced during the second restructuring of June 30, 2009 G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements (USD millions) 1 10/19/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory /13/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory /29/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory /28/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory /16/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /24/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /22/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /10/2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /27/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /06/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /16/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory H. Restructuring (if any) Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring DO IP v Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made 09/29/2006 Yes n/a n/a - Additional financing for a Supplemental Component, revision of performance indicators, and amendment of the PDO to cover a broader scope 06/30/2009 No S MS Additional financing,

12 Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring DO IP Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions 06/24/2011 No S MS /04/2012 No S MS Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made reallocation of grant to match limited financial resources to changing Government priorities, update the performance indicators and extension of the project closing date. Extension of project closing date Extension of project closing date I. Disbursement Profile vi

13 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. Country context. This was an emergency project for Liberia, a country rich in natural resources with abundance of iron ore, timber, diamonds, gold, vast hydropower potential, offshore oil fields, and climate favorable for agriculture. Fifteen years of brutal conflict devastated the country s economy, its physical infrastructure and human assets. By the end of the war, the country had become one of the least developed countries with per capita income of about US$100, and a population disillusioned by years of corruption and mismanagement of public funds. The country was in arrears of its international obligations. External debts were to the tune of US$3.7 million. Since 1987, Liberia was ineligible to borrow and by April 30, 2006, Liberia, a non-accrual member of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), was nearly US$1,419 million in arrears on IFIs of which US$402 million was International Bank for Reconstruction and Development s (IBRD), US$47 million International Development Association s (IDA), US$750 million International Monetary Fund s (IMF) and African Development Bank s (AfDB) US$220 million. 2. Government strategy. In August 2003, Liberia s warring parties ended hostilities with the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement and a National Transition Government was established to administer a two-year interim period leading to national elections in October The United Nations Mission in Liberia had been given the mandate to secure the peace and to support implementation. 3. To aid the process of emergency reconstruction, a Results Focused National Framework (RFNF) was prepared, based on rapid needs assessment carried out by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank in December This served as the strategic framework for the transitional government, as well as a tool for engagement with donor partners at the time on the basis of their comparative advantage in delivering emergency services. 4. Rationale for Bank involvement. On that basis the World Bank also prepared a Country Re-engagement Note (CRN) which was organized around three priority areas: (i) economic management; (ii) infrastructure rehabilitation; and (iii) community based development. The Bank took the leadership role in the macroeconomic management and infrastructure sectors. 5. Higher level objective in which the project contributed. The Bank s US$30 million initial grant for the Emergency Infrastructure Project (EIP), the first World Bank Group (WBG) project after the conflict, was made to provide timely assistance to Liberia in the critical period before arrears were cleared, leading to regular IDA financing became available. The EIP was therefore significant in that it served as primary vehicle to work out the legal basis for assistance to a non-accrual member. Thus, the operation made significant contributions to consolidate the then window of opportunity into a 1

14 genuine move to sustainable economic growth, security and peace, which also had a positive impact not only in Liberia but in the entire region. Due to the timely leadership provided by the Bank through its EIP grant, a total of 13 multilateral and bilateral organizations, and a large number of local and international Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) participated in support of the transitional and elected governments strategies over the project implementation life 3. Altogether, they made available over US$4.584 billion in grants for clearing Liberia s arrears and a total of US$946 million 4 disbursement since, thereby securing peace and enhancing its capacity to borrow and finance its reconstruction. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) 6. The objective of the Project was to provide the Recipient with emergency support to restore priority infrastructure through: (a) rehabilitation, repair and reconstruction of critical road and potable water supply infrastructure; and (b) strengthening the capacity of the Recipient s Ministry of Public Works and the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation 7. The key performance indicators that were selected to measure the project development objectives were: Outcome indicators (i) Average reduction in travel time on Monrovia - Buchanan and Monrovia - Ganta corridors; (ii) Increase in annual revenue of Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation. Output Indicators (i) Kilometer (Km) of primary roads repaired; (ii) Number of bridges or culverts repaired or constructed; (iii) Daily production of Water at White Plains in Million gallons per day (Mgd). 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 8. Project Restructuring of September 2006: Prior to effectiveness of the original grant, the project was restructured by the provision of an additional grant US$16.5 million for a supplemental component to the project with a focus on job creation to enhance EIP s development impact. This was approved by the Board on September 29, The PDO remained relevant for the restructured project, but was slightly amended to read as follows: The objective of the Project is to provide the Recipient with 3 IEG: Liberia Country Program Evaluation 4 World Development Indicators Database (Disbursement on Long Term Debt) 2

