IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H1700 IDA-H6250) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 14.6 MILLION (US$ 22.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE

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1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Document of The World Bank International Development Association IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H1700 IDA-H6250) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 14.6 MILLION (US$ 22.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE FOR THE Report No:ICR2972 BUMBUNA HYDROELECTRIC ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL MANAGEMENT PROJECT Energy and Extractives Global Practice Country Department, AFCW1 July 30, 2014

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective November 2, 2013) Currency Unit: Sierra Leonean Leones (SLL) US$1.00 = SLL4, US$1.53 = SDR1 FISCAL YEAR: January 1 December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AfDB BCA BEST BHC BHD BHESMP BHP BPIU BTC BT BWMA BWMP CAP CAS CBHP CDGP CSO CUC DfID DGA DSC DSRP EA EAU EMP EPP ESAP ESMP ERR FAO FFS GEF GoSL African Development Bank Bumbuna Conservation Area Business Engineering Science and Technology Bumbuna Hydropower Company Bumbuna Hydroelectric Dam Bumbuna Hydroelectric Environmental and Social Management Project Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project (official acronym used by GoSL) Bumbuna Project Implementation Unit Bumbuna Trust Company Bumbuna Trust Bumbuna Watershed Management Authority Bumbuna Watershed Management Plan Community Action Plan Country Assistance Strategy Completion of the Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project Initial Scope of the Project Community Development Growth Poles Civil Society Organization Community User Committee Department for International Development Development Grant Agreement Dam Safety Committee Dam Safety Review Panel Environmental Assessment Emergency Action Unit Environmental Management Plan Emergency Preparedness Plan Environmental and Social Advisory Panel Environmental and Social Management Plan Economic Rate of Return Food and Agriculture Organization Farmer Field Schools Global Environment Facility Government of Sierra Leone ii

3 GWh IDA IFC INT ISR JSDF KPI LAIR LMNP M&E masl MoAFS MoLCPE MoEP MoEWR MoFED MoU MTR MW NaCSA NPA O&M OREINT PAD PAP PDO PIU PMU PPA PPP PRG PRSP PWP QAG RAP ROW Salcost SAP SRBDA T-line ToR UNDP USCDI XDR Giga Watt Hour International Development Association International Finance Corporation Integrity Vice-Presidency (of the World Bank) Implementation Status Report Japan Social Development Fund Key Performance Indicators Livelihood Assessment and Income Restoration Program Loma Mountains National Park Monitoring and Evaluation meters above sea level Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Forestry Ministry of Land, Country Planning and Environment Ministry of Energy and Power Ministry of Energy and Water Resources Ministry of Finance and Economic Development Memorandum of Understanding Mid-Term Review Mega Watts National Commission for Social Action National Power Authority Operation and Maintenance Organization for Research and Extension of Intermediate Technology Project Appraisal Document Project Affected Persons Project Development Objectives Project Implementation Unit Project Management Unit Power Purchase Agreement Public-Private Partnership Partial Risk Guarantee Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Power and Water Project Quality Assurance Group Resettlement Action Plan Right of Way Salini Costruttori the Italian Main Contractor Stabilized Agriculture Program Seli River Basin Development Authority Transmission Line Terms of Reference United Nations Development Programme Upper Seli Community Development Initiative Special Drawing Rights iii

4 Vice President: Makhtar Diop Senior Practice Director Anita Marangoly George Director Charles M. Feinstein Country Director: Yusupha B. Crookes Practice Manager: Meike van Ginneken Project Team Leader: Syed Waqar Haider ICR Team Leader: John Mason Denton iv

5 REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE Bumbuna Hydroelectric Environmental and Social Management Project CONTENTS DATA SHEET A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring (if any) I. Disbursement Profile 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes Assessment of Outcomes Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance Lessons Learned Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing Annex 2. Outputs by Component Annex 3: Results framework Original Project Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes Annex 5. List of Supporting Documents Annex 6: MAP v

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7 DATA SHEET A. Basic Information Country: Sierra Leone Project Name: SL Bumbuna Hydroelectric Environmental and Social Management project Project ID: P L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H1700, IDA- H6250 ICR Date: 07/31/2014 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE Original Total Commitment: SDR8.30M Disbursed Amount: SDR13.21M Revised Amount: SDR13.21M Environmental Category: A Implementing Agencies: Project Coordination Unit of the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources Co-financiers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 10/31/2003 Effectiveness: 10/26/ /19/2006 Appraisal: 05/09/2005 Restructuring(s): 06/26/ /24/ /30/ /25/ /28/ /20/2012 Approval: 06/16/2005 Mid-term Review: 03/01/ /01/2009 Closing: 08/31/ /30/2013 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Risk to Development Outcome: Bank Performance: Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory High Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory vii

8 C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Unsatisfactory Government: Unsatisfactory Quality of Supervision: Moderately Implementing Moderately Satisfactory Overall Bank Performance: Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: Yes Yes Moderately Unsatisfactory Quality at Entry (QEA): Quality of Supervision (QSA): None None Rating D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration General education sector 3 3 General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 3 3 Other social services Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 1 1 Actual Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Education for the knowledge economy Environmental policies and institutions Other social development Other social protection and risk management Pollution management and environmental health viii

9 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Gobind T. Nankani Country Director: Yusupha B. Crookes Mats Karlsson Sector Manager: Meike van Ginneken Yusupha B. Crookes Project Team Leader: Syed Waqar Haider Donal T. O'Leary ICR Team Leader: Syed Waqar Haider ICR Primary Author: John Mason Denton F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the Project is "to increase the supply of electricity services at least-cost in an efficient and environmentally and socially sustainable manner. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The revised objective is "to assist the recipient in satisfactorily addressing and mitigating the environmental and social impacts in the Project Area associated with the completion and initial operation of the Bumbuna hydroelectric dam and transmission line." (a) PDO Indicator(s) Indicator Indicator 1 : Value (quantitative or qualitative) Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Project Affected Persons (PAPs) claims related to the transmission line addressed. 0% 100% 100% Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Comments Achieved. All claims have been addressed, barring those PAPs who are not (incl. % contactable. achievement) Indicator 2 : PAPs around the dam and reservoir area are resettled and compensated. Value (quantitative or 0% 100% 100% qualitative) Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Comments Achieved. Compensation payments have been completed (barring few cases (incl. % where the PAPs are not contactable), and PAPs have been resettled. achievement) Indicator 3 : PAPs with livelihoods restored to same level as pre-project. ix

10 Value (quantitative or 0% 100% 100% qualitative) Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Comments Achieved. Livelihood Restoration Programs are completed, and socio-economic (incl. % surveys indicate that PAPs are better off after the project implementation. achievement) Indicator 4 : Bumbuna Watershed Management Authority (BWMA) fulfills its key functions. Value (quantitative or qualitative) Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Substantially achieved. The indicator uses a composite scoring with a possible maximum score of 25 points, based on the agreed indicators for implementation Comments effectiveness:( i) completion of the Revised Dam/Reservoir RAP (10 points); (ii) (incl. % water quality monitoring undertaken regularly (5 points); (iii) water borne achievement) disease monitoring program in place (5 points); and (iv) management of the conservation area (5 points). Indicator 5 : Loma Mountains National Park (LMNP) established and operational. Value (quantitative or No Yes Yes qualitative) Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Comments Achieved. Loma Mountain National Park has been proclaimed as a National (incl. % Park and is operational. achievement) Indicator 6 : Direct Project Beneficiaries (number) of which female (%). Value (quantitative or 0% 50% 51% qualitative) Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Comments (incl. % 51% female beneficiaries have benefited in LAIR and SAP. achievement) (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Indicator Indicator 1 : Value (quantitative Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Revised 161kV Transmission line RAP implemented. No Yes Yes Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years x

11 or qualitative) Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved. RAP is fully implemented and a Completion Report has been prepared. Indicator 2 : Amount of replacement land provided (in ha). Value (quantitative or qualitative) Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Comments (incl. % Achieved. achievement) Indicator 3 : RAP implemented in accordance with schedule. Value (quantitative or qualitative) No Yes Yes Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Comments (incl. % Achieved achievement) Indicator 4 : Completion of the Stabilized Agriculture Program (SAP). Value (quantitative or qualitative) No Yes Yes Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Comments (incl. % Achieved. achievement) Indicator 5 : Completion of the Livelihood Assistance and Income Restoration Programs. Value (quantitative or qualitative) No Yes Yes Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Comments (incl. % Achieved. achievement) Indicator 6 : Legal Act passed to create BWMA and Bumbuna Conservation Area (BCA). Value (quantitative or qualitative) No Yes Yes Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Comments (incl. % Achieved. xi

12 achievement) Indicator 7 : Bumbuna Watershed Management Plan developed and adopted. Value (quantitative or qualitative) No Yes Yes Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Comments (incl. % Achieved. achievement) Indicator 8 : Sustainable Financing Mechanism in place for BWMA and Loma Mountains National Park. Value (quantitative or qualitative) No Yes No Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Not Achieved. While arrangements have been put in place to finance the Comments BWMA and LMNP from revenues from the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) (incl. % between Bumbuna project and National Power Authority (NPA), funds are not achievement) being allocated as envisaged. Indicator 9 : BWMA regularly reports on state of environment in watershed. Value (quantitative or qualitative) No Yes Yes Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Comments (incl. % Achieved. achievement) Indicator 10 : Draft Loma Mountain National Park Management Plan prepared. Value (quantitative or qualitative) No Yes Yes Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Comments (incl. % Achieved. LMNP Management Plan prepared and disclosed. achievement) Indicator 11 : Provisional warning system downstream installed. Value (quantitative or qualitative) No Yes No Date achieved 09/28/ /30/ /30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Partially achieved. Most civil works have been completed, all siren equipment is in the country and some of it has been installed. However, the sirens warning system is not operational. xii

13 G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements (USD millions) 1 11/16/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory /30/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Unsatisfactory /28/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /26/2007 Moderately Moderately Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory /20/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory /02/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory /28/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /23/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /29/2009 Moderately Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory /15/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /18/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /07/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /03/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /01/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /21/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /30/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /01/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /25/2013 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /07/2013 Moderately Moderately Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory /17/2014 Moderately Moderately Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory H. Restructuring (if any) Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Amount Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring DO IP in US$ millions 06/26/2008 N MS MU 8.45 xiii Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made The restructuring amended the grant agreement to reflect: a revision of the Bumbuna dam pre-impoundment conditions, on-going provision of food and cash support to affected

14 Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Amount Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring DO IP in US$ millions 07/24/2009 N MU U /30/2009 N MS MS /25/2010 N MS MS /28/2010 Y MS MS xiv Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made persons in the Bumbuna dam and reallocation of proceeds. This restructuring included a first extension of closing date for a period of 4 months and a second reallocation among the disbursement categories in line with activities related to the project This restructuring included a second extension of closing date for a period of six months in order to allow for additional time for a level 1 restructuring of the project and avoid delays in disbursements due to recovery of the advance in the special account. This restructuring extended the closing date for 3 months to allow time for completion of the level 1 restructuring package for the 24 months extension which was to be submitted to the Board. The restructuring was necessary to: (a) cancel the PRG as requested by the GoSL that had found alternative funding to complete the dam; and (b) make more funds available to finance the expanded scope of safeguards activities under the restructured project, from the resources previously allocated to the PRG. The restructuring entailed revising the PDO and indicators, reallocating the funds, and extending the closing date for an additional 24 months.

