Brazil Economic Weekly

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1 Macroeconomic Research Department Macroeconomic Research Department Brazil Economic Weekly January 29 th 2016 Credit market remained sluggish in 2015 Ellen Regina Steter With a balance of R$3.217 trillion, equivalent to 54.2% of GDP, the national financial system s credit inventory ended 2015 with a growth rate of 6.6%, down from the 11.3% expansion seen in The increase in inventory was not only more modest than that seen during the previous year, it was also lower than the inflation calculated for the same period. Thus, in real terms, the system s credit inventory showed a decrease of 3.7%, a move that has not happened since The financing portfolio s pace of growth slowed over the past year, following the downturn in economic activity. While the quarterly growth of the inventory was approximately 3.0% in the first three months of last year, the growth rate did not exceed 1.0% in the last quarter of With the continued economic downturn, with a 3.5% decline in GDP this year, the demand for credit will remain weak, which will limit the growth of concessions and, consequently, the portfolio. Thus, we project a slight moderation in credit performance in 2016 compared to the previous year, with a 6.2% increase in the national financial system s total credit portfolio. To this end, we expect a 2.7% increase in loans granted with free funds and a 9.7% increase in the portfolio with directed funds. Changes in the global scenario are structural, implying a more permanent and sustained reduction of economic dynamism Fabiana D Atri BRAZIL ECONOMIC WEEKLY The start of the year has brought many questions, accompanied by risks to the global economy. As a result, expectations with regard to asset prices and the dynamics for growth have quickly adjusted. The driver for this increased pessimism was the rapid and significant correction of the stock markets in China. At the same time, commodities prices, especially oil, have dropped fairly significantly, raising important questions about the whole production chain for raw materials. Similarly, this scenario certainly has been, and should be, important for monetary policy decisions in both emerging and developed economies, given that deflationary forces are expected to prevail in this context, even though the depreciation of most currencies against the dollar must be taken into account. Our view is that this unfavorable environment should be understood to be structural rather than temporary. Interestingly, the market seems to be pricing in already known scenarios, such as the structural slowdown in the Chinese economy and the surplus present in commodities markets. We do not see a global recession underway, even though asset prices are reflecting such a fear. Among the major economies: (i) US GDP growth is expected to continue to be driven by domestic demand, including internal consumption, residential real estate investment and government spending, although a crisis in the mining industry cannot be ruled out (which would remove approximately 0.3 pp of GDP this year, keeping in mind that a significant portion of internal consumption is due to the disposable income resulting from the fall in fuel prices); (ii) there is room for policies in China that will moderate the intensity of the slowdown and we expect some stability in the equities and foreign exchange markets in the months ahead; (iii) monetary stimulus will still be expanded globally and this will impose some stability on growth (more than offsetting the normalization of monetary conditions in the US, in light of the aggressive reactions last week by the Central Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank). Commodities producers, on the other hand, represent the greatest risk, as there will be lower demand and negative effects on GDP, especially in economies dependent on the commodities sector. 1

2 Credit market remained sluggish in 2015 Ellen Regina Steter With a balance of R$3.217 trillion, equivalent to 54.2% of GDP, the national financial system s credit inventory ended 2015 with a growth rate of 6.6%, down from the 11.3% expansion seen in The increase in inventory was not only more modest than that seen during the previous year, it was also lower than the inflation calculated for the same period. Thus, in real terms, the system s credit inventory showed a decrease of 3.7%, a move that has not happened since ,0% 22,0% 18,0% 14,0% 10,0% 10,8% 15,2% 17,0% 23,3% 23,4% 10,4% 13,8% 11,5% 10,0% 8,1% Change in the national financial system s credit inventory, in real terms 6,0% 4,6% 2,0% 1,6% -2,0% -0,4% -6,0% -4,4% ,7% 2015 The financing portfolio s pace of growth slowed over the past year, following the downturn in economic activity. While the quarterly growth of the inventory was approximately 3.0% in the first three months of last year, the growth rate did not exceed 1.0% in the last quarter of Domestic Outlook 9,7% 8,7% 7,7% 6,7% 6,0% 5,7% 4,7% 3,7% 2,7% 1,7% 0,7% Sep-07 Dec-07 8,8% 7,3% 2,7% 4,5% 5,1% 4,5% Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Dec-08 Mar-09 Jun-09 Sep-09 Dec-09 Mar-10 Jun-10 Sep-10 Dec-10 Mar-11 Jun-11 Sep-11 Dec-11 Mar-12 Jun-12 Sep-12 Dec-12 Mar-13 Jun-13 Sep-13 Dec-13 Mar-14 Jun-14 Sep-14 Dec-14 Mar-15 Jun-15 Sep-15 Dec-15 3,9% The directed credit portfolio ended 2015 with the highest growth rate of the inventory, at 9.8%, and it was responsible for the largest contribution to 3,4% 3,0% 1,5% 2,0% 1,0% Quarterly growth of the total credit inventory (free and directed seasonally adjusted the expansion of credit. Approximately 70% of the expansion of the total credit market seen last year came through the directed lines, which, however, 2

