Chilean pension reform: Refining the model after 25 years

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1 Chilean pension reform: Refining the model after 25 years Guillermo Larrain Rios Vice President IOPS and AIOS Member of the Board, Expansiva Santiago, march 2005

2 Agenda 1. Workings of the Chilean model 2. Outcomes a. Macroeconomic and financial issues b. Social issues: estimated replacement ratios 3. Reforming the Reform 1. Multifunds 2. SCOMP 3. Information to affiliates

3 General aspects of the multipillar Chilean pension system Pillar 1: Old age poverty prevention Contributory Minimum pension State-guaranteed (20 yr) Non contributory means tested basic pension Pillar 2: Consumption smoothing, mandatory, DC AFP (accumulation) Life Insurance Companies (LIC, disbursement) Pillar 3: Consumption smoothing, voluntary AFP LIC, Mutual Funds, brokers, banks

4 The AFP system in graphical terms Managed by Pension Multi Funds Scheme Portfolio A Savings In Personal Accounts B C D E Government regulates and supervises and provide guarantees

5 The minimum pension guarantee PM PA Years contributing 20

6 Means tested basic pension PA Threshold Poverty score

7 Stable formal jobs Formalization Labour Complementary Marketareas are needed: reforms pension reform istotal not a Jobs magical potion! Growth Pension Reform Financial The outcomes Developmt in Chile are so TFP because of the Public financing of transition Macroeconomic impact of pension funds: analytics For this model to work, many reforms in different persistence of reforms directed in the same orientation for decades. Savings Investmnt Macro stabilty, resource allocation

8 Macroeconomic impact of pension funds: estimates Initial Not explained Linked to reform Med. GDP growth (average 80-01) 4.6 Effects of reform: Savings + Investment 0.13 Labour Markets 0.10 Financial developmt + TFP 0.20 Total contribution , ,1 3,1 "Initial growth", Average growth

9 Pension savings, a history upwards 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% MM US$ % of GDP Millons of USD % of GDP

10 Pension Funds Return: high return and volatility 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% -5% Fdo Tipo A Fdo Tipo B Fdo Tipo C Fdo Tipo D Fdo Tipo E Promedio Fdo A Promedio Fdo B Promedio Fdo C Promedio Fdo D Promedio Fdo E

11 Asset diversification has increased over time: all instruments 100% 90% Invest. Abroad 80% Corporate Sector 70% 60% 50% Financial Sector 40% 30% 20% Government Bonds 10% 0%

12 Asset diversification has increased over time: financial sector 100% 90% 80% Deposits 70% 60% Mortgage Credit 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

13 Asset diversification has increased over time: all instruments 100% 90% Invest. Abroad 80% Corporate Sector 70% 60% 50% Financial Sector 40% 30% 20% Government Bonds 10% 0%

14 Asset diversification has increased over time: Corporate Instruments 100% 90% Bonds 80% Equities 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

15 Portfolios in Latin America País Total (millones Deuda Gubernamental Instituciones financieras Instituciones no financieras Acciones Fdos. Mutuos y de inversión Emisores extranjeros de US$) (Proporción respecto al fondo total) Argentina ,9% 3,6% 1,5% 11,8% 2,8% 9,7% 1,7% Bolivia ,1% 7,3% 16,7% 8,6% 1,7% 1,5% Chile ,7% 26,3% 7,7% 14,5% 1,9% 23,7% 0,1% Costa Rica ,5% 13,8% 5,7% 1,0% El Salvador ,3% 13,2% 4,2% 0,3% México ,3% 4,5% 13,2% Perú ,5% 21,4% 12,1% 35,5% 1,0% 8,8% 1,7% Uruguay ,6% 22,9% 5,8% 1,8 Total ,0% 15,3% 8,9% 10,2% 1,7% 12,4% 0,4% Total S/Chile ,8% 6,7% 9,8% 6,8% 0,8% 3,4% 4,2% Total S/Chile y Perú ,7% 5,0% 9,5% 3,6% 0,8% 2,8% 4,5% Otros - Chile and Peru are the most diversified portfolios

16 But significant challenges remain: Replacement rates as criteria Longevity, low densities of contribution, excess early retirement, high transaction costs in acquiring annuities lower pensions Table 4-5: Average Replacement Rates by Pensioner Category ( ) Replacement Rate (1) Replacement Rate (2) Replacement Rate (3) Last observed wage Average wage, 3 years Average lifetime before retirement contributed wage All Affiliates 44% 44% 121% With pension above MPG (with own fund) With more than 10 years contributed 66% 66% 121% 62% 63% 114% Source: Berstein, Larrain, Pino (2006)

17 Reforming the reform 1: Multifondos At the beginning there was only one portfolio Strict regulation on limits Minimum relative return

18 Reforming the reform 1: Multifondos Herd behaviour appeared (as always but more than elsewhere) Two opposing views on that: minimize likelihood of individual errors of judgement: safety element. as portfolios do not vary, nor do returns. AFPs offered only one portfolio, very similar to each other.

19 Reforming the reform 1: Multifondos Percentage 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Fund A Fund B Fund C Fund D Fund E Fondo A Fondo E Variable Income Fixed Income Up to and Up

20 Reforming the reform 1: Multifondos 10% Risk- Return Tradeoff for Type of Pension Fund (January 2005 December 2005) Average Real Return (%) 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% -2% 0,0% 0,5% 1,0% 1,5% 2,0% 2,5% 3,0% 3,5% 4,0% 4,5% Risk (s.d.) (%) A B C D E

21 Reforming the reform 1: Multifondos apr 2001 sep Returns Price Help salesperson AFP image Gift Friend s recommendation Doesn t know

22 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% Intermediation fees while acquiring an annuity Dic.90 Dic.91 Dic.92 Dic.93 Dic.94 Dic.95 Dic.96 Dic.97 Dic.98 Dic.99 Dic.00 Dic.01 Dic.02 Dic.03 Dic.04 Ene.05 Feb.05 Mar.05 Abr.05 May.05 Jun.05 Jul.05 Reforming the reform 2: SCOMP Lagos administration put priority to this law

23 Reforming the reform 2: SCOMP Average difference between highest and lower offer of annuities 9 8,5 8 7,5 + 16,5% % 7 6,5 6 5,5 5 Ag-Dic.04 Ene.05 Feb.05 Mar.05 Abr.05 May.05 Jun.05 Jul.05 Vejez Edad Vejez Anticipada

24 Reforming the reform 3: information to affiliates Behavioural economics has found convincing evidence that in saving decisions what prevails is inertia. However, no rational choice is possible, even for those that take decisions, without appropriate information Two major problems remained for 20 years: 1. When there was only one possible portfolio, the benefit of being informed was smaller compared to the cost. 2. The statement was extremely complex, therefore People received statements but it was useless: desinformation. Surveys suggest: 93% of affiliates did not know the price 56% declared ignorance of the balance of their personal accounts 54% of men and 64% of women declared that they have never changed from one AFP to another

25 Reforming the reform 3: information to affiliates Financial statement: comparison of fees Variable fee (% of salary) Fixed Com. Total Com. paid Annual dif. Respect cheapest Name of each AFP

26 Chilean pension reform: Refining the model after 25 years Guillermo Larrain Rios Vice President IOPS and AIOS Member of the Board, Expansiva Santiago, march 2005

Impact of the Financial Crisis on Pension Systems in LAC

Impact of the Financial Crisis on Pension Systems in LAC Waldo Tapia Labor Market Unit Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) OECD/IOPS GLOBAL FORUM ON PRIVATE PENSIONS: PENSION REFORM AND DEVELOPMENTS