15 Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Amount Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring DO IP in US$ millions 09/20/2012 N MS MS Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made Due to delays in the installation of the siren warning system, restructuring undertaken to reallocate among expenditure categories and extend the closing date by 9 months. If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving body) enter ratings below: Outcome Ratings Against Original PDO/Targets Unsatisfactory Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets Moderately Satisfactory Overall (weighted) rating Moderately Unsatisfactory I. Disbursement Profile xv

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17 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1. The Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project (BHP: P and P086801) was approved by the IDA Board of Directors on July 16, The original project included a Partial Risk Guarantee (PRG) of up to US$38.0 million from the International Development Association (IDA) to support commercial loans to be used for completion of the civil works of the Bumbuna Hydroelectric Dam and an IDA Grant of US$12.5 million to support the implementation of related environmental and social safeguards and project management activities. After project approval, the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) faced challenges in making the PRG effective and thus requested that the PRG be canceled. The GoSL found alternative sources to finance the remaining civil works. Following a restructuring in 2010, the PRG was dropped and the scope of activities financed by the IDA Grant was revised. This Implementation Completion Report assesses the performance of the project over the full implementation period to the closing date on June 30, 2013 as well as the Bank and the Borrower s performance Context at Appraisal 2. Country Background. Sierra Leone emerged from a decade long civil war in 2002 during which time the economy had contracted by roughly 40 percent, and over 70 percent of its population was living on less than US$1 a day. The death toll from the civil war was estimated at 20,000, and over two million people were rendered homeless with roughly 500,000 people driven into internal exile. Rehabilitation of infrastructure destroyed during the war was badly needed to increase investment and stimulate employment and growth. 3. Energy Sector. Lack of electricity was at that time, and even today, a serious impediment to economic growth, particularly in the industrial and service sectors in Sierra Leone. Postwar reconstruction required significant energy production, but less than five percent of the population had access to electricity. Support to Bumbuna was identified as a high priority as it would have widespread poverty alleviation impacts and would be critical to the country s economic recovery. Feasibility studies for the Bumbuna dam were undertaken from with some Bank support. Construction of the dam began in 1986 and it was roughly 85 percent complete, the transmission line (T-line) towers were installed, and 40 percent of the cable had been strung when civil works were interrupted due to the civil war. When construction resumed in 2002, about 65 percent of the 540 standing T-Line towers were damaged and half of the 80km of cables that had been laid were missing. Every month of delay in delivery of power from Bumbuna cost the country an estimated US$3.1 million in diesel and other fuel purchases resulting in one of the highest costs of electricity in Africa. Together with unreliable service and poor quality of supply, high energy tariffs in Sierra Leone translated into problems for commercial and industrial enterprise, thus hindering the country s growth potential. 4. Bumbuna Hydropower Project. Construction of the Bumbuna hydropower project had been started in the early 1990s but had to be suspended in when the dam was complete - due to armed conflict. As the conflict ended, the GoSL was looking for ways to finalize the project. 1

18 5. Rationale for Bank Assistance. The rationale for Bank involvement in the BHP was fourfold: i) to act as a catalyst for resource mobilization and donor coordination; ii) to promote public-private partnerships in developing and operating infrastructure projects; iii) to develop customized risk mitigation instruments under the PRG to facilitate implementation of major infrastructure projects; and iv) to ensure application of appropriate safeguards to mitigate the impact on the population and the environment. In addition, under the power component of the Sierra Leone Power and Water Project, the Bank was bringing its experience in supporting power sector reform and utility enhancement programs. 6. The Bank s decision to support the BHP in 2005 was part of a broader effort to address structural constraints in the electricity sector and was designed in conjunction with the Power and Water Project approved in The PWP aimed at: i) supporting GoSL s electricity sector reforms; ii) upgrading and strengthening the dilapidated distribution network in Freetown; iii) strengthening business practices; and iv) improving revenue collection by the NPA to make it financially viable. 7. Given the uncertain financing capacity of the sector, in part due to post-conflict conditions, a US$38 million PRG was offered as a way to mobilize commercial financing to complete the remaining works for the Bumbuna hydropower project, in addition to other donor financing. The PRG could have improved financing terms of a commercial loan and thus have lowered the tariff that NPA had to pay for electricity offtake from Bumbuna under the PPA. This, in turn, would have helped to lower tariffs for end users. 8. The technical assistance grant of US$12.5m was designed to finance certain project activities not directly related to physical construction. These activities included implementation and supervision of the Environment Management Plan (EMP); the Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) for the dam/reservoir and the transmission line (T-Line), support for the Bumbuna Project Implementation Unit (PIU), the Dam Safety Review Panel (DSRP), and the Environment and Social Advisory Panel (ESAP); benefit sharing programs under the Upper Seli Community Development Initiative (USCDI) and the Community Action Plan (CAP); and capacity building for relevant ministries and agencies for sustainable implementation of the project s safeguards measures Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 9. The development objective of the project (combined PRG and Grant), as outlined in the 2005 PAD, was to expand the capacity of Sierra Leone to increase the supply of electricity services at least-cost, and in an efficient and environmentally and socially sustainable manner. However, because of the Grant s exclusive focus on safeguards activities, the Development Grant Agreement provided a more specific objective of these activities, namely to assist the Recipient in completing the Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project (BHP) activities in an environmentally and social sustainable manner through the carrying out of measures to avoid mitigate, reduce and/or offset the adverse environmental and social impacts of the BHP in the 2

19 Project Area, and to enhance the environmental and social benefits to be derived from the BHP in the Project Area. The key outcome indicators 1 were as follows: a. Electricity sales (GWh) increasing from 68.9 GWh in 2003 to 230 GWh in 2008; b. Percentage reduction of average electricity tariffs; \ c. A bio-diversity index, to be established under the Additional Environment Studies, acceptable to the Association, does not decrease by the end of the Project; d. Sixty percent increase of the targeted watershed area under improved agricultural conservation practice by the end of the Project; e. Sustainable fishery practices in 60 percent of the reservoir and downstream of the dam; f. All Project Affected Persons (PAPs) resettled as per definition in OP 4.12 by the end of the Project; g. Eighty percent increase of income of involved households with new income generating activities (forestry, fisheries, agriculture, soap making, carpentry, etc.) by the end of the Project; h. The Bumbuna Watershed and Management Plan developed by March 1, 2007; i. Environmental and Social Management Unit in the Ministry of Energy and Power (MoEP) created and operational by December 1, 2008; j. Bumbuna Conservation Area established by October 31, 2006 and management plan adopted by March 1, 2007; and k. Environmental management monitoring system developed by the date of effectiveness of the Grant Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification 10. The project was restructured on September 28, 2010 in response to the GoSL s 2007 request for the cancelation of the PRG component of the project. GoSL was able to mobilize over US$55 million in donor funding to cover the remaining costs of completing the construction of the BHP. BHP was commissioned in 2009 and was already operational by the time of project restructuring in Consequently, the PDO and key indicators and activities were revised to focus on safeguard issues associated with the final stages of completion and initial operation of the BHD and T-Line. 11. The revised PDO is to assist the Recipient in satisfactorily addressing and mitigating the environmental and social impacts in the Project Area associated with the completion and initial operation of the Bumbuna hydroelectric dam and transmission line. The revised PDO indicators were as follows: a. BWMA fulfills its key functions; b. PAP around the dam and reservoir are resettled and compensated; c. PAP claims related to the transmission line addressed; 1 The key outcomes indicators listed were reflected in paragraph 2.1 of the PAD. Some vary slightly from those reflected in the results framework in Annex 3 of the PAD. 3

20 d. PAPs livelihoods around the dam and reservoir are restored to the same level as preproject; e. Loma Mountains National Park established and operational; and f. Direct Project beneficiaries (number) of which female (%). 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 12. The main beneficiaries of the original project were the GoSL which would be able to mobilize private-sector financial resources, through the use of PRG, to complete BHP and electricity consumers in Sierra Leone. The timely completion of the project and generation of hydro-electricity was expected to benefit the domestic and commercial consumers in Sierra Leone and the population at large. Bumbuna s energy generation was forecast to have a positive impact on lowering the electricity tariff, thus contributing to the country s economic growth. Further, the direct beneficiaries from the environment and social safeguards and the benefit sharing programs were the upstream and downstream communities in and around the dam-site, including households affected by the T-Line. 13. The beneficiaries under the restructured BHP continued to be communities upstream and downstream of the dam site and along the T-line. Further, following advice from the ESAP, the inclusion of Loma Mountain National Park (LMNP) as an additional environmental offset for natural habitat impacts of the project was beneficial to a larger population in Sierra Leone. Establishment of LMNP was meant to enhance the BHP s conservation impacts on global biological diversity, with emphasis on preservation of key endangered species such as chimpanzees. 1.5 Original Components 14. Component A - Hydroelectric and Transmission Infrastructure. This component comprised a US$38 million PRG to mobilize commercial loans to finance completion of the BHD. The PRG was to cover a breach of payment obligations by GoSL under the Concession Agreement and NPA s obligations under the PPA. Only a default by GoSL or NPA that caused a default by BHC towards the IDA guaranteed lender (exclusive of other creditors) was to be covered. At the time of project approval in 2005, the construction of the BHD and its ancillary facilities were 85 percent complete. The proceeds of the PRG-backed loan were, therefore, to finance the remaining works including completion of civil works, hydraulic steel structures, the electro-mechanical equipment, and the transmission line. 15. Component B - Environmental Mitigation, Resettlement, Watershed Management and Benefit Sharing. This component had three sub-components as follows: (i) environmental management - implementation of the Environmental Management and Mitigation Plan (EMP), leading to the efficient operation of the Bumbuna Watershed Management Authority (BWMA); (ii) social mitigation - implementation of the Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) for the dam, the reservoir and surrounding areas, and the T-Line in accordance with RAP implementation schedules; and (iii) benefit sharing - effective establishment and demonstration of the basic institutional model for the proposed Bumbuna Trust (BT) for local resource development. 4

21 16. Component C - Technical Assistance. This component comprised management and supervision of the activities under Component B; support for the PIU, the two international panels of experts (DRSP and ESAP), the RAP Implementation Team and the Communications Action Program. An international and national Environmental Management Technical Assistance Team would assist the PIU in implementing the EMP, in collaboration with the Department of the Environment and other Sierra Leonean agencies. 1.6 Revised Components 17. With the decision to cancel the Partial Risk Guarantee (PRG) as part of the project, the project underwent a restructuring to improve its relevance. The components under the restructured project were limited to support to environmental and social management activities, as described in the following paragraphs. 18. Component A - Environmental Management and Social Mitigation. This revised component had the following key activities: (i) implementing the RAPs for the dam, reservoir and T-Line; (ii) establishing the BWMA; (iii) establishing the LMNP (environmental offset); (iv) implementing the Emergency Preparedness Action Plan; (v) implementing the Livelihood Assessment and Income Restoration (LAIR) and the Stabilized Agriculture Program (SAP). 19. Component B - Community Growth Poles. This component was added to the project during the restructuring, and supported the implementation of energy based community growth pole sub-projects. These subprojects covered directly affected villages, and three indirectly affected downstream villages, as part of a community development program designed to ensure that eligible communities around the Bumbuna reservoir area share in the benefits of the Bumbuna hydroelectric dam in a sustainable manner. The activities under this component were complemented by parallel funding from Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF). 20. Component C - Technical Assistance. This component supported: (i) the PIU to ensure continued financial management, procurement and monitoring and evaluation; (ii) the independent experts panels, ESAP and the DSRP, until project close; and (iii) the update and implementation of the Communication Strategy and Plan. 1.7 Other Significant Changes 21. On September 20, 2012, the project underwent its final restructuring which introduced two changes: (a) reallocation of Grant (H1700-SL) proceeds to allow for the supply, installation, commissioning and testing of an extended siren warning system, which was not envisaged in ; and (b) extension of the Project closing date by nine months from September 30, 2012, to June 30, 2013 to allow for the remaining activities to be completed. There was no change in the PDOs. The revised allocation of grant resources by components is provided in Annex-1. 2 As recommended by the DSRP during their 5 th assessment mission in July

22 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 22. Soundness of the Background Analysis. A Bank team, with technical, financial, legal, environmental, social, and communication skills, undertook the appraisal of the project. In hindsight, the background analysis for the original Project was skewed towards safeguards issues. Extensive consultations were carried out in compliance with the World Bank Safeguard Policies on Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01) and Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12). On the other hand, the appraisal of the proposed PPP structure and supporting PRG structure was not undertaken in a very thorough manner. The financial analysis for the PRG structuring was limited. For instance, no market testing was done to determine the likely terms of a commercial loan in Sierra Leone. This led to an unrealistic assumption that a 15 year loan at 4.5 percent interest could be secured resulting in a cost of power of 8.7UScents/kWh. The Bank team also lacked an experienced hydropower engineer. The project team revalidated a feasibility study completed in the 1980s as a basis for technical appraisal. Also, the PAD does not include an assessment of the adequacy of the sector policy framework as required by OP Assessment of the Project Design. The project design consisted of a US$38 million PRG and a US$12.5 million grant. This project design was retrofitted to serve the purpose of finalizing the construction of a mostly finished dam and complement construction with a set of environmental and social measures to allow the hydropower project to meet international good practice standards. 24. The description of PDO and key indicators in the PAD notes that the PDO assumes that all energy generated by the BHP is sold to NPA and that NPA functions properly as described under the Power and Water Project (PWP) (Cr SL) 3. Thus, the success of the project rested on a number of policy actions to be undertaken by the GoSL under a separate project, including the selection of a management contractor for NPA and tariff reforms. 25. The design of the PRG component of the project was unusual and not very advanced at time of Board presentation. The proposed PRG would cover a relatively small commercial loan to finalize construction of remaining works. This was a non-traditional use of the instrument. The arrangements to set up the special purpose company BHC between Salcost and GoSL were not yet made. The 20 years concession contract between the GoSL and BHC was not yet drafted and the PPA was not agreed at time of appraisal. The proposed concession contract was nontraditional 4 also, as construction was not included in the contract. 26. The relative small size of IDA support to the hydropower project and the fact that IDA got involved in the project at a late stage provided little leverage vis-à-vis the GoSL and the contractor/concessionaire to influence project implementation. 3 PAD pg. 13 footnote 1. 4 In traditional concession agreements, an entity is often allowed to operate an asset for a specified period after it is constructed by it. 6

