The Many Factors that Affect the Success of Regulatory Mechanisms Designed to Foster Investments in Energy Efficiency

Transcription

1 The Many Factors that Affect the Success of Regulatory Mechanisms Designed to Foster Investments in Energy Efficiency Jay Zarnikau Fron-er Associates and UT- Aus-n LBJ School of Public Affairs and Division of Sta-s-cs UT Energy Symposium 8 September 2011

2 Key QuesAons Absent any special incen-ves, will an electric u-lity under tradi-onal regula-on invest in energy efficiency programs? What factors impact the effec-veness of special regulatory mechanisms designed to encourage u-li-es to pursue conserva-on? This paper is forthcoming in Energy Efficiency (Springer).

3 IntroducAon The Na-onal Ac-on Plan for Energy Efficiency prepared by the U.S. Environmental Protec-on Agency reports that Few energy efficiency policy issues have generated as much debate as the issue of the impact of energy efficiency programs on u-lity margins. The reduc-on in profitable sales resul-ng from energy efficiency poses a disincen-ve to u-lity investments in energy efficiency. U-li-es make money by selling energy. Right? Why would a u-lity want to reduce its energy sales?

4 If We Have a Policy Goal to Encourage Energy Efficiency through Electric UAliAes We could force the u-li-es to do it Or provide an economic incen-ve to encourage a u-lity to invest in energy efficiency

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7 Regulatory Mechanisms Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanisms (LRAMs) compensate the u-lity for the margins or earnings lost as a result of reduced sales. The impacts of energy efficiency programs upon the u-lity s sales are es-mated. The under- recovery of earnings or margins resul-ng from energy efficiency programs is then calculated. Adjustments or true- ups are undertaken to compensate the u-lity for the earnings foregone as a result of its investment in energy efficiency. Decoupling seeks to fully divorce earnings and revenues from sales, thus removing the throughput incen-ve. Allowed revenue or allowed revenue per customer is calculated. Rates are periodically adjusted through true- ups to ensure that the u-lity receives its allowed revenues or margins. The revenue collec-on allowed by the regulatory authority may be either increased or decreased under decoupling. As a result, actual u-lity revenues track projected revenue requirements despite unexpected fluctua-ons in sales.

8 States with Electric Decoupling Plans

9 States with LRAM Plans

10 Demand Side Management (DSM) From h^p://siteresources.worldbank.org/intenergy/resources/primerondemand- SideManagement.pdf. p. 7.

11 My Approach Determine the u-lity s op-mal profit- maximizing level of DSM and the mix of DSM programs selected by the u-lity under various ratemaking schemes. The focus here is to explore a u-lity s mo-va-on to pursue energy efficiency investments under various market condi-ons and regulatory incen-ve mechanisms. I modeled a hypothe-cal electric u-lity using a non- linear op-miza-on model.

12 My HypotheAcal Electric UAlity Buys fuel (e.g., natural gas, uranium, coal) Converts the fuel into electricity Transmits the electricity to consumers Sell power to consumers at a retail level Can make investments in DSM, including energy efficiency Three types of DSM are available to the electric u-lity: load management (the u-lity can turn off appliances or equipment at the consumer s site), medium DSM (perhaps, energy efficiency programs providing a rebate to promote high efficiency air condi-oners), and base load DSM (e.g., promo-on of energy efficient refrigerators or water heaters).

13 What Happens Under TradiAonal RegulaAon Under tradi-onal regula-on with annual rate adjustments, a u-lity with no regulatory mandate to pursue DSM will weigh certain benefits against certain costs in deciding whether to invest in DSM. The u-lity sees a benefit if it can avoid uneconomical sales e.g., peak period sales of electricity for which the cost of making the sale exceeds the retail price at which the electricity may be sold. This savings in opera-ng cost increases the u-lity s profit, provided prices are based on the u-lity s cost of service in a previous year (an historical test- year). This may be negated through automa-c pass- through mechanisms and true- ups. The efficiency gain through DSM focused on reducing uneconomical sales has a secondary effect the resul-ng reduc-on in future retail prices may lead to higher future sales, revenues, and profits through the price elas-city of demand effect.

