Longevity risks in Pension Systems viewed from the pay-out phase in. Chile

Transcription

1 Longevity risks in Pension Systems viewed from the pay-out phase in Chile Guillermo Larrain R. Superintendente Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros Chile Sao Paulo, Mayo 2008

2 Agenda I. Hard facts: longevity is a world wide phenomena. II. Consequences: longevity affects all pension systems: DB/DC, PAYG/Capitalization, Closed/Open III. Looking for solutions in the Chilean DB payout phase

3 Ageing is affecting all. Chile is ageing relatively more Ageing, an international comparison Life expectancy at birth (both genders)

4 Mortality Tables for pensioners in Chile : 2004 vs ,70 0,60 Tablas de mortalidad rentistas hombres Q x 0,50 0,40 0,30 0,20 0,10 0, Años RV2004 H RV 85 H Tablas de mortalidad rentistas mujeres Q x 0,70 0,60 0,50 0,40 0,30 0,20 0,10 0, Años RV2004 M RV 85 M

5 Mortality Tables for beneficiaries in Chile: 2006 vs 1985 Tablas de mortalidad beneficiarios hombres Q x 0,70 0,60 0,50 0,40 0,30 0,20 0,10 0, Años B 2006 H B 85 H Tablas de mortalidad beneficiarios mujeres 0,70 0,60 0,50 Q x 0,40 0,30 0,20 0,10 B 2006 M B 85 M 0, Años

6 Mortality Tables for disabled persons in Chile: 2006 vs 1985 Tablas de mortalidad inválidos hombres Q x 0,70 0,60 0,50 0,40 0,30 0,20 0,10 0, Años MI 2006 H MI 85 H Tablas de mortalidad inválidos mujeres Q x 0,80 0,70 0,60 0,50 0,40 0,30 0,20 0,10 0, Años MI 2006 M MI 85 M

7 Life expectancy at each age in Chile: a gender issue appears Pensioners Edad Esperanza de vida según tabla de mortalidad Male Rentistas hombres Female Rentistas Mujeres RV-85 RV-2004 Diferencia RV-85 RV-2004 Diferencia 45 32,71 35,17 2,46 37,79 42,48 4, ,36 30,71 2,35 33,16 37,67 4, ,29 22,12 1,83 24,32 28,38 4, ,65 18,16 1,51 20,21 24,04 3, ,34 14,56 1,22 16,36 19,83 3,47 Beneficiaries Edad Esperanza de vida según tabla de mortalidad Male Beneficiarios Hombres Female Beneficiarios Mujeres B-85 B-2006 Diferencia B-85 B-2006 Diferencia 45 30,28 35,31 5,03 35,55 40,82 5, ,07 30,83 4,76 31,01 36,13 5, ,41 22,21 3,80 22,44 27,12 4, ,04 18,24 3,20 18,52 22,88 4, ,05 14,61 2,56 14,9 18,87 3,97 Disabled Edad Esperanza de vida según tabla de mortalidad Male Inválidos Hombres Female Inválidos Mujeres MI-85 MI-2006 Diferencia MI-85 MI-2006 Diferencia 45 23,79 25,04 1,25 29,25 31,83 2, ,18 21,97 0, ,51 2, ,97 16,72 0,75 19,52 21,84 2, ,43 14,3 0,87 16,34 18,48 2, ,96 11,88 0,92 13,22 15,15 1,93

8 Female Conclusions: Women on top Increase in life expectancy at age Pensioners Beneficiaries Disabled Age group (increasing) Male

9 Preliminary conclusions Ageing is universal It is more acute in countries like Chile It may have more impact in rich countries because they had developed more generous PAYG pension systems Two broad conclusions: Retirement age is critical in view of ageing populations Women appear to outpace men's ageing. Huge gender issue with vast implications (social, political, economic, etc )

