Methodologies for Evaluating the Socio-Economic Consequences of Large Earthquakes

Transcription

1 Kajirna - CUREe Research Project Methodologies for Evaluating the Socio-Economic Consequences of Large Earthquakes Dr. Kaoru Mizukoshj Dr. Masamitsu Miyamura Mr. Yoshikatsu Miura Mr. Toshiro Yamada Dr. Mitsuharu Nakahara Mr. Hiroshi Ishida Prof. Henry J. Lagorio Mr. Robert A. Olson Mr. Stanley Scott Dr. Kenneth A. Goettel Kajima Corporation CUREe

2 Kajima Corporation * Kajima Instit-ute of Construction Technol * Information Processing Center * Structual Department, Architectual Design Division * Civil Engineering Design Division * Kobori Research Complex * The University of California, Berkeley * The University of California, Davis * The University of California, Irvine * The University of California, Los Angeles * The University of California, San Diego * The University of Southern California

3 SUMMARY REPORT CUREe Kajima Research Project Center for Environmental Design Research University of California, Berkeley Methodologies for Evaluating the Soclo-Economic Consequences of Large Earthquakes Henry J. Lagorlo, Team Leader SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF METHODOLOGIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS None of the evaluation methodologies reviewed contain a complete, integrated methodology for evaluating the socio-economic impacts of large earthquakes. Most of these approaches are fairly narrow in scope and consider only a portion of the full impacts of large earthquakes. Most of these approaches are based heavily on informed opinion of experienced experts, but only a few state assumptions and relationships between variables explicitly. We believe that three approaches (ATC-13, ATC-25, and the VSP Benefit-Cost Model) provide the best methodologies for the quantitative modeling of the socio-economic impacts of large earthquakes. These methods all use quantitative relationships between earthquake intensity, physical damage and socio-economic impacts which arise from physical damage. None of these approaches are comprehensive, but these approaches can be generalized to produce a systematic, comprehensive methodology for evaluating socio-economic impacts. The three key elements of this approach are: a measure of the intensity of the earthquake, for example MMI, JIMAI, or a quantifiable physical measure such as peak (or effective) ground acceleration, a relationship between earthquake intensity and expected physical damages to buildings or other facilities, for example the AATC-13 damage probability matrices, relationships between physical damages to facilities and other socio-economic impacts, including damages to contents, deaths and injuries, loss of function, and socio-economic impacts arising from the physical damage and from the loss of function of the facilities.

4 OUTLINE OF FLOW DIAGRAMS The methodology outlined above must be conducted for each significant facility including Buildings (residential, commercial, industrial, schools, and other), Infrastructure (highways, bridges, railroads, airports, harbors), Utilities (telecommunications, electric power, gas, water, sewage), and Critical Facilities (hospitals, emergency services, nuclear power, hazardous material facilities, dams). The six major steps in the conceptual damage propagation model are shown in Figure 1: Earthquake Characterization (time, location, magnitude), Local Intensity (accounting for distance, attenuation, and site effects), Physical Damage to Building, Facility, or System, Other Physical Effects (contents, casualties, loss of function) Direct Socio-Economic Impacts, and Indirect Impacts. The first two elements (Earthquake Characterization and Local Intensity) are very well determined by straightforward seismological and geotechnical data. The sixth element, Indirect Socio-Economic Impacts (delays, disruption, confusion, panic, crime, etc.) is only very indirectly related to actual earthquake events. Study of these effects is probably more important for sociology or psychology rather than earthquake engineering. Thus, even for social engineering for earthquake hazard mitigation (SEEHM) study of these indirect effects is probably not very important. Therefore, at this stage in the development of the Damage Propagation Flow Model, we suggest that such indirect effects not be considered. Rather, we will focus on more direct physical damages and direct socio-economic impacts. Therefore, as shown in Figure 2, we will focus on three steps in the process of evaluating social economic impacts: Going from Local Intensity to Physical Damage to a Facility or System, Going from Physical Damage to Other Physical Effects, and Going from Other Physical Effects to Direct Socio-Economic Impacts. SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF THE DAMAGE PROPAGATION MODEL The model may be used for two conceptually-distinct, but closely-related applications: making pre-earthquake predictions of expected damages and compiling and analyzing post-earthquake damage data. Case 1: Pre-Earthquake Predictions In this case, the objective is to estimate as quantitatively as possible what the expected damages (including direct socio-economic impacts would be from a future earthquake. This case is the "planning scenario" application. To make such predictions, one must first specify the magnitude and location of the expected earthquake, then compute the expected intensity of

5 7 ground motions at the city or location under consideration. This is the "planning" earthquake. Then, Steps A, B, and C, as shown below, allow one to make estimates of the expected physical damages and direct socio-economic impacts. The parameters and relationships used in Steps A, B, and C are based on cumulative experience from = earthquakes and on professional judgment by knowledgeable people. The results of this application is a quantitative prediction of what physical damages and direct socio-economic impacts would be expected in a future earthquake of the magnitude and location considered in the planning process. This process could be repeated for several possible earthquakes which might be expected to affect a given city (for example, to determine which earthquake would be most damaging or what the most critical damage would be expected to be). Case 2: Post-Earthquake Analysis In this case, the damage propagation model provides a framework in which to collect postearthquake data and to refme estimates of the relationships between steps A, B, and C. It would also be possible to predict damages before or after an earthquake in a given city, and then to compare the predictions of the damage propagation model with the actual damage to investigate the accuracy of the prediction. It is important to note that most post-earthquake damage date is not collected systematically and the types of quantitative data necessary to develop algorithms between physical damages and socio-economic impacts is frequently not available. While the Damage Propagation model as outlined above is conceptually correct, in many cases the full data will not be available. Therefore, one may have to make estimates based on experience and judgment. Summary Comments on Use of the Damage Propagation Model The Damage Propagation Model provides a conceptual framework in which to analyze detailed planning scenarios. The objective would be to identify key critical links where damage is expected Wd where such damage would have major socio-economic impacts. Once these critical links were identified, then benefit/cost analysis would help both the private and public sectors to prioritize retrofit of existing facilities or to indicate that retrofit was not economically justified and therefore that new replacement facilities should be built. Benefit/cost analysis could also be used to help optimize the design level for new construction to ensure that acceptable seismic performance is achieved for a particular facilities use and degree of criticality. Most of the above discussion focused on buildings, but very similar considerations apply to lifelines (utilities, transportation, communication) and other sorts of facilities. To model socioeconomic impacts on lifelines, one would need damage probability matrices or fragility curves to estimate the percentage damages to various key components of a lifeline. Then, from knowing the Local Intensity (MMI or JIMAI) one could estimate the percentage damages excepted (Step A). Step B requires estimating the impacts of the physical damage on the system. For a lifeline the key factor would be loss of function How many days will it take to restore service given a

6 certain percentage damage to the system? Such estimates are made in ATC-25 for a range of lifelines. This process is Step B of the Damage Propagation Model. Finally, the direct socioeconomic impacts of such loss of the lifeline must be estimated (Step Q. As an example, for electric power utilities, studies by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) suggest that the direct economic impact of lost electric power varies from about $1.00 to $5.00 per lost kilowatt hour. Thus, the economic impact of lost electric power may be estimated. Similar calculations apply to gas systems, water systems, communications systems, transportation systems, and other lifelines. 5) In considering application of the Damage Propagation Model, either to make pre-earthquake predictions of damage or to collect post-earthquake data, it is important to recognize that significant data limitations may occur. Pre-earthquake predictions may have to be based partly on hard data from past earthquakes and partly on experience and judgments. Similarly, post-earthquake procedures for collecting damage data rarely contain as much detail as would be desired. Therefore, inferences and extrapolations may have to be made.

7 Figure 2 Key Steps in Evaluating Socio-Economic Impacts of Earthquakes LOCAL EARTHQUAKE INTENSITY (MMI or JMAI) AU PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO FACILITY OR SYSTEM := I Damage to Contents Deaths I OTHER PHYSICAL EFFECTS and Injuries Loss cu DIRECT SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS Other Income Losses I Relocation Costs I of Function Impacts

8 Figure 1 DAMAGE PROPAGATION MODEL EARTHQUAKE (location, magnitude) LOCAL INTENSITY (distance, attenuation, site effects) Ground motions w Other Effects (ground failures, tsunamis) PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO FACILITY OR SYSTEM (damage probability matrices or physical damage reports) Cause of Damage: ground motion or other effects? 1) 11 OTHER PHYSICAL EFFECTS 11 Damage to Contents and Deaths and Injuries Loss of Function Inventory 'U, DIRECT SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS h Income Losses Relocation Costs Secondary Impacts 'U. INDIRECT IMPACTS Delays I Disruption I Confusion I Panic I Crime

9 CUREe-KAJIMA RESEARCH PROJECT METHODOLOGIES FOR EVALUATING THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF LARGE EARTHQUAKES FINAL REPORT February 15, 1993 Henry J. Lagorio Robert A. Olson Kenneth A. (3oettel Center for Environmental Design University of California Berkeley Research Period: February 15, February 14, 1993

10 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1) LITERATURE REVIEW... 2 General Approaches to Modeling Socio-economic Impacts... 2 Earthquake Planning Scenarios...2 Probable Maximum Loss Estimates...3 Estimating Losses From Earthquakes (National Academy of Sciences)...3 Books Providing an Overview of Earthquake Impacts... 4 Human System Responses to Disaster Natural Hazard Risk Assessment and Public Policy...4 Reducing Earthquake Hazards: Lessons Learned from Earthquakes (EERI) 5 Earthquake Reconnaissance Reports (EERI)...5 Quantitative Models of Physical Damages and Socio-economic Impacts... 5 Earthquake Damage Evaluation Data for California (ATC-13, 1985)... 5 Seismic Vulnerability and Impact of Disruption of Lifelines in the Conterminous United States (ATC-25, 1991)...6 A Benefit-Cost Model for the Seismic Rehabilitation of Buildings (VSP Associates, 1992)...7 2) ANALYSIS OF METhODOLOGIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS...7 3) OUTLINE OF FLOW DIAGRAMS...8 4) SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF THE DAMAGE PROPAGATION MODEL...17 Case 1: Pre-Earthquake Predictions...18 Case 2: Post-Earthquake Analysis...18 Summary Comments on Use of the Damage Propagation Model ) CASE STUDIES OF THREE EARTHQUAKES...20 Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake (Japan)...20 Loma Prieta Earthquake (California)...22 Mexico City Earthquake (Mexico)

11 The focus of this year's research program has been to review and improve methodologies for evaluating the socio-economic impacts of large earthquakes. There are five main elements in this draft report: literature review, analysis of methodologies and recommendations, outline of flow diagrams, summary of possible applications, and case studies of three earthquakes. 1) LITERATURE REVIEW The purpose of this literature review is to determine whether any comprehensive methodologies exist for evaluating the socio-economic consequences of large earthquakes. The principal conclusion drawn from this review is that of the existing methodologies provide a complete, comprehensive method for assessing or predicting the full range of socio-economic impacts of large earthquakes. However, many of the existing methodologies do have useful components or approaches which could be combined and modified to produce a more useful evaluation and/or estimation methodology. The major approaches to estimating the socio-economic impacts of large earthquakes are reviewed below. Some of these approaches provide after-event estimates of the total impacts of actual earthquakes. However, many of these approaches represent attempts to predict expected damages and other impacts of future earthquakes. In considering the socio-economic impacts of large earthquakes, it is important to recognize that there are great overlaps in the methodologies necessary to make preearthquake predictions of impacts and the methodologies by which post-earthquake damage is assessed. Most importantly, both approaches require establishing quantitative relationships between physical damages and socio-economic impacts. Therefore, both approaches are reviewed below. The concepts of the damage propagation model, which is presented in Sections 3 and 4 of this report, are applicable to either pre-earthquake predictions of socio-economic impacts or to postearthquake evaluations of damages and impacts. General Approaches to Modeling Socio-economic Impacts A. Earthquake Planning Scenarios. Beginning in about 1980, a series of earthquake planning scenarios have been published by the California Division of Mines and Geology and by other organizations. These planning scenario reports are also known by several other names, including vulnerability studies, loss estimates, impact assessments, and risk assessments. In general, these scenarios present the likely impacts of expected earthquakes which would affect large areas or the recurrence of major historical earthquakes. The need for such scenarios was expressed by disaster planning officials who asked for general estimates of the problems they might face after a major earthquake so they can prepare countermeasures. 2

