HEATHER RHODES Department of Finance and Economics Cell: (256) Mississippi State University Office: (662)

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1 Last Updated: August 2014 HEATHER RHODES Department of Finance and Economics Cell: (256) Mississippi State University Office: (662) P.O. Box 9580 McCool 312 Mississippi State, MS EDUCATION Ph.D. in Finance, August 2014 GPA: 4.0/4.0 University of North Alabama B.B.A. in Finance, May 2007 Summa Cum Laude, GPA: 4.0/4.0 ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE Visiting Assistant Professor of Finance, Mississippi State University, 2014-Present Mississippi State, Mississippi Graduate Research Assistant,, Tuscaloosa, Alabama Instructor,, Tuscaloosa, Alabama DISSERTATION Issues in IPO Valuations: Asymmetric Information and Market Regulation Chair: Dr. James A. Ligon RESEARCH EXPERIENCE AND INTERESTS Interests: Capital Markets under Imperfect Information and Corporate Finance, especially Initial Public Offerings, Corporate Governance, Institutional Investors and Insider Trading Publication Hahn, T., J.A. Ligon and H. Rhodes, 2013, Liquidity and Initial Public Offering Underpricing, Journal of Banking and Finance 37, Paper Under Review Ligon, J.A. and H. Rhodes, 2014, Regulatory Corporate Governance and the Valuation of IPO Firms.

2 Working Papers Rhodes, H. and J.A. Ligon, 2014, Institutional Investment and IPO Pricing. Rhodes, H., 2014, Asymmetric Information in the Market for IPOs. Work in Progress Cook, D., H. Rhodes, and E. Sherrill, 2014, Social Networks and the Transfer of Private Information. TEACHING EXPERIENCE AND INTERESTS Financial Management, FIN 3123, Mississippi State University, Fall 2014 Senior Seminar in Finance, FIN 4243, Mississippi State University, Fall 2014 Intermediate Financial Management, FI 410,, Summer 2013 Business Finance, FI 302,, Summer 2010, Summer 2014 Computerized Management Information Systems (Teaching Assistant), FI 389/EC 389, The University of Alabama, Fall 2009, Spring 2010, Summer 2010, Summer 2011 Interests: Corporate Finance, Investments, Financial Markets and Institutions, Money and Capital Markets, Business Finance, Computerized Management Information Systems CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS AND PARTICIPATION Presentations Asymmetric Information in the Market for IPOs, presented at: Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans, February 2012 Southern Finance Association Annual Meeting, Charleston, November 2012 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Valuation of IPO Firms, presented at: Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, March 2013 Eastern Finance Association Annual Meeting, St. Pete Beach, April 2013 IPO Pricing and Institutional Investment, presented or to be presented at: Eastern Finance Association Annual Meeting, Pittsburgh, April 2014 Financial Management Association Annual Meeting, Nashville, October 2014 Southern Finance Association Annual Meeting, Key West, November 2014 Participation Discussant, Midwest Finance Association, 2012, 2013 Session Chair, Midwest Finance Association, 2012 Discussant, Southern Finance Association, 2012 Discussant, Eastern Finance Association, 2013 Session Chair, Eastern Finance Association, 2014 Program Committee, Midwest Finance Association, 2015 Cell: (256) Office: (662) msstate.edu 2/6

3 HONORS AND AWARDS Graduate Assistantship, University of Alabama, Mitchell Scholarship, University of Alabama, Summer Excellence in Research Grant, University of Alabama, 2012 Graduate School Travel Grants, University of Alabama, Alabama Power Co. Endowed Scholarship, University of Alabama, Beta Gamma Sigma, University of Alabama, 2010 Graduate Council Fellowship, University of Alabama, PROGRAMMING SKILLS AND DATABASE EXPERIENCE Programming Languages: SAS, RATS, STATA Databases: SDC Platinum and WRDS: CRSP, COMPUSTAT, Eventus, Thomson Reuters, TAQ PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS American Finance Association, Eastern Finance Association, Financial Management Association, Midwest Finance Association, Southern Finance Association Cell: (256) Office: (662) msstate.edu 3/6