10 Agenda I. Hard facts: longevity is a world wide phenomena. II. Consequences: longevity affects all pension systems: DB/DC, PAYG/Capitalization, Closed/Open III. Looking for solutions in the Chilean DB payout phase

11 Impact on Pay-as-you-go pension systems Dependency ratios 100% 45 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Old age Overall 0-14 years (% pop, right axis) Increasing dependency ratios require: Increasing state financing (to be financed by taxes or reducing other expenditures) Increasing personal contributions Source: SVS, based on INE Ageing progresses without clear bound and birth rates stall, hence The previous process is unbound: enormous fiscal pressure whose political economy is complex (tendency to delay decisions evident)

12 Impact on Capitalization pension systems Pensions are diminished (for any size of personal savings, it is necessary to finance more years of survival): the buffer becomes people s pensions instead of public finances or so it seems at first glance Interphase Phase I : accumulation Phase II : Payout Retirement age Lifetime This is a system. As such, the outcome depends on all of its parts

13 Impact on Capitalization pension systems Pension = Retirement age Net savings Life expectancy at retirement Personal contributions (size, frequency, starting age) Employers contributions (matching) State contributions (incentives) Financial returns in accumulation phase Financial returns in payout phase Costs Operational during accumulation phase Transactional in the interphase of acc/payout Operational during payout phase The ongoing pension reform in Chile took care of all of this elements plus a critical redefinition of the zero-first pillar

14 Estimated effects of ageing on programmed withdrawals in Chile (DC) Trayectoria de la pensión en Retiro Programado (fuente: SAFP) Líneas verticales expectativas de vida: --- RV85 y RV 2004

15 Consequences for Life Insurance Companies (annuity providers, DB) Spreads are reduced inducing LICs to look for ways of compensation Potential increase in investment risks Incentive to reduce operational costs: potential market concentration Increase in capital and reserve requirements to face increased pension obligations Increased competition may induced commercial war with unintended consequences on undesired practices

16 Agenda I. Hard facts: longevity is a world wide phenomena. II. Consequences: longevity affects all pension systems: DB/DC, PAYG/Capitalization, Closed/Open III. Looking for more solutions in the Chilean DB payout phase

17 1. Promote voluntary savings: Individual (APV) Individual Voluntary Savings Scheme (APV) Tax incentive (suitable therefore only for income tax payers: upper middle class) More financial institutions allowed Attractive liquidity feature : unless mandatory savings, APV can be consumed before retirement. Taxes are paid when consumption takes place Mar-02 May-02 Jul-02 Sep-02 Nov-02 Ene-03 Mar-03 May-03 Jul-03 Sep-03 Number of accounts Nov-03 Ene-04 Mar-04 May-04 Jul-04 Sep-04 Nov-04 Ene-05 Número de cuentas Mar-05 May-05 Jul-05 Sep-05 Nov-05 Ene-06 Mar-06 May-06 Jul-06 Sep-06 Saldo acumulado (MMUS$) Nov-06 Ene-07 Balances Mar-07 May-07 Jul-07 Sep-07 Nov

18 2. Promote voluntary savings: Collective (APVC) Colective Voluntary Savings Scheme (APVC, just introduced) Tax incentive with liquidity feature as in APV Financial institutions allowed as in APV New features Matching contribution from employer, tax deductible All APVC plans offered to employees are open to them: no discrimination permitted Worker has rights over her savings and earns the right over the matching contribution after some time. Possible use as an incentive device to promote permanence in the firm (hence, training, productivity ) Minimum number of workers within the firm must adhere to any savings plan to make the firm eligible for tax benefit: this grants access to lower middle classes

19 3. Tougher conditions for early retirement Tougher conditions for early retirement and use of excedent of free disposal. Early retirement. Before 2004: resulting pension should be 110% of minimum pension and greater than the 50% of the last 10 years income. After 2004: same criteria but new parameters 150% of minimum pension and 70% of last 10 years income.. Excedent of free disposal. Antes de 2004: Igual que retiro de ELD Ley Año 2004: Igual que retiro de ELD Gradually increase in legal retirement age, still a possibility for the future

