Why Do Firms Evade Taxes? The Role of Information Sharing and Financial Sector Outreach The Journal of Finance. Thorsten Beck Chen Lin Yue Ma

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1 Why Do Firms Evade Taxes? The Role of Information Sharing and Financial Sector Outreach The Journal of Finance Thorsten Beck Chen Lin Yue Ma

2 Motivation Financial deepening is pro-growth This literature is based on macro indicators and aggregate data Using a large sample of firm-level survey data on more than 64,000 firms across 102 countries over the period 2002 to 2010, this paper assesses the relationship between financial outreach and incidence and extent of tax evasion Specific dimensions of financial depth (branch penetration and credit information sharing) Outcome variable on micro-level: tax evasion

3 Why is this important? Recent interest in financial system development influencing public policy space Tax evasion important constraint for fiscal policy space Examples in recent European debt crisis Tax evasion has repercussions for information asymmetries, corporate governance and agency problems among a firm s stakeholders Tax evasion creates opacity that increase agency problems among firm s stakeholder Unlike large literature on tax avoidance and managementshareholder conflicts, we focus on tax evasion and borrowerlender relationship

4 Possible channels of how branch penetration and credit information sharing influences corporate tax evasion Higher probability of access to credit increases opportunity costs of tax evasion Lower financing obstacles in countries with higher branch penetration (Beck et al., 2007) and credit information sharing (Brown et al., 2009) Access to credit decreases the benefits of tax evasion: Lower incentives to cook the books as they are easier to detect in countries with better credit information sharing and closer proximity of banks to clients Countervailing effect: collateral becomes less important as financial systems deepen

5 Data and methodology

6 Firm-level data WB-IFC Enterprise Survey Data for 102 countries, between 2002 and 2010 Sample size per country bt. 250 and 1,500 enterprises of different sizes, industries, locations, ownership etc. Simple random or random stratified sampling Questions on obstacles, financing, firm characteristics Advantages of firm-level data: Direct micro-evidence on corporate tax evasion, not available from aggregate data Exploit within-country variation in tax evasion Control for composition of corporate sectors

7 How to measure tax evasion? Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in your area of activity reports for tax purposes? Tax evasion ratio: 1 percentage of taxes paid Tax evasion dummy: one if tax evasion ratio greater than zero Indirect question to elicit more honest response, but could introduce measurement error Responses stable over time (corr. 64% with WBES) 65% correlation with informal economy share, >60% with tax evasion index from WCR We gauge robustness with industry-level regressions

8 Firm-level control variables Location (small town, medium-sized city, capital) Size (small, medium, large; employment) Ownership (foreign-owned) Exporter Age Firm audited or not

9 How to gauge the banking system? Private Credit to GDP - financial depth Bank concentration (3-bank ratio) Credit information sharing Depth: extent of info, borrower pop., sources etc. Coverage relative to population Dummy for existence (separate for public and private registries) Banking sector penetration Branches per capita Branches per km 2

10 Country controls GDP per capita Control of corruption, Rule of Law, Government effectiveness, Crime Tax rate and taxation burden Additional controls: Creditor rights, # legal procedures, voice & accountability, political stability, quality & regulation, rule of law, # registration procedures, expropriation risk

11 The empirical model T ij = af i + bc i + gb j + e ij T ij = af i + bc i + gb j + df i *Size j + e ij T ij = af i + bc i + gb j + df i *Location j + e ij T ij = af i + bc i + gb j + df i *Industry char j + e ij Probit and Tobit Include year and industry dummies Clustered on country-level

12 Samples Pooled data for 102 countries (157 surveys), >60,000 firms, 2002 to 2010 Pooled sample with sampling weights for 44 countries, with >24,000 firms, 2004 to 2010 Panel data set for 42 countries (85 surveys) with >7,000 observations, 2002 to 2010

13 Basic results: Information sharing, financial outreach, and tax evasion Panel A: Probit regressions Panel B: Tobit regressions Depth of credit information *** *** *** *** *** *** Demo branch *** *** *** *** *** *** Firm-level controls X X X X X X Country level controls related to tax system X X X X Other country level controls X X Observations 64,438 64,438 64,438 64,438 64,438 64,438 Countries Pseudo R

14 Economic effect One SD in credit information sharing: 16.6% drop in the likelihood of corporate tax evasion and a 12.6% drop in the tax evasion ratio One SD in demographic branch penetration: a reduction in the incidence of tax evasion of 12.3% and a reduction of the tax evasion ratio of 9%.