23 27. The 2008 QAG review concluded that the project was overly designed in terms of safeguards augmentation activities. For example, under the benefit sharing objective, the original design proposed an inter-agency and multi-district set up that presumed the government s decentralization policy to be fully functional. It did not take into account potential conflicts that eventually arose between traditional Chiefdom leaders and elected District officers. The QAG review also highlighted the ambitious undertakings in relation to dam safety and environmental standards in the dam and reservoir where implementation was to occur during a period of political uncertainty. 28. Adequacy of Government s Commitment. Achieving the objectives of the BHP relied heavily on the commitment and ability of the GoSL to undertake meaningful sector reforms, both in terms of setting up a PPP for the management of the Bumbuna facilities as well as in the transmission and distribution sub-sectors. Such reforms were necessary to ensure the financial viability of BHP. However, as the subsequent discussion on implementation (2.2) points out, the reforms were not fully implemented which had a major impact on project performance. 29. Adequacy of Participatory Process. Extensive consultations were carried out, and a three-step process in stakeholder interactions on safeguard studies-at the national, district and village levels in 2000 and was adopted as follows: (i) introduction of the purpose of the studies and eliciting concerns; (ii) active involvement in the data collection, surveys and evaluation; and (iii) presentation of results, stakeholder review and feedback. The participatory process adopted was adequate and resulted in comprehensive analysis and documentation of environmental and social safeguard issues. 30. Assessment of Risks. Four significant risks were identified during preparation which revealed the project s vulnerability at the design phase. These were the: (i) risk of failure to establish the Bumbuna Hydropower Company (BHC) as a PPP; (ii) risk of ineffective crosslinkages between the Power and Water Project (PWP), approved by the Board on July 1, 2004, and the CBHP; (iii) risk of limited institutional capacity in both the PIU and GoSL agencies to adequately implement the project; and (iv) the inability of the GoSL to effectively set up and operate the Bumbuna Trust (BT). While the assessment of risks was thorough, the mitigation measures proposed to address each of these risks were not well defined. For example, even though the risk of failure in establishing the BHC was high, the project did not provide for alternative institutional arrangements. 31. Crucial to BHP s success as designed was the PPP, to be implemented and managed by the private company, the BHC. The establishment of BHC was deemed necessary to reduce the performance risks during operation and maintenance of the hydropower project. The PAD recognized that the main proposed shareholder of BHC was a hydropower plant builder and not an operator. The proposed mitigation measure for this was that, following commissioning of the BHP, the BHC was expected to contract an international operating utility, to be competitively selected under Bank procurement guidelines, to operate and maintain (O&M contract) the project on behalf of BHC. The operator was also to be responsible for carrying out the environment and management programs for the operation of the dam, reservoir, transmission facilities and right of way. 7

24 32. The risk of limited institutional capacity of the GoSL and its implementation entities was appropriately assessed as substantial and adequate resources were allocated for capacity building. However, the capacity building programs focused mainly on improving the staff within the ministry while day to day project management was delegated to a PIU. The project design also relied on the ability of the GoSL to establish the BT prior to the commissioning of BHP. The establishment of the BT, as designed, was a practical measure, recognizing the limited budgetary resources of the GoSL to provide sustainable funding for environmental and social safeguards of BHP in the long term. However, alternative options for financing these safeguard costs were not considered. 2.2 Implementation 33. Background. Two presidential elections and four leadership changes in the Ministry of Energy took place during the project implementation period. As a result, implementation of sector reforms was slow and the institutional memory of the project was lost over time. Implementation can be divided into four phases: (i) project effectiveness, (ii) initial implementation; (iii) mid-term review in 2009 and subsequent level 1 restructuring, and (iv) implementation phase following restructuring. 34. Effectiveness. The project had an initial effectiveness deadline of October 26, 2005 which was extended to March 30, 2007 (i.e. by 17 months) at the request of the GoSL. The key condition delaying effectiveness of the PRG was the inability to secure acceptable terms on the commercial loans, for the completion of remaining works at BHP, facilitated by the PRG. Effectiveness of the PRG was delayed due to failure of negotiations on the project agreements among the concessionaire, its senior lender, the GoSL, and IDA. Negotiations with commercial banks failed to yield a commercial loan on terms that were acceptable to all. 35. To ensure the start of the implementation of the grant components of the original project, the GoSL requested that the effectiveness conditions for the Grant and PRG be delinked. The Bank granted this request. The IDA grant was declared effective on December 19, Implementation. In April 2007, the Minister of Finance requested cancellation of the PRG. The GoSL was able to mobilize alternative donor funding to cover the remaining costs of completing construction of the Bumbuna dam. The GoSL decided that the dam would be developed as a public project rather than through a PPP structure as agreed with the Bank. The PWP which supported key sector reforms, such as the selection of a management contractor for NPA and tariff reforms, was restructured in 2007 to rehabilitate a power plant that had stopped working and the support for reforms was eliminated from the project. Attracting an international operator into that environment would have been difficult were there a willingness to do so. Construction was finalized and the impoundment of the reservoir was initiated in March The extent and cost of key activities under the grant were underestimated, particularly the RAPs and the environmental offset, while potential revenue streams from carbon credits or from energy generation were greatly overestimated. As impoundment of the dam approached and resources were dwindling, the project prioritized measures required to ensure safeguards compliance during impoundment. This was achieved by cutting back drastically on the benefit 8

25 sharing and deferring other activities; such as establishing the environmental offset, implementation of the Emergency Preparedness Plan and environmental capacity building within the Ministry of Energy. 38. The BHP was commissioned on November 6, At the time of commissioning, no arrangements had been made for the operation and maintenance of the dam. The GoSL requested the dam contractor, to operate the BHP for an interim period of months. This arrangement was extended a number of times and the contractor continues to work as the interim operator to this day. Over the life of the project, both the contractor and the owner s engineer have not been fully paid for their services by the GoSL. 39. A Quality Assessment of the Lending Portfolio (QALP) in 2008 rated the project moderately satisfactory. The QALP rated quality of supervision as moderately likely to achieve PDOs and was critical of the Bank team s performance; specifically with regard to fiduciary matters (procurement and financial management were rated unsatisfactory and moderately unsatisfactory, respectively). 40. Mid-Term Review. The Mid Term Review (MTR) was undertaken in February This was during the impoundment of the reservoir but before the commissioning of the project. The MTR observed a number of deficiencies and recommended to restructure the project: Unclear Arrangements for Dam Operations. No professional dam operator had been recruited prior to initiation of impoundment and the testing phase of the hydropower project as agreed at appraisal of the IDA project. The MTR advised to use IDA financing to provide support to the GoSL for the creation, staffing, equipping and basic capacity building of an Emergency Action Unit (EAU) 5 to address dam safety and emergency preparedness issues. Lack of Legal Framework Underpinning Bumbuna s Operation and Financial Sustainability. A PPA, that would set out the arrangements for the purchase of power by NPA for the BHP, had not yet been approved despite consultants assistance to the GoSL in drafting a PPA and a national energy tariff study carried out under the project (in partnership with DfID and AfDB). Continued Weak Implementation Capacities of PIU and GoSL. Client counterpart capacity was very weak and required the IDA team to provide very intensive support on even small tasks. The MTR noted that the PIU suffered from the frequent changes in its management and staff, in tandem with similar changes in ministerial leadership. The MTR found the internal controls to be seriously weak, warranting a full-scale financial and procurement review in Allegations of corruption were brought to the attention of the World Bank s Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) following the MTR. In response, the Bank team devised an action plan that included a procurement review, increased supervision, and key personnel changes. 5 This unit consisted of local guards who would patrol the shoreline and travel within the surrounding communities in order to sensitize and convey alerts from the BHP Dam Safety Committee. 9

26 Funding Shortfalls. Expenditures on safeguards components exceeded amounts included in some categories and required a reallocation of resources. The funding shortfalls were partly a result of the introduction of new activities recommended by the DSRP and ESAP that were not envisaged in the original project. For example, resources had to be allocated to establish an additional environment offset (LMNP), to ensure that the BWMA had the resources to carry out identified activities, and to ensure that a sustainable financing mechanism (BT) was in place for long term social and environmental management activities. Also the expected revenues from carbon offset financing had not materialized. Risk of Non-payment of Compensation to T-line Claimants. There was concern about the inability of the GoSL to resolve issues related to legacy PAPs, who had been relocated by GoSL during the 1990s as a result of clearing a right of way (ROW) for the high voltage T-Line. There were also issues beyond the project s scope including: (i) issues related to GoSL s compensation policies under the recovery law for post-war or conflict-affected households who occupied sections of the T-Line; (ii) unclear regulations of the GoSL for valuation of assets subject to eminent domain and corresponding procedures for determining assets given to the Ministry of Land, Country Planning and Environment, instead of local governments; and (iii) lack of legal framework for pre-war compensation, which is not covered in the existing land and property laws. To address these concerns an ESAP resettlement expert provided step-by-step procedures for addressing valuation issues. A special account was set up to cover compensation payments, as soon as a legal framework was in place. 41. The MTR concluded that there was insufficient time and funding available to complete safeguard activities under the original grant. The MTR recommended a project restructuring in order to: extend the closing date, reallocate funds from the PRG (in the order of US$9.5 million) for carrying out the remaining environmental and safeguard activities under the original project, and to fund new activities recommended by the DSRP and ESAP. 42. Following the MTR, a revised EMP was discussed in a workshop on June 16, 2010, during which it was renamed the Environment and Social Management Plan (ESMP). The revised ESMP included the following additional safeguard measures: (i) inclusion of the establishment of LMNP 6, including the conservation area immediately above the dam site, as BHP s environmental offset; (ii) inclusion of the updated Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP) and associated funding; and (iii) establishment and initial operation of the Bumbuma Trust 7. The ESMP also included programs in the Bumbuna watershed area and reservoir not previously financed by the grant. Social mitigation instruments were also revised during the course of implementation and were reflected in the restructuring package including: (i) a revised RAP for 6 Loma Mountain National Park (LMNP) was to be set up through legislative instruments; necessary staff was to be deployed; and it was to be run as a protected area, a National Park. 7 Bumbuna Trust (BT) was envisaged to be a conduit for the sustainable financing of the Bumbuna environmental and social mitigation actions, and was to be funded through the revenues accruing through the PPA from the sale of electricity to NPA. 10

27 the dam and reservoir and disclosed in 2008, including previously unplanned food and cash compensation; and (ii) an updated RAP for the 161kV T-line, including pre-2005 compensation Project Restructuring GoSL s initial request to cancel the PRG was made in April 2007 but restructuring of the project only took place in September This delay was caused by: (i) GoSL requesting time to find some form of alternative guarantee to address financing problems caused by cancellation of the PRG and to ultimately mobilize US$55 million in donor funding; (ii) trying to fill a funding gap, caused by the cancellation of carbon financing from the Netherlands Clean Development Fund, which would have covered the costs of the Upper Seli Community Development Initiative 9 ; and (iii) adjustments in the planned safeguards. The restructuring limited the project scope to supporting environmental and social management measures related to the BHP. The PRG component was canceled and funds reallocated (US$9.5 million which is equivalent to a guarantee of US$38.0 million) to cover the cost overruns and expanded scope of the environmental and social activities. The PDO and key indicators were revised to focus on safeguard issues associated with the final stages of completion and initial operation of the BHP and T-Line. The restructured project, renamed the Bumbuna Hydroelectric Environmental and Social Management Project, became effective in March The project was restructured for a second time in September 2012 to reallocate funds to finance the supply installation, commissioning and testing of sirens as part of the dam s early warning system (this was not envisaged in 2010) and to extend the closing date to allow remaining activities to be completed. While the DSRP found Bumbuna dam to be no less safe than any similar dam elsewhere in the world, at its July 4-15, 2012, it recommended the installation of a siren warning system extending 50 km downstream from the dam, to protect downstream populations form the consequences of unsatisfactory operation of the dam. The DSRP s recommendation was based on the possible interruption of dam operation and maintenance and monitoring, due to uncertain funding flows to the interim operator. 45. The project s closing date was subsequently extended by nine months from September 30, 2012 to June 30, The closing date extension affected neither the Project Outcomes nor the PDO. At the time of the project extension, the Bank communicated to the GoSL that no further project extensions would be granted. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 46. M&E Design. The PDO was ambitious and there was a gap between the PDO and the PDO indicators. The PAD included an adequate results framework and arrangements for monitoring and evaluation. The original PDOs are clearly stated as are the outcome indicators and targets. Intermediate results are grouped by Components and results indicators are specified. 8 Payments to affected households, which were identified prior to 2005, were to be funded from the revenue of electricity sales. However, GoSL requested the BHESMP for financial support to cover these commitments since electricity revenues were insufficient to cover the compensation costs. 9 The carbon offset P was budgeted at US$300,000 at the time of appraisal. This was revised to US$5.3million afterwards. Unfortunately, the methodology for large hydro projects was modified by the Clean Development Mechanism s Executive Board shortly after the Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement was signed, making the project ineligible for such financing. 11