14 What Happens Under TradiAonal RegulaAon, conanued Under tradi-onal regula-on, there may be a detrimental financial impact on the u-lity if the DSM reduces the u-lity s future rate base and thus the future financial returns to the u-lity permi^ed by the regulatory authority. A one- -me payment by the u-lity to foster consumer investments in energy efficient equipment may impact demand on the u-lity s system, the u-lity s load shape, opera-ng costs, and the u-lity s capacity needs over the life of the equipment promoted through a DSM program. Further complica-ng the analysis, there is considerable feedback among key variables. DSM investments affect retail prices, opera-ng costs, and capital costs. The level and type of DSM investment, retail prices, opera-ng costs, and capital costs should be treated endogenously.

15 What Happens Under Decoupling The u-lity s incen-ve to achieve efficiencies by reducing uneconomical sales is greatly weakened. The reconcilia-on process prevents the u-lity from keeping the profits resul-ng from efficiency gains. The u-lity has an incen-ve to invest in the types of DSM which will reduce the u-lity s sales. The u-lity has a financial incen-ve to increase the rate adjustment to its revenue requirement since a higher adjustment to rates will lead to higher revenues and profits. (This point is controversial.) As is the case under tradi-onal regula-on, price elas-city effects and the impact of DSM on opportuni-es to receive future returns on investments in new capacity which will expand its rate base complicate the story. The u-lity s interest in earning returns from an increasing rate base may remain strong, but factors such as the cost of capital and avoided costs will determine the strength of this mo-ve. These factors suggest that the type of DSM favored by a u-lity under decoupling will be quite different from the type of DSM pursued by a u-lity under tradi-onal regula-on.

16 What Happens with a Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (LRAM) The LRAM is calculated as the revenue loss associated with DSM (i.e., the MWh sales lost as a result of DSM mul-plied by the retail price) minus the opera-ng costs which are avoided as a result of the foregone sales. This difference is divided by sales which are adjusted for the impact of DSM. Using this factor, the retail price is raised to compensate the u-lity for any revenue loss resul-ng from DSM investments. The prospect of this addi-onal charge on retail bills seeks to ensure that the u-lity s profits are no lower than under tradi-onal regula-on. A properly designed LRAM removes tradi-onal regula-on s disincen-ve for the u-lity to reduce profitable types of retail sales (e.g., base load or off- peak sales). The remaining factors (e.g., price elas-city effects and the ability to earn returns from future rate base addi-ons) determine whether an LRAM can induce any DSM absent an external goal for energy efficiency. The u-lity s incen-ve to reduce uneconomical retail sales (e.g., sales during peak periods) may be muted.

17 Yikes! How am I going to model all this? The typical regulated u-lity selects an op-mal level and mix of DSM programs so as to maximize the present value of profits over T years subject to a demand constraint, requiring it to meet the energy needs of its ratepayers. A nonlinear op-miza-on model was developed using GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling Sohware) to examine the impacts of various regulatory incen-ve mechanisms upon u-lity earnings and rates under various scenarios.

18 Regulatory Systems Modeled 1. Tradi-onal ratemaking with an annual adjustment of prices 2. Tradi-onal ratemaking with rate cases every five years 3. Decoupling of margins or revenues from sales volumes with an annual adjustment of prices 4. Tradi-onal ratemaking is adjusted using an LRAM and new rates are set every year 5. Tradi-onal ratemaking is adjusted using an LRAM and new rates are set every five years