3 showed the most significant slowdown. With this, a significant part of the 2015 credit slowdown, especially as of the second half of the year, was triggered by the directed credit trends. Even though the movement is gradual, this is the first time since 2009 that there is a consistent inflection in the movement of the portfolios contribution to the growth of credit, which can be noted in the chart below. 80,0% 70,0% 68,0% 60,0% Free credit Directed credit 63,5% 58,4% 55,9% 54,8% 66,0% 78,1% 90,0% 70,7% 70,0% 71,0% Contribution of the portfolios to the growth of the credit inventory over twelve months 50,0% 50,0% 40,0% 32,0% 36,5% 41,6% 44,1% 45,2% 34,7% 30,0% 30,0% 29,3% 27,6% 20,0% 21,9% Jan-09 Mar-09 May-09 Jul-09 Sep-09 Nov-09 Jan-10 Mar-10 May-10 Jul-10 Sep-10 Nov-10 Jan-11 Mar-11 May-11 Jul-11 Sep-11 Nov-11 Jan-12 Mar-12 May-12 Jul-12 Sep-12 Nov-12 Jan-13 Mar-13 May-13 Jul-13 Sep-13 Nov-13 Jan-14 Mar-14 May-14 Jul-14 Sep-14 Nov-14 Jan-15 Mar-15 May-15 Jul-15 Sep-15 Nov-15 10,0% Among the lines of directed credit, the modalities that showed the greatest decline in their contributions to the expansion of credit in the system were: (i) rural credit, whose contribution decreased from about 10% at the beginning of the year to 5.4%, and (ii) the BNDES portfolio, which accounted for approximately 30% of the growth and ended the year with a 20% share. Even though the slowdown in rural credit has been more intense, given that the BNDES share is higher (about 20% of total financial system portfolio compared with 7% of rural credit), its behavior was the most relevant to the downward trend of loans seen in In fact, the moderation in activity by the BNDES can be noted both in the pace of the portfolio s expansion, as well at the volume conceded. According to data from the Central Bank, the annual disbursements decreased from R$181.8 billion in 2014 to R$135.0 billion last year, falling 26% in one year. 40,0% 36,0% 36,6% 34,0% 32,8% 28,8% 28,0% 27,7% 24,8% 26,0% Rural 22,0% Real Estate BNDES 20,6% 16,0% Other Microcredit 10,0% 9,7% 7,5% 7,5% 6,1% 5,2% 3,1% 5,4% 4,0% 2,9% 4,1% 4,7% 0,0% 0,0% -2,0% Jan-15 Feb-15 Mar-15 Apr-15 May-15 Jun-15 Jul-15 Aug-15 Sep-15 Oct-15 36,4% Nov-15 37,3% Dec-15 Contribution of the directed modalities to the growth of the total credit inventory over twelve months Domestic Outlook The free funds portfolio also grew less than the directed credit portfolio, 3.7% versus 9.8%, a trend that will continue in However, the slowdown over the past year was less intense than that observed in the directed modalities. In fact, there is stability in the inventory, a fact that is related to the maintenance of volumes conceded. The average amount conceded to families is virtually unchanged since the beginning of 2014, at around R$7.0 billion per day. It is worth noting that a significant portion of these concessions is shortterm, such as credit card purchases, which account for nearly 40% of the total disbursed. It is important to note that even at this moment of more adverse economic conditions, especially in the labor market, 3