15 Instrumental variable regressions Concerns of omitted variable bias Focus on variables that are exogenous to corporate tax evasion but (as suggested by literature) influence branch expansion and decision to establish/improve credit registries average tenure of bank supervisors, number of bank supervisors, supervisory independence from both banks and politicians, supervisory power, NPL ratio, policy contagion: share of countries in each region with a credit registry, bank ownership

16 First-stage regressions Panel A: Without sampling Panel B: With sampling weights weights Depth of credit Demo Depth of credit Demo information branch information branch Proportion of other countries in the same region that have credit registries 3.762** 0.529** 3.644*** 0.488** Bank supervisor tenure (years) 0.064* 0.063** ** Log of # of bank supervisors *** Independence of supervisory authority - overall 0.107* 0.083** 0.328** Official supervisory power 0.067** *** Non-performing loan 2.942** ** Foreign bank ownership 0.839** 0.418** 0.817** 0.423*** Private bank ownership 0.860** 0.503* 0.843** 0.580** Observations 57,094 57,094 21,541 21,541 Countries F-test of IVs Adjusted R

17 Second stage regressions Panel A: Without sampling weights Panel B: With sampling weights Depth of credit information *** *** *** *** *** *** Demo branch *** *** *** *** *** *** Firm level controls Country controls related to tax system X X X X X X X X X X Other country level controls X X Observations 57,094 57,094 57,094 21,541 21,541 21,541 Countries Hansen s over-identification test (p-value) Pseudo R

18 Further robustness tests Drop Islamic countries Control for informal financing Control for potential interplay between mafia, government s provision of public good and tax evasion Consider large and small firms separately Drop countries with WB/IMF programs Control for financial liberalization Control for other dimensions of institutional framework Use alternative indicators of branch penetration and information sharing

19 Firm location and tax evasion Dependent variable: extent of tax evasion Tobit IV Tobit Country x year fixed-effects Depth of credit information *** *** *** *** Demo branch *** *** ** *** Small city x Depth of credit information *** ** *** *** ** *** Capital city x Depth of credit information 0.022** 0.019** 0.025** 0.022** 0.015** 0.016* Small city x Demo branch *** ** ** Capital city x Demo branch 0.012** 0.014* 0.012**

20 Economic effect One SD in credit information sharing reduces tax evasion by Small town: 18.3% Capital city: 8.1% One SD in demographic branch penetration reduces tax evasion by Small town: 15.5% Capital city: 7.9%

21 Firm size and tax evasion Dependent variable: extent of tax evasion Tobit IV Tobit Country x year fixed-effects Depth of credit information *** *** *** *** Demo branch *** *** ** *** Small firm x Depth of credit information ** ** ** ** ** ** Big firm x Depth of credit information 0.027** 0.023* 0.012* 0.013* 0.018* 0.024** Small firm x Demo branch ** ** ** Big firm x Demo branch 0.016** 0.019* 0.016**

22 Economic effect One SD in credit information sharing reduces tax evasion by Small firm: 16.9% Large firm: 6.6% One SD in demographic branch penetration reduces tax evasion by Small firm: 14.2% Large firm: 9.1%

23 Industry characteristics and tax evasion Financial dependence (EFD): fraction of capital expenditure not financed with internal funds Growth opportunities at industry-level (GEO1): US industry growth, (Fisman and Love) Growth opportunities at country-level(geo2): based on Bekaert et al. (2007), P-E ratios for industries outside the respective country, averaged with weights from industry composition of respective country

24 Industry characteristics and tax evasion Tobit IV Tobit Country x year fixed - effects Depth of credit information *** ** *** *** ** *** Demo branch *** *** ** ** *** *** EFD x Depth of credit information *** *** ** EFD x Demo branch ** *** ** GO1 x Depth of credit information ** * ** GO1 x Demo branch ** ** * GO2 x Depth of credit information * ** *** GO2 x Demo branch ** ** ***

25 Panel regressions 42 countries, 85 surveys, 3800 firms asked twice 15 countries with changes in credit information sharing and branch penetration Panel allows us to control for firm-fixed effects

26 Panel regressions with firm-fixed effects (1) OLS with firm effects IV with firm effects Depth of credit information *** *** ** ** *** *** ** *** Firm location effects Small city x Depth of credit information ** *** ** ** ** ** ** ** Capital city x Depth of credit information ** 0.013* 0.026* 0.016** ** 0.035** Firm size effects Small firm x Depth of credit information ** ** * ** * ** ** Big firm x Depth of credit information ** 0.029** 0.022* 0.021** Industry characteristics EFD x Depth of credit information *** *** GO1 x Depth of credit information GO2 x Depth of credit information * ** *** *** *** ***

27 Panel regressions with firm-fixed effects (2) OLS with firm effects IV with firm effects Depth of credit information *** *** *** ** *** ** ** ** Demo branch *** ** ** *** ** *** ** ** Firm location effects Small city x Demo branch *** *** *** *** ** *** *** ** Capital city x Demo branch 0.012* 0.022* 0.016* 0.024** 0.024** 0.040* 0.039** 0.039** Firm size effects Small firm x Demo branch ** ** ** *** ** ** ** ** Big firm x Demo branch 0.029* ** 0.049** * 0.045* Financial characteristics EFD x Demo branch ** ** GO1 x Demo branch * ** GO2 x Demo branch ** *** ** ***

28 Why do we care? Tax evasion and expected sales growth Tax evasion ratio ** ** *** Government ownership dummy Foreign firm dummy * Exporter dummy ** Government subsidy dummy *** * No. of competitors 3.293** ** Constant * *** *** Industry fixed effects no yes yes Country fixed effects no no yes Observations Countries Adjusted R

29 Conclusions Tax evasion varies negatively with Branch penetration Credit information sharing Effect stronger for Small firms More remote firms More financially dependent firms and firms with higher growth opportunities