19 Model Structure Maximize u-lity profits (discounted profits over a ten- year -me horizon) Subject to: DSM programs and price changes (price elas-city of demand) affect the baseline demand DSM costs (for types of DSM other than load management) exhibit increasing costs as more DSM reduc-on is achieved Load Management DSM costs are assumed to be propor-onal to amount achieved Load Management impacts can t exceed a certain level The u-lity s future Rate Base (assets upon which a return may be earned) is reduced by the amount of the DSM impacts that occur at the -me of the u-lity s peak demand, -mes the avoided cost of capacity Variable opera-ng costs are highest for peak periods ($1000 per MWh) and lower for periods of medium demand ($40 per MWh) and base load demand ($30 per MWh) Annual u-lity expenses are the sum of variable opera-ng costs, deprecia-on on rate base, debt costs for rate base, and DSM program costs. Retail prices equal return on rate base plus expenses divided by test year sales Revenue to the u-lity equals price -mes the quan-ty of electricity sold Profit equals revenues minus expenses Solve for op-mal levels of the following variables: annual profits annual revenues annual opera-ng cost DSM demand reduc-on (for three types of DSM programs) DSM cost (in year 1) future rate base annual expenses annual adjusted demand annual prices

20 Modeling Notes The model is dynamic, in that DSM investment decisions in year 1 affect all the variables over the next ten years. The model is non- linear. DSM costs are an increasing func-on of the amount of DSM investment. Interac-ons among all the variables, through price elas-city effects and other rela-onships.

21 TradiAonal RegulaAon with Regulatory Lag Under tradi-onal regula-on, I can assume: Prices change every year with prices based on costs incurred by the u-lity in the previous year, or Prices change every five years. Note that a u-lity s profits will generally benefit from regulatory lag if there is load growth and low infla-on. Profits may suffer if there is a decline in demand or high infla-on.

22 How I Modeled Decoupling The expected margin or profit to be earned on each customer is calculated based on test- year costs and test- year levels of sales. The u-lity s recovery of this level of profit for a set of customers is ensured, regardless of any incremental impact of DSM on the current year s level of sales. Prices are adjusted each year. Any under- or over- recovery of margins in one year that is a^ributable to devia-ons of actual sales from the level of sales upon which rates are set is reconciled through an adjustment in rates the following year.

23 How I Modeled LRAM Lost revenues are calculated and added to the u-lity s revenue requirement. Rates may be adjusted each year or every five years. A full rate case is not necessary in order to enable the u-lity to recover these costs.

24 Base Case Results Load management looks a^rac-ve to the u-lity under tradi-onal regula-on with regulatory lag. Base load or medium energy efficiency would be favored by the u-lity under decoupling or an LRAM. DSM Investment (MWh) 2500 U-lity Profit ($ Millions present value over 10 years) Load Management In this case, 3% load growth is assumed. The u-lity would likely oppose any decoupling scheme Annual Every 5 years Annual Annual Every 5 years Tradi-onal Tradi-onal Decoupling LRAM LRAM Medium Load Base load

25 Base Case Results Prices under five ratemaking approaches Prices are lowest under tradi-onal regula-on.

26 Avoided Capacity Costs Set to $0/MW $4.50 $4.00 $3.50 $3.00 $2.50 $2.00 $1.50 $1.00 $0.50 $0.00 Annual Every 5 years Annual Annual Every 5 years Tradi-onal Tradi-onal Decoupling LRAM LRAM Now there is a li^le more interest in load management (although the benefit and cost analysis typically applied to this problem would suggest otherwise). DSM Investment (MWh) 2500 U-lity Profit ($ Millions present value over 10 years) Load Management In the Base Case, I assumed that the capacity costs which could possibly be avoided through DSM where $100,000 per MW. Now I ll assume $ Annual Every 5 years Annual Annual Every 5 years Tradi-onal Tradi-onal Decoupling LRAM LRAM Medium Load Base load