4 we have not noticed an increase in the lines related to indebtedness 1 in relation to the total volume granted. The only change seen, which began in 2014, occurred between the reduction in the share of lines linked to the consumption of durable and semi-durable goods (financing of vehicles and goods) in favor of purchases (full and instalment retail purchases) with credit cards. This scenario is compatible with the moderation of the average ticket paid and consumption more geared towards everyday expenses Daily average of the concessions with free funds to individuals (seasonally adjusted) R$ million Aug-11 Oct-11 Dec-11 Feb-12 Apr-12 Jun-12 Aug-12 Oct-12 Dec-12 Feb-13 Apr-13 Jun-13 Aug-13 Oct-13 Dec-13 Feb-14 Apr-14 Jun-14 Aug-14 Oct-14 Dec-14 Feb-15 Apr-15 Jun-15 Aug-15 Oct-15 Dec-15 Composition of the average daily concession to individuals with free funds (seasonally adjusted) 48,0% 43,0% 38,0% 46,4% 44,5% 38,4% 42,9% 38,2% 42,1% 44,4% 43,2% 39,9% 40,0% (*) Debt: revolving credit + overdraft + renegotiation + check cashing + other (**) Core: personal credit (including consigned credit) + financing + leasing (***) Credit cards ex-revolving: credit cards purchased + retail installment purchases 33,0% 33,2% 28,0% 23,0% 23,4% 18,0% 31,9% 24,4% 19,8% 21,9% 21,7% Core Debt Ex-revolving cards 16,8% 13,0% Aug-11 Oct-11 Dec-11 Feb-12 Apr-12 Jun-12 Aug-12 Oct-12 Dec-12 Feb-13 Apr-13 Jun-13 Aug-13 Oct-13 Dec-13 Feb-14 Apr-14 Jun-14 Aug-14 Oct-14 Dec-14 Feb-15 Apr-15 Jun-15 14,7% Aug-15 Oct-15 Dec-15 In the case of financing for companies with free funds, despite the fact that the growth of the inventory accelerated in the past year compared to 2014, at 4.8% versus 3.8%, an important part of this is explained by the effect of the exchange rate depreciation. It is known that some corporate lines are indexed to the dollar, such as ACC, external funding, and import and export financing. Therefore, whenever there is a currency depreciation, there is automatically an increase in these operations. For example, if we exclude the exchange rate variations and consider the exchange rate stable throughout 2015, using the quote from December 2014 (R$/US$ 2.65), the free funds portfolio would have contracted 2.9%. The same signs of moderation can be seen in the rate of credit conceded to companies: while the daily average conceded in 2014 was R$7.2 billion, last year the average was R$6.9 billion. Domestic Outlook Aug-11 Oct-11 Dec-11 Feb Apr-12 Jun-12 Aug-12 Oct-12 Dec-12 Feb-13 Apr-13 Jun Aug-13 Oct-13 Dec-13 Feb-14 Apr Jun-14 Aug-14 Oct-14 Dec-14 Feb Apr-15 Jun-15 Aug-15 Oct-15 Dec Average daily concessions to companies with free funds (seasonally adjusted) in R$ million 1 We consider lines of credit to be overdraft, revolving credit card, check cashing and renegotiation 4

5 With the continued economic downturn, with a 3.5% decline in GDP this year, the demand for credit will remain weak, which will limit the growth of concessions and, consequently, the portfolio. Thus, we project a slight moderation in credit performance in 2016 compared to the previous year, with a 6.2% increase in the national financial system s total credit portfolio. To this end, we expect a 2.7% increase in loans granted with free funds and a 9.7% increase in the directed funds portfolio. Domestic Outlook 5