15 emergency support to restore priority infrastructure through: (a) rehabilitation, repair and reconstruction of critical infrastructure; and (b) strengthening the capacity of the Recipient s Ministry of Public Works, the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation, and the Monrovia City Corporation. 10. The amendment dropped the words road and potable water supply from the original PDO and added Monrovia City Corporation to the institutions targeted for capacity building. This was necessary from a legal perspective, to accommodate the broadened scope of the project which now had additional components for rebuilding the rural road network and rehabilitation of urban infrastructure. The project performance indicators were revised by adding four new indicators to account for the supplemental component. 11. Project restructuring of 2009: The project was restructured again in 2009 by the addition of a new component for port investments, and the modification of project components by reduction in scope, deletion of activities, and additional financing for existing activities. An additional performance indicator to measure the investment at the port was added while an existing indicator for the rehabilitation of Monrovia City Roads was dropped. The project closing date was also extended by 12 months to June 30, Project restructuring in 2011 and The project was again restructured on June 24, 2011 and April 4, Both were to extend the project closing date at no additional cost, initially to March 31, 2012 and then to December 31, 2012, to allow for critical works and an audit of LWSC to be completed. Neither restructuring made any further changes to PDO or project indicators. Overall, the project was extended by 30 months from the original closing date. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 13. The main beneficiaries of the project were the people of Liberia at large and more specifically, the population living within Monrovia city, people employed in rural roads construction and along the constructed road corridor. The planned project targeted the rehabilitation of the two main corridors of influence in road transport, which therefore, have a broader impact on the transportation of people, marketing of goods and services within Liberia, and integrating Liberia to its neighbors and the rest of the world. The project would also improve accessibility within Liberia with immediate impact on security. 14. The specific institutions targeted were the Ministry of Public Works (MPW), Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation (LWSC), and Monrovia City Council (MCC). These institutions were direct beneficiaries of the funding that contributed to the improvements in infrastructure in the transport, water and sanitation sectors, as were the suppliers and service providers who ensured that the project activities were realized. 1.5 Original Components (as approved) 15. The project consisted of the following two components: 3

16 Component 1: Emergency Rehabilitation and Repair of Critical Infrastructure (US$24.40 million, excluding contingencies) - The component was to support: (i) the repair of the following primary roads: (a) Monrovia-Buchanan, linking the two largest population centers; and (b) Monrovia-Gbarnga-Ganta- Guinea border, linking Monrovia with the interior of Liberia and with one neighboring country; (ii) the construction of at least 6 major bridges and the repair of a further 65 on the aforementioned roads (iii) Improving potable water supply to Monrovia, through the emergency rehabilitation of the White Plains surface water treatment plant and distribution network and the testing and potential development of additional groundwater resources at Paynesville; (iv) supporting emergency electricity generation for Monrovia, through the provision of fuel and managing fuel supply to Emergency Power Plants. Component 2: Strengthening Institutional Capacity (US$3.45 million, excluding contingencies) (i) Strengthening the capacity of the Recipient s Ministry of Public Works, the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation (ii) Supporting the Recipient s Ministry of Public Works in the re-establishment of basic management and procurement systems. (iii) Supporting the Special Implementation Unit in the management, and monitoring and evaluation of the Project, including civil works for office rehabilitation (iv) Supporting the Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU) in carrying out the financial management of the Project. 1.6 Revised Components 16. Following the restructuring of the project as described in Para 8-12, the overall revised project components were as follows: Component A: Emergency Rehabilitation, Repair, and Reconstruction of Critical Infrastructure (US$23.90 million excluding contingencies) - (i) Supporting the rehabilitation, repair, and reconstruction of the Monrovia-Buchanan corridor linking the two largest population centers including bridges and culverts (ii) Improving potable water supply to Monrovia, through the emergency rehabilitation of the White Plains surface water treatment plant and distribution network ; (iii) Supporting emergency electricity generation for Monrovia, through the provision of fuel and managing fuel supply to Emergency Power Plants. Component B: Strengthening Institutional Capacity (US$4.99 million excluding contingencies) (i) Strengthening the capacity of the Recipient s Ministry of Public Works, the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation and the Monrovia City Corporation (ii) Supporting the Recipient s Ministry of Public Works in the re-establishment of basic management and procurement systems. (iii) Supporting the Special Implementation Unit (SIU) in the management, and monitoring and evaluation of the Project, including civil works for office rehabilitation (iv) Supporting the PFMU in carrying out the financial management of the Project. 4

