PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS

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1 KATERYNA V. HOLLAND Purdue University, Krannert Graduate School of Management Office: KRAN W. State Street West Lafayette, IN ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE Purdue University, Krannert School of Management Assistant Professor of Finance August 2013-Present PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS Research: Government Ownership, International Finance, Energy, Corporate Finance Teaching: Risk Management, Corporate Finance, International Finance EDUCATION Ph.D.; Finance, University of Oklahoma, Price College of Business May 2013 MBA (GPA: 4.0); University of Oklahoma, Price College of Business May 2001 Price Scholar Program; New York University, Stern School of Business Aug BS; Management Information Systems (GPA: 4.0), University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma 1999 WORKING PAPERS The Wealth Effects of Government Investment in Publicly Traded Firms. (Job Market Paper) Abstract: I study shareholder wealth effects associated with different types of government investors and varying levels of political interference in a sample of 1,809 government equity investments spanning 68 countries from 1988 to Prior literature suggests that government political goals might conflict with shareholder wealth maximization and harm firm valuation. Alternatively, government ownership could benefit firms by providing easier access to financing, state contracts and regulatory lobbying. I find that target stock prices react positively to announcements of investments by foreign and right-wing governments, by governments less likely to expropriate, and by governments economic arms. Conversely, target stock prices react negatively to announcements of investments by domestic and left-wing governments, by governments more likely to expropriate, by governments political arms and to minority stake state purchases. These results indicate that government investments associated with higher levels of political interference have a negative influence on shareholder wealth, while the opposite is true for government investments with economic objectives. Government Ownership and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Government Investments in Publicly Traded Firms, August 2012, revise and resubmit, Journal of Financial Economics. (with Ginka Borisova, Veljko Fotak, and William Megginson) Abstract: We investigate how government share ownership affects the cost of debt. Government ownership could carry an implicit debt guarantee reducing the chance of default and leading to a lower cost of debt. On the other hand, government ownership could lead to a higher cost of debt if this guarantee increases managerial moral hazard and if state owners impose political goals that reduce corporate profitability. Using a sample of 5,048 bond credit spreads from 43 countries over , we find that government ownership is associated with a higher cost of debt in non-crisis years but with a lower cost of debt during distress. We also document that the effect of government ownership differs by type of government entity. Further, domestic government ownership is linked to a decrease in debt pricing, while foreign government ownership is tied to an increase. Our results indicate that government ownership generally leads to a higher cost of debt, consistent with investment distortion fostered by state influence, but in times of economic or firm distress, the dominant effect is a reduction in perceived default risk due to implicit government guarantees.

2 Contango in Cushing? Evidence on Financial-Physical Interactions in the U.S. Crude Oil Market, March 2012, (with Louis Ederington, Chitru Fernando, and Thomas Lee) Abstract: We explore how trading in energy derivatives, specifically crude oil futures, impacts the physical supply of and demand for crude oil and thus the physical or spot price. We document a very large and active cash and carry arbitrage market at Cushing OK, the delivery point for the crude oil contract. When the futures-spot spread exceeds the cost of storage, oil is pulled off the spot market (thereby reducing the spot supply and raising the spot price), stored and sold forward. The futures-futures spread leads to similar cashand-carry arbitrage with a lag. Our findings establish the first tangible evidence of a causal link between oil futures and spot markets via inventory changes resulting from cash and carry arbitrage. Follow-up research is being funded by a grant from the Energy Information Administration in the U.S. Department of Energy. WORK IN PROGRESS The Behavior of Price Discovery in the Crude Oil Spot and Futures Markets (with Ederington L., Fernando C., and Linn S.), 2012 Abstract: We study the behavior of price discovery in the crude oil spot and futures markets to determine which market drives the determination of oil prices. Our results indicate that during the pre-2005 period the futures market was the dominant contributor to price discovery and that in comparisons across maturities, longer-dated contracts tended to contribute more. In contrast, during the post-2005 period, while futures markets were dominant when comparing the spot and the one- and two-month contracts, for longer-dated contracts the spot market was dominant. Likewise, in comparisons between futures contracts of varying maturities shorter-dated contracts tended to dominate the longer-dated contracts. We conclude that some important shifts occurred during the second half of the sample period. Nonetheless, it is premature to conclude that these shifts can be attributed to non-traditional speculative activity as might be generated by commodity investment fund activities. We leave this and other important questions that emerge from our study for future research The Effect of Cash and Carry Arbitrage on Spot Oil Prices (with Ederington L., Fernando C., and Linn S.), 2012 Abstract: We examine whether the crude oil futures markets and cash-and-carry (C&C) arbitrage documented in Ederington, Fernando, Holland, and Lee (2012) tend to stabilize or destabilize oil prices. If futures market participants have better information about future oil prices than spot market participants, we would expect futures trading and C&C arbitrage to reduce the volatility of spot oil prices by withdrawing oil from the market when the spot price is below fundamental value and returning oil to the market when the spot price is above fundamental value. In contrast, if there is better information in the spot market, futures trading and C&C arbitrage would exacerbate volatility in the physical oil market by causing the spot price of oil to deviate from its fundamental value. Our preliminary evidence on this question is suggestive of the former possibility that futures trading and C&C arbitrage tend to stabilize the physical crude oil market. Nonetheless, consistent with the findings in Ederington, Fernando, Holland, and Linn (2012), we find that our results weaken in the post-2005 period The Influence of Reported Derivative Gains and Losses on Earnings Announcement Reactions of Energy Exploration and Production Firms Government Ownership and Competition: How Do Rivals React When Governments Purchase a Stake in Their Competitor? PUBLICATIONS Bank Nationalizations: A History of the Credit Crisis of , February 2009, Privatization Barometer 2008 Report TARP Participation and Exit for U.S. Banks, March 2010, Privatization Barometer 2009 Report