12 A typical scenario presents the earthquake history of the region and what might be expected in the future. Subjects discussed in the scenarios include expected numbers of collapsed buildings, expected deaths and injuries, and expected effects on transportation, utilities, communications, and other facilities and services. Maps are prepared showing the location of such facilities in relation to the faults and ground conditions. The methods for preparing planning scenarios depend primarily on expert judgement about what the extent of damages would be in expected future earthquakes. Scenarios address the potential earthquake damages on key facilities, and it would be relatively easy to judge the socio-economic impacts of such losses. One problem with the scenario method, however, is that generally little or no information is given about the assumptions or algorithms used to make the damage estimates. Different groups of experts may make different assumptions. Therefore, it may be difficult to generalize planning scenario reports into a more quantitative evaluation methodology. Probable Maximum Loss Estimates Insurance companies who write earthquake insurance, or who are at risk for claims on other lines of insurance after an earthquake, frequently conduct assessments of their probable maximum loss in the event of a major earthquake. The focus of such analyses is generally narrow and limited to insured losses. These analysis are always quantitative, because insurance companies use such information for setting insurance rates and determining reinsurance needs. However, because insurance companies are privately owned, the details of their probable maximum loss estimates are rarely made public. The California Department of Insurance issues an annual report that estimates the losses from various potential major earthquakes for insured properties in the state. The data is submitted by individual insurance companies authorized to write earthquake insurance policies in California. The purpose of this requirement of the insurance industry is to quantify each company's exposure to large earthquake losses. The data supplied by the companies is then compiled and analyzed by Department staff members. These annual reports are statistical in nature, and can be used to estimate the total financial losses that might be experienced under selected major earthquake conditions. For example, in 1985 the potential insured losses in the Los Angeles area were estimated to be about $5.9 billion. In general, this information is helpful from a regulatory viewpoint by allowing the State of California to monitor the industry's underwriting practices so that the individual companies do not sell more earthquake insurance than they can afford to honor if a major earthquake occurs. The reports have some value in estimating such losses to the policyholders, and these estimates could be included in a more comprehensive model of the socio-economic impacts of large earthquakes. Estimating Losses From Earthquakes (National Academy of Sciences) A panel of experts was convened by the National Academy of Sciences to review the state of knowledge and practice in the U.S. about estimating losses from future earthquakes. The panel's report discusses how two principal methods for estimating losses can be helpful, depending on the needs of the user. One method is the earthquake planning scenario which can be used by emergency

13 officials. A second method is the probabilistic risk assessment that considers losses from a spectrum of possible earthquakes that could effect a given area. The expert panel prepared a set of guidelines that could be used in doing such loss estimates in the future. This report discusses User Needs, Ground-Shaking Hazard, Building Damage and Losses, Collateral Hazards, Damage and Losses to Special Facilities and Urban Systems, Indirect Losses, Rapid Post-earthquake Loss Estimates, and it presents a series of Conclusions and Recommendations. Two recommendations are very important: 1) the need to demonstrate the validity of the current techniques for loss estimation, and 2) the need to develop improved methods. This report provides helpful background information, but it is very general and does not provide a specific, quantitative model. The principles outlined in this report, however, do provide helpful suggestions for designing a socio-economic impact model. Books Providing an Overview of Earthquake Impacts Human System Responses to Disaster. This book by Professor Thomas E. Drabek presents an inventory of sociological findings about human response to all forms of disaster. The author reviewed over 1,000 studies, reports, and professional articles. He then compiled the conclusions from each of these into several categories: Planning, Warning, Evacuation and Other Forms of Pre-Impact Mobilization, Post-Impact Emergency Actions, Restoration, Reconstruction, Hazard Perceptions, Attitudes Toward and the Adoption of Adjustments, and Disaster Research: A Strategic Research Site. An extensive bibliography of references is included. Professor Drabek's book is widely used to obtain information about actual disaster experiences, and it is the best overall compilation available. Much of the information is oriented toward human behavior, and as such could be somewhat useful for socio-economic impact modelling purposes. However, most of this material is not directly applicable to building a quantitative model of the socio-economic impacts of earthquakes. Natural Hazard Risk Assessment and Public Policy. This book by Professors William J. Petak and Arthur A. Atkisson, is widely used to understand the problems and processes associated with how natural hazards influence the development and implementation of countermeasures. The book has several parts, including: Anticipating the Unexpected as a Focus of Public Policy, Natural Hazards Risk Assessment and Mitigation Analysis, and Natural Hazards Policy Planning and Administration. While very useful for those engaged in public policy development or research, this book has only limited value in socio-economic impact assessment. However, it has some useful data about particular disasters and their consequences that could support the development of a comprehensive model. 4

14 Reducing Earthquake Hazards: Lessons Learned from Earthquakes (EERI) This book was published by the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI). Its purpose was to review the studies of individual earthquakes and to summarize the general lessons learned. Each section presents several such lessons, and the sections are titled Geosciences, Geotechnical Engineering, Engineered Buildings, Lifelines, Industrial Facilities, Architecture and Urban Planning, and Social Sciences. This report, like the others discussed above, could be somewhat helpful for preparing an overall socio-economic impact assessment model. In particular, the framework of considering impacts on buildings, lifelines, and industrial facilities may be transferrable to more quantitative models. Earthquake Reconnaissance Reports (EERfl The Earthquake Engineering Research Institute also publishes reconnaissance reports after major earthquakes (both within the United States and worldwide). For example, a report on the Loma Prieta earthquake was published in May, 1990 about 6 months after the earthquake. These reconnaissance reports contain very useful descriptions of the types of earthquake damages reported in specific earthquakes. Such damage reports provide useful insights into the extent of both physical damages and socio-economic impacts. However, these reports are descriptive in nature and are not intended as quantitative models for evaluating the impacts of earthquakes. Quantitative Models of Physical Damages and Socio-economic Impacts Earthquake Damage Evaluation Data for California (ATC ) This publication (ATC-13) is the result of a FEMA-sponsored project to develop consensus opinions on methods to quantify expected earthquake losses. A large group of experienced earthquake engineers and experts in related disciplines worked together to develop this damage estimation methodology. The objective was to quantify the expected damages to buildings and contents as a function of the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) of damaging earthquakes. The intent of ATC-13 was to provide estimates for classes of buildings, not for specific, individual buildings (which might vary markedly from the average values). ATC-13 provides numerous tables of expected damages for various types of facilities and relationships between building damages and other socio-economic impacts. This methodology as published is not computer-based (but could be easily modified to be computer-based). Buildings are classified by a "Facility Classification" which represents the structural system of the building. For example, buildings are classified as unreinforced masonry (bearing walls), unreinforced masonry (load-bearing frame), reinforced concrete shear wall (with or without momentresisting frame), braced steel frame, and many others. It is important to note that many of these building types are quite earthquake-resistant, and therefore, that most vulnerable buildings fall into only a few of these facility classifications. Buildings are also classified by "Social Function" which indicates the use of the building (for example, residential, retail, office, etc.). 5

15 For each Facility Classification, Damage Probability Matrices were estimated by consensus opinion. These damage probability matrices indicate the expected amount of building damage (for each facility classification) as a function of MM!. From these building damage probability matrices, other impacts of the earthquake were also estimated. For example, damage to contents and loss of function (time the building is out of service) as well as the expected number of deaths and injuries were all assumed to be proportional to building damages. The tables of estimates presented in ATC-13 allow estimates of damages to be made for each building type (facility classification) as a function of MM!. For example, if a city has a group of unreinforced masonry buildings used as residences, then these tables of estimates allow calculations to be made to determine the expected percentage of building damage, damage to contents, loss of function, deaths and injuries for this group of buildings for various MM! earthquakes experienced at the buildings location. I. Seismic Vulnerability and Impact of Disruption of Lifelines in the Conterminous United States (ATC ). This report compiled a large amount of information on lifelines into a computer data base. Lifelines considered in this report include: Transportation highways railroads airports ports and harbors Energy electric power transmission gas and liquid fuel transmission pipelines Emergency Service Facilities emergency broadcast facilities hospitals Water Aqueducts and Supply The approach adopted in this report for estimating damages is heavily based on the ATC-13 methodology discussed above. For each major type of facility, damage probability matrices (damage as a function of MM!) and loss of function (time out of service) were estimated. From these loss of function estimates, the economic consequences of the loss of function of these lifelines were estimated for each of the above lifelines. The approach adopted in ATC-25 is largely computer based. However, the assumptions made and sources of data used for determining relationships between physical damages, loss of function, and economic impacts are only partially explained. Uncertainties in these relationships could be large. Nevertheless, this publication is an important step in quantifying the impacts of earthquake damages to lifelines.

16 J. A Benefit-Cost Model for the Seismic Rehabilitation of Buildings (VSP Associates. 1992). This FEMA-sponsored report presents a methodology for benefit-cost analysis of the seismic rehabilitation of hazardous buildings and thus has a somewhat different focus than the other reports reviewed in this section. However, the benefits of a seismic rehabilitation project are simply expected damages and other losses which are avoided by the seismic rehabilitation project. Therefore, to conduct a benefit-cost analysis, estimates must be made of expected damages both with and without the rehabilitation. Therefore, many elements of this model are applicable to the Damage Propagation Model. The methodology used to estimate expected damages was based heavily on the approach of ATC-13. However, in this case the methodology was completely computer-based, and a broader range of economic impacts are considered than in ATC-13. Using ATC-13 data, estimates are made of expected building damages, contents damages, deaths and injuries, and loss of functions for various facility classifications as a function of MMI. From the loss of function estimates, other economic impacts are also calculated. Economic impacts considered include: relocation costs, rental and personnel income losses, business inventory losses, and personal property losses. This model, which addresses only buildings, could be generalized to include other important aspects of the socioeconomic impacts of large earthquakes, such as damage to infrastructure. 2) ANALYSIS OF METhODOLOGIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS None of the evaluation methodologies reviewed above contain a complete, integrated methodology for evaluating the socio-economic impacts of large earthquakes. Most of these approaches are fairly narrow in scope and consider only a portion of the full impacts of large earthquakes. Most of these approaches are based heavily on informed opinion of experienced experts, but only a few state assumptions and relationships between variables explicitly. We believe that the last three approaches discussed above (ATC-13, ATC-25, and the VSP Benefit-Cost Model) provide the best methodologies for the quantitative modeling of the socioeconomic impacts of large earthquakes. These methods all utilize specific quantitative relationships between earthquake intensity, physical damage, and socio-economic impacts which arise from physical damage. None of these approaches are comprehensive, but this quantitative modeling approach could be generalized to produce a systematic, comprehensive methodology for evaluating socio-economic impacts. This approach is applicable both to making pre-earthquake estimates of expected damages and impacts and also to post-earthquake evaluations of damages and impacts. The three key elements of this approach are outlined below: a measure of the intensity of the earthquake, for example MMI, JMAJ, or a quantifiable physical measure such as peak (or effective) ground acceleration, a relationship between earthquake intensity and expected physical damages to buildings or other facilities, for example the ATC-13 damage probability matrices, relationships between physical damages to facilities and other socio-economic impacts, including damages to contents, deaths and injuries, loss of function, and 7