28 However, the achievement of PDO under the original project was dependent on the successful achievement of the results under the PWP. The fact that the results framework in Annex 3 of the PAD assumed that all the energy produced by the BHP is sold to NPA and that NPA functions properly as described in details under the PWP, is telling. 47. Under the original project, an arrangement for monitoring of activities was established and the PAD clearly articulates baselines, targets, and criteria for data collection reporting by indicator including frequency of reporting, data collection instruments, and responsible parties for collection, in most cases. The M&E design for the restructured project also clearly specified the project s PDO, outcome indicators, intermediate outcomes and associated indicators and the key activities. New outcomes and activities were added as a direct result of a revised RAP and ESMP disclosed in August M&E implementation. M&E implementation between 2005 and the project restructuring in September 2010 was ad-hoc. The results framework was not judiciously transferred into the electronic implementation status reporting system. To determine results at the time of the restructuring during ICR elaboration, it was necessary to glean information from ISR #11 and the 2010 restructuring paper. After project restructuring, Aide Memoires and ISRs reflect meticulous monitoring and evaluation and corresponding adjustments to supervision plans to address any underperforming activities. 49. M&E Utilization. The precondition of successful implementation of the PWP and subsequent delay in implementation of BHP prevented utilization of the M&E framework developed in the PAD. Upon project restructuring, capacity building in PIU in M&E activities was given heightened importance, and a specialist was engaged on a full-time basis. Visiting supervision missions spent substantial time with PIU staff reviewing their work, and providing guidance on utilizing the M&E systems for informed decision-making. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 50. Environmental and Social Safeguards. The project was classified as a category A project. The following safeguard policies were triggered by CBHP: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01), Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04), Forests (OP/BP 4.36), Cultural Property (OPN 11.03), Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12), and Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4.37). Essentially a safeguards management project after restructuring, the project provided extensive support to the government to address environment and social safeguards associated with the operation of the Bumbuna dam. 51. The environmental impacts and resettlement issues raised by the CBHP were addressed in the 1996 and 2005 EAs, in the Dam and Reservoir RAP, in the T-Line RAP, and included in the work of DSRP and ESAP. The implementation of the EAs and the RAPs entailed resettlement and compensation covering 38 villages, 599 households, and 5,033 PAPs, emergency food aid, land for land exchange for 41 households (186 people) in five villages covering hectares of agricultural lands, and cash compensation for lost crops, trees and other assets to 171 farmers with 117 hectares of partially or fully inundated farmlands. For the T- line, roughly 910 households and 1,565 PAPs were found to be within the ROW's built-up areas 12

29 under the revised requirements in 2009, including over 50 structures within the clearance limit. RAPs were revised in 2008, including a shoreline survey in Following an influx of grievances after impoundment, a resurvey was conducted in 2009 and At the project s close, there were a few activities that were still incomplete, for example the emergency warning system was not yet fully functional, thus consistent with the Bank s environmental safeguard policies, the Bank will continue to supervise implementation of these activities. 52. For social safeguards, the reservoir RAP completion report carefully outlined the methodologies undertaken for carrying out the RAPs and shoreline surveys including limitations. The assessment of valuation and compensation is described in detail, including costs associated with relocation, agricultural and tree production losses, and relocation of cultural assets. It also outlines communication strategies, M&E arrangements, livelihood restoration strategies, and complaints and grievance procedures undertaken. 53. Procurement. Procurement capacity in the PIU posed serious problems in the early stages of the implementation of the project due to a lack of the requisite skills as well as a lack of familiarity with the IDA procurement guidelines. The restructured project involved relatively small-sized but a large number of procurement packages. In March 2013, the Bank conducted a procurement post review of the project and the report was shared with the GoSL. Following the review, the overall procurement arrangements for the project maintained a Moderately Satisfactory rating, while the procurement risk was rated as 'High. 54. Financial Management. The Financial Management (FM) aspects of the project were handled by a full-time FM Specialist in the PMU. While challenges were encountered during the early part of the implementation of the project, FM activities were streamlined later. In line with the fiduciary oversight, the FM team of the Bank continuously reviewed the adequacy of the FM arrangements and whether they met the Bank's minimum requirements. 55. In January 2013, a detailed and comprehensive FM assessment was completed. There were adequate systems in place, including staffing, within the Accounts department, which provided reliable and credible financial data, together with adequate support documentation. Overall, the FM arrangement of the project is rated as being Moderately Satisfactory (MS) and there has been no adverse change in the arrangements as documented in the PAD. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 56. Since its commissioning in late 2009, the Bumbuna hydropower project has not consistently produced power at the level of its installed capacity. In November 2012, the shaft of Generator Unit-2 cracked and it had become completely inoperable; subsequently, Unit-1 also started exhibiting excessive vibration and had to be run at much lower generation capacity (8-10 MW). During April 2013, Generator Unit-1 was shut down for maintenance, the shaft replaced, and has since been generating between MW (against a rated capacity of 25MW). The GoSL has extended the interim operator s contract up to December 2014 to undertake repairs and replace the shaft in Generator Unit-2, which is expected to be complete by end June It is expected that a new operator will be engaged after December 2014, once repair work on both units is complete and they have been operating for a further six months without incident. 13

30 57. The technical problems early on during the operation of the dam (hydropower projects normally have a project life of several decades) point to potential engineering problems during the design and construction phase or might be the result of ad hoc operation of the dam and powerhouse. To date, the GoSL continues to incur a backlog of payments to the interim operator (the company that constructed the dam) and dam engineer. 58. At project closing in June 2013, conformance to the provisions of the Bank s environmental and social safeguards policies was incomplete. Sustainable funding by the GoSL for the continued implementation of the environmental and social safeguards measures, including the environmental offset, was not assured. The GoSL is responsible for financing outstanding activities to ensure compliance from other sources. In compliance with its Operational and Safeguards Policies, the Bank will continue to supervise the implementation by the GoSL of the following outstanding environmental and social safeguards after the project closing date: (i) installation and commissioning of a siren warning system, continued functioning of Emergency Action Unit; and completion of three new Communication Centers (for safety information dissemination). (ii) Operationalization of Loma Mountains National Park as an environmental offset for Bumbuna project, including measures to protect the park; maintenance of the Bumbuna Conservation Area; and continued functioning of the Bumbuna Watershed Management Authority. (iv) payment of compensation to the few remaining PAPs 10 ; and (v) completion of the remainder of livelihood related training and distribution of tools/seeds to forest-edge communities. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 59. The objectives of the project remain highly relevant. Both the Joint World Bank/IFC Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Sierra Leone for FY10-FY13 and the Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP II) for emphasized the government s support for the country s growth agenda in three priority areas: (i) agriculture; (ii) energy; and (iii) transport infrastructure. As the most significant installed generation capacity in the sector, Bumbuna s safe operation and distribution of power is critical for the country s continued economic growth and support both pillars of the CAS: human development and promoting inclusive growth. 60. The project design remains moderately relevant. As the dam was 85 percent complete in 1997, completion of BHP was the best option to improve energy access and reliability. The use of a PRG to obtain a commercial loan was an innovative way to leverage a small envelope, but was too ambitious for the country circumstances. The design overestimated the political will to undertake significant policy reforms and was not thoroughly informed by background analysis as it related to the PRG. The redesign of the project at restructuring still did not fully take into account the client s institutional capacity. 10 These are PAPs who have not come forward despite outreach activities by PMU, and are not contactable. 14

31 61. Project implementation was relevant. As previously noted the extent and cost of key activities under the grant were underestimated. Circumstances changed significantly during implementation. The GoSL and the Bank team reacted to these changing circumstances by restructuring or other means to retain relevance of objectives and design. The recommendations and advice of the Expert Panels (ESAP and the DSRP) were largely adopted by the project and led to major revisions and improvements in the set of measures necessary to ensure compliance with safeguards requirements. However, restructurings were done reactively and with delay. Relevance could have been enhanced by a more proactive approach. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives (Original and Restructured) Original PDOs 62. The achievement of the PDO prior to project restructuring is rated Unsatisfactory (U). While progress was made on implementing the environmental and social safeguards measures, these activities did not contribute in large measure to the achievement of the PDO reflected in the PAD which was principally oriented towards the anticipated result of the PRG. The GoSL had requested the cancellation of the PRG four months after project effectiveness; which was delayed 14 months from the original effectiveness deadline due to unsuccessful negotiations of a commercial loan that was integral to the success of the PRG. The following paragraphs outline the outputs under each component of the Original Project, prior to restructuring. 63. Component A comprised the US$38 million to mobilize commercial loans to finance completion of the BHD. Negotiations of commercial loans were unsuccessful; therefore the GoSL requested that IDA cancel the PRG. The PRG never became effective; therefore no progress was made in relation to the PDO and intermediate indicators related to electricity sales, percentage reduction in electricity tariffs, establishment of the public private partnership through the concession contract to BHC, or the establishment of the regulatory legal function and appropriate legal environment. 64. Component B was designed to implement safeguard measures including environmental mitigation, resettlement, watershed management, and benefit sharing. Most of the activities identified in the EMP and RAP were completed for the construction and impoundment phases. However, activities for operational phase remained partly outstanding. By the date of the restructuring, implementation had not progressed sufficiently to have monitorable progress on most of the PDO and intermediate indicators (See Annex 3 for details). However, there was good progress made on the implementation of activities, the highlights of which are reflected below with a more detailed overview of project outputs in Annex Under the environmental management sub-component the following activities were completed: (i) (ii) Oversight of the EMP and the RAPs had been carried out by the PIU; Establishment of the BWMA and the BCA on July 4, 2008 by an Act of Parliament, however, the BWMA was not operational by the time of the 2010 Restructuring; 15

32 (iii) (iv) (v) A community awareness campaign and education program for watershed management and formulation of a water quality monitoring program, even though the watershed management plan had not been fully developed; Biodiversity baseline studies which led to the identification of an alternative environmental offset, LMNP 11, and baseline studies and boundary demarcation for the LMNP was ongoing; and Clearing the reservoir area of most large trees to reduce methane gas emissions and navigation risks. 66. Under the social mitigation subcomponent progress was made on the implementation of the SAP, the RAPs and the LAIR Program as follows. The project financed the implementation of a SAP focused on agricultural extension and training for conservation farming. This activity was partially complete at the time of restructuring due to delays in starting the tree nurseries. Though not an activity originally identified for financing under the Grant, an Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP) for safety measures downstream from the reservoir was developed. The EPP was originally to be developed by the operator under the O&M contract. However, as an international operator was not contracted, the Grant funded this activity and initial set-up of an Emergency Action Unit The RAP for the dam and reservoir area was updated in 2008 using a new shoreline demarcation. It was subsequently implemented prior to the first phase of Bumbuna s impoundment and by December 2008, following activities were completed: Resettlement and compensation covering 38 villages, 599 households, and 5,033 PAPs; Emergency food aid, not originally envisaged in the project design but recommended by ESAP, over two years (2007 to 2009); Land for land exchange for 41 households (186 people) in five villages covering hectares of agricultural lands; and Cash compensation for lost crops, trees and other assets to 171 farmers with 117 hectares of partially or fully inundated farmlands. 68. The 2005 RAP for the transmission line (T-Line) identified 367 households inside the Right-of-Way (ROW). After exploring three alternatives, GoSL revised the RAP; this reduced the area within the ROW where houses would be moved. The GoSL also established a Resettlement Advisory Group in July 2009 to approve guidelines for identification of eligible PAPs and to define the criteria for compensation, including for so-called legacy PAPs A more significant offset on natural habitats was identified and considered preferable by the ESAP to upgrade the nearby Loma Mountains Non-Hunting Forest Reserve into the LMNP. The approach was endorsed by the GoSL but Parliamentary approval was significantly delayed. 12 Dam safety concerns, especially preparedness, were enforced prior to full impoundment. An incident in January 2009, causing the accidental death of two boys from Bumbuna Town, occurred during one of the large water releases, prompting the implementation of more clearly defined emergency warning procedures. 13 An exception to OP 4.12 was given to allow the use of IDA grant funds for legacy compensation of PAPs for loss of property and farmland that occurred when the transmission line foundations were originally constructed. PAD Section 7.1 page 42 16