17 Component C: Road Rehabilitation (US$7.28 million excluding contingencies) (i) implementation of basic rehabilitation of selected rural roads sections, mostly concentrating on the construction of small temporary bridges, culverts, and improvement of critical sections in Monrovia City roads, resurfacing, and rehabilitation of selected urban streets. (ii) Carrying out of construction supervision, including periodic independent technical audits. Component D: Urban Works Rehabilitation (US$10.52 million excluding contingencies) - Carrying out of: (i) the rehabilitation and/or maintenance of urban works, including public toilets, main and secondary gravity lines in the urban sewerage network, the urban storm drainage system, the solid waste disposal system, market places and buildings; and (ii) a public awareness training program on the rehabilitation program. Component E: Port Investments (US$5.00 million excluding contingencies) - Carrying out, at the Port of Monrovia, rehabilitation and paving of: (i) the container stacking area; (ii) the passage between the sheds at the southern end of the marginal wharf; (iii) the passage connecting the main cargo corridor from the marginal wharf; and (iv) the road from the customs house to the National Port Authority office block. 1.7 Other significant changes 17. The scaling up of the project by the Supplemental Component which had a focus on maximizing job creation using labor-intensive methods was adopted for the rehabilitation works. To achieve impact in a short time, available in-country United National Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) equipment and engineering capacity were used to significantly shorten contractors' mobilization time. Consequently, the UNDP was brought on board as the project implementing agency for the Supplemental Component. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 18. Soundness of background analysis. The selected road corridors were the most critical routes for strategic, commercial and accessibility reasons. The initial basis of identification of the emergency works was the Joint Needs Exercise undertaken by the Bank and the UNDP in A more detailed assessment was undertaken by a consultant who prepared technical feasibility studies and prioritized emergency works in five infrastructure sub-sectors, under the Trust Fund for Liberia (TFLIB). This included the two main corridor road works of about 400 km. While the works selected were relevant, detailed cost estimates were difficult to generate in the absence of an active construction market, and therefore costs were based on rough orders of magnitude. Thus the basis of the costing was fairly subjective. No specific lessons from previous emergency infrastructure projects were clearly reflected in the accompanying technical annex although the major risks of operating in the environment were clearly identified. 19. Assessment of the project design. The project was designed with the objective that was relevant and responsive to the needs of Liberia in the early post-conflict era. 5

