Assessing Tax Compliance in Europe Through Public Opinion: Quantitative Methods and Qualitative Considerations. Joe Goldman
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1 Assessing Tax Compliance in Europe Through Public Opinion: Quantitative Methods and Qualitative Considerations Joe Goldman
2 Tax Morale and Europe Taxes are a vital part of the balance sheet Auditing and determining tax compliance is expensive 2014 Fiscal Surplus/Deficits (% of GDP, Eurostat) -8.8% >0% -3% 2
3 Literature Tax compliance is far more complex than just a simple probability of getting caught evading (Spicer and Ludstedt 1976). Cost/Benefit analysis underestimates tax compliance (Torgler 2004). Feld and Frey (2007) explain that tax gaps might be due to the overestimated risk of detection, but inconsistencies are too great. Tax morale is used overwhelmingly as an important piece to the puzzle (Lago Peñas and Lago Peñas 2008). s
4 EVS V234 Is cheating on tax if you have the chance ever justified? (10-point scale, 1= never, 10 = always )
5 State of Tax Morale in Europe
6 Current Studies on Tax Morale (Torgler 2005) Is cheating on tax if you have the chance ever justified? Limitations Opportunities Cross-cultural concerns Developing link with tax evasion Using multiple variables to make analysis more robust Factors of tax morale Dependence on just one trended variable Test relationship by using tax evasion estimates Social Desirability Develop complex understanding of tax culture in Europe
7 Coding Concerns Torgler (2003) Methdology Response Coded Binary Point
8 SE2 Coding Concerns Torgler (2003) Methdology Response Coded % 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Frequency of responses for Is evading taxes ever justified? Tax Morale
9 Slide 8 SE2 I can't remember what question V234 is. Perhaps include brief question text instead of Qtag. Steele, Elizabeth, 5/15/2015
10 Research Question Is the Torgler (2005) model of tax morale evaluation better than using a binary version? Hypotheses A binary model using other variables will be more predictive than the EVS tax morale question (V234) alone Tax compliance relates to factors other than tax morale
11 Model Dependent: Model I LEGIT = 100 UNDERGROUND Country level assessment on total tax compliance 12 Stepwise OLS regressions Large sample size (N>40,000) Based on Schnieder s (2012) assessment of the underground economy Independent: Model II 12 Stepwise GLS regressions incorporating clustered standard errors Factors of tax morale Promoting More meaningful significance levels Restraining
12 Restraining Factors of Tax Morale Obedience AUTHORITY OBEY PARLIAMENT Restraining Factors Trust in Gov t CIVIL SOCIAL PARTIES Ability to Pay Education GOV INCOME EDUCATE
13 Promoting Factors of Tax Morale Identity PRIDE GOODEVIL Promoting Factors Morality SIN CHEAT LIE Egalitarian Views CONCERN POLVIEW Education EDUCATE
14 Model I (1) Results P<.01 P<.10 Not Significant GOODEVIL CONCERN POLVIEW AUTHORITY SIN EDUCATE PRIDE CIVIL PARTIES GOV PARLIAMENT SOCIAL INCOME CHEAT LIE OBEY Significance Level Positive Relationship Negative Relationship
15 Model II (1) Results P<.01 P<.05 P<.10 Not Significant SIN EDUCATE GOODEVIL CONCERN CIVIL OBEY LIE PRIDE PARLIAMENT INCOME SOCIAL CHEAT AUTHORITY GOV POLVIEW Significance Level PARTIES Positive Correlation Negative Correlation
16 Discussion When recoded, variables other than CHEAT have a stronger relationship with tax compliance. Model II Significance SOCIAL exhibits a significant positive correlation. OBEY provided new evidence INCOME had surprisingly high correlation Difference between Restraining and Promoting variables
17 Discussion Failures Morality variables were not consistent EDUCATE exhibited a strong, negative correlation Confidence variables showed a negative trend The factors of morality and some regarding confidence did not succeed. Western European Expectations Conservative Culture Bias