33 Roughly 910 households and 1,565 PAPs were found to be within the ROW s built-up areas under the revised requirements in During this time, approximately 70 percent to 80 percent of PAPs opted to move to other areas. At the time of restructuring, implementation of the T-line RAP was partially complete. 69. Implementation of the Livelihood Assessment and Income Restoration (LAIR) programs for the dam and reservoir areas had commenced by the time of the restructuring in Under the benefit sharing subcomponent, the project design envisaged four distance groups of activities: (1) ward and community subprojects; (ii) Youth Capacity Building programs; (iii) Catchment Stakeholder Forums; and (iv) the establishment and demonstration of the basic institutional model for the proposed Bumbuna Trust (BT) for local resource development. At the time of restructuring, the BT had not been established, although a draft Act establishing the BT had been submitted for approval. The ward and community subprojects, the Youth Capacity Building Program and the Catchment Stakeholder Forums were not initiated. 71. Implementation of Component C showed uneven progress. Although the Bumbuna PIU was fully staffed, its performance was poor. The MTR in 2009 noted that significant strengthening was needed to address the following: (i) documentation not properly organized or was incomplete; (ii) serious delays in withdrawal applications; and (iii) operations hampered by lack of financial management, with serious procurement issues causing delays in release of funds for project activities. 72. The ESAP and DSRP functioned satisfactorily during BHP s implementation. Both panels visited the project sites four times between 2005 and The panels reports provided extensive advice throughout all stages of project implementation and their recommendations led to significant changes in project design and a broadening of the scope of the safeguards measures. Finally, the Communication Action Plan was formulated. Restructured PDOs 73. The achievement of the PDO after project restructuring is rated Moderately Satisfactory (MS). The activities under the project were to assist the Recipient to address and mitigate social and environmental impacts in the project area associated with the completion and operation of the dam and transmission line. Notwithstanding the sustainability issues relating to the BWMA, EAU and the LMNP, environmental and social safeguard have been complied with well. Five of the six PDO indicators were fully achieved and one was substantially achieved. While nine of the eleven intermediate outcome indicators were achieved, one was partially achieved and the remaining one was not achieved. The achievement of the PDO is assessed with reference to the achievement of each of the six PDO indicators with reference to the related intermediate indicators. A detailed overview of project outputs is provided in Annex The resettlement and compensation of PAPs related to the dam and reservoir area and the transmission line have been addressed and livelihoods have been restored to pre-project levels, barring a few cases where the PAPs are not contactable. Therefore, the three PDO indicators relating to PAPs have been fully achieved. To facilitate the achievement of these PDO 17

34 indicators, the following activities were successfully undertaken: the revised 161kV Transmission line RAP was approved, replacement land was provided and the RAP was implemented in accordance with the schedule. Further, implementation of the SAP and LAIR Programs was completed. Therefore five intermediate indicators were achieved. Highlights of the results of related activities follow. 75. At the project s close, almost 100 percent of PAPs claims related to the T-Line had been addressed. Approximately US$242,000 was paid for losses incurred from the destruction of assets. Institutional structures that needed to be relocated were constructed, including four schools, three churches, and two mosques. There remain, however, cases of compensation to be paid as a result of grievances concerning legacy PAPs as well as unavailability of PAPs during the compensation period (95 persons which could not be located since they migrated out of the area). 76. Following the restructuring, a new shoreline survey was undertaken in 2011 to follow up on the conditions of PAPs after impoundment. The survey results showed roughly 100 new PAPs for possible compensation and noted that: (i) most of the identified affected lands in 2008 experienced partial or full flooding; (ii) of the 507 or so markers placed in 2007, 142 went missing after impoundment; and (iii) lands were generally cultivated by over 500 or so shoreline farmers or those who opted to make use of lands during the dry season, including some new households who migrated into the area. 77. The RAP completion report states that 41 houses in 5 villages were resettled for US$286,370. In addition, compensation allowances were made for loss of economic trees, opening of new land, moving costs, cultural lands, and others (e.g. sacred sites) in 38 villages for a total of US$1.4million. Finally, PAP support was provided for emergency agriculture and livelihood assistance, direct food aid, finance and business assistance, rehabilitation and construction of footpaths, etc. for a total of US$2.8 million. The shoreline resurvey in 2012 found that living conditions of resettled households were on the whole satisfactory. Some damage to the resettlement houses was noticed post-resettlement. Maintenance and rehabilitation of the 41 resettlement houses was firmly underway in January 2013 and by the project s close, repairs in one out of three sites was completed. 78. PAPs in the dam and reservoir area were provided with land-for-land exchange, resettlement housing, and/or livelihood restoration support through the Stabilized Agriculture Program (SAP) or the Livelihood Assessment and Income Restoration Program (LAIR). 79. The RAP Completion Report notes that of the 846 FFS members who benefited from the program, 52 percent were female. This confirms that women s contribution in agriculture in the catchment s area is higher than their male counterparts. The focus on women s participation was also evident in the composition of beneficiaries of food aid, community livelihood assistance, and capacity building programs. 80. The impacts of SAP activities were measured through baseline surveys of beneficiaries that were done in 2008 (as the baseline) and in 2011 (as the impact measure). Overall, over 95 percent of households reported an improvement in living conditions since the project s inception 18

35 of SAP activities in A summary of year over year farm production and productivity shows that 45 percent of households had surplus rice compared to 28 percent before the SAP intervention. Finally, the across the board increase in household income was used to invest in livelihood assets, such as renovation of houses, business improvements, investment in tree crop plantations, education, etc. 81. The LAIR carried out by the organization for Research and Extension of Intermediate Technology (OREINT) provided: (i) awareness raising to communities to pursue fishing as a livelihood; (ii) training and materials to newly established fishing groups; (iii) capacity building of affected communities to pursue farming as a business enterprise and generate income for community development (e.g. fisheries and boat building); (iv) skills and knowledge improvement of communities in promoting health and sanitation behaviors for healthcare; (v) access to quality education (e.g. renovation of classrooms); (vi) safe storage to minimize postharvest losses; and (vi) set up of livelihood micro grants for women. 82. The percentage female beneficiaries of the project under LAIR were estimated at 45 percent, but, when added together with SAP, the overall female beneficiaries were estimated at about 51 percent. To the extent that the LAIR and SAP were successful, this PDO indicator is deemed successful. 83. The implementation of energy based community growth pole subprojects was the benefit sharing component of the project and it has been implemented satisfactorily. Activities in connection therewith included: the electrification of Bumbuna Town with connections provided to community level infrastructure such as schools, health centers, and streetlights; the rehabilitation of housing and the construction of six communication centers, landing points and foot-trails. 84. Finally, installation of a provisional warning system downstream. At the project s closing this intermediate indicator had only been partially achieved. At the time of the project s restructuring in 2010, an EPP for dam safety was in place and an EAU established. The EAU was established to perform three important functions: (i) collection and compilation of data regarding downstream communities in the context of safety; (ii) communication of early warning messages; and (iii) responses to any unforeseen emergency situations. The EAU was performing its duties effectively at the project s closing. To complement the operation of the EAU, in 2009, the DSRP had recommended the installation of seven sirens in the near zone downstream from the dam. In 2011, the DSRP recommended a more extensive siren-based emergency warning system totaling 27 sirens to be installed. At project close, 19 siren sites had been completed and partial foundation and perimeter wall work was completed for the remaining 8 siren sites. This activity suffered from significant procurement delays and delays in delivery of the sirens to Bumbuna due to clearances needed once the equipment arrived in Sierra Leone. 85. The BWMA is functional and fulfills its key functions: (i) dam and reservoir RAP; (ii) regular water quality monitoring; (iii) water-borne disease monitoring program; and (iv) management of the conservation area. The BMWA was established to manage the watershed of the reservoir following the commissioning of BHP. It fulfills all the functions described with the exception of the monitoring of waterborne diseases; as such the related PDO indicator is 19

36 substantially achieved. The Act establishing the BWMA was passed in 2008 and by late 2012 a well-functioning technical team was in place. The Bumbuna Watershed Management Plan was developed and adopted. The BWMA regularly reports on the state of the environment in the watershed. However, there is still no sustainable financing mechanism for BWMA. Resulting in only three of the four intermediate indicators related to this PDO indicator being achieved. 86. Loma Mountains National Park (LMNP) is established and operational. LMNP, comprising 33,201 hectares or 128 square miles, was identified by the ESAP in 2007 as an appropriate additional offset for the natural habitat impacts under the project and was established as a national park in December This was in addition to BCA for watershed catchment above the dam and near-zone reservoir. Management of the park is operational 14 ; however, no sustainable financing mechanism is in place for the LMNP. The following activities have been completed: The physical demarcation of Park boundaries was completed with participation of local communities using 90 erected pillars; Women s groups participated in the clearing and planting of 20,000 economic tree seedlings between demarcation pillars; Park rangers (15) assigned, trained, and are carrying out regular patrolling and threat monitoring, which is believed to have been highly effective in restricting illegal use of park resources; An initial biodiversity inventory has been established through collation of existing studies; Process framework and management plan developed and disclosed (fulfilling the related intermediate indicator); A settlement court was convened to address any issues with legal claims to resources within the Park s boundary, and concluded that there were no valid claims; Collaboration with local and chiefdom officials and a MoU between Forestry Department and communities on appropriate land uses in and around the Park, including development of a Community Action Plan. Overall Rating for the Achievement of the PDO 87. The overall rating for the achievement of the PDO is Moderately Unsatisfactory. This rating is a weighted average of the PDO rating before and after restructuring, taking into account that approximately 63 percent of disbursement took place before project restructuring, e.g. under the original PDO (see table). 14 Operational means that the park staff is present, equipped and that there are facilities for field work. 20

37 Against Original PDO Against Revised PDO Rating Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Rating Value 2 4 Weight (% disbursed before/after change in PDO) Weighted Value Final Rating (rounded) 2.74 equivalent to Moderately Unsatisfactory 3.3 Efficiency 88. Efficiency is rated low. While the project achieved tangible results, the costs involved in achieving project objectives were relatively high when compared with both the benefits and with recognized norms. 89. At the time of project appraisal, a Financial Summary for the Revenue Earning Project Entities, namely BHC and the Project Company, were prepared. Based on the changes in the project, BHC was not established and the revenue and cost streams, supported through IDA PRG (which was canceled on GoSL s request) did not materialize. This analysis is not relevant to determine the efficiency of the restructured project. The restructured project was a Technical Assistance Grant that financed environmental and social mitigation actions. A quantitative economic or financial analysis to determine the internal rate of return is not feasible given the scope of the project. 90. Frequent changes in the definition of project activities had a negative influence on the efficiency of project implementation. The project preparation and implementation period of this relatively small project spanned a period of a decade and not all project activities were finalized at project closure. The project underwent one Level 1 restructuring during this period but also underwent multiple Level 2 restructurings. These Level 2 restructurings included multiple reallocations of IDA funds. This lowered the efficiency of project implementation, resulting in a fragmented approach to procurement (arguably resulting in higher unit costs). The project amount for the environmental and social activities was US$12.5million. This amount was increased by 76 percent (US$9.5 million) at time of project restructuring because of cost overruns and to fund new activities recommended by the DSRP and ESAP. 91. It should be noted that Bank Budget spent on the project is equivalent to over 20 percent of the IDA Grant amount disbursed. The total amount of Bank Budget spent on preparation and implementation support for the BHP since 2005 is approximately US$4.0 million, including US$2.2 million in staff costs, US$1.3million in travel and US$504,000 in other expenses. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating 92. The overall outcome rating is Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU). This composite rating is a combination of the ratings for project relevance (relevant), achievement of the PDO (MU), and efficiency (low). 21