6 Changes in the global scenario are structural, implying a more permanent and sustained reduction of economic dynamism Fabiana D Atri The start of the year has brought many questions, accompanied by risks to the global economy. As a result, expectations with regard to asset prices and the dynamics for growth have quickly adjusted. The driver for this increased pessimism was the rapid and significant correction of the stock markets in China. At the same time, commodities prices, especially oil, have dropped fairly significantly, raising important questions about the whole production chain for raw materials. Similarly, this scenario certainly has been, and should be, important for monetary policy decisions in both emerging and developed economies, given that deflationary forces are expected to prevail in this context, even though the depreciation of most currencies against the dollar must be taken into account. Our view is that this unfavorable environment should be understood to be structural rather than temporary, which should keep markets quite volatile and economic activity depressed this year. Interestingly, the market seems to be pricing in already known scenarios, such as the structural slowdown in the Chinese economy and the surplus present in commodities markets. We re almost ending the first month of 2016 and the sharp decline in equity markets and the depreciation of the renminbi against the dollar once again brought to the forefront concerns about the Chinese economy. The Shanghai index has accumulated a decrease of 22.7% so far this year and the currency has lost 1.3% in value against the dollar, showing some stabilization more recently. Naturally, various issues, which were present a few years ago, have returned. In our view, there is not much new in relation to what we have discussed: intensified slowdown concentrated in industry and in real estate, combined with the high leverage of the financial system and industry excess capacity, accumulated in recent years, increases the vulnerability of the economy as a whole. With this, the margin for interventions has been reduced and errors and/or background noise with regard to the conduct of economic policy ultimately generates volatile and often exaggerated movements, such as those observed this year on a global scale China stock market: Shanghai composite index (in points) Global Outlook /02/ /03/ /04/ /05/ /06/ /07/ /08/ /09/ /10/ /11/ /12/ /01/ /02/ /03/ /04/ /05/ /05/ /06/ /07/ /08/ /09/ /10/ /11/ /12/ /01/ /02/ /03/ /04/ /05/ /06/ /07/ /08/ /09/ /10/ /11/ /12/ /12/ /01/2016 We re not saying there aren t any problems or challenges coming from China. On the contrary, we believe that the risks for China are significant. Primarily because industry and exports are still important to the country s economic Source: Bloomberg cycle and currently the level of idleness is too high and the overseas markets have considerably slowed as well. Added to this, risks also stem from the outflow of capital, but we still believe that the government has 6

7 instruments to mitigate them, promoting a smoother deceleration (given the strong injection of liquidity in recent weeks), encouraging new sources of growth and advancing reforms, which will take time. Unlike what we had previously believed, we are assuming a stronger depreciation of the currency against the dollar and the pressure for a decline in the stock market will remain present and, unlike the government targets, is expected to be rapid. We maintain our expectation of GDP growth of 5.5% this year, after expanding by 6.9% last year. In other words, the Chinese economy will continue to weaken and we should not expect good news from the country in terms of growth. Thus, it seems that China will export a significant amount of deflation to the global economy, through the depreciation of the renminbi and, especially, the fall in commodities prices. The sharp drop in oil prices approximately 10% this year has captured this increase in risk aversion in the markets. However, we know that not only frustration with regard to demand, but also production surpluses explain this adjustment in the commodities market. Added to this, it goes without saying that there are geopolitical issues behind these new prices for oil. The fact is that there is much uncertainty about its equilibrium price over the short term. Some analyses suggest that it may go as low as US$10/barrel (approaching the cost of production in Saudi Arabia) and other analyses suggest that it will return to $40/barrel ,6 112,6 110,6 110,0 115,1 107,7 WTI BRENT Price of oil (US$/barrel) ,3 98,0 99,7 93,7 86, ,2 62,5 67,8 57,7 63,3 54,2 53,1 46, ,5 43,9 38,2 34,7 33, ,6 04/05/13 23/06/13 12/08/13 01/10/13 20/11/13 09/01/14 28/02/14 19/04/14 08/06/14 28/07/14 16/09/14 05/11/14 25/12/14 13/02/15 04/04/15 24/05/15 13/07/15 01/09/15 21/10/15 10/12/15 29/01/16 Source: Bloomberg Global Outlook The oversupply in this market, which has already been bringing worries and pressure on prices since 2014, is still the main vector exerting downward pressure on this commodity and is expected to remain present throughout the year. Iran s earlier than expected return to the international market and signals from OPEC that it will not alter its output targets have only worsened the oversupply scenario. In addition, winter in the northern hemisphere began only recently, leading to a new build-up in inventories in a market that already had an excess of inventory. Given that global growth is not expected to be a vector to reduce these inventories on the contrary the adjustment is expected to come through supply reduction, particularly in the United States. For now, estimates of the US EIA 1 show a 7.5% decline in oil production in 2016 compared to last year, which is a major adjustment, but is still at the production level seen in 2014, which is what led OPEC to its current aggressive policy for the maintenance of global market share. Therefore, we continue to expect a scenario of oversupply and accumulation of inventory over much of the year, which should keep prices at very low levels. Currently, with prices near US$30/ barrel, the US production estimates should be revised downward, with some producers with higher extraction costs leaving of the market. In addition, last week, Russia stated that it would accept reducing supply by 5%, which also creates a lower limit for these prices. In our assessment, at the end of the year we should have oil prices back to around US$40/barrel. Our view, therefore, more structural than cyclical, is that the reduction of the global potential GDP and particularly the decline in industrial activity (driven by China) explain a significant part of the change in commodity price levels. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to speak of a corporate crisis on a global scale, particularly in relation to the whole manufacturing sector, with brutal idleness, particularly for companies in the oil chain and producers of raw materials. In fact, it is estimated that the idle capacity in the steel industry has now reached 40%. And, if part of the adjustment of the commodities sector implies production cuts, many companies may end up disappearing during the transition, where only the most efficient will be able to compete. 1 US. Energy Information Administration 7