18 Further Study Fielding questions with yes/no response types would simplify responses and create more useful data. Gallup World Poll Question WP1347 Do you think each of the following is morally acceptable, or morally wrong? People who don't declare all of their income for tax purposes. (to be fielded in 2015)
19 Thank you
20 OLS Regression Results Parameter Expecte d Sign (1) N = Adj. R 2 = 0.38 (2) N = Adj. R 2 = 0.11 (3) N=54010 Adj. R 2 = 0.34 (4) N=66270 Adj. R 2 =.02 Step 5 N= Adj. R 2 = 0.10 (6) N= Adj. R 2 = 0.11 Intercept GOODEVIL SIN POLVIEW AUTHORITY PARLIAMEN T CIVIL SOCIAL PARTIES GOV CHEAT LIE PRIDE OBEY CONCERN EDUCATE INCOME (0.2615)*** (0.2491)*** (0.1256)*** (0.0812)*** (0.1801)*** (0.1698)*** (0.1114)*** (0.1178)*** (0.1021)*** (0.1193)*** (0.1085)*** (0.1138)*** (0.1025)*** (0.1151)*** (0.0224)* (0.1042) (0.024) (0.0962)*** (0.1307)*** (0.1218)*** (0.1311)*** (0.123) (0.1147) (0.1242) (0.1165)*** (0.1088)*** (0.1174)*** (0.1344)*** (0.1252)*** (0.1355)*** (0.1213)*** (0.1309)*** (0.13)** (0.1132)*** (0.1215)*** (0.1094)*** (0.0242) (0.1122)*** (0.1133)*** (0.1206)*** (0.1078)*** (0.1094)*** (0.1381) (0.1299)* (0.1826)*** (0.1924)*** (0.1659)*** (0.1084)*** (0.1157)*** (0.1144)*** (0.1028)*** (0.0506)*** (0.0441)***
21 OLS Regression Results Parameter Expected Sign (7) N =41636 Adj. R 2 = 0.38 (8) N =49668 Adj. R 2 = 0.11 (9) N =54010 Adj. R 2 = 0.34 (10) N =66270 Adj. R 2 = 0.02 (11) N =66270 Adj. R 2 = 0.1 (12) N =49668 Adj. R 2 = 0.09 Intercept GOODEVIL SIN POLVIEW AUTHORITY PARLIAMENT CIVIL SOCIAL PARTIES GOV CHEAT LIE PRIDE OBEY CONCERN EDUCATE INCOME (0.4239)*** (0.1114)*** (0.1085)*** (0.0224)* (0.1042) (0.1307)*** (0.123) (0.1165)*** (0.1344)*** (0.13)** (0.1132)*** (0.1133)*** (0.1299)* (0.1826)*** (0.1084)*** (0.1144)*** (0.0506)*** (0.2491)*** (0.1178)*** (0.1138)*** (0.298)*** (0.0812)*** (0.1801)*** (0.1021)*** (0.1025)*** (0.170)*** (0.1193)*** (0.1151)*** (0.024) (0.024)*** (0.1122)*** (0.1215)*** (0.1206)*** (0.1381) (0.1924)*** (0.1157)*** (0.1218)*** (0.1311)*** (0.1147) (0.1242) (0.109)*** (0.1174)*** (0.1252)*** (0.1212)*** (0.1027)*** (0.044)*** (0.1355)*** (0.1309)*** (0.1094)*** (0.1094)*** (0.1078)*** (0.109)***
22 GLS Regression Results Variable Expected Sign (1) N = Adj. R 2 = 0.38 (2) N = Adj. R 2 = 0.11 (3) N=54010 Adj. R 2 = 0.34 (4) N=66270 Adj. R 2 =.02 (5) N= Adj. R 2 =0.11 (6) N= Adj. R 2 = 0.11 Intercept GOODEVIL SIN POLVIEW /- AUTHORITY PARLIAMENT CIVIL SOCIAL PARTIES GOV CHEAT LIE PRIDE OBEY CONCERN EDUCATE INCOME (1.8992)*** (0.8284)* (0.8063)*** (2.6379)*** (1.2406)*** (1.9946)*** (1.6631)*** (0.9889)** (0.8123)** (1.2494)*** (1.3637)** (2.1652)*** (0.9876)** (1.2628)*** (0.2584) (0.2967) (0.2986) (0.576) (0.6503) (0.8232) (0.7364) (0.8202) (1.0974)* (0.5552) (0.6442) (0.8681) (0.5477)** (0.6183)* (0.9739)* (1.3522) (1.2446)* (1.3579)** (0.6786) (0.8544) (1.09) (0.6719) (0.8415) (0.8212) (1.1659)** (1.405)** (1.1784)** (0.79) (1.2087) (0.6806)*** (1.1276)*** (0.9887)*** (0.9702) (1.2692) (1.5054)** (1.475)** (0.828)*** (0.9701)*** (1.2496)** (1.0881)***
23 GLS Regression Results Variable Expected Sign (7) N =65665 Adj. R = 0.03 (8) N =66270 Adj. R = 0.02 (9) N =66270 Adj. R = 0.02 (10) N =49668 Adj. R = 0.11 (11) N =54010 Adj. R = 0.34 (12) N =41636 Adj. R = 0.38 Intercept GOODEVIL SIN POLVIEW /- AUTHORITY PARLIAMENT CIVIL SOCIAL PARTIES GOV CHEAT (1.5351)*** (1.8219)*** (1.8219)*** (2.5147)*** (6.4956)*** (5.2496)*** (0.9939)** (0.8224)** (1.2478)*** (0.8135)*** (0.2976) (0.2658) (0.9526) (0.9653) (0.9653) (1.0904)* (1.0961)* (1.0961)* (0.7604) (0.8451) (0.8614) (0.8614) (0.9354)* (0.977)* (0.977)* (0.4912)** (1.3488)** (1.3657)** (1.3657)** (1.3233)* (1.0458) (1.0778) (1.0778) (1.09) LIE PRIDE OBEY CONCERN EDUCATE INCOME (1.2662)** (1.0659)** (1.2157) (0.8127) (1.1274)*** (0.6843)*** (1.2804) (0.9964) (1.6558) (1.4914)** (1.5226)** (0.9918)*** (0.8318)***
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