38 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts a. Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 93. The project contributed to the objectives of reducing poverty; enhancing community development; encouraging women s empowerment; and strengthening capacity-building at the grass-roots level. The social development programs focused on addressing hunger and deprivation while ensuring improved local governance. The project s outcome measurements applied time and cross section poverty indicators that showed an improvement in household incomes by over 26 percent (since the baseline in 2004 up to the follow-up survey in 2010) The indicators were broken down by categories of vulnerable populations. Since one of the project s objectives was women s empowerment, the outcomes were quantified using gender disaggregated data. These included qualitative impact assessments (using case studies) for such activities as female-headed micro-enterprises and small businesses; women s participation in project and local decision making, and changes in women s life skills (using demographic and health indicators). Overall, there was significant improvement in women s incomes and leadership (e.g. a 50 percent increase in women local leaders in agri-business groups and farmer field schools). 95. Similarly, there was a separate outcome indicator that was measured for youth participation. In 2004, the project organized a peace building and conflict management workshop for youth, following an assessment of the post-conflict conditions in the area. By end of project, more than 35 percent of community development programs were coordinated by youth leaders in the 33 villages covered by the project. An example of long-term impact is the inter-chiefdom youth sports tournament (labeled Soccer for Peace ) which eventually became a yearly event and integrated into the District youth programs. b. Institutional Change/Strengthening 96. The project was part of the CAS program for institutional strengthening and public sector reforms. The project did not achieve the envisaged institutional strengthening through the establishment of a PPP structure for the management, operation and maintenance of the BHP. Some progress was made in setting up, within the energy sector, management institutions that integrated environmental and social considerations into infrastructure services, for example the legal establishment of the BWMA as part of the BHP. This further led to the inclusion in power projects of environment monitoring indicators, which were subsequently applied to the mining sector. Many of these efforts required inter-ministerial collaboration between energy, environment, and social ministries. 15 The poverty baseline was established in 2004 (sample survey as part of project preparation), then followed up with a panel survey conducted one year after the project s community driven development activities started in The final poverty measure was performed in 2010, one year after household and community compensation payments was completed, and once livelihood support schemes had started. 22

39 c. Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 97. The project had no other unintended outcomes or impacts. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 98. A comprehensive measurement approach was applied to assess beneficiary impacts of the project. Baseline socio-economic surveys were completed using two time lines before the start of the project in 2004 and after one year of implementation (in 2008). Panel surveys were undertaken in 2010 to measure impacts on households incomes and livelihoods. This included GIS mapping of post-impoundment conditions at the community level. 99. The results of the socio-economic and environment surveys were disclosed and explained to communities in two district-wide workshops. In addition, a Stakeholder Workshop was also organized in 2012 to harvest and exchange experiences of representatives of a number of project affected communities, which included disaster risk preparedness and village-based disaster risk reduction and management approaches. Some of the key findings of the socio-economic surveys from 2008 to 2012 are as follows: Farming still remains the major source of livelihood in the immediate Bumbuna catchment area with the proportion of households engaged in farming increasing 17 percent to 98 percent in Ownership of agricultural land/property has increased from 76 percent (in 2008) to 88 percent (in 2012), but use of mechanized tools has not caught up among PAPs. Rice and groundnut still remain the food crops predominantly grown by all households in the target communities, and oil palm is considered important in the Bumbuna immediate catchment areas. There is a moderately high increase in mid-level income (Le300, ,000) received from self-employment from 2008 to Common cold and malaria which were reported as highly prevalent in 2008 still remain to be the major disease burdens in the Bumbuna immediate catchment areas. Other diseases that had low prevalence in 2008 had significantly high prevalence in 2012 (diarrhea, typhoid and cholera). Health care facilities have deteriorated significantly from Access to literacy courses by household heads fell sharply from 53 percent to 13 percent from A review of housing and sanitation continues to remain a major concern. For example, housing with mud/earth floor increased from 64 percent in 2008 to 84 percent in Availability of common pit latrines fell to 4 percent. The lakes, rivers and ponds still serve as major sources of drinking water for a large proportion of households in the Bumbuna immediate catchment areas. While over 70 percent of communities still do not have access to year-round drinkable water, but access had increased by roughly 20 percent by

40 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome 100. The risk to the development outcome is rated high. This rating reflects the risks to the sustainability of the development outcome to mitigate, reduce and offset environmental and social impacts and enhance the benefits of the BHP. The risk to the development outcome mainly lies in the fact that these institutions are not fully operational and lack sustainable financing. The Bumbuna dam and power house are still operated on an ad hoc basis. This has already led to reduced power production, but will need to be improved to improve production and avoid dam safety issues in the future. Agreed payment structures for O&M are not implemented. Bumbuna Trust, the institutional vehicle designed to provide sustainable financing for the project s ongoing safeguards, has not been operational and is not financed 16. The GoSL did not finalize all environmental and social measures sponsored under the project before project closing. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance a. Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry [Rating: U] 101. The Bank s performance in ensuring quality at entry is rated unsatisfactory. This rating is based mainly on the shortcomings in the background analysis underpinning the project design. The design of the PRG and the underlying PPP structure for the management and O&M of the BHP were not very advanced at the time of Board approval. The due diligence underlying the PPP design and the use of a PRG was limited. The assessment on the willingness and capacity to introduce a private operator did not take into account the advance stage of construction and the pressure to commission the hydropower plant in a power-starved country. The achievement of the PDOs was contingent upon the successful implementation of a reform program supported through another project, the PWP, which never fully achieved its objectives. Technical due diligence was limited and the Bank team did not include an experienced hydropower engineer. On the other hand, quality of entry on environmental and safeguards issues was satisfactory, although the cost of environmental and social measures was underestimated 17. It should be noted that project preparation was done under time pressures with the specter of loss of Sierra Leone s exceptional IDA allocation at the end of the fiscal year. b. Bank Performance in Quality of Supervision [Rating: MU] 102. Bank performance in the quality of supervision is rated as moderately unsatisfactory. This rating reflects a combination of a meticulous supervision on specific activities financed under the project with a reactive approach to changing circumstances at a strategic level. 16 There is no immediate or foreseeable prospect of Bumbuna Trust, given the inability of GoSL to put the overall electricity sector and the hydropower project on a sustainable financial footing. Bumbuna Trust has not been established even though the draft Trust Deeds and the Implementation Manual were drafted and submitted to GoSL. 17 The restructuring paper states that the extent and cost of key activities under the IDA Grant were greatly underestimated, most particularly the RAPs and the environmental offset, while potential revenue streams from carbon credits or from energy generation were greatly overestimated. 24

41 103. On the one hand, the project benefited from intense Bank safeguards supervision and implementation support, undertaken by an experienced team of senior specialists. The supervision team included lead energy specialists (who also served as Task Team Lead during the period when the project was managed by the Bank s energy department), a lead social specialist, with support from senior social specialists based in Accra and Freetown, as well as energy and dam safety staff. Supervision benefited from support from senior safeguards staff from the Bank s central units. Project supervision missions were frequent both before and after project restructuring, and focused mainly on safeguards. Training on fiduciary management included two procurement and one financial management workshop for PIU and GoSL staff. It should also be noted that the project originated in the Bank s energy department, was then moved to the environment unit, and back to energy again, which resulted in changes in task leaders On the other hand, the Bank was not proactive to adjust to changes in the operating environment. An important factor in this rating is the delay in Bank action after the request for cancellation of the PRG within a year after Board approval and four months after the investment lending component of the project became effective. This means that activities financed under the investment lending component of the project continued to be implemented for three years without a realistic prospect of meeting the project s original PDO. The Bumbuna dam was already commissioned and operational by the time the project was restructured in The restructured project to a large degree retrofitted a set of social and environmental measures on a completed infrastructure project. The Bank found itself in a situation where it was legally obliged to stay engaged to support the completion of all social and environmental activities of the BHP to ensure compliance but with little leverage to influence those responsible for project implementation. At the time of restructuring, the likelihood of the GoSL outsourcing operation and maintenance to an independent operator in the near term was already low 18 and the capacity constraints of the GoSL to implement social and safeguards activities were known. However, the restructuring did not substantially address these issues After the first restructuring, increasingly leadership on project activities shifted from the GoSL to the Bank team. As the project proceeded, several measures were added to the scope of the project to respond to recommendations by the ESAP. The decision making process between the GoSL and the Bank on these changes in the scope of project activities is not well documented and hard to assess. However, indications are that the GoSL showed little ownership in the implementation of these measures as it moved on to other pressing priorities - especially after the Bumbuna hydropower project was no longer operating at full capacity. c. Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance [Rating: MU] 106. Overall Bank performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. As noted above, the environmental and social appraisal was thorough but appraisal did not fully address financial, PPP structuring, and engineering issues. This resulted in a complex project design to fill a relatively small construction financing gap. The long delay in restructuring the project and the 18 The restructuring paper states that NPA has already accumulated arrears in making payments to Bumbuna and GoSL is considering dropping the wholesale tariff to reduce NPA s payment liability. 25

42 decision to limit Bank financing to safeguard activities weakened the Bank s ability to influence institutional and financing issues bearing on the project s longer term sustainability. At the same time, the Bank carried out a thorough and sustained supervision of project activities that led to completion of most activities outlined at the project restructuring. 5.2 Borrower Performance a. Government Performance [Rating: U] 107. The Government of Sierra Leone did not consistently follow through on its commitments regarding the project. The initial agreed PPP structure and related sector reforms for the BHP were dropped soon after project approval as the GoSL found alternative sources to fill the financing gap that allowed for a finalization of construction under a more traditional public sector management structure. Subsequently, the GoSL muddled through with the operation and maintenance of the dam and the powerhouse - it never recruited a professional operator and did not define a clear plan on how to operate the dam. Instead, it extended the contract with the contractor to operate the dam on an interim basis several times but never fully paid the contractor to properly operate the facilities. As time went by, the GoSL lost interest in the environmental and social safeguards activities, as the dam was commissioned. A positive note is that the GoSL was able to pass legislation related to formation of institutional structures, like BWMA and BCA that provide some longer term follow up of safety, environmental, and social safeguards. However, these structures were not backed up by budgetary commitments to sustain their activities. Frequent changes in government including changing Ministers of Energy hampered continuity and reduced the institutional memory of what motivated past decisions and agreements with the World Bank. b. Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance [Rating: MS] 108. Implementation agency performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory (MS). The PIU initially suffered from lack of capacity and frequent changes in leadership. In later years, the PIU was strengthened and managed to complete key programs (e.g. procurement of siren equipment, LMNP set up, RAP implementation, etc). The restructured project expanded the set of activities and introduced substantial shifts in project administration and the doubling of the number of contracts that had to be procured through competitive bidding. This additional administrative load overstretched the PIU till additional staff could be hired to deal with the additional load. Before restructuring, PIU performance on M&E and communications was lagging, but this improved much after the restructuring. Furthermore, the PIU was able to put in place a revised program for developing monitoring indicators and improving the collection and analyses of evaluation surveys. c. Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance [Rating: MU] 109. The overall borrower performance rating is Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU). While the performance of the PIU of the project has been moderately satisfactory, this is outweighed by the shortcomings in the government s performance. 26