17 socio-economic impacts arising from the physical damage and from the loss of function of the facilities. None of the existing models which utilize this methodology are complete or comprehensive. However, this approach can be generalized to include the full range of expected damages and socioeconomic impacts. The outline of flow diagrams section below is a preliminary attempt to produce a more complete model for evaluating both physical damages and socio-economic impacts. The flow charts as presented do not assume a computer-based evaluation methodology. However, this approach of specifying quantitative relationships between earthquake intensity and physical damages and then specifying quantitative relationships between physical damages and other socio-economic impacts could easily be computerized. 3) OUTLINE OF FLOW DIAGRAMS The prototype flow diagrams which follow are preliminary effort to extend the quantitative approach discussed above to provide a more comprehensive evaluation methodology. To be comprehensive, an evaluation methodology must include the relationships between earthquake intensity, physical damages, and socio-economic impacts for the full range of modern facilities (both buildings and infrastructure). The first flow chart, Figure 1, outlines the six major steps in the conceptual damage propagation model: Earthquake Characterization (time, location, magnitude), Local Intensity (accounting for distance, attenuation, and site effects), Physical Damage to Building, Facility, or System, Other Physical Effects (contents, casualties, loss of function) Direct Socio-Economic Impacts, and Indirect Impacts. The second flow chart, Figure 2, illustrates that a detailed inventory or database is necessary to have or to collect for a wide range facilities, including buildings, infrastructure, utilities, and critical facilities in the urban area. This data allows for the comparison of the types of damages with the number of such facilities in the area. At this step in the damage estimation/compilation process, information as to whether the damage is due to ground shaking or to collateral hazards (soil failures, landslides, rock falls, etc.) should be included. To determine and refine quantitative relationships between ground motions and physical damages, it is essential to collect data on undamaged facilities as well as on damaged facilities. For example, knowing that 1,000 wood frame houses were destroyed and 10,000 damaged in a major earthquake does not allow development of fragility estimates or damage probability information. Rather, what is required is information on the percentages of such wood frame houses that were undamaged, damaged, and destroyed. For example, it may be that (for the simple illustrative example chosen), there were 200,000 wood frame houses which were undamaged. Therefore, less than 0.5% of the total wood frame housing inventory was destroyed and only about 5% damaged. Furthermore, it is important to determine the cause of such damage. For example, it may be that virtually all of the destroyed/damaged wood frame houses were subject to ground failures or that they were of a particularly vulnerable construction type. Detailed data on the reasons for the damage and statistics on undamaged as well as damaged facilities are necessary to develop quantitative models of the socio-economic impacts of earthquakes.

18 Figure 1 DAMAGE PROPAGATION MODEL EARTHQUAKE (location, magnitude) IL LOCAL INTENSITY (distance, attenuation, site effects) Ground motions Other Effects (ground failures, tsunamis) IL PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO FACILITY OR SYSTEM (damage probability matrices or physical damage reports) Cause of Damage: ground motion or other effects? IL IIOTHER PHYSICAL EFFECTS Damage to Contents and Deaths and Injuries Loss of Function Inventory IL [DIRECT SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS H Income Losses I Relocation Costs Secondary Impacts H IL INDIRECT IMPACTS Delays I Disruption I Confusion I Panic I Crime

19 Figure 2 PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO FACILITY OR SYSTEM (damage probability matrices or physical damage reports) Cause of Damage: ground motion or other effects? BUILDINGS residential corn rn ercia I industrial schools other INFRASTRUCTURE highways bridges railroads airports harbors UTILITIES telecommunications electric power gas water sewage CRITICAL FACILITIES hospitals emergency services nuclear power hazardous materials dams tul

20 The third flow chart, Figure 3, illustrates the concept that for each of the facilities listed above in Figure 2 relationships and algorithms must be developed to relate physical damages to the facility to other physical effects, and in turn to relate these physical effects to direct soclo-economic impacts and to indirect impacts. Figure 3 FOR EACH FACILITY OR SYSTEM: PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO FACILITY OR SYSTEM (damage probability matrices or physical damage reports) 1)0 OTHER PHYSICAL EFFECTS (location, magnitude) Damage to Contents and Deaths and Injuries Loss of Function Inventory 4 SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS H Income Losses Relocation Costs Secondary Impacts 1), INDIRECT IMPACTS Delays I Disruption I Confusion I Panic I Crime 11

21 As outhned in Figure 1, the proposed Damage Propagation Model has six elements. However, the first two (Earthquake Characterization and Local Intensity) are very well determined by straight-forward seismological and geotechnical data. The sixth element, Indirect Socio-Economic Impacts (delays, disruption, confusion, panic, crime, etc.) is only very indirectly related to actual earthquake events. Study of these effects is probably more important for sociology or psychology rather than earthquake engineering. Thus, even for social engineering for earthquake hazard mitigation (SEEHM) study of these indirect effects is probably not very important. Therefore, at this stage in the development of the Damage Propagation Flow Model, we suggest that such indirect effects not be considered. Rather, we will focus on more direct physical damages and direct socioeconomic impacts. Therefore, as shown in Figure 4, we will focus on three steps in the process of evaluating social economic impacts: Going from Local Intensity to Physical Damage to a Facility or System, Going from Physical Damage to Other Physical Effects, and Going from Other Physical Effects to Direct Socio-Economic Impacts. Figure 4 Key Steps in Evaluating Socio-Economic Impacts of Earthquakes LOCAL EARTHQUAKE INTENSITY (MMI or JMAI) 4 PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO FACILITY OR SYSTEM I OTHER PHYSICAL EFFECTS Damage to Contents I Deaths and Injuries Loss of Function cij DIRECT SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS Income Losses I Relocation Costs Other Impacts 12

22 STEP A: Going from Local Earthquake Intensity to Physical Damage to Facility or System This step requires a Damage Probability Matrix, which explicitly relates Local Earthquake Intensity (MMI or JMAI or PGA) at the site of the building or other facility to the amount of physical damage. For buildings, examples are given below, following the format given in ATC-13. The ATC-13 examples are given to illustrate the concepts involved; the use of these examples does not mean that ATC-13 data necessarily would be used in an actual application. Damage states are defined relative to the replacement value of the entire building or facility: Figure 5 DAMAGE STATE DAMAGE FACTOR RANGE CENTRAL DAMAGE FACTOR 1-None 0% 0% 2 - Slight 0-1 % 0.5% 3-Light 1-10% 5% 4- Moderate 10-30% 20% 5 - Heavy 30-60% 45% 6 - Major % 80% 7 - Destroyed 100% 100% As shown in Figure 6, damage probability matrices show the expected statistical distribution of damages for specific building types. For example, for unreinforced masonry buildings, in an event of MMI VIII, about 11% of such buildings would be expected to have light damage (about 5%), 66% would have moderate damage (about 20%), 23% would have heavy damage (about 45%), and 0.2% would have major damage (about 80%). On average, a large group of such buildings would have about 24% damage at MMI VIII. In Figure 6, CDF is Central Damage Factor, which corresponds to the 7 damage states listed in the first table. MDF is Mean Damage Factor, which is the average of the central damage factors; MDF is the average expected damage for this type of building. 13

23 Figure Unreinforced Masonry (Bearing Wall, Low Rise) CDF1 VI VII VIII MODIFIED MERCALLI INTENSITY ] I MDF A simpler way to look at Damage Probability Matrices is to just consider the Mean Damage Factors, for each MM! (or JMAI) event. Using the data in the previous table, the MDFs for such unreinforced masonry buildings would be as follows: Figure 7 Modified Mercalli Intensity Mean Damage Factor VI 4.7% VII 11.7% VIII 24.2% IX 43.1% X 66.7% XI 77.7% XII 88.0% For facilities or systems other than buildings, similar Damage Probability Matrices can be developed. For some, for example bridges or an electric power utility substation, expected damages as a percentage of replacement value could be used, exactly as for buildings. For other types of systems, for example a gas utility or electric utility, other measures of damage might be used. For example, damages could be expressed as a number of pipe breaks per mile of pipe or other such measures. 14

24 For Step A (going from local earthquake intensity to physical damage) two different procedures would be used depending on whether post-earthquake data were being collected or whether a pre-earthquake estimate of expected damage were being made. If post-earthquake data were collected, then data on percentages of damage experienced as a function of MMI or JMAI or PGA should be acquired. If pre-earthquake estimates were being made, then a combination of building inventory and damage probability matrices would yield estimates of expected damage. STEP B: Going from Physical Damage (to Facility) to Other Physical Effects (Damage to Contents, Deaths and Injuries, Loss of Function) This step requires relationships between direct physical damage to a building (or other facility or system) and other physical effects. The most direct assumption is that percentage building (or facility) damage is directly related to other physical effects. For example, to assume that if a building has 30% damage that contents (or inventory) will also be damaged 30%. Of course, in special circumstances other relationships could be assumed. Likewise, death and injury rates (per 1000 occupants) are also logically related to percentage building damage. In our benefit/cost work for FEMA, we have made the simple assumption that deaths and injuries are related to the seven damage states shown in Table 1. Figure 8 EXPECTED INJURY AND DEATH RATES DAMAGE STATE EXPECTED INJURY AND DEATH RATES FOR EXISTING BUILDINGS CDF(S) (%) Minor Fraction Injured Serious Fraction Dead 1-none slight light moderate heavy major destroyed These expected death and injury rates are from ATC-13 and are estimates for all types of buildings, except that light steel or wood frame buildings are expected to have only 10% as many casualties as shown in the above table. Thus, this table assumes that the casualty rate is directly related to percentage building damage and that the relationship does not vary from one building type 15

25 to another. Figure 8 allows one to estimate expected casualties directly from expected building damages. As with the damage probability matrices shown in Step A, these ATC-13 death and injury estimates are shown as illustrative examples only. Many socio-economic impacts of earthquakes arise because of loss of function of a building or other facility due to earthquake damage. In the same manner that casualties may be estimated by relationships between building damage and casualties, loss of function may also be estimated from building damages. An example is given below in Figure 9. Figure 9 WEIGHTED STATISTICS FOR LOSS OF FUNCTION AND RESTORATION TIME OF SOCIAL FUNCTION CLASSIFICATION (IN DAYS) Social Function Classes 1, 2, 3 Mean Time in Days to Restore to Given Percent of Function Central Damage Factor (or Damage State) 30% 60% 100% Here, the assumption is made that the time to restore normal function depends on the amount of building damage (damage state or central damage factor) and on the social function or use of the building. In this example, Social Function Classes 1, 2, and 3 are are all residential: Class 1 is permanent dwellings, Class 2 is temporary lodging facilities, and Class 3 is group institutional housing. In this case, the loss of function relationships were assumed to be the same for all types of residential buildings. The numbers in Figure 9 were averages from experts opinions and probably should be rounded off to reflect a lower degree of significance than shown. For example, the row for Central Damage Factor 20% (moderate damage) indicates that, on average, it would take about 2 days to restore 30% of normal function, 5 days to restore 60% and 10.5 days to restore 100% of function. Similar tables are included in ATC-13 for other types of Social Functions such as office buildings, etc. The examples given above are illustrative of how one goes from building damages to other direct impacts of earthquakes such as damage to contents, deaths and injuries, and loss of function of 16