3 AWARDS Financial Management Association (FMA) Doctoral Student Consortium Paper Presenter/Participant, 2012 Graduate Student Teaching Excellence Award (Price College award to a single student), 2012 Energy Information Administration (EIA) Research Grant, Business Energy Solutions Center Research Fellowship, University of Oklahoma (Price), The American Finance Association (AFA) Travel Grant, 2011 Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Fellow, Doctoral Student Summer Research Fellowship, University of Oklahoma (Price), Graduate Foundation Fellowship, University of Oklahoma, Michael F. Price Distinguished Graduate Student Scholarship, University of Oklahoma (Price), Outstanding Graduate Award, University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma, 1999 Women s Tennis Player of the Year Award, University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma, Freedom Support Act (FSA) Scholarship, U.S. Congress, TEACHING Fall 2013: Advanced Corporate Finance (MGMT 413), Purdue University Summer 2011: Investments (FIN 4103/5103), University of Oklahoma. Score: 4.750/5.000 Fall 2010: Business Finance (FIN 3303), University of Oklahoma. Score: 4.457/5.000 Spring 2008-Fall 2007: Corporate Financial Management (MBE 322), Virginia Wesleyan College Spring 2007-Summer 2007: Finance and Investing (MGMT 333), Embry-Riddle University (Norfolk) Fall 2005: Risk Management and Derivatives, California State University, Fresno PRESENTATIONS 2012 Meeting of the Financial Management Association, FMA, Doctoral Student Consortium Special Session Presentation (Atlanta, GA) Presented: The Wealth Effects of Government Investment in Publicly Traded Firms 2012 Meeting of the European Finance Association, EFA (Copenhagen, Denmark) th Darden Risk Management Conference (Charlottesville, VA) 2012 University of Oklahoma Seminar Series (Norman, OK) Presented: The Wealth Effects of Government Investment in Publicly Traded Firms 2012 Energy Information Administration, EIA, Project Presentation (Washington, D.C.) Q&A: Contango in Cushing? Evidence of Financial-Physical Interactions in the U.S. Crude Oil Market (with Ederington L., Fernando C., Lee T.)

4 2011 Southwest Finance Symposium (Tulsa, OK) 2010 Meeting of the Financial Management Association, FMA (New York, NY) Discussed: Chang K., Lee S., Yi H., Does National Culture Influence the Firm s Choice of Debt Maturity? 2010 Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, FEEM (Milan, Italy) Presented: Trends in Nationalizations and Privatizations 2009 University of Oklahoma Seminar Series (Norman, OK) Presented: The Effects of Government Bailout Awards on Securityholder Wealth: Interactions Between Government Monitoring and Corporate Governance WORK EXPERIENCE Dec Dec 2003: Forward Power Trader for the North East (NE) Region, Williams Energy (Tulsa, OK) Job Responsibilities: I managed the risks of the NE power (electricity) forward position and hedged the peak, off-peak, gas, basis and capacity (UCC) positions of the power plants in the NE. I oversaw speculative and spread books (PJM and NY regions) which included outright positions, time / regional spreads and options, published observed OTC price and volatility curves for risk management and coordinated position rolls to physical daily traders in situations of limited forward liquidity. Routine transaction size was over $500K, subject to $10MM VAR. May Dec 2001: Power Market Analyst, Williams Energy (Tulsa, OK) Job Responsibilities: In providing support to power traders, I evaluated historical price and volatility spreads between different regions using various statistical techniques and presented research and FERC legislation updates. In order to improve communication between the research, trading and risk management departments I created databases and Excel templates that allowed traders to track implied heat rates, new generation, outage and deal information by region, date, and company, as well and evaluate their positions and risk. May 2000-Aug 2000: Internship in the Capital Markets Credit Division (Broker Dealers Group), Salomon Smith Barney/Citigroup (New York, NY) Job Responsibilities: I evaluated the credit risk exposure for various broker dealers, investment advisors and funds, money managers, insurance companies and municipalities, as well as analyzed the limits, market-tomarket and potential exposure for different kinds of financial products (fixed income, equity, derivatives,etc.) SKILLS, MEMBERSHIP and PERSONAL SAS, Eviews, Access, VB for Excel macros, some STATA and Matlab Memberships: AFA, EFA, FMA Citizenship: Languages: U.S. English (fluent), Russian (fluent), Ukrainian (fluent)

5 REFERENCES Professor Louis H. Ederington (co-chair) Michael F. Price Chair in Finance, University of Oklahoma Phone: (405) ; Professor William L. Megginson (co-chair) Rainbolt Chair in Finance, University of Oklahoma Phone: (405) ; Professor Scott C. Linn R.W. Moore Chair in Finance and Economic Development, University of Oklahoma Phone: (405) ;