27 Avoided Capacity Costs Increased $4.50 $4.00 $3.50 $3.00 $2.50 $2.00 $1.50 $1.00 $0.50 $0.00 Annual Every 5 years Annual Annual Every 5 years There is a mild Aversch- Johnson effect. The u-lity may be reluctant to pursue DSM investments that may reduce future returns on rate base. DSM Investment (MWh) Tradi-onal Tradi-onal Decoupling LRAM LRAM 2500 U-lity Profit ($ Millions present value over 10 years) Load Management Avoided capacity costs were doubled from the base case assump-on Annual Every 5 years Annual Annual Every 5 years Medium Load Base load Tradi-onal Tradi-onal Decoupling LRAM LRAM

28 Changes in Avoided Capacity Costs Rela-onship between avoided cost ($/MW) and total DSM investment (annual MWh)

29 External DSM Goal As a varia-on from the Base Case Scenario, we consider a situa-on where a regulatory or governmental authority has set a minimum goal for DSM. This has become a common prac-ce in U.S. states and in na-ons which seek to meet targets for reduc-ons in greenhouse gasses. This becomes an addi-onal constraint to the model.

30 VariaAons in Load Growth U-lity profits are significantly reduced under tradi-onal regula-on if there is no natural load growth. The u-lity fails to realize a benefit from the regulatory lag inherent in tradi-onal ratemaking if there is no load growth.

31 VariaAons in Load Growth When 10% annual decreases in sales are assumed, decoupling becomes favored over tradi-onal regula-on, as is evident from Table 9.

32 DSM Investments Under Higher Price ElasAcity of Demand As price elas-city of demand increases (in absolute value), more energy efficiency under decoupling, less under LRAM, and more load management under tradi-onal regula-on with no lag.

33 Decoupling s Effects under Further Changes in AssumpAons

34 AlternaAve Growth Rates for the Rate Base $4.00 $3.50 $3.00 $2.50 $2.00 $1.50 $1.00 $0.50 $0.00 Annual Every 5 years Annual Annual Every 5 years DSM Investment (MWh) Tradi-onal Tradi-onal Decoupling LRAM LRAM 2500 U-lity Profit ($ Millions present value over 10 years) Now, let s assume a 10% annual growth in rate base, rather than the 3% I assumed in the base case. Regulatory lag hurts u-lity profits, since costs increase but prices are not adjusted upward in a -mely manner Annual Every 5 years Annual Annual Every 5 years Tradi-onal Tradi-onal Decoupling LRAM LRAM Load Management Medium Load Base load

35 Findings Regulatory mechanisms designed to promote energy efficiency and economic condi-ons affect not only the level of a u-lity s DSM investment but also the types of DSM programs preferred by the u-lity. Decoupling will indeed lead the u-lity to greater investment in energy efficiency (conserva-on) than tradi-onal regula-on over a broad range of alterna-ve assump-ons, although the rela-ve costs of different types of DSM programs impact this. An LRAM mechanism may also lead a u-lity to conserva-on investments. But in only one case (i.e., excep-onally high growth in the u-lity s rate base) was the op-mal level of DSM investment higher under an LRAM than under decoupling. Decoupling and LRAMs would promote DSM investments with low load factors (i.e., programs focused on energy conserva-on throughout the year, rather than peak load reduc-on). But this can change if load management becomes sufficiently cheap.

36 More Findings The type of DSM investments preferred by the u-lity is sensi-ve to avoided costs, program costs, and other variables. Load management is a^rac-ve to a u-lity under tradi-onal regula-on and infrequent rate cases. At a sufficiently high price elas-city of demand, load management becomes a^rac-ve under tradi-onal regula-on with annual rate changes, as well. In an environment of strong growth in energy demand, a u-lity is likely to favor tradi-onal regula-on with its built- in regulatory lag. A fast- growing u-lity may righpully see decoupling as a threat to its profits and oppose any policy changes in that direc-on. In an environment of nega-ve growth, a decoupling mechanism is likely to be preferred over tradi-onal regula-on by the u-lity.

37 Ques-ons?