18 The components were simple and well aligned. While there was the need to restore critical infrastructure on an emergency basis, the long term sustenance of the rebuilding effort was pivoted on the related institutions which were to be strengthened under the project. The results indicators were simple, derived from the direct achievement of project activities, and suited to the weakened institutional environment of Liberia. However, the scope was overly ambitious when compared to the modest amount available for the project. The expectation to repair about 400 km of roads with some US$24 million (i.e. about US$0.006m/km) was over optimistic, given the distressed condition of the targeted roads. A physical contingency of 9 percent of infrastructure costs was provided, but this was woefully inadequate, considering the inadequate scope definition and likelihood of rapid change in emergency operations. 20. The design provided for the rebuilding of institutional capacity by the creation of a Special Implementation Unit as a starting point for the re-establishment of professional project management functions of the MPW, and the establishment of the relevant financial management functions in the PFMU under the Ministry of Finance (MoF). In spite of these provisions, the design also recognized that the environment of Liberia at the time could prove impossible to operate in, and therefore an exit strategy was documented in case progress towards achieving the objectives of the project was unsatisfactory. 21. Adequacy of government s commitment. Government commitment was high at project preparation. In the early reconstruction phase, several short and medium-term development plans were being developed to provide focus and direction for the reconstruction efforts. At a broader level, steps were being taken to address the high incidences of corruption, non-transparency and financial mismanagement at all levels of Government. For the project in particular, Government took steps to establish the steering committee, the SIU and PFMU which were critical for implementation by project effectiveness. Government commitment was also reflected in its alertness to drive priorities, manage challenges and engage with donors and other key stakeholders (including NGOs) to provide solutions for the emergent demands under major financing constraints. 22. Assessment of risks. Being the first World Bank major project to be implemented by the Government since the eighties, the overall risk to the project was rated as being substantial. Identified risks included: (i) limited capacity to prepare and manage the Project within MPW; (ii) Low private sector interest in civil works contracts; (iii) difficulty in conducting dialogue with donors in a fragile environment; and (iv) corruption. 23. To address these risks: (i) a Special Implementation Unit utilizing both local and experienced international staff hired under the project was to be created to build capacity for implementation; (ii) procurement packages were to be structured and disseminated to be sufficiently attractive to generate private sector interest; and (iii) provision for tight procurement control, regular supervision by qualified supervision consultants, and technical and financial audits. Donor coordination was considered a global risk to the project, given that only the European Commission (EC) and United States Agency for 6

19 International Development (USAID) had any active involvement in the reconstruction agenda for the water and electricity sectors. 24. Risk mitigation measures were relevant but were quite difficult to achieve. Capacity build up in the SIU was slow, aided by the inability to attract experienced and qualified individuals to bring on board the necessary expertise. In procurement, the large packages created limited interest with associated high construction costs. However, donor coordination improved significantly with a number of donors getting involved within the framework of the Liberia Reconstruction Trust Fund. 2.2 Implementation 25. The following were the main factors that affected implementation. 26. Inadequate risk assessment and provision of contingencies: The project did not consider the possibility of sudden collapse of infrastructure which had not been maintained for more than 15 years. Thus, when the rains set in and destroyed several sections of the existing roads, there was inadequate provision for construction to restore the functionality of the roads. 27. Changes in project scope: Severe rainfall over two rainy seasons made several sections of the selected road corridors impassable. The cost of the first civil works contract changed significantly, as a result of increased work quantities since the initial basic designs two years earlier for repair/rehabilitation was changed to reconstruction. A decision was made to implement only 83 km out of the original 400 km envisaged. With the entire funding for the component released for the Monrovia to Robertsville Airport and other associated roads along the Monrovia-Buchanan corridor, it was necessary to change the project scope to reflect reality. 28. Challenges in building capacity: Poor responses to requests for consultancy services for both firms and individuals to provide technical assistance for project management affected the planned capacity building effort in the SIU. The Bank had to engage in intense hands on implementation support to help build capacity of the SIU. 29. Difficulty in attracting qualified international firms to bid on large value works contracts: The ICB procurement for the initially proposed major works packages along the Monrovia-Buchanan and Monrovia-Ganta roads was unsuccessful. The Bank showed considerable flexibility in going forward with a Limited International Competitive Bid process which is not recognized in Bank procurement method which led to the selection of a contractor who was able to complete the now reduced scope of works. 30. Use of additional Implementing Agency with community based approaches: The supplemental component which was added in the first restructuring had its own implementation agency, i.e. the UNDP. The use of existing UNMIL equipment and managerial expertise with labor intensive construction of roads was strategic and 7