8 In other words, the global scenario is unfavorable, which was reinforced by the last update made by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The organization recently released its new projections for the world economy in 2016 and According to the report, global GDP is expected to grow 3.4% this year and 3.6% next year, following the expansion of 3.1% in 2015 in October, it forecast increases of 3.6% and 3.8%, respectively. Despite the continuing global recovery, the rebalancing of the Chinese economy, lower commodities prices and the difficulties faced by major emerging economies (notably Brazil and Russia) have led the IMF to revise their expectations downward. In this sense, the risks to this scenario remain negative, linked, in addition to the performance of emerging economies, to the monetary normalization in the US (affecting the cost of financing for companies) and the rise of geopolitical tensions in different regions of the world. The fund is forecasting growth of 2.1% in developed economies in 2016 and 2017, highlighting the 2.6% growth expected for the US over those two years. With regard to emerging economies, the expectation is for 4.3% growth this year and 4.7% next year, with China slowing from an expansion of 6.3% to 6.0% in the period. It also calls attention to the performance of Brazil and Russia, with declines of 3.5% and 1.0% of GDP this year and an expected recovery in 2017 (stability for the Brazilian GDP and growth of 1.0% in Russia). 4,0% 3,6% 3,43% 3,70% 3,80% 3,80% 3,56% 3,40% Forecast for the growth of global GDP in 2016, based on the most recent IMF revisions 3,2% 3,05% 3,02% 2,8% 2,4% FMI Jan/16 IMFI April/16 IMF July/16 IMF Oct/16 IMF Jan/17 Source: BRADESCO, IMF Global Outlook Our view is very similar to that of the IMF, recognizing that the global economy is expected to grow more moderately without significant growth drivers. That said, we do not see a global recession underway, even though asset prices are reflecting such a fear. Among the major economies: (i) US GDP growth is expected to continue to be driven by domestic demand, including internal consumption, residential real estate investment and government spending, although a crisis in the mining industry cannot be ruled out (which would remove approximately 0.3 pp of GDP this year, keeping in mind that a significant portion of internal consumption is due to the disposable income resulting from the fall in fuel prices); (ii) there is room for policies in China that will moderate the intensity of the slowdown and we expect some stability in the equities and foreign exchange markets in the months ahead; (iii) monetary stimulus will still be expanded globally and this will impose some stability, albeit a moderate amount, on growth (more than offsetting the normalization of monetary conditions in the US, in light of the aggressive reactions last week by the Central Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank). Commodities producers, on the other hand, represent the greatest risk, as there will be lower demand and negative effects on GDP, especially in economies dependent on the commodities sector. This new, more challenging context, on the one hand, is deflationary through lower commodity prices, and, on the other hand, exacerbates the trend of a depreciation of emerging market currencies against the dollar. The strengthening trend of the US dollar, in turn, is expected to increase, but this movement is expected to be contained by a more cautious stance from the Fed. This is because, whereas the rest of the world economy is slowing significantly and promoting monetary expansion programs, the Fed s normalization process which began in December last year tends to be more moderate and gradual (as evidenced in last week s FOMC meeting statement). 8