20 4. The challenge of the interphase: The SCOMP system Diminish asymmetries of information, promote healthier competition reducing fees charged : the SCOMP system Objective: promote a clear and comparable market for annuities and other retirement products Electronic market for Life Insurance Companies, Pension Fund Administrators, Brokers Blind quotation mechanism: each LIC compete for providing the best possible annuity to an unknown client Client can iterate (even organizing an auction among providers) or postpone decision (except in case of auction) Joint supervision: SVS - SAFP Started 19 de agosto de 2004.

21 4. The challenge of the interphase: The SCOMP system 3. Diminish asymmetries of information, promote healthier competition reducing fees charged : the SCOMP system 7,00% 6,00% 5,00% 4,00% 3,00% 2,00% 1,00% 3,40% 3,62% 3,47% 4,67% 4,66% 5,58% 5,33% 5,45% 5,84% 5,91% 3,89% 2,67% 2,68% 2,47% 2,13% 2,13% 2,19% 2,16% 0,00% Feb 2008

22 4. Working of the SCOMP 7 Certificado de Ofertas Remate Inicio Trámite 9 Certificado Electrónico Saldo 1 2 SCOMP 3 Consultante Solicitud de Ofertas 2 Certificado Saldo AFP origen 8 Oferta Externa de RV Montos RP, Bono, Proyección 2 Solicitud de Ofertas + Certificado de Saldo 5 Ofertas 6 CSV n AFP o CSV o Corredor RV o Asesor Previsional Formulario Solicitud de Ofertas 4 AFP n

23 4. Working of the SCOMP AFP SISTEMA Envío Antecedentes del potencial pensionado Recepción Ofertas de Montos de Pensiones CIAS. SEGUROS Certificado de Ofertas de Montos de Pensiones AFP Compañía de Seguros Corredor, Asesor Previsional Solicita Oferta TRABAJADOR POTENCIAL PENSIONADO

24 5. New Investment Regime for Life Insurance Companies Better risk-adjusted returns on assets More flexible approach focused on financial and operational risks. It should allow investments on more variable income instruments looking for a better riskreturn profile Hedging instruments desirable Critical good governance of LICs Risk based capital requirements

25 6. Potential new pension products : Differed Annuity Differed Annuity. It allows to fix the terms of an annuity during the working life period. This annuity, coupled with other pension products will consist in the final pension. It transfers longevity risk to the insurer It allows future pensioners to take advantage of good market conditions for buying annuities. It requires significant financial advise.

26 7. Potential new pension products : Bonds indexed to relevant inflation Inflation protection In Chile annuities are indexed to inflation measured by the Consumer Price Index Consumption bundle of retired persons eventually coincide with the average worker (relevant for CPI purposes) but it gradually moves significanly away from it as the person gets older The older the person, less relevant is CPI as relevant measure of inflation Challenge: Create a Pensioner Price Index Design a market for instruments linked to this: government, private companies (health institutions, ) including derivatives or outright subsidies

27 8. Potential new pension products Longevity Bonds A longevity bond promises a yearly payment indexed to a mortality index which replicated the behavior of the pensioners Pago del Bono (CLP bn) etc Años

28 8. Potential new pension products Longevity Bonds LICs would obtain an instrument to hedge against longevity risk. Indexation could consider size of payments or maturity of the instrument Hedge is adequate, even though not perfect as it relies on average mortality, not LIC specific Issuer Must have interest in exposing itself to this kind of risk Derivative market desirable Transfer longevity risk to a reinsurer. Calculation of official mortality tables critical: Which entity will do it? Public or private? How frequent?

29 Longevity risks in Pension Systems viewed from the pay-out phase in Chile Guillermo Larrain R. Superintendente Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros Chile Sao Paulo, Mayo 2008