20 effective for project delivery, as was the mobilization of communities for cleaning, waste disposal and other small urban works in Liberia. 31. Increased project portfolio: Several infrastructure projects emerged during the project implementation period and all these were under the management of the SIU. Therefore its limited capacity was stretched thin. 32. Mid-Term Review: The mid-term review of the EIP held from September to October of 2008 recommended the restructuring of implementation arrangements to replace the Special Implementation Unit with an autonomous Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU) and with international management. This was particularly critical to achieve the needed skills mix required for managing the rapidly evolving program of donor projects being implemented by the MPW. By this time, the project was two years into implementation with 56 percent of the overall project costs disbursed, indicating reasonable progress in spite of the difficult conditions prevailing. 33. Delay in Project Execution: Delays in the completion of the corporate audit of LWSC and the construction of the access road to White Plains (inherited from the realignment of World Bank and AfDB involvement) and the construction of Whein Town Landfill resulted in extension of the project by 30 months. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 34. Design. Given the generally weak institutional capacity that existed in the implementing agencies, the project indicators selected were simple, focused and relevant. Five performance indicators (including two outcome indicators) were selected, this was later expanded to nine performance indicators (including six outcome indicators) under the restructured project. The indicators were directly derived from achievement of project activities. However, it would have been appropriate to have an indicator for the primary rural roads activity which was added during the supplemental component. Only the length of city streets was reflected in the revised indicators, and this was later dropped during the second additional financing. All the indicators were targeted at measuring the objective of emergency support to critical infrastructure; there was no indicator(s) to measure strengthened capacity of key institutions which is also part of the PDO. It was considered that the interventions were too limited to implement a representative indicator. In addition, the indicator on employment creation (labor employed) lies outside of any of the PDOs. While job creation was a specific objective of the Supplemental Component, this was not reflected by revising the PDO. The target levels were realistic, with the exception of the intermediate indicator for road component. For the job creation indicator (labor employed), it would appear that the target was too low if the entire spectrum of job creation activities in both urban works and primary roads rehabilitation is considered. 35. Implementation. The selected indicators were collected generally on a regular basis by staff of the SIU as the implementation of the project activities progressed, and were disseminated in quarterly progress reports. However, there was no mechanism for 8

21 continuous monitoring of the project outcomes beyond the completion of project activities. 36. Utilization. Both the outcome and output indicators served as signals on how the project was progressing towards achieving its targeted outcomes. The indicators also signaled the changing implementation environment facing the project and whether progress was being made towards achieving the project objectives. The decision to continue waste disposal activities under the Bank-funded Emergency Monrovia Urban Sanitation (EMUS) Project is an example of the use of indicators to provide input to another project in the pipeline. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 37. Environmental Safeguards. The project was classified as environmental assessment category B and triggered OP/BP/GP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) and OP/BP/GP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement). The following instruments were disclosed in-country and at Info Shop: Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) for water sector projects (prepared under an AfDB project); Environmental Management Plan (EMP) for roads; EMP for urban works; Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) for removal of solid waste; Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for Whein Town Landfill. All the safeguards instruments were to be disclosed within six months of project effectiveness which was allowed for under this emergency operation. However, the preparation of the safeguards instruments was delayed. During implementation a case of non-compliance with OP 4.12 was recorded for sanitation works at locations along the Metsurado River where solid waste cleanup was to be done. Works were stopped and deferred until the RAP was prepared. In spite of this, it is considered that overall safeguard compliance was satisfactory. 38. Financial management compliance was moderately satisfactory. The PFMU was established under the project for the financial management function in fulfillment of effectiveness conditions. It was adequately staffed with a qualified manager, accountant, and internal auditor who received additional training. Annual audits performed by an independent auditor expressed opinion on the project s financial statements. Quarterly Financial Management Reports (FMRs) were submitted in a timely manner. 39. Financial management of the supplemental component suffered some delays in compliance, on account of co-mingling of funds, delays in submission of withdrawal applications and difficulties in reconciliation between Bank and project records which were eventually resolved through an external audit. However, the fiduciary covenants of the project were respected by submitting all required interim unaudited financial reports on time. 40. Procurement was moderately satisfactory, even when it was guided by intense hands-on implementation support by the Bank. Under the Supplemental Component, procurement of new activities remained static during the first nine months of 2010 due to financial management difficulties aforementioned in paragraph 39, resulting in long 9