26 the building. As with building damages, such a methodology could be used to make pre-earthquake estimates of damages to contents, casualties, and loss of function from pre-earthquake estimates of building damages. Alternatively, this methodology could be used to collect post-earthquake data. For example, if a group of buildings was damaged 20% on average, then the data of interest would include: How much damage to contents occurred? How many deaths and injuries occurred? and How long did it take to restore normal function to the buildings? Step C: Going From Physical Effects to Direct Socio-economic Impacts To estimate the dollar (or yen) value of contents damage, it is necessary to know what the value of the contents was before the earthquake (either as a specific number or as a percentage of building value), then the damage value may be calculated directly from the percentage damage obtained under Step B. Alternatively, separate damage probability estimates may be made for contents, where the fragility of contents differs significantly from that of the facility itself. To estimate the economic costs of casualties, the number of casualties from Step B must be multiplied by the dollar value or cost of: deaths, major injuries, and minor injuries. In our work for FEMA (benefit-cost modeling, see Section 1, Part J), we assumed a dollar value per life of $1,740,000 based on studies conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration. We did not value injuries because the economic value of injuries was assumed to be small compared to the economic value of deaths. However, estimates of the economic costs of major injuries (perhaps $10,000 to $50,000 dollars each) and minor injuries (perhaps $1000 each) could made. From such a method, one can then calculate the economic value or cost of the human casualties. Many of the other direct socio-economic impacts of earthquakes can be calculated directly from the Loss of Function estimates described under Step B. For example various kinds of income losses (wages, proprietors' income, rents) are directly proportional to Loss of Function. If a group of buildings has a total loss of function of 150 days (percentage loss of function times days) and a square footage of 10,000 square feet, then rental losses are rent/square foot/day times lost days. Similarly, other sorts of income losses can be estimated in this way. For example, relocation costs may be incurred in a building is unusable. Relocation costs can be estimated from the estimated days lost (loss of function) times a rental rate for new space of the necessary square footage. Other direct socio-economic impacts can be estimated in a similar manner. 4) SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF THE DAMAGE PROPAGATION MODEL The damage propagation model may be used for two conceptually-distinct, but closely-related applications: making pre-earthquake predictions of expected damages and compiling and analyzing post-earthquake damage data.

27 Case 1: Pre-Earthguake Predictions In this case, the objective is to estimate as quantitatively as possible what the expected damages (including direct socio-economic impacts) would be from a future earthquake. This case is the "planning scenario" application. To make such predictions, one must first specify the magnitude and location of the expected earthquake, then compute the expected intensity of ground motions at the city or location under consideration. This is the "planning" earthquake. Then, Steps A, B, and C, as shown below, allow one to make estimates of the expected physical damages and direct socioeconomic impacts. The parameters and relationships used in Steps A, B, and C are based on cumulative experience from past earthquakes and on professional judgement by knowledgeable people. The result of this application is a quantitative prediction of what physical damages and direct socioeconomic impacts would be expected in a future earthquake of the magnitude and location considered in the planning process. This process could be repeated for several possible earthquakes which might be expected to affect a given city (for example, to determine which earthquake would be most damaging or what the most critical damage would be expected to be). Case 2: Post-Earthquake Analysis In this case, the damage propagation model provides a framework in which to collect postearthquake data and to refine estimates of the relationships between steps A, B, and C as more data accumulate from more earthquakes. It would also be possible to predict damages before or after an earthquake in a given city, and then to compare the predictions of the damage propagation model with the actual damage to investigate the accuracy of the prediction. It is important to note that most postearthquake damage data is not collected systematically and the types of quantitative date necessary to develop algorithms between physical damages and socio-economic impacts is frequently not available. It is important to note that while the Damage Propagation Model as outlined above is conceptually correct, that in many cases the full data will not be available. Therefore, one may have to make estimates based on experience and judgement. Summary Comments on Use of the Damage Propagation Model The Damage Propagation Model provides a good conceptual framework in which to analyze and interpret detailed planning scenarios prepared by governments. The objective would be to identify key critical links where damage is expected and where such damage would have major socio-economic impacts. Once these critical links were identified, then benefit/cost analysis would help both the private and public sectors to prioritize retrofit of existing facilities or to indicate that retrofit was not economically justified and therefore that new replacement facilities should be built. Benefit/cost analysis could also be used to help optimize the design level for new construction to ensure that acceptable seismic performance is achieved for a particular facility's use and degree of criticality. 18

28 Most of the above discussion focused on buildings, but very similar considerations apply to lifelines (utilities, transportation, communication) and other sorts of facilities. As an example, consider an electric power utility. As for buildings, to estimate damages one would need damage probability matrices to estimate the percentage damages to various key components of an electric utility: generation plants, transmission lines, high voltage substations, and distribution lines. Then, from knowing the Local Intensity (MM! or JMAI) one could estimate the percentage damages expected (Step A). Step B requires estimating the impacts of the physical damage on the system. For an electric power utility the key factor would be loss of function: How many days will it take to restore service given a certain percentage damage to the system? Such estimates are made in ATC-25 for a range of lifelines. This process is Step B of the Damage Propagation Model. Finally, the direct socio-economic impacts of such loss of electric power must be estimated (Step Q. For electric power, studies by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRE) suggest that the direct economic impact of lost electric power varies from about $1.00 to $5.00 per lost kilowatt hour. Thus, the economic impact of lost electric power may be estimated. Similar calculations apply to gas systems, water systems, communications systems, transportation systems, etc. In considering application of the Damage Propagation Model, either to make preearthquake predictions of damage or to collect post-earthquake date, it is important to recognize that significant data limitations may occur. Pre-earthquake predictions may have to be based partly on hard data from past earthquakes and partly on experience and judgements. Similarly, post-earthquake procedures for collecting damage data rarely contain as much detail as would be desired. Therefore, inferences and extrapolations may have to be made. 19

29 5) CASE STUDIES OF THREE EARTHQUAKES A) Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake (Japan) Earthquake : Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake Date:Junel4, :14PM Epicenter: N38 09' E142 13' Depth : 40km Magnitude: M.m'IA=7.4 (MLF7.0) MnvlA : Magnitude by Japan Meteorological Agency ML: Lichter Magnitude City : Sendai Population : 670,000 Source-to-site Distance: about 100km Local Intensity: JMAI=V+ (MMI4X-) JMAI: Intensity by JMA MMJ: Modified Mercalli Intensity Ground Motions (Accelerogram) : Gal Tsunamis : about 40cm (no damage) Physical Damage to Facility or System Damage List as of July 5, 1978 by AIJ Report Items Number Loss (mi1lion) Housing 59,912 27,166 Totally destroyed 658 4,184 Half destroyed 2,505 5,078 Partially destroyed 56,749 17,904 Land 11,285 3,081 Sheathing 3,992 1,800 Landslide Fissure 7,020 1,131 Fences and Gates 20,898 3,679 Hollow block fences 14,825 2,608 Soil, stone or wood fence 3, Gates 2, Furniture 78,149 households 8,227 Medical and Sanitaiy Facilities Medical facilities Water System 3, Sanitary facilities

30 Industrial Facilities 22,205 usjne 46655, 271 Small business ,934 31,374 griculture and Stockbreeding 5,040 Educational Facilities 139 Elementaiy schools Junior high schools Senior high schools 185 Others ,665 Public Works 81 Roads 692 Bridges River Others wage System 2, Gas System 347 Traffic System Others ,024 Total Darn Other Physical Effects Damage to People Deaths : 13 Injuries Serious: 125 Slight: 9,175 Loss of Function Power System: I day (670,000 people) Water System : 3 days (25,000 people) Gass System: I months (410,000 people) 21

31 B) Loma Prieta Earthquake (California) Direct socio-economic impact data of the Loma Prieta Earthquake The data shown below were collected by the CUREe team to build a Damage Propagation Flow Model. The main data sources are (1) the "Loma Prieta Earthquake Reconnaissance Report" [May 1990], issued by the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute as a supplement to Earthquake Spectra, (2) "Loma Prieta's Call to Action" [1991], issued by the California Seismic Safety Commission, and (3) "Reflections on the Loma Prieta Earthquake, October 17, 1989, issued by the Structural Engineers Association of California. Basic Information Earthquake: Loma Prieta Earthquake Date: October 17, 1989, 5:04 pm Epicenter: N37deg2. 1 9mm, W12 ldeg52.98mm Depth: 18km Magnitude: MR=7.0 (Richter Magnitude) City: Santa Cruz, but affected much larger area including portions of 10 counties, including the cities of San Francisco, Oakland, and other communities. Population: Santa Cruz about 42,000; region about 6 million. Source distance: 16km NE of Santa Cruz Local Intensity: MMI=Vll-VJll (MMI= Modified Mercalli Intensity) Ground Motions:.64g within 10 km of epicenter Tsunamis: none Physical Damage to Facilities or Systems Total direct losses estimated to be $8 billion; includes damages to buildings, contents, infrastructure and lifelines, and other direct losses. Another $2 billion estimated for indirect losses. Averages about $1700 per person in the ten county affected area. Housing: several thousand single and multiple family units, especially older structures not anchored to their foundations or having weak first stories, such as those housing structures in the Marina District of San Francisco. For Santa Cruz County only: Destroyed Major Damage Minor Damage Dwellings 674 2,228 9,934 Mobilehomes SRO units* 187 n/a n/a *SRO units = single room occupancy hotel rooms occupied by community residents. 22

32 Land: Landslides: 45 in the Summit Area of Santa Cruz County. Medical and Sanitary Facilities: Medical facilities: 2 with major damage; $40 million estimated damages. Water systems: damage composed primarily of water main breaks and service connections breaks with some scattered damage to storage tanks, filtration plants, and equipment. Water main breaks: 770 Service connections breaks: 430 Industrial Facilities: Food processing: several in Watsonville area with moderate damage and loss of contents; $5 million estimated damages. Light manufacturing industry: mostly new industry in area in buildings of recent construction and modern equipment installation; light damage; no damage costs presented. Heavy industry: very little in the area; minor damage with no costs presented. Educational Facilities: 1,544 public school buildings inspected; 5 buildings severely damaged; $81 million estimated damages. Public Works: Railroads: No significant damage to any systems, although all temporarily discontinued operations for a few hours to inspect for damages. Loss of power to electrically operated systems caused shutdowns. Roads and bridges: Severe damage to several State Highways, county roads, and local streets; collapse of Cypress Freeway structure; collapsed section of Bay Bridge, and collapsed parallel sections of bridges at Struves Slough. Overall, 10 bridges were closed due to major damage, 10 needed temporary shoring for support, and 80 other bridges suffered minor damage. Damages estimated at $315 million. Airports: 5 affected; most serious was liquefaction damage at Oaldand International Airport (3,000 feet of 10,000 foot runway) and Alameda Naval Air Station (4,000 foot runway). Others experienced minor damage and short term power outages. 23

33 Others: Sewage system: minor damages to filtration and processing plants; scattered damage to collection system, mostly in the epicentral area. Number of breaks not reported, nor is estimate of damages. Gas system: 1,500 services connections in Marina District; about 150,000 customers lost service for up to 7 days where piping was not damaged. Other Physical Effects Damage to people Deaths: 62 Injuries: 3,757 Homeless: 12,000 Businesses destroyed: 367 Loss of Function Power system: Gas system: Water system: Telephone system: up to 5 days in epicentral area; less elsewhere. up to 3 weeks in poor ground areas; less elsewhere. up to 7 days in some areas. only a few hours in some places, but automatic call controlling delayed dial tone because of traffic volume of 80 million calls on October 18 instead of average of 55 million. 24