4 REFERENCES Dr. Douglas O. Cook Professor of Finance and Camp Endowed Chair of Finance and Investments Dr. Junsoo Lee Professor of Economics and Horsley Faculty Fellow Dr. James A. Ligon Professor of Finance and Russell Professor of Business Administration Dr. Harris Schlesinger Professor of Finance and Park Samford Chair of Insurance Cell: (256) Office: (662) msstate.edu 4/6

5 PAPER ABSTRACTS DISSERTATION ESSAYS Asymmetric Information in the Market for IPOs This study tests the effect of equity retention and management ownership on the relative market value of a matched-sample of initial public offerings issued in the U.S. prior to and following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The market for IPOs is particularly plagued with asymmetric information problems and it is the interest of this study to test two theories associated with adverse selection and moral hazard: the signaling hypothesis and the agency theory. Because the wealth effect can influence the results of such tests, it is also examined. Though several studies have examined these theories in the context of IPOs, all were prior to the passage and compliance deadlines of SOX, which may have affected the types of firms going public and ultimately the relative importance of the agency, wealth and signaling hypotheses. All ownership data are hand-collected. These data are better suited to test these theories and preferable to data available in popularly used databases because such databases lack sufficient detail to separate important ownership classes. Results on both the pre- and post-sox samples are consistent with the signaling theory and evidence of a wealth effect exists in both eras, although it is more significant post-sox. However, in contrast to results of studies conducted prior to SOX, both the pre- and post-sox results give little credence to the agency theory, suggesting that SOX has not impacted investors concerns regarding moral hazard. Rather, the difference between the pre-sox results and the results of other studies conducted prior to SOX suggests that SOX appeared to reduce moral hazard concerns only through its effect on the self-selection of firms going public. Regulatory Corporate Governance and the Valuation of IPO Firms Using a matched sample of IPOs issued prior to implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and Exchange Listing Requirements and IPOs issued after implementation, we examine the effect of compliance with the board structure provisions of these reforms on firm value, as well as reform s general valuation consequences. Before matching, we document that postreform IPO firms are much different than pre-reform IPO firms, but, in matched sample comparisons, reform does not increase valuations. Compliance with the board structure provisions provides no consistent benefit and a post-reform dummy is negative for some valuation measures for firms subject to SOX Section 404. Institutional Investment and IPO Pricing We hypothesize that the level and concentration of institutional investment in an issuer's industry is a proxy for competitiveness in the supply of capital to that industry, and that greater competition reduces the need for partial adjustment of the IPO price, as competition itself provides the incentive to be honest. With greater competition, institutional investors indications of interest should be more accurate and less discounted by the underwriters. Hence, with greater competition, offer price updates should be larger, initial returns relatively lower, and the link between the offer price adjustment and underpricing weaker. We find that with greater competition the link between the offer price adjustment and underpricing is weaker and offer price revisions are larger. Results regarding initial returns, however, are not robust to endogeneity. Cell: (256) Office: (662) hnr83@ msstate.edu 5/6

6 OTHER WORKING PAPER Social Networks and the Transfer of Private Information Social networks, and the benefits they provide to members, are of increasing interest in financial research as they have been shown to be important to many aspects of financial markets, particularly to the transfer of private information. Because of the high degree of information asymmetry that exists around firms, obtaining access to private information in advance of its public disclosure offers enormous advantages. As a result, social networks play an important role in both selectively distributing material information and incorporating this information into asset prices through informed trading. Motivated by the growing literature documenting this relationship, we investigate the use of social networks developed through board of directorships as a means of transferring material private information on publicly-traded firms. Specifically, using a novel dataset to identify the undisclosed dates of board committee meetings (which are the basis for the potential transfer of private information), we examine whether there appears to be unusual trading activity in the stock and derivatives of the company on whose board these individuals jointly serve, the companies for which the committee members work, and the other companies on whose boards these individuals serve around the times of meetings. Observation of unusual trading activity in any of these firms around such meetings suggests the use of network connections to exchange information. Further, we examine whether cumulative abnormal returns and unusual option trading activity around these dates precede the eventual announcement of value-relevant information (e.g. earnings surprises and changes in management). In order to make sense economically, positions taken prior to public disclosure of the information should be profitable once the information is released. Cell: (256) Office: (662) hnr83@ msstate.edu 6/6