22 delays in procurement of a contractor for landfill construction at Whein Town. By the original closing date of June 30, 2010, all activities were completed with the exception of three activities, i.e. the construction of an access road to White Plains, Corporate Audit of LWSC, and the construction of Whein Town Landfill. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 41. A number of infrastructure projects are being implemented in the transport sector and are currently managed as a coherent program. Experiences derived from this project have already been incorporated in the current transport sector projects (i.e. the Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project (AIDP), Urban and Rural Infrastructure Development Project (URIRP), and Liberia Road Asset Management Project (LIBRAMP). 42. Project activities which could not be implemented under the EIP have been better defined and taken up for financing in the current portfolio, for example, the Monrovia- Buchanan Corridor from Cotton Tree to Bokay Town to Port of Buchanan has been taken up and completed with the Bank funded URIRP. Similarly the Monrovia-Ganta corridor is the subject of the Liberia Road Assets Management Project, which is currently ongoing. 43. The solid waste activities were curtailed after they exceeded the intermediate outcome and have been continued under the Bank funded EMUS Project which is a broader urban management project, building on experiences of the emergency solid waste collection program funded under EIP. 44. While capacity in Liberia remains a challenge, significant steps have been taken in the current and follow on projects to transform the SIU into an IIU and eventually transform it into a Road Agency. In this framework, a number of other initiatives have taken place, notably the recruitment of national staff to work in the now IIU in the interim, and the preparation of a road map to the creation of a Liberia National Road Authority/Agency. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 45. The project outcomes are highly relevant and satisfactory. Assessment of the project outcomes is based on the revised project components and their associated target achievements. 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 46. The project was highly relevant to Liberia s post-conflict situation. The project helped to mitigate the crisis in Liberia which in turn prevented fear from the engulfing the region. First, the project objectives supported the priorities set out by the transition and the elected Governments of Liberia. Second, the World Bank s Country Reengagement Note for Liberia which was organized around three priority areas: economic 10

23 management, infrastructure rehabilitation and community based development was aligned with the government priorities. Third, the projects helped identify, through the process of Bank-Government interactions, key priority projects that are subsequently financed under IDA. The objectives continue to be relevant as the new Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) focuses, among others, on reviving the economy and reintegrating the country. 47. The design of the project is highly relevant, combining institutional capacity strengthening with the implementation of infrastructure investments. As the project evolved, infrastructure delivery was matched with capacity of implementing institutions and relevant partnerships, e.g. the use of existing engineering and management capacity of UNMIL, labor based approaches and community participation in rural roads and small urban works. Institutional responsibilities were also assessed and delineated clearly e.g. the separation of financial management (PFMU) and technical/engineering functions (SIU/IIU). 48. Following changes in Government priorities, or when a willing donor is ready to take over an ongoing EIP subproject, the Bank was willing to cooperate and pass on implementation or financing responsibilities as needed. As a result, the implementation of the project has led to changes in the implementing agencies or funding sources for specific project activities. The current development priorities build on the objective of the project, and seek to sustain the momentum gained in the efficient provision of infrastructure. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 49. Achievement is rated as satisfactory on the basis of the achievement of the major outcomes targeted under the restructured project. The outcome indicators have either been met or exceeded as indicated in the table below. Program outcomes noted here are also attributable to complementary investments from other Bank projects as well as donors and are not solely to the Bank s support. PDO Indicator Table 1: Achievement of Project Development Objectives Indicator 1: Average reduction in travel time on (a) Monrovia - Buchanan corridor (%) (b) Monrovia - Ganta corridor (%) Indicator 2: Increase in annual revenue of Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation (US$ * Thousands) Indicator 3: Number of skilled and unskilled labor employed (thousands man-months of employment) Indicator 4: Number of on-site sanitation facilities rehabilitated (No.) Original Project Target 20% 20% Revised Project Target 20% dropped Achievement 20% dropped ,457 n/a 7 9 n/a