34 C) Mexico City Earthquake (Mexico) The data shown below were collected by the CUREe team to build a Damage Propagation Flow Model. The main data sources are (1) "Report of the Investigation of the Earthquake in Mexico" [1986] issued by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, (2) "The 1985 Mexico Earthquake" [February 1989] issued by the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, (3) "Proceedings of the U.S.- Mexico Workshop on the 1985 Mexico Earthquake Research" [1987] issued by the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, and (4) "Proceedings for Utilization of Research on Engineering and Socioeconomic Aspects of the 1985 Chile and Mexico Earthquakes" [1991] issued by the Applied Technology Council. Basic Information: Earthquake: Date: Epicenter: Magnitude: City: Population: Source distance: Local intensity: Ground motions: Tsunamis: Mexico City Earthquake September 19, 1985, 7:18 a.m. Ni 8deg.266min, W 1 O2deg.748min] MR 8.1 (Richter Magnitude) Mexico City 17 million 300km highly variable, strong frequency dependent amplification effects strongly frequency dependent None Physical Damage to Facilities or Systems Housing: 3,745 = Total 577 = Destroyed 1,638 = Severely damaged 1,530 = Moderately or slightly damaged Medical Facilities: 41 = Total 5 = Destroyed 22 = Severely damaged 14 = Moderately or slightly damaged Industrial Facilities: Private offices: 170 = Total 28 = Destroyed 69 = Severely Damaged 73 = Moderately or slightly damaged Manufacturing Plants: 19 = Total 7 = Destroyed 6 = Severely Damaged 6 = Moderately or slightly damaged 25

35 Educational Facilities: 703 = Total Recreational Institutions: 35 = Total 43 = Destroyed 206 = Severely Damaged 454 = Moderately or slightly damaged 9 = Destroyed 9 = Severely Damaged 17 = Moderately or slightly damaged Other Buildings: 374 = Total 86 = Destroyed 93 = Severely Damaged 195 = Moderately or slightly damaged LiQuid Petroleum Gas Leakage: 3,500 cases (70% from installed tanks; 23% from portable bottles; 4% from gas operated equipment; and 3% unknown). Other Physical Effects: Damage to People: Deaths: Injuries: estimated 10,000-20,000, depending on the source; 4,287 confirmed in Mexico City; 47 confirmed outside of Mexico City. 14,268 reported in Mexico City and 424 reported outside of Mexico City. Loss of Function: Water system: Telephone: 22% (10-20% lost service for nearly a month). 5-30% inoperative (75% of long distance service lost). 26

36 Kajima - CUREe Research Project Topic Number 6, Multi-disciplinary Strategies for Earthquake Hazard Mitigation YEAR THREE FINAL REPORT Submitted by SEEHM, Kajima Corporation Kaoru Mizukoshi Masamitsu Miyamura Yoshikatsu Miura Toshiro Yamada Mitsuharu Nakahara Hiroshi Ishida February 15, 1993

37 CONTENTS Work shop on knowledge transfer in construction process 1 Direct socio-economic impact data of the Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake 16 Long Road No.2 -- Learning from the Past -- 18

38 1.1 Background WORKSHOP ON "KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER IN THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS" I Background and Objectives Construction technology is advancing with remarkable speed as new techniques are incessait1y developed and applied to high-rise buildings, nuclear power plants, and other projects. In order for such new techniques to be effectively utilized it is essential that the fruits of research are correctly understood, transferred and applied to actual construction works. Reviews of damage inflicted abroad by earthquakes indicates that there are many instances in which damage was more severe than would have otherwise been the case due to the unsatisfactory diffusion of new construction technologies. This is especially true for developing countries, where extensive earthquake damage can be attributed in part to the fact that though new construction techniques have been imported from industrially advanced countries, sufficient seismic engineering consideration was not paid to vital structural elements because the technology transfer process was inadequate. Thorough knowledge transfer is important not only for developing and applying new techniques, but also with regard to the general issue of technological assistance extended to developing countries. This issue must be examined from an international perspective. Kajima Corporation is engaged in a joint study, scheduled to last for three years, with a research organization known as CUREe. This organization was established by eight California universities to work on the technological evolution of seismic engineering and earthquake hazard mitigation. The joint study addresses the problem of "Earthquake Hazard Mitigation through a Social Engineering Approach" as a sub-theme under the overall theme of "Earthquake Hazard Mitigation of Large Structures Built on Soft Soil." The workshops described in this report were held on this sub-theme with the above background in mind, with the intention of applying in. Japan the techniques worked out by CUREe for discussing the "Transfer of Knowledge about Seismic Engineering in Construction Processes"

39 In workshops sponsored by CUREe with over ten participants from universities, private enterprises, and government all with different fields of expertise discussions were held on various knowledge sources, transfer media, and important specific knowledge items in the construction process from planning, design, and construction through maintenance. These discussions addressed topics such as how the results of seismic engineering research are utilized in actual construction work, how knowledge items are collected into a systematic whole and conveyed, through what processes such knowledge items are conveyed when new techniques are developed, and so forth. 1.2 Objective The major objective was "Analysis of Seismic Engineering Knowledge Transfer and Proposals for Improvement." These workshops aimed at finding effective measures for making the best use of the results of our seismic engineering studies the ultimate purpose of which is to mitigate the damage inflicted by earthquakes in the construction of real structures, by freely discussing such matters as from what sources and media the people responsible for carious processes obtain knowledge, how they transfer this knowledge, what problems they encounter in the transfer process, the overall flow of knowledge, and so on. All of these topics are difficult to grasp if discussion is limited to a specific field. The results achieved by the workshop will be published annually in the "Long Road" booklet and distributed among governmental private and other concerned organizations. The current knowledge transfer process will be clarified to pinpoint problems. Draft solutions will be prepared on the basis of the workshop discussions. These results will also be made available in the form of a special report and widely distributed among concerned parties within Kajirna Corporation so they will influence the choice of new research thenes, the rationalization of design and constru!tion work, the reduction of construction costs, recommendations and advice on new projects, etc.

40 2 Workshop Technique and Participants 2.1 Workshop Techriiqtie It was decided that the workshops should be run using a multi-disciplinary technique roughly similar to one used in some workshops held in the United States. The following steps were followed. A SEEHM (Social Engineering for Earthquake Hazard Mitigation) Research Group is the host and determines the themes. Before the workshop it prepares and distributes among participants materials (working papers) which present rough assumptions about the flow of knowledge in the transfer process to help them grasp the subject. Brainstorming discussions, including the expression of opinions on the working papers, are held in the form of workshops by experts who are actually involved in the construction process and who have been selected from various fields The host collects and arranges at its own discretion the opinions stated in the workshop in an interim report. Comments by participants are added to the report. By repeating the workshops using the previous interim report as working papers and, thus, clarifying problems, proposals for solutions gradually take shape. - The final results of the workshops are published after the comments and consent of participants are obtained. Two workshops were held on trial basis within Kajima Corporation, in preparation for actual workshops in the future, as follows: First: Understanding the current situation (October 27, 1992) Second: Abstracting problems and discussing solutions (January 13, 1993) 22 Participants As these were the first workshops we sponsored, attendance was limited to Kajima Corporation employees and, further, largely to experts in highstrength reinforced concrete. The decision to invite participants who shared the same field of expertise was made in anticipation that common technical experiences among the participants would. make it easier for them to understand each other and would animate the exchange of opinion. -3--

41 The names and positions of the participants are listed below. Ishida Kanai Beshio Fuj ii N agao Fukusa wa Ono Onishi Mizu.koshi, M iy am ura, Miura, Ya mad a, Nakahara, Ishida Manager, Business Promotion Division Chief, Development Group Manager, Special Projects, Kajima Technical Research Institute Section Chief, Architectural Technology Division Manager, Architectural Design Department Chief Structural Engineer, Structural Design Department Chief Facility Engineer, Facility Design Department Project Chief, Chiba District Office, Tokyo Brax,ch Members of SEEHM Research Group 3 Understanding the Current Situation 3.1 Participant opinions at first workshop Opinions sorted according to the construction processes in Figure 1 were as follows. Planning and Marketing Knowledge of seismic engineering is not required at the marketing stage but the transfer of information, as on costs and construction periods, is vital. Information inevitably has to be assimilated at the personal (individual) level so human relations and associations are important. The company's customers have significant knowledge of seismic engineering. 4

42 Design Designers are working as generalists and thus have to depend on experts for highly specialized knowledge. They sometimes display rather excessive dependence on these experts. Knowledge is very often obtained from newspapers and television. Concerning aseismic design for facilities and equipment, following the manuals is entirely sufficient. Pamphlets are effective as a means of knowledge transfer at the initial stages. Research and Development On-the-job training, is an effective means of transferring knowledge. Extreme specialization among researchers has excessively limited the scope of their knowledge. Sometimes it is difficult to know who possesses the particular knowledge needed. The most important knowledge for research managers to have is a general idea of what their subordinates are doing. A certain level of knowledge must he ready and available any time it is needed. Knowledge is readily and efficiently acquired by association with experts. As the knowledge acquired is often fragmentary, the pieces have to be organized into a systematic body. The knowledge acquired and accumulated by senior workers should be transferred to their juniors. Construction Standardized knowledge is easy to utilize. Regarding the transfer of knowledge to a customer, pamphlets will suffice only if the customer trusts the construction firm. Knowledge transfer at the initial stages of a project; has great influence on the result. Other opinions, common to a}.i processes, were as follows:

43 The intense competition in Japan prompts the quick diffusion of effective technology and knowledge. K_nowledge of distinct nierit diffuses without special assistance. Effective means of knowledge transfer are: human relations within a firm, and video from outside a firm. 3.2 Knowledge transfer flow chart and analysis Based on our opinions, in addition to those stated above in 3.1, the knowledge transfer flow chart shown in Figure 2 was devised. Referring to this chart, the present status of knowledge transfer on seismic engineering for each process of construction is summarized as follows. Planning and Marketing The input of knowledge (information) depends on personal connections. There are almost no systems for systematically transferring knowledge. The transfer of information from marketing to other fields is inadequate. In marketing, the input and output of knowledge are unfavorably concentrated in people working within certain domains. Design Designers do not read many of the newest studies on seismic engineering. Designers work as generalists rather than specialists, in the processes of construction, Research and Development Researchers tend to associate much with sources of expertise and little with sources which can provide information on appropriate research subjects. Research results are not published for a general audience. Construction Frequent transfers are made to firms cooperating with Kajima Corporation. The flow of knowledge in the field is slightly less than uniform among different topics. 900

44 4 Problems Identified 4.1 Major opinions expressed at the second workshop Major opinions expressed in the discussions, arranged in the three categories of knowledge sources, media and maintenance, are as follows. (1) Sources of knowledge In general, the opinion shared by almost all participants is that people play a major part in knowledge transfer. The 1)ackgrOUfld of this observation seems to lie in the following facts. (a) Kajima Corporation abounds with distinguished employees. (b) Capitalizing on access to these individuals is the shortest way to obtain knowledge. (c) Finding the specific knowledge needed from a wealth of information requii'es sound knowledge and judgment, and people compare favorably with other sources of information in this context. (d) People stay current in their fields of expertise. On the other hand, the following are cited as problems that occur when people perfonn important functions in the transfer process. It is possible that the knowledge (information) is biased, incorrect, or dogmatic. Access cannot be available to everyone when they need. it. (e) The transfer process is influenced by human relations. Access can be shut off if a person leaves the firm. A certain amount of knowledge is necessary to make a connection with a knowledgeable person, (1) Many people are too proud of their own expertise to try to understand related fields. Some participants wondered if a database shared by all employees is necessary, though not without restrictions to accessing sensitive data such as personal information. (2) Knowledge transfer media (a) Though mechanisms of knowledge transfer for the corporation as a whole and for its components (such as quality control, education, and information distribution systems) seem have been established to some

45 extent, the facts that people play the leading role and that human relations are an important element remain unchanged. ZP Therefore, there must be lively communication among various components of the firm, let alone among employees within a component. It was pointed out that at Kajima Corporation across-the-board call-ups of specialists for meetings, briefings and the like has led to the number of experts present at such gatherings being greater than is the case in other firms. The cultivation of generalists was suggested as a countermeasure to this phenomenon. Pamphlets are effective means of transferring knowledge. It should be noted, however, that current pamphlets do not necessarily express what customers want to know and that they must keep pace with the times. OJT is important and the results are prominent. Training and the lateral distribution of knowledge are worthy of further consideration. (3) Maintaining the quality of knowledge In order to effective].y utilize knowledge, up-to-date information must constantly be taken in. The following comments were made on this topic. This is now a function of the individual efforts of employees. It is best to make use of projects organized by headquarters for this purpose, something which can be done extensively. A database must be created. 42 Major problems Major problems drawn from opinions expressed in the discussions and classified by function are as follows. Planning and Marketing Is the present situation, in which access to knowledge depends on human relations, desirable? Mustn't the company have a more rational knowledge (information) transfer system in order to enhance our marketing power? Isn't there a need for enhancing the transfer of knowledge (information) from marketing to other flelds? Design (a) Shouldn't designers read more of the latest studies on seismic engineering?