9 1,1% 0,9% 0,4% 8,0% 6,0% 4,0% 2,0% 7,2% 5,6% 4,3% 3,6% 3,0% 2,3% 1,9% 1,4% Updated: 29/01/2016 Variation of selected currencies over the last month 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% -2,0% -1,2% -4,0% -3,5% Argentina New Zealand Poland Mexico UK Source: Bloomberg Global Outlook Switzerland Colombia Australia South Korea Russia South Africa India Peru Taiwan Philippines DXY China Turkey Brazil Euro Czech Republic Canada Singapore Japan Chile Hungary Egypt Emirates Emirates Thailand Indonesia Malaysia 9

10 Bradesco Macroeconomic Forecast Bradesco Macroeconomic Forescast * 2017* DOMESTIC ACTIVITY, INFLATION AND INTEREST RATES GDP (%) Agriculture (%) Industry (%) Services (%) Private consumption (%) Government consumption (%) Investment (%) Exports of goods and services (%) Imports of goods and services (%) GDP (R$ billion - current prices) 2,720 3,109 3,333 3,885 4,373 4,805 5,316 5,687 6,114 6,378 6,901 GDP (US$ billion) 1,396 1,695 1,668 2,207 2,611 2,459 2,463 2,416 1,835 1,617 1,679 Population (million) Per Capita GDP (US$ - current prices) 7,281 8,716 8,469 11,083 13,229 12,343 12,255 11,919 8,976 7,850 8,089 Industrial Production - IBGE (%) Unemployment Rate - IBGE (%) Retail Sales - (%) CPI - IPCA - IBGE (%) CPI - FIPE (%) WPI - IGP-M - FGV (%) Nominal Interest Rates - Selic target (end of period - %) Nominal Interest Rates - Selic target (12-month - %) ,82 10,81 10,81 10,81 Real Interest Rates - Selic (12-month - %) ,25 4,54 4,54 4,54 EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS AND FX Trade Balance (US$ billion) Exports (US$ billion) Imports (US$ billion) Trade flow (exports + imports) (% of GDP) Deficit of Services and Income (US$ billion) Current Account Deficit (US$ billions) Current Account Deficit (% of GDP) Foreign Direct Investment (US$ billions) FX - end of period (R$ / US$) FX - yearly average (R$ / US$) Nominal FX devaluation (YoY - %) Nominal FX devaluation (average - %) International Reserves (US$ billion) Total Medium and Long term External Debt (US$ billion) FISCAL ACCOUNTS Primary Surplus (R$ billions) Primary Surplus (% of GDP) Public Sector Nominal Balance (% of GDP) Gross Public Debt (domestic and external) (R$ billion) 1,542 1,740 1,973 2,011 2,243 2,583 2,748 3,252 4,049 4,719 5,462 Gross Public Debt (domestic and external) (% of GDP) As of January 29 th (*) Forecast. na = not available. Source: Official figures Production and forecasts(*): BRADESCO 10

11 Team Octavio de Barros - Macroeconomic Research Director Marcelo Cirne de Toledo Global economics: Brazil: Brazilian sectors: Fabiana D Atri / Felipe Wajskop França / Daniela Cunha de Lima / Thomas Henrique Schreurs Pires Igor Velecico / Andréa Bastos Damico / Ellen Regina Steter / Myriã Tatiany Neves Bast / Ariana Stephanie Zerbinatti Regina Helena Couto Silva / Priscila Pacheco Trigo / Leandro de Oliveira Almeida Proprietary survey: Fernando Freitas / Leandro Câmara Negrão / Ana Maria Bonomi Barufi Internships: Davi Sacomani Beganskas / Henrique Neves Plens / Mizael Silva Alves / Gabriel Marcondes dos Santos / Wesley Paixão Bachiega / Carlos Henrique Gomes de Brito / Gustavo Assis Monteiro Team - BRADESCO does not accept responsibility for any actions/decisions that may be taken based on the information provided in its publications and projections. All the data and opinions contained in these information bulletins is carefully checked and drawn up by fully qualified professionals, but it should not be used, under any hypothesis, as the basis, support, guidance or norm for any document, valuations, judgments or decision taking, whether of a formal or informal nature. Therefore, we emphasize that all the consequences and responsibility for using any data or analysis contained in this publication is assumed exclusively by the user, exempting BRADESCO from all responsibility for any actions resulting from the usage of this material. We all point out that access to this information implies acceptance in full of this term of responsibility and usage. The reproduction of the content in this report (partially or in full) is strictly forbidden except if authorized by BRADESCO or if the sources (the name of the authors, publication and BRADESCO) are strictly mentioned. 11