43 6. Lessons Learned 110. Level of Ambition and Pace of Reform in Fragile States. The rationale for the Bank s involvement was sound given the needs of the client at the time. IDA only got involved in the BHP at a late stage and with limited resources (a PRG to backstop a loan to complete the remaining 15 percent of the works and a grant for E&S activities) but the success of the IDA supported operation depended on an ambitious number of institutional reform measures to be undertaken by the Government of Sierra Leone. Some of these were directly related to the operation (e.g. establishing a PPP structure for the operation of the BHP). But the PDO of the IDA-supported operation also depended on a broader power sector restructuring. This sector restructuring was supported by IDA through the Power and Water Project. This Bank support was dropped when the Power and Water Project was restructured in 2007 to rehabilitate a power plant that had stopped working. The lesson learned from the experience is to more prudently assess the pace of sector reforms in a fragile environment and to adjust (and where possible ringfence) project objectives and design to fit the environment Project Scope and Timing. The Bank s environmental and social safeguards policies apply to the entirety of an infrastructure project supported by the Bank and its associated facilities, regardless of the extent of Bank support. In the case of the Bumbuna project, most construction activities already had been completed when IDA financing became effective. The project tried to retrofit good performance on a hydropower development that was already near completion. As the Bank was not financing construction, it had no formal relationship with the contractor. Given the frequent power outages in Sierra Leone, the GoSL s interest was mainly on commissioning BHP as soon as possible. After project restructuring, the operation exclusively supported environmental and social activities. This further reduced the leverage the Bank had on various stakeholders. It should be noted that while the achievement of the operation s PDO after restructuring is rated moderately satisfactory, the Bumbuna hydropower project in a broader sense was performing unsatisfactorily as it was only operating at half its capacity. In later stages of project implementation, the interests of the GoSL and the Bank continued to diverge. The GoSL s interest shifted to restoring the dam to full installed capacity. However, the Bank s attention was channeled to a near exclusive focus on safeguards compliance. For instance, in the absence of a professional operator for the dam, the Bank recommended the creation of an Emergency Action Unit to narrowly address dam safety issues rather than provide a broader suite of support for the operation and maintenance of the BHP. The first lesson is for the Bank to be involved more upstream in hydropower project development, ensuring in particular that safe operation and maintenance of the plant after commissioning is secured at the planning stage. The second lesson is to provide broader support on complex hydropower developments in order to be able to be better aligned with the interests of client governments The Dilemma of Continuing Support. While the risks inherent in this operation were consistently recognized during project preparation and supervision, the Bank did not have a sufficiently comprehensive strategy in the event that the GoSL failed to abide by its commitments. Several years passed between the request to cancel the PRG and the actual cancellation. At that time, the Bank had little choice but to increase the amount of resources for social and environmental activities as (in the words of the restructuring paper): the Project was unable to ensure immediate compliance in a dynamic manner, but now faces a mortgage of 27

44 future liabilities that must be addressed. This pattern was repeated as the project moved forward. When the GoSL did not hire a professional operator, as it had committed to, the project was extended and restructured to finance a siren system. The issue of long term financing to sustain the environmental offsets was not resolved before project closure. In short, the Bank was faced several times with the dilemma whether to continue support to the GoSL to reach safeguards compliance while having few credible remedies to ensure that the GoSL would undertake the necessary action. In some ways, this situation continues beyond project closure, as the Bank will continue to supervise the implementation of environmental and social safeguards as per Bank policies. The lesson learned is that, the Bank needs to establish clear understandings, commitment and prior actions by the client, and remedies for handling situations where prior actions are not met Decision Making on Changes in Compliance Requirements. The measures necessary for environmental and social safeguards compliance were revised and extended several times during project implementation. Many of the revisions were initiated by the two panels of experts. For instance, the size of the environmental offset was revised upwards, including the addition of the Loma Mountain National Park. The number of people to be compensated under the RAP also was revised during project implementation. The installation of a siren system was added when the recruitment of an experienced operator did not take place in time. While adjusting the social and environmental activities to changing circumstances is sometimes necessary, the scope and frequency of revisions is notable 19. Also, the decision-making on including new activities is not very well documented. The lesson learned is to better define upfront what needs to be done for safeguards compliance and to have a clearer decision making framework on revisions of the various safeguards instruments. This would increase the efficiency and predictability of Bank support and help create ownership of the additional activities for various stakeholders, in particular the government. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/Implementing Agencies 114. The Borrower and implementation agencies did not provide comments on this report, despite multiple reminders. (b) Co-financiers 115. Not applicable. 19 The restructuring paper describes the changes as a striking case of the learning by doing, while adapting to an uncertain and unchartered environment in a post-conflict country. However, it is unclear in how far changes were indeed caused by the post-conflict country environment. 28

45 (c) Other Partners and Stakeholders 116. Not applicable. 29

46 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing Bumbuna Environmental & Social Management Project (a) Original Project Allocation by Component at Appraisal Description of Proposed Allocation Total Project Cost at Appraisal (US$m)* Component A:Hydroelectric Project Contracts Component B: Environmental Mitigation/Area Development Component C: Technical Assistance Repayment of Project Preparation Facility (PPF) Total Project Cost * The breakdown of actual expenditure by component is unavailable (b) Project Allocation of Additional Financing by Components Description of Proposed Allocation Estimated Allocation of IDA Additional Financing Grant (US$m)* Component A:Environmental Management and Social Mitigation 7.05 Component B. Benefit Sharing 1.25 Component C. Technical Assistance 1.20 TOTAL 9.50 * The breakdown of actual expenditure by component is unavailable (c) Original and Revised Financing Plan (US$ million) Source Original Revised Borrower IDA AfDB Italy Netherlands OPEC Commercial Bank (IDA Guarantee, P086803) TOTAL

47 A. Original Project Annex 2. Outputs by Component Bumbuna Environmental & Social Management Project Planned Activities Completed Activities Component A. Hydroelectric and Transmission Infrastructure Completion of hydroelectric and transmission civil works Component B. Environmental Mitigation, Resettlement, Watershed Management and Benefit Sharing. Oversight of the Environmental Management Plan and Resettlement Action Plans by the BPIU Development of an Environmental and Social Management Unit within the Ministry of Energy and Power Establishment of Bumbuna Watershed Management Authority (BWMA) and Bumbuna Conservation Area (BCA) Oversight of the EMP and the RAPs completed for construction and impoundment phase - BWMA and BCA established on July 4, 2008, by an Act of Parliament Bumbuna Watershed Management Plan Community environmental awareness program (BWMP) prepared and implemented started Monitoring of public health impacts - Establishment of an environmental and social Environmental bypass built to maintain an amenity flow environmental/social amenity flow at all times Management of water quality in the reservoir Water quality monitoring program formulated area Preparation/implementation of a - comprehensive environmental monitoring program Biodiversity Baseline Studies Reservoir Clearing Emergency Preparedness Plan for safety measures downstream from the reservoir Implementation of the Dam/Reservoir Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) 31 Completed studies led to the identification of an alternative environmental offset, the Loma Mountains National Park (LMNP). Reservoir area was cleared of most large trees to reduce methane gas emissions and navigation risks. Partially Completed Emergency Preparedness Plan formulated. (Emergency Action Unit established under the Grant in the absence of counterpart funds) RAP updated and implementation of the revised RAP started prior to the first phase of Bumbuna dam impoundment. By December 2008, 38 villages, 599 households, and 5,033 project affected persons (PAPs) had been resettled and compensated,

48 Implementation of Livelihood Assessment and Restoration Program (LAIR) for Dam/Reservoir Implementation of Stabilized Agriculture Program (SAP) for Dam/Reservoir Implementation of transmission line RAP Ward and Community Subprojects, Youth Capacity Building Program, Catchment Stakeholder Forums Bumbuna Trust New activity not referenced in the PAD Establishing and Operationalizing the Loma Mountains National Park (LMNP) and emergency food aid was provided for two years, as recommended by ESAP, from August 2007 to August 2009 to address hunger and deprivation during the transition period (prior to full impoundment). Of these PAPs, 41 households (186 people) in five villages were resettled, and received hectares of village lands in replacement. In addition, there are 95 farm plots belonging to 171 farmers, covering an area of 117 hectares that will be partially or fully inundated so replacement lands (under a land-for-land exchange program) were allocated and cash compensation paid for lost crops, trees, and other assets. Lastly, there were 48 sacred sites in 21 villages that received village compensation to cover the costs of replacement and the performance of cultural ceremonies. The audit of the RAP for the dam and reservoir area was completed in May 2008 and rated highly satisfactory by ESAP. LAIR activities commenced Local consulting firm hired to carry out activities under the Stabilized Agriculture Program (SAP), focusing on agricultural extension and training for conservation farming. Farmer field schools (FFS) were formed using 30 farmers per FFS. Each FFS received training on conservation farming through a Memorandum of Agreement with the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Forestry (MoAFS) Tonkolili District offices T-Line RAP was revised to update of PAPs and redefine the T-Line right-of-way RAP requirements for testing and activation implemented - Draft legal act for the establishment of the Trust prepared but not adopted Baseline studies for LMNP completed. Boundary demarcation of LMNP ongoing. 32

49 Management and supervision of Component B Funding of the Dam Safety Review Panel (DSRP) and the Environmental and Social Advisory Panel (ESAP) Communication Action Plan B. Restructured Project Component C. Technical Assistance Management and Supervision for construction period completed Funding for DSRP and ESAP for the construction period completed Communication Action Plan formulated Planned Activities Completed Activities Component A. Environmental Management and Social Mitigation ESMP oversight during operation phase Completed Key personnel recruited and BWMA becomes Completed operational BWMP prepared and implemented by BWMA Completed Plan for monitoring and mitigating public Not completed health impacts is formulated and implemented as part of BWMP Water quality monitoring program Completed implemented as part of BWMP Environmental Monitoring program is Completed prepared and implemented as part of BWMP Emergency Preparedness Action Plan for safety measures downstream form the reservoir fully implemented. Legally establish Loma Mountain National park (LMNP) including the preparation of the process framework Bumbuna Trust established to sustainably support the BWMA and LMNP Dam/Reservoir RAP updated following impoundment LAIR continues to be expanded to cover all Completed PAPs for 2 additional years SAP continues to be expanded to cover all 846 members benefitted from the FFS program PAPs for 2 additional years 52 percent female Transmission Line RAP is updated, Almost 100 percent of PAPs claims related to compensation paid including legacy PAPs and the T-Line had been addressed and completion livelihoods restored of compensation payments was made during October December, Approximately US$ 242,000 was paid for losses incurred from the destruction of assets (physical property and economic trees). However, there remain cases of compensation to be paid as a result of grievances concerning legacy PAPs as well as 33

50 unavailability of PAPs during the compensation period (95 persons which could not be located since they migrated out of the area). The remainder of compensation payment, which was equivalent to an estimated US$ 15,000, was deposited in a special account (similar to an escrow ) and will be paid out, once the issues are resolved. These include construction of relocated institutional structures (four schools, three churches and two mosques). Component B. Community Growth Poles Implement energy-based community growth pole sub-projects Component C. Technical Assistance Support the PIU Finance the DSRP and ESAP Communication Action Plan updated and Implemented 34

51 Annex 3: Results framework Original Project Bumbuna Environmental & Social Management Project PDO Indicators Baseline value Target Actual value Electricity sales (GWh) increasing from 68.9 GWh in 2003 to 230 GWh in 2008 (PAD para 2.1 and Annex 3) * Percentage reduction of average electricity tariffs (PAD para 2.1 and Annex 3)* A biodiversity index to be established under the Additional Environmental Studies, acceptable to the Association, does not reduce by the end of the Project (PAD para 2.1, Legal Agreement) 100 percent of Project Affected Persons resettled per definition of OP4.12 by the end of the project (PAD para 2.1, Legal Agreement) Sixty percent increase of the targeted watershed area under improved agricultural conservation practice by the end of the project. (PAD para 2.1, Legal Agreement) Sustainable fishery practices in 60% of the reservoir and downstream of the dam (PAD para 2.1 and Annex 3) 80 percent of PAP involved in new income generating activities (forestry, fisheries, agriculture, soap making, carpentry, etc) by the end of the Project (PAD para 2.1, Legal Agreement) Bumbuna Watershed Management Plan (BWMP) developed (PAD para 2.1, Legal Agreement) 68.9 GWh 230GWh Not monitored 0% 15% Not monitored None exist Index established Completed 0% 100% 0% Partially completed (5,033 persons identified were resettled and compensated. 60% Not monitored 0% 60% Not monitored 0% 80% Not Available NA BWMP developed by March 1, 2007 Not completed Environmental and Social Management Unit NA Created and operational by Not completed 35

52 PDO Indicators Baseline value Target Actual value in the Ministry of Energy and Power (MoEP) created and operational. (PAD para 2.1, Legal Agreement) December 1, 2008 Bumbuna Conservation Area (BCA) established and management plan adopted (PAD para 2.1, Legal Agreement) NA BCA established by October 31, 2006 and management plan adopted March 1, 2007 BCA and BWMA established July 4, 2008 by an Act of Parliament; management plan not prepared. Environmental management monitoring system developed by the date of effectiveness of the Grant (PAD para 2.1, Legal Agreement) NA Date of effectiveness Not Available *These two indicators were recorded in ISR Sequence 1 and 2. Subsequent monitoring was not recorded. Intermediate Outcome Indicators Baseline Target Actual Component A. Hydroelectric and Transmission Infrastructure Delivery of electricity at the power substation in Freetown in line with PPA (PAD Annex 3)*** Operation of a privately managed power generation company (the Special Purpose Company, the BHC)(PAD Annex 3)*** Not monitored 0 Regulator in place Not monitored Component B. Environmental Mitigation, Resettlement, Watershed Management and Benefit Sharing Environmental Management and Mitigation Plan (EMP) is being implemented as agreed, leading to the Efficient Operation of the Bumbuna Watershed Management Authority (BWMA)***+ EMP developed EMP activities implemented; Watershed Management Authority functional; Wildlife Conservation Area established. Most activities implemented; ongoing; ESAP panel largely satisfied. Safety issues to be implemented. Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) for the Dam and Reservoir and the RAP for the transmission line, are being implemented in accordance with RAP implementation RAP developed All RAP activities implemented. Implementation ongoing; completion scheduled for