46 (b) Are designers conveying without fail to other sections the technical problems they encounter in their work? Research and Development Are researchers exposing themselves to a sufficient number and range of studies and reports? Aren't researchers determining themes and performing research without knowing the actual circumstances of design or construction? Aren't there cases in which research results are not distributed laterally as general knowledge? Are research results of expressed in a form which is easy to understand? Construction Are the people engaged in construction work trained to understand the contents of design packages and specifications? Are designers consistently advised of constraints on and problems in construction? Is information on a given type of construction distributed laterally to all sites where similar work is under way? 5 Proposals Under the current circunistances of knowledge transfer within a firm, the person-to-person route which makes individuals the media plays such an important role that augmenting this process appears to be the best practical policy to improve the transfer of knowledge. Some suggestions on how this might be accomplished are given below. (1) Knowledge transfer with individuals as the media sbould be more vigorous. It is thought that the following measures would be effective for this purpose. Eliminate parochialism Promote the unrestricted exchange of knowledge &mong various components of the firm. Provide appropriate rewards for the provision of knowledge T he names of those who contributed knowledge to a project could be publicized.

47 (2) The stability of person-to-person knowledge transfer should be raised. The following measures may serve this purpose. (a) Increase the redundancy of routes for knowledge transfer To avoid instability caused by employee transfers, the following should be pursued. Combine person-to-person knowledge transfers with institutional knowledge transfer routes. Hire outstading people and position them strategically. (b) Enlighte.n juniors on knowledge transfer routes and encourage the flow of advice from seniors to juniors throgh OJT. 6 Conclusion Some measures are proposed here for improving the transfer of knowledge about seismic engineering. The proposals were created by grasping the current status of the information transfer process and the problems in it using a multi-disciplinary workshop technique. Since these workshops were held not merely to analyze knowledge transfer but also to acquire practical experience with the multi-disciplinary technique, all workshop participants were employees of Kajima Corporation. The scope of knowledge transfer was limited to the in-house realm. In order to hold more substantial discussions on knowledge transfer to mitigate earthquake hazards, workshop participants should be drawn from a greater variety of sources. -10-

48 pecision at themes, preparation of 4vance materials by host ection of workshop participants I jistribution of pre-event materiii1 ective,, present their opinions individua11 voi'ksho Open discussion and exchange of information çrim summarization of opinions portbyhostl -'- LDistribution of fport to participaiif ITUSS1OI) vision of reiooftl let 4- ICollection of commen1 fproposals to governmental and other organi zations I IFigure I Flowchar Figure 2 Construction Processes and Related Functions 11

49 2. Direct socio-economic impact data of the Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake Data shown below were collected for the CUREe team to build a Damage Propagation Flow Model. Main data source is "Reports on the Damage Investigation of the 1978 Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake "issued by the Architectural Institute of Japan. Earthquake : Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake Date : June 14, :14 PM Epicenter: N38 09' E142 13' Depth : 40km Magnitude: Mjivi=7.4 (M7.0) MJMA : Magnitude by Japan Meteorological Agency ML: Lichter Magnitude City : Sendai Population : 670,000 Source-to-site Distance : about 100km Local Intensity: JMAI=V+ (MMIIX-) JMAI: Intensity by JMA MMI: Modified Mercalli Intensity Ground Motions (Accelerogram) : Gal Tsunamis : about 40cm (no damage) Physical Damage to Facility or System Items Number Loss (million) Housing 59,912 27,166 Totally destroyed 658 4,184 Half destroyed 2,505 5,078 Partially destroyed 56,749 17,904 Land 11,285 3,081 Sheathing 3,992 1,800 Landslide Fissure 7,020 1,131 Fences and Gates 20,898 3,679 Hollow block fences 14,825 2,608 Soil, stone or wood fence 3, Gates Furniture 78,149 households 8,227 Medical and Sanitary Facilities Medical facilities Water System 3, Sanitary facilities

50 Industrial Facilities 22,205 46,655 Big business ,281 Small business 21,934 31,374 Agriculture and Stockbreeding 5,040 Educational Facilities 139 2,877 Elementary schools Junior high schools Senior high schools Others 77 1,665 Public Works Roads Bridges River 7 42 Others 2,273 Sewage System Gas System Traffic System 6 52 Others - 1,024 Total Damage 100,638 Other Physical Effects Damage to People Deaths: 13 Injuries Serious: Slight: 9,175 Loss of Function Power System: 1 day (670,000 people) Water System: 3 days (25,000 people) Gass System: 1 months (410,000 people) 13

51 I :{s7!1 i Toward Mitigating Earthauake Hazard I;..., -

52 Great Kanto Earthquake Niigata Earthquake Tokachioki Earthquake Miyagiken.oki Earthquake Nihon-kai Chubu Earthquake Topic 1: How new technology was adopted. experiences in the US Topic 2: Earthquake Insurance differences between the US and Japan 15

53 Learning rom the Past The background of thsaster In the wake of a major earthquake we have a tendency to concentrate on calamities such as fallen buildings, damaged roads and bridges, and casualties caused by tsunamis and fires. We often fail to understand the real background and causes of such terrible events. It is of vital linportance that we detect potential disasters in advance and prepare sufficient countermeasures, rather than merely reacting with astonishment at the damage caused by a major earthquake. The collapse of buildings and expressways cannot be attributed to design alone. The real reason may be found in the social circumstances from which a design emerged. These circumstances include economic factors, such as cost and the availability of materials, engineering factors, such as personnel skills and construction methods, and administrative factors, such as whether there is time for proper construction and inspection systems. Looking at disaster prevention from a regional perspective, we absolutely must consider all factors which have the potential to contribute to earthquake damage, not merely those which might directly lead to the damage of individual structures. This may be a lengthy process (long road). Are we learning from the past? Reviewing the history of earthquake disasters, we find that the nature of earthquake damage has changed as society has changed. Moreover, though people try to utilize the knowledge acquired from past experience, this knowledge is not always successfully applied to contemporary society. As illustrated by the chart below, the causes of earthquake- related fatalities varied among individual earthquakes and geographical regions. This suggests that it may be tricky to use our knowledge of historical events to prevent damage in the future. Fbr this report, five disastrous earthquakes which occurred in Japan in this century were selected because of differences among them in terms of historical period and location. Factors which contributed to these disasters are investigated with a stress on the relationship between the nature of the damage and society. Fires Tsunamis Landslides Building Crush Collapse of Walls and Gates Shock Death ME 0 Explosion of Plants Drowning Death Others Nihon-kaiChubu Earthquake %Hac' ji M77tAk>\ 1968 M7.9 ter Tokachi-oki Earthquake 16 ilit 1964_M7.5 Sendai Niigata Earthquake 0 (-:2' Nilgata 1978 M7.4 Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake t I Ell 1923 M7.9 4 Causes of Earthquake-related Fatalities O6 Great Kanto Earthquake 16

54 Relations between Earthquake Damage and Social Factors Measures to mitigate damage Earthquakes are natural phenomena. However, the destruction wrought by an earthquake is a social phenomenon closely related to our way of life. It arises from earthquake hazards in society and grows from such weaknesses if they are not corrected. Fbr this reason, to reduce earthquake damage to the urban environment we must discover the hidden weak points in society and in the urban infrastructure so that we can devise ways to strengthen or overcome them. The first issue of Long Road pointed out that the social engineering approach is an effective way to tackle this problem. To locate weak points in terms of earthquake disaster prevention in today's complex society, a procedure as shown in the flow chart below should be useful. First, the current systems and structures of the city must be understood. A disaster scenario is then devised which reflects past disaster experiences. Then the weak points in terms of disaster prevention are sought. In this report, two different analyses which are part of the overall process of rectifying weak points are described. One analysis involves creating a chart (a damage propagation flow chart) which represents relations between damage and social factors concerning each earthquake. The other is an analysis of the process of evaluating the dangerous elements from case to case for each damage factor. Damage propagation flow chart Fbr each of the five disastrous earthquakes selected, a damage propagation flow chart was created to reveal the occurrence of damage and its propagation. To choose factors which previous damage experiences had in common, which could be useful for formulating a disaster scenario for the future, the damage caused by individual earthquakes had to be clarified in connection with the social background. As is shown in the diagram below, the lower half of a propagation flow chart shows damage caused by the earthquake and the propagation of the damage to explain the relationship between the cause of the damage and its result. Social fea- tures and weather phenomena or geographical conditions which are thought to have some association with the damage are also shown in the upper part of the chart. To create the charts, newspaper articles and various reports on damage were studied and the social circumstances of the time and place were investigated. Also, meetings with local residents and officials were held. Based on the data collected, important damage phenomena were selected. Relationships between cause and effect were determined mainly through discussions among the members of the SEEHM study group. The damage propagation flow charts for the five earthquakes appear on the following pages. Through this series of studies, phenomena which were common to each earthquake are revealed to some extent in connection with changes in the social background. In addition, the relation between particular characteristics of damage and social circumstances changing with the passage of time were clarified. Relevant social factors The occurrence and spread of damage 10 (arrows link cause and etlect) Procedures for Preventing Earthquake Disasters Concept of Damage Propagation Flow Chart 17