24 Indicator 5: Total volume of solid waste removed from Liberia (thousand m 3 ) n/a Two objectives can be identified from the amended PDO statement and the key outcomes under these are discussed in the following paragraphs. Some of the outcomes indicated are actually project outputs, and per the ICR guidelines, the intended objectives have been inferred. Achievement of project development objective is rated as satisfactory. Objective 1: Provision of emergency support to restore priority infrastructure through rehabilitation, repair and reconstruction of critical infrastructure Outcome 1: Average Reduction in travel time on Monrovia Buchanan Corridor. 51. Along the Monrovia-Buchanan corridor, 83 km of selected roads were repaired or reconstructed: (1) Freeport of Monrovia-ELWA Junction (16.20 km) (2) Freeport of Monrovia-Red Light Junction (13.25 km) (3) Freeport of Monrovia Careysburg (3.56 km) (4). ELWA Junction to Robertsfield Airport (44.3 km) (5). ELWA Junction to Gate 15 (4.5 km) (6) SD Cooper Road (1.3 km). This system of roads has improved access to Monrovia, particularly from the Robertsfield International Airport into Monrovia which was rehabilitated under the Liberia Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project to ensure the resumption of international flights to Liberia. Thus with the construction of the Elwa Junction to Robertsfield Road, access to Liberia from the airport has improved tremendously. An average reduction in travel time reduced by at least 20 percent, improving the flow of traffic significantly. Outcome 2: Increase in annual revenue of Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation 52. Annual revenue generation of LWSC has increased from US$0.35 million in 2006 to US$2.46 million, well beyond the targeted US$0.65 million in 2012, an increase of about 280 percent. Achievement of this outcome is a result of a combination of factors. Under the project a Duetz pump was procured for the White Plains water treatment facility, and the laboratory rehabilitated to assure quality of water production. Leak detectors for water mains and distribution lines, supply of various water meters (8,395 No.) and fabrication of valve meters were procured and installed. The volume of potable water supply to Monrovia has increased from 1.2mg/d to 5mg/d by the end of the project, exceeding the 2.8mg/d target by 78%. Training of LWSC staff in the installation of water meters has resulted in recovery of lost water revenue and increased the revenue generation of LWSC to the level observed. The high achievement is also attributable to rehabilitation of the White Plains Treatment Plant under the AfDB funded Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project. Outcome 3: Job creation through and improved rural connectivity 53. This is measured by the number of man months of skilled and unskilled labor created through labor intensive methods. Implementation status reports indicate that 12

25 9,000 man-months of labor were generated as compared to the 7,000 man months targeted 5. This was achieved by rehabilitation of major rural gravel road sections along the Gbarnga-Foya Corridor and the Ganta-Fishtown corridor (implemented by UNDP through UNMIL), as well as the critical Pleebo-Barclayville road corridor (implemented by MPW). These are key corridors for UN peacekeeping forces operations and general access from Liberia to neighboring Cote d Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone. Overall, the rehabilitation of the 641 km length of primary rural roads maximized job creation for both skilled and unskilled labor. Outcome 4: Improved urban sanitation in Monrovia 54. This outcome encompasses two of the approved outcome indicators: Number of on-site sanitation facilities rehabilitated, and total volume of solid waste removed from Liberia. 19 public toilets were rehabilitated in high density areas of Monrovia, nine more than was targeted. The volume of solid waste removed was a result of improved use of the Fiamah landfill site under the project which contributed to the short term final waste disposal needs of Monrovia. A landfill at Whein Town for the medium term needs was also financed by the project to about 80 percent of works; leachate treatment system with series of ponds and a reeds bed is yet to be completed. The landfill has served as a final waste disposal site for communal cleaning works that have improved the ambience of Monrovia to become a live able city. A rudimentary solid waste collection system which comprises 120 collection sites and regular collection and disposal has been developed, estimated to cover percent of the city needs. By 2009, the volume of waste collected was 609,000 m 3 which was far in excess of the 130,000 m 3 targeted. Overall, these labor intensive urban activities generated about 38,600 man-months. The waste collection activity continues under the EMUS project which now caters for about 60 percent of waste disposal needs of Monrovia. Objective 2: Provision of emergency support to restore priority infrastructure through strengthening the capacity of the Recipient s Ministry of Public Works, the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation, and the Monrovia City Corporation. 55. There were no specific indicators for the institutional strengthening objective because it was considered that the planned interventions were too limited and relatively modest. The institutional capacity building in MPW, LWSC, MCC, SIU, and PFMU was carried mainly by on-the-job training. Mid-level professionals were recruited to gain experience under international consultants. Challenges in attracting a reasonable number of such professionals have limited the impact of the capacity building effort. However, even though assessment has been done to date, the outcomes may be regarded as positive. 5 As per project completion reports, about 57,000 man-months of labor of which 4% skilled and 96% unskilled jobs were generated in the vicinity of the roads constructed 13