53 Intermediate Outcome Indicators Baseline Target Actual schedules. ***+ Effective establishment and demonstration of the basic institutional model for the proposed Bumbuna Trust for local resource development. ***+ Component C. Technical Assistance Ensure satisfactory implementation of the project including meeting IDA safeguard policies and promoting sector capacity building. ***+ Not fulfilled Limited capacity GoSL has adopted a Community Sub-projects Manual as part of the PIP defining eligibility criteria, environmental and social screening guidelines and approval and administration arrangements. Environmental and Social Management Unit in MoEP established. High level of public support for the project. Community projects will be addressed during restructuring and they are likely to be negotiated as part of community compensation in land for land swap. BPMU now receiving assistance with communication action plan. Minister wants to strengthen and incorporate BPMU to his ministry as an implementing unit for all projects. ***When the results framework in the PAD was transferred to the electronic Implementation Status Report format, the higher level results in the first columns of the PAD Annex 3 were used for monitoring. +Target and actual results were taken from ISR #11 dated June 18,

54 Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes Bumbuna Environmental & Social Management Project (a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Lending Dona1 O'Leary Task Team Leader AFTEG Richard Senou Sr. Financial Analyst AFTEG Fanny Missfeld-Ringius Energy Economist AFTEG Pierre Vieillescazes Sr. Financial Officer IEF Charlotte Bingham Lead Environmental Specialist ESDQC Robert A. Robelus Sr. Env. Assessment Specialist AFTS1 Kristine M. Ivarsdotter Sr. Social Dev. Specialist AFTS1 Wendy Wakeman Sr. Operations Officer PRMGE Leonardo Mauei Communications Specialist EXTCD Tesfaalem Gebreiyesus Sr. Procurement Specialist AFTPC Giovanni Casartelli Lead Procurement Specialist OPCPR Mohammed Bekhechi Lead. Counsel LEGEN Alberto Ninio Sr. Counsel LEGAF Manush Hristov Counsel LEGAF Ximena Talero Sr. Counsel LEGCF Helene Bertaud Sr. Counsel LEGAF Frederick Yankey Sr. Financial Management AFTFM Specialist Erica Hyde Program Assistant AFTEG Responsibility/ Specialty Marie-Adele Tchakounte Program Assistant AFTU2 Lawrence Haas Consultant Power Systems Planner James Vincent Consultant Community Driven Dev. Thomas Katta YP Youth Expert Don Webster Consultant Economist Nigel Wills Consultant Expert Manitoba Hydro Supervision/ICR Joyce Olubukola Agunbiade Consultant AFTMW Akinrinmola O. Akinyele Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTMW Ferdinand Tsri Apronti Consultant AFTA1 Mi Hyun Bae Mbayo Senior Social Development Spec LCSSO Helene Bertaud Senior Counsel LEGAM 38

55 Alexandra C. Bezeredi Regional Environmental and Safeguard AFTSG Samuel Bruce-Smith Consultant AFTDE Malcolm Cosgrove- Davies Sector Manager, Energy LCSEG Maria Concepcion J. Cruz Lead Social Development Specialist AFTCS Robert W. DeGraft- Hanson Financial Management Specialist AFTMW Martin Fodor Senior Environmental Specialist AFTN3 Manush A. Hristov Senior Counsel LEGES Kristine M. Ivarsdotter Senior Social Development Specialist LCSSO Helena Mamle Kofi Consultant AFTG1 Paivi Koljonen Lead Energy Specialist AFTG1 Anton Luis Garcia E T Consultant LEGLA Stephen F. Lintner Senior Adviser OPSOR Fanny K. Missfeldt- Ringius Senior Energy Economist MNSEE Sameh I. Mobarek Senior Counsel LEGPS Mark M. Moseley Lead Counsel LEGPS Mohua Mukherjee Senior Energy Specialist SASDE Alberto Ninio Chief Counsel LEGEN John Nyaga Sr. Financial Management Specialist EASFM Lars O. Oedegaard Consultant AFTN1 Oluwole Pratt Financial Management Analyst AFTME Dirk Nicolaas Prevoo Senior Operations Officer CPFGC Chrisantha Ratnayake Consultant AFTG1 Robert A. Robelus Consultant AFTA1 Scott Sinclair Lead Financial Officer AFTG2 Rajiv Sondhi Senior Finance Officer CTRLA John W. Fraser Stewart Sr Natural Resources Mgmt. Specialist CPFIA S. Swaminathan Finance Analyst CTRLN Charles Taylor Consultant AFTPW Satoru Ueda Lead Water Resources Specialist TWIWA Jorge E. Uquillas Rodas Consultant OPSOR Virginie A. Vaselopulos Language Program Assistant AFTN1 Pierre C. Vieillescazes Consultant MNSF1 Frederick Yankey Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTMW 39

56 (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle US$ Thousands (including No. of Staff Weeks Travel and Consultant Costs) Supervision/ICR FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY Total: ,

57 Project Preparation Documents: Annex 5. List of Supporting Documents Bumbuna Environmental & Social Management Project 1) SIERRA LEONE: Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project. Report of the First Meeting of the Dam Review Panel, October 25-November 4, ) Retrospective Review of the Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project: Emphasizing the Role and Application of Options Assessment Concepts; Lawrence J.M. Haas, in collaboration with the PIU Bumbuna Staff and with contributions from stakeholders; November 30, 2004 (draft final report). 3) Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project, Environmental Impact Assessment. NKUK/BMT CORDAH EFA, draft final report January 2005 (3 volumes). 4) Resettlement Action Plan for the Reservoir and Dam Area, Bumbuna Hydropower Project, Electrowatt-EKONO, Techsult Company Ltd, Final Report, January 26,2005 (2 volumes). 5) Resettlement Action Plan Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project - Transmission Line Project from Bumbuna to Freetown Sierra Leone, AZIMUT, INFOTIERRA, BGJLR, Land Compensation Consultants, with the collaboration of the Bumbuna PIU staff, Final Report January ) Completion of the Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project, Environmental and Social Advisory Panel, Report 1, 11 November, ) Upper Seli River, Community Development Initiative, James Vincent, February ) SIERRA LEONE: Recommended Legal Framework for the Electricity Sector, prepared by Hunton and Williams LLP, Washington D.C. January ) Bumbuna Falls Hydroelectric Project. Laser Scanning Survey Report. Studio Pietrangeli Airborne Laser Solutions, January ) The National Power Authority (Amendment) Act Bumbuna Arrangements, February 2005 (Draft). 11) Design of the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission for Sierra Leone. International Management and Regulatory Institute, Freetown, Sierra Leone, March 2005 (Draft). 12) The Sierra Leone Public Utilities Regulatory Commission Act. International Management and Regulatory Institute, Freetown, Sierra Leone, March 2005 (Preliminary Draft). 13) Republic of Sierra Leone: Institutional Support Project to Strengthen the Public Financial Management and the Energy Sectors: Appraisal Report. African Development Fund, Country Operations Department, West Regions, September ) Transitional Support Strategy for the Republic of Sierra Leone, World Bank, March ) Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, A National Programme for Food Security, Job Creation and Good Governance ( ), Government of Sierra Leone, February ) Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Sierra Leone, World Bank, May ) Upper Seli River Community Development Initiative, World Bank, proposal to the Japan Social Development Fund, March Project Supervision A. Safety: 1) Memorandum of Understanding between MEWR, ONS and SLRCS, November ) West Africa Disaster Management Capacity Building Project - Simulation Exercise Report, November

58 3) Terms of Reference for the Emergency Action Unit, BHP, October ) ACP-EU for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (DRR) - Window 2 Proposal, August ) Bumbuna Project, Dam Safety Review Panel, Final Report, September ) Bumbuna Emergency Preparedness and Action Plan, GoSL, August ) Bumbuna Site Assessment Report, Voith Engineering, December ) Bumbuna Project, Dugout Canoe Accident in Kakuthan, August ) Bumbuna Project, ESIA Progress Report on Siren Location, November ) Bumbuna Siren Warning System Design, Studio Pietrangeli, November ) Bumbuna Warning System Sirens Location General Map, Studio Pietrangeli, November ) Contract for the Supply, Installation, Testing and Commissioning of the Siren Warning System at Bumbuna, May ) Concealing of Exposed Counterpoises and Demolition of Structures under 161 KV Transmission Line, Layanaa Consultants, June B. Bumbuna Trust: 14) Memorandum and Articles of Association of Bumbuna Trust Company (SL) Ltd, July ) Bumbuna Trust Company Operational Manual (draft), May C. Environmental and Social Advisory Panel (ESAP): 16) Bumbuna project - ESAP Mission-1 Report, November ) Bumbuna project - ESAP Mission-2 Report, April ) Bumbuna project - ESAP Mission-3 Report, April ) Bumbuna project - ESAP Mission-4 Report, April ) Bumbuna project - ESAP Mission-5 Report, January ) Bumbuna project - ESAP Mission-6 Report, April D. Bumbuna Watershed Management Authority (BWMA): 22) Water Quality and Fisheries Management Report: November June ) BWMA Fisheries Management Program, Survey of Fishing Communities, April ) Hydrological and Fisheries Monitoring Programme, Final Field Report, April ) Draft Bumbuna Eco-tourism Assessment Report, May ) Environmental Health Impact Assessment: Bumbuna Hydro-electric Dam, October ) Report of the Botanical Survey in Bumbuna Watershed (Sierra Leone), April ) Follow-up Survey of Amphibians and Reptiles of Bumbuna Project Area, May ) BWMA Biodiversity Monitoring Draft Report. Study Area Butterflies, June ) Bat (Chiroptera) Study for Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project (draft), June ) Primates and Other Large Mammals Survey in the Bumbuna Conservation Area, June ) Bumbuna Biodiversity Monitoring, Thematic Group Birds, June ) Signed MoU between BCA Land Holding Families, Communities and BWMA, March ) Survival Rate of Tree Crop Planted in BCA and Watershed in 2012, June ) BWMA Community Sensitization Meetings Report, November ) Tree Planting and Management in BCA and Watershed, November ) Details of Beneficiaries within BCA and Watershed during CY2012, May ) Bumbuna Conservation Area Eco-tourism Brochures, June ) BWMA Monthly Progress Report, June

59 40) BWMA Overall Power-point Presentation of its Activities, September E. Loma Mountains National Park (LMNP): 41) Proclamation for the Constitution of the Loma Mountains National Park, February ) National Protected Areas Authority Gazette Notification, October ) LMNP Preliminary Management Plan (Volume I), OBF, February ) LMNP Community Action Plan, Volume II, OBF, February ) LMNP Preliminary Management Plan , Management Planning and Consultation Report, Volume III, OBF, February ) LMNP Process Framework Report (draft), EEMC, June ) Report on the Assessment of Routes Leading to LMNP, May ) Agreement between GoSL / FD and Forest-edge Communities, May ) LMNP Status Report, June ) LMNP Civil Works Outstanding, September F. Loma Mountains National Park (LMNP): 51) RAP Completion Report of Bumbuna Project - Reservoir and Dam Area, June ) RAP Completion Report of Bumbuna - Transmission Line, August ) Bumbuna Socio-Economic Impact Survey, Implementation of the Transmission Line RAP, Independent Consultant Report, May ) Bumbuna Socio-Economic Survey Community, Household and Community-services Questionnaires, July ) Bumbuna Socio-Economic Impact Survey, Implementation of Dam & Reservoir RAP, Independent Consultant Report, November ) Bumbuna Socio-Economic Baseline Report, EEMC, August ) Witness NGO Inception Report to Monitor the Implementation Completion of Activities under Transmission Line RAP, Centre for Accountability and Rule of Law (CARL), August ) Complaints after Shoreline Re-Survey in the Dam/Reservoir Area, February ) SAP Final Implementation Report, July ) LAIR / OREINT Program of Activities, October 2012 to June ) Kawunkulu Food Support Programme Report, August ) Maintenance of Sanitary Facilities (VIP toilet) in 4 Project Affected Communities, May G. Miscellaneous Documents: 63) Sierra Leone Power Sector Financial Review , June

60 Annex 6: MAP Bumbuna Environmental & Social Management Project 44