55 Great Kanto Earthquake R The rapid growth of Tokyo's population due to migration from the countryside, the high density of housing, and a lower public awareness of the need for fire prevention compared with the Edo era all contributed to the spread of fires. The fires also grew because people carried their belongings with them while fleeing, and because few cisterns were available for fighting the fires. The inflation and economic slump which followed the boom years of World War I, a shortage of goods after the disaster, higher unemployment and corrupt business practices and crime contributed to social and economic instability. I The disruption of mass communication channels fostered the spread of rumors, which led to a vicious outbreak of violence against ethnic Koreans living in Tokyo. Evacuees at Ueno Station (Tokyo) (Photo:The Osaka Mainichi, Earthquake Pictorial Edition, Part One, Sept ) 'Weatteer boot passes Fires in kitchens and chamceal -Ede 840 evammatian with Based on investigation Cl 1906 San Fmarrcrsco Recesuon oonrs alter Grearercampetruon to acquire near Tokyo sloven ta( cootung knock baggage Earthquake Fusaluclo Omon adsised Tokyo City Wand War I colco Os among great powers Government to reinforce water service pipelnes tihimed speed: nuts Decbning awareness of Ore prevention J Puce hikes. Rice flats Japan anneoes Korean Pavinsunla Pressure from authorities Social unrest F Koreans brought termeasures not Movement to parted the constitution to Japan to wont taken In lime Sodolnr rnnuownnr LANDSLiDES J 15UkiA58S IDAMAGETOBUIWFIGSI I FIRES - I I OAMAGETOLIFELINES INFORMATION FLOW DISRUPTION Landslides ISo at /.tand O.6rn al Tokyo Houseswashed away Fires start sonotane005ty at many locations (178 in Tokyo) Waler supply disrupted 25o,000 buddings Fires spread oaniroaris damaged - nort m Smba palliasy or totalty (95 In Tokyo) IsKanagowa 'dedroyed '7t 10 OWra -',t Firestorms Telophone 008 Newspaper Poslal services telegram service pubisiting suspended ivlerruplod suspended Shortage 01 intormation I Large tires develop Train anodents (24) (58 to Tokyo) Search br - tanitty members JRoods Bund l ievacuatmon cause dre to spread Hansen bu ( in Toky Falaktreo. - Evacuation routes blocked' Ueotns Dy Otowning) Deaths We to btekllog stush Deaths due In tire ) ) 40% ot Tokyo burns (I t% 01 total fatuities) L1 01 total tat.akties) '---- to Evacuation rivers (Doad and missing in Tokyo 68,000 persons) Search for missing by Tokyo Civic Research Commission. Casualties lolormulion Centor. Tokyo Palm Office Rumors spread (largn tsunami, eruption 01 Mt. Fuji. another large earthquake, dnalh 01 leadnr 01 Soiyu-Imai poihical party. Jailbrnaks. fires set by Koreans, etc.) ( ) At Honjo Clothing Depot, lireslorm caused by rvao.mee baggage kills 38,000 inj red [ Home Deaths by dmwrong (26,000 In Tokyo) (1.38 million in Tokyo) O in Tokyo) Evamalion to5 Umtsootravel Koreans murdered distant areas" Into Tokyo 'r (lbs sands 01 Koreans k lied) ii

56 Niigata Earthquake Fires broke out at chemical plants built on reclaimed land and spread to residential districts due to the lack of experience with major earthquakes and government policies. In the absence of any precedent, no one expected such a large earthquake. Priorities were thus weighted toward cost considerations as represented by the use of asbestos pipe for the city's water supply. The water lines suffered major damage. Over-reliance on inadequate building standards, in particular those related to soil behavior during an earthquake, led to damage caused by soil liquefaction. This sort of damage was more extensive than that caused by purely structural failures. Fire at Petrochemical Plant (Photo: Japan Society of Civil Engineers).5l9tsuftlderg progress of aseisndc engineering :-n. Lads of experience with major earthquakes - Preference for lamer costs Dedted Industrial cflstrict I Bufil-up area spreads over salt sails I Asbestos pipe Overused lnsulfidenl routine ciremical plants beck so (price is 1/4 that of cast bairavg for emergency }4 - reclaimed lasso non pipe) sod distribution (104 oil dosage tasks) Land subsidence Made-to-odor system for Mutual eothange program among Inadequate systens tar marsdacturing water supply electrical power companies tot fighting chenrical fires equipmera (no stock) emergency assistance DAMAGE TO LIFELINES I I FIRES Soi tqueted od I Breakwater cracks form. etc. F, collapses (2 tataslies) J Collapse of bearing wail structures (2 cases). Estensive damage to Rahmen frame structure besting (29 cases, latalilies) flooded Sliowa Great Bridge labia I 660km (60%) of water toes I I AC aithty pates I I I Conrmonicahon cables Fires break out at oil plants and continue damaged tat and tot severed I buirdrrg for 360 hours)4 dinerent places) Value V850 orison II Value: VS bison I I ru,.,c,,..u--s,,aa.,u., o,.c, Delayed recovery (over one year anti Restored (prickly (100% In 4 I604cLekseveP complete recovery) days) Information Owe conlused ncludrg damage to telephone company office buridings) 5-, -.-, Value:,,7 0111ev I Fires spread to private houses (332 househokts) - VaOje:V3COr,sllon Inoquitablo drslribstinn 01 load Rood system damaged Tratfic (ams Food shortage I I Rartwaynetworlcdamaged I I Threat at pabfc dstu,hance

57 Tokachi-oki Earthquake U Many casuahies in mountainous terrain were due to landslides. These events raised numerous questions about evacuation plans and methods of sheathing slopes vulnerable to landslides. Having learned from the Niigata earthquake, many citizens joined fire-fighting efforts and this contributed to limiting the number of fires. Electric service was restored promptly thanks in large part to the activities of independent work teams from the local electric power company. Considerable assistance was offered by private firms for food and other necessities. a No more heartbreaking disasters! (Statue of the Buddhist goddess of mercy at the former site of a junior high school in Aomori Prefecture. Four of the school's students died in the catastrophe.) rny days from May13 1. ub8cb- us. ilding Growing arbarban lois, including a dorm, - rdr? I we RC obsidures I (rainfall near Gonohe :2t5rrsn) J Devpmestof reaklerrtiaj lexuujalrei I $larfasneceswyvolcanic deposits. nandy a sods In some nnturrtairioua areas - lapid development 01 Line tmbond softened rr6al area on volcanic I a ash terrace In tabfelatrd LANDSUDES I DAMAGETOUFEUNES I I OAMAGETOBULDPIGS 723 landsldes 33 deaths and 659 casuafties due to landslides (nralnlyinhtdrroheerea) - I I I I kill couapsesz One death caused by j AC buikdrrgsdar000edj Damage cancentrated ntlldntm;ofainllries I annong (55bouses663 LhoOPitaili I I I I!icd!!gflI k$ngsdamage + SIrips eeecualed Landufde at Teltiyazawa Crashed I I l Ẏ froj n'kaol"'f!j faint 9cM :7 8 evacuation by Rail serrece Telephone Gas supply Damage to Elecinc service too temporary haibor lalatlies bndsfde from 1111 paralyzed networks lirlerrupled for reservntro, pipes: I iflteflrjpted for houses psonided caused by behind edrool I jfdtalod one or two water service to I rrisode I days after I households in women. + I I Iriotounesni damage j 4, eaflhqueke households {s (92.5/. 01. I r dlsropred (26,000 the crty( MInd at iteto Folsml&. (r.'egetasie prices nse - 8Pai' ooperallsn- sclrooliderrts sc(lniuief. 1 from US broed Usawa Base I households in Aomoii Cdv) Food assistance from All telephone Itt-kg LPG AdlMlies oil 632' V private 9rms: Sires between cyfirrdert I irrember sell-organized Rescue learn of bottles of mali. Hoirkaido and distributed learn from TOhOIW 3003 loaves of bread, mainland Eledric Power Company IODO padrages of severed NodrinlringT( + instant food Intone or penale buried by portions of dried days landslide rescued noodles bottles Eleric service restored of sauce. etc. on third day Measures to restore (rlatron networks Water supply vehicles and containers al siributed by prelecturot government Wells provl

58 Miyagi.ken.oki Earthquake U The advance of engineering technology for earthquake resistance meant that buildings suffered relatively little structural damage. However, many were injured by falling furniture or shattered tableware. Hollow concrete blocks were then in common use. More than half of all fatalities were children and the elderly, who were killed by the collapse of walls made of such blocks. U Considerable damage to land and buildings on engineered soils was evident The city of Sendai had expanded over hilly terrain and soft soils during the course of its growth. U The utility service networks which are indispensable for urban life suffered severe damage. This caused serious problems for residents of the city. Large residential developments on steep hillsides have also been built in Tokyo. with destructive eaflhguakes I I I Medem urban Progress in aseirnc I Itigh'(tse apartment I I engureeiing I wungs more I I common I Pubic utility services ruamt IU rf.x.bl KUa I UtUNL WetcKb I ek,al,c IL) LlI nunta I I I I Partition Wafis and gates tat Sewage Pal and coma Water hoes Fire 51 gas Power plants, madred inndow (canting r6ol total pimping sire networks tn5iedtand tanks substations, broken. tarnirure 27 talatties) damaged disrupted break and r overturned transrrrission tacililies darnaged 0wnage U' &idrrgs $mi a( as laymen. Cunctation mainly Water I Gv Electric Tetephone toes show.e pcthdr i sir softjs 72% oirrndelderly and Ctnklren supplyi supply, service swamped l:r Initedro SalSdaSI1aged(, irsioo.sand (15otsttat16 kttoattver linterruptedl linterrupled]interrupted L 'v lied lend (),377 65% were to larairies) I creates TT f Trartic signals Traltic jams.3demcai)3 [lettse Ifla' Wghlise apartment (tt.nc.jp(erj again by I Urban Ito becomes niffiath Incapacitated is.nthd Ldamagealnsei buildingssumter etrerstrocks coirdeinned and A 9uaksOaajrTed hemp damage d.81royedj ''' jafterco4hlig indusiriai advities dtficult Normal serrace Frmnr.aid acricities I)owi pcocnpity restored paralyzed 'V Sevoe I Has I thactrarged Campiete conrpiero Ecompiere Eeacue.nt omago on Emergency food,oatv8t In recovery In recovery Is Public owperatin "' tdc9mpad supplies distributed ii days about 1 month 1.5 days notated using radio (74% nests 51 damage) Inpassangerson and TV distance trains I I I Power suppled from Fakicotrima and AlmIta Ratio anti P/ stations use private elec2rtciy generators 21

59 Nihon-kai Chubu Earthquake Since the area had not experienced large earthquakes or tsunami in the past, the level of earthquake disaster preparedness was very low. Also, governmental disasterprevention activities lagged behind those in the Kanto and Tokai regions. Alarm systems for tsunami were inadequate, and alarms were delayed or never arrived in many localities. Relying on telephone contact to spread the alarm was found to be problematic. In light of these experiences, new systems were devised. The liquefaction of soft, sandy soils caused extensive damage to houses, agricultural facilities, and infrastructure, and the destruction had great impact on the regional economy. Damage to key industries such as woodwork machinery and metals deepened the recession. There were many difficulties in rebuilding homes and restoring agricultural facilities due to a lack of funds. Fishing boats tossed on the shore at the Yoneshirogawa River in Akita (Photo: the Akita Sakigake Shinpo-sha) jle4tnlã( j-.rr Prosperous acoarear',l Ettaito tolamease Thorough siousion lnatà: - amble land of pubic ufil4ies (electrisify, water. gas( Appropriate soil for. Spread of lrrigatcn. iirri,tt agriculture but, mostly soft ground, -. fatmino with rirryl sheets on sandy sod Necessary for everyday lie Urbanizahon of, someioeme' Wells abandoned OAMAGETOSOlL Housescoilapsed - ' ' Farmlarrddarnaged Waterarsigas supphes aortages of I Few earthquake interrupted aspowerand Unrestorabley money. 'policies if, :Reoaame Extended 'subsidence damage to utigaled land damaged closure Recovery] I I I fialdstwmedwrth, laleesaimost V V V -inyi sheets ' one moose Repair of residences is delayed Tramponation I I Repiandng Out of use Shortage of I I "problems-' water.supply, Temporary houses ' IF vehrcles constructed ao caj0und; bden_c_e_a_s_d ecnnhny (over 20 billor) c1 mtical I G_rea_ impaci emntx Un addue t _. on evday a life lwate Agricultural mutual aid spedal I Pttvâta'companie1 suw end drarnage. Indemnity (about 70% o1,, using port settler'. systems average producflonl5 Neunemos cemptarnts about lack of bath Induslnal families,,' ' Otodearge pump does rly not j-* Few of sea wuter damaged nc I1l0n tacrhties contnbutedto ocesoluo "Few of sacondaj-y - frnkrmber,metais.,,' disasleroduelorarnry,,r.t, mactrineryl,.j, 1'weather 'F'a of lam; -ztosses 22 Leolslauoutr hnandai ale to ms of natood colares"-ouaster Rodet Ad' Love wid fur ac5hen

60 What Caused the Damage? The five large earthquakes described in the previous section had different locations, times of occurrence, and magnitudes. However, comparing damage and the spread of damage, we find some common factors present for any earthquake. Studying the way these factors have changed over time will help us formulate disaster scenarios for contemporary cities. Here we will examine fires, which can cause major losses of life and property. We analyze how danger factors associated with the five earthquakes have changed with the passage of time. Danger factors which contribute to the occurrence or development of damage were selected for analysis. It should be noted with regard to selecting danger factors that each were to be found in all five earthquakes and that they were intended to be as independent of each other as possible. Then levels of danger were evaluated based on the record of damage which occurred. Fbur levels of danger were used in this analysis. The results of the analysis are summarized in the chart below. The following findings were obtained through the analysis: The number of dangerous fire sources and the percentage of wooden buildings remain significant danger factors, although public awareness that earthquakes demand immediate firefighting response is high. As for factors concerning the spread of fires, the use of non-flammable building materials has become more common compared with the situation at the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake. Also, fire-fighting capabilities have been upgraded in line with the growth of cities. However, housing density differs among different areas, and the capability for fighting fires in highly built-up districts remains inadequate. There have been no mass fatalities due to fire since the Great Kanto Earthquake. Accordingly, it is not possible to analyze the change of danger factors associated with mass fatalities from this analysis because of the lack of other data. Fbr the current analysis, the selection of danger factors and the evaluation of danger levels were discussed by the members of the SEEHM study group. The choices were not always based on objective data. Rather, the expert opinions of professional engineers also were used. Moreover, some factors are closely related to the regional nature of earthquakes. However, this attempt to analyze damage that occurred in past earthquakes from a universal viewpoint offers a new approach to subjectively understanding change in the nature and level of danger factors. Nihon-kai Chubu Great Kanto -. Niigata Earthquake Tokachi-oki. - Miyagi-ken-oki ' V ma - Relevant lactors - Earthquake.. Earthquake Earthquake Earthquake i IAMI1: I6PM1: AM9: PM5: pM0:01 Cities involved -.&Toko.V Niigata. Hachinohe;: Sendai Akita V}* Dangrlevel... -? 1' - Earthquake-(Magnftudej,:jMA Scale)' 7M=7.9p V M=7.5. M=7.4 M=7.7 Strength of ground motion - -. Number of fire sources and level of danger Fires. - Ratio of wooden buildings - Lack of citizen awareness (fire-fighting) Weather (wind, etc.) V 178 cases V V 4 oil plants 32 cases V 11 cases 2 cases Flammability of buildings Lack of fire-fighting capacity - Density of housing - S Spread of fires - 58 outes None T ( houses) households None None Lack of citizen awareness L...a. I (evacuation) Lack of evacuation routes and refuges I I i I Lack of accurate information J and instructions I i I Danger at evacuation site f Mass fatalities due to fire;; V 57,000 None None None None 0: small 1: medium 2: large 3: very large Analysis of Trends in Fire Danger 23

61 Clues f or Predicting Danger If a large earthquake occurs while you are in a subway train, a theater, a highrise building, a car on an expressway, or a densely built-up urban area, what will happen and what will you do? In the absence of any actual experience, it is very difficult to comprehend the horror of a large earthquake. One clue may be acquired by making a chart which shows relationship between the social background and the damage caused by major earthquakes in the past, and by knowing how factors which affect the damage are linked to society. Studying such a chart, we hope to find clues for predicting damage while keeping in mind the importance of preventing earthquake disasters. We expect that more and more international viewpoints will be required, and that international exchanges on this topic will increase in the near future, partly because a disaster in one country may affect the rest of the world. (Picture: Record of Experiences in Ansei Periodl A modern building destroyed by the 1985 Mexico Earthquake 24

62 Topic 1: How new technology was adopted experiences in the US Introduction of New Technology as a Result of the Knowledge Transfer In recent years, seismic response control technology, which brings with it great changes in conventional concepts of earthquake resistance, has rapidly been developed and put into practical use. In contrast to conventional earthquake resistance technology which emphasizes structural strength and toughness to prevent collapse, seismic response control technology, by limiting as much as possible the vibration of a structure caused by an earthquake, is intended to raise the safety and utility of a structure. Seismic response control can be divided into two classes. One is active control, which, by anticipating the motion of a structure due to earthquakes, actively controls this motion. The other is passive control using devices which accelerate vibration damping or absorb vibration displacement of a structure. Seismic response control has attracted attention as offering hope for considerable improvement of the urban environment and is worthy of wider recognition and application. However, in order for a new technology to be recognized and extensively utilized, various hurdles such as public awareness of its effectiveness must be cleared. In this context, the first application of a new technology is particu- L & J Center the first base-isolated building in the US larly important. Thus, taking up base isolation, which is a representative passive seismic response control technology, we studied two cases of how it came to be applied to actual structures in the US, where this technology was adopted earlier than in Japan. We thus take up the question of "knowledge transfer" regarding this new technology. Two Buildings for Case Study The first building to which base isolation in the US was applied was the Fbothill Communities Law and Justice Center (L & J Center), a public facility constructed in 1985 in the suburbs of Los Angeles, California. The second was the City and County Administration Building (C & C Building) in Salt Lake A C & C Building a historic buildinç 25

63 City, Utah, a historic structure which was renovated with base isolation in For our study, we planned to interview people involved with the adoption of base isolation in these two cases and then extract from the resulting oral histories factors which had made possible the use of this new technology. *The L & J Center, the First Base-isolated Building in the us While base isolation technology in the US had been developed to the point of viability by the early 1980s, no clients willing to make use of it had appeared. R. Rigney was at that time employed by San Bernardino County (located near Los Angeles) and was also chairman of the state Seismic Safety Commission, which prepares drafts of state law and makes proposals to the state concerning earthquake safety. Rigney managed the construction of the L & J Building as a critical facility, and naturaily was concerned about its earthquake safety. One day he happened to hear a lecture on base isolation technology at a Commission meeting and was so interested that he began to investigate it to the extent of traveling abroad for the purpose. He redesigned the L & J Center incorporating base isolation, and compared his new design with alternatives. It was concluded that, despite its being more expensive, base isolation should be adopted because it improves the safety of the building remarkably and, moreover, earns the county credit as a pioneer of the new technology. The building was completed in C & C Building Strengthened with Base Isolation The C & C Building is a beautiful and historic building which was completed in However, it had become superannuated by the 1970s and was judged to be in need of drastic structural reinforcement. After discussing the issue, the city council decided to renovate it. In a referendum, a majority of voters also favored its preservation. The method to be used, however, was left undecided for a lengthy period. P. DePaulis, who was a former Mayor and then chief of the city's Public Works Department, conducted studies on measures for strengthening the building's earthquake resistance and concluded that base isolation was best because it would raise the building's safety and preserve historic exterior and interior appearance, though it would be more costly. In 1985, when he ran for the mayor's office, one of his campaign slogans was "Choose me and the building." Immediately after being elected he started more detailed studies on the subject. He put his plan for renovating the C & C Building into action, and the work was completed in Various Factors Facilitating the Introduction of New Technology The results of these two case studies in the US suggest that factors which have played an important part in the introduction of new technology were as follows: Organizational culture that is receptive to innovative technology Influential champions who favor the new technology Consensus of those concerned about the adoption of the new technology Importance of the structure (historical value) Recognition by those concerned of the added value offered by the new technology to offset its higher cost These are conclusions drawn from studies on two cases in the US. There may, therefore, be some factors that cannot be applied to Japan; where society and culture differ from those of the US. Nevertheless, the points made above should be useful when examining the current situation in Japan regarding the adoption of new technology. Finally, it should be noted that all the above are fruits of work undertaken with Prof. Henry J. Lagorio, Mr. Robert A. Olson, Mr. Stanley Scott, and Dr. Kenneth A. Goettel in the Kajima- CUREe joint projects. Influential Champions., ff Rnsus. R 'of Structure Various Factors Facilitating the Introduction of New Technology ME

64 Topic 2: Earthquake Insurance differences between the US and Japan : A major earthquake immediately causes extensive destruction and imparts an enormous economic burden on the region affected. This includes the expense of repairing damaged buildings. Earthquake insurance systems are intended to reduce the burden of recovery. However, as can be seen in the table below, earthquake insurance systems in the US and Japan differ greatly. This reflects the fact that these systems are closely related to the social background of each country. Fire insurance policies in Japan contain disclaimers for fire damage resulting from an earthquake, a volcanic eruption or a tsunami, and therefore such losses are not wholly indemnified by such policies. This is because there are many wooden houses in Japan, and insurance companies would be under enormous obligations in the absence of such disclaimers if a major earthquake occurred. The Japanese earthquake insurance system is such that premiums are as low as possible, with the major purpose being to provide security for consumers. Therefore, the system is based on a no-loss, no-profit concept which implies that insurance premiums be determined such that insurance companies neither profit nor lose. Further, the national government reinsures these policies in preparation for massive claims. In the United States, on the other hand, insurance systems have great regard for the independent policies of private insurance companies. This is reflected in the fact that the US is called an "insurance country". In A general, even if a fire is caused by an earthquake the resulting damage is indemnified by fire insurers. There are considerable differences in the probability of earthquakes depending on the location, so here a comparison is made with California, which is subject to many earthquakes. California began trial operation of a state earthquake insurance system in Comparison between Earthquake Insurance Systems of Japan and California Japan California Relationship with State ofers insura nce but government reinsurer. most coverage provided by private companies Business concept No-loss, no-protit itar to other insurance fies Coverage of fires Handled in principle by, Handled in principle by caused by earthquakes earthquake insurance only ordinary fire insurance C Japan Fire and lnsurano Associati Both Japan and California have established different rate structures for premiums depending on the seismicity of region. As is apparent from the above, earthquake insurance exists to aid recovery from earthquake damage though there are some differences in the details of earthquake insurance systems in Japan and California. 0 Insurance premium classifications according to location California State Insurance (Holden 1991) zones from A to H

65 The members of SEEHM are: Prof. Takuji Kobori Mr. Toshiro Yamada Dr. Kaoru Mizukoshi Dr. Mitsuharu Nakahara Dr. Masamitsu Miyamura Mr. Hiroshi Ishida Mr. Yoshikatsu Miura What is the SEEHM? The SEEHM is a research group established in Kajima Corporation for the purpose of limiting the overall potential for earthquake damage by applying findings in social engineering to earthquake engineering. [Reference] Department of the Interior: The Record of the Great Kanto Earthquake, 1925 Hiroi: Information Problems of Urban Disaster, Institute of Journal and Communication Studies, Tokyo University, 1987 Yoshimura: The Great Kanto Earthquake, 1977 Press the Niigatanippo: The Record of the Nilgata Earthquake, 1964 Aomori Pref.: The Record of Earthquake Disaster in Aomori Prefecture (The 1968 Tokachi-oki Earthquake), 1969 Miyagi Pref.: The Lessons Learned from the 1978 Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake (Actual Conditions and Problems) Mikami: Earthquake Insurance of Our Country; System and How to determine the Insurance Rate, Earthquake Journal Nagashima: How will the Non-life Insurance Change?; Earthquake and Insurance, Earthquake Journal