Report on the Implementation. of Euratom Safeguards in Energy

Transcription

1 Report on the Implementation of Euratom Safeguards in 2014 Energy

2 If you wish to receive additional copies of this report, please contact: EUROPEAN COMMISSION Directorate-General for Energy Directorate E Euratom Safeguards European Commission L-2920 Luxembourg Tel: ener-directorate-e@ec.europa.eu

3 Contents FOREWORD... III 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY... V 2. LEGAL BASIS OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES Yearly Safeguards Statement for Inspection Activities Nuclear Material Amounts & Number of Installations Nuclear Material Accountancy Euratom Nuclear Cooperation Agreements IAEA Safeguards Agreements RESOURCES Staff Budget INTERNAL MANAGEMENT Integrated Management System Technical support Developments in specific facilities and new facility types Development of Data Evaluation Software Training Health & Safety of Nuclear Inspectors EXTERNAL RELATIONS Member States International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ESARDA, INMM and ENEF Third countries and organisations... 37

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5 FOREWORD The primary purpose of this report - as in previous years is to provide a clear and succinct description of Euratom Safeguard's activities during the past year. However, we recognise that this report is also a valuable source of information for the wider safeguards community. In preparing this year's report, we have endeavoured to provide readers with a useful and informative picture of the current safeguards environment in the EU. This environment is of course evolving as the energy sector of the EU evolves. The Energy Union announced by Vice-President Šefčovič and Commissioner Arias Cañete will be a cornerstone of the Juncker Commission. The Energy Union seeks to make energy more secure, affordable and sustainable for all citizens of the EU. It will lead to a competitive, low carbon and environmentally friendly economy, putting Europe at the forefront of the fight against global warming and sustainable energy production. Regardless of Member States' energy choices, Euratom Safeguards has an important role to play in providing an assurance of the peaceful - and above all - secure use of nuclear materials in the EU. For international suppliers of nuclear material to the EU, Euratom Safeguards offers a guarantee that materials entering the EU comply with all external obligations, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and remain in peaceful use. As the energy sector evolves so does the safeguards landscape: the recent geopolitical changes in Europe have brought security of supply questions to the forefront. The continued operation of the fleet of nuclear reactors and related installations in the EU requires a constant supply of uranium ore, resulting in steadily increasing amounts of nuclear material to be safeguarded - in particular plutonium. These issues coupled with the continued threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism will be met by a more stringent application of the legislative framework as required by Chapter 7 of the Euratom Treaty and safeguards Regulation 302/2005. In future annual reports, Euratom Safeguards will be including a more comprehensive reporting of breaches and failings of obligations to ensure that standards are raised and kept at the highest levels of good nuclear material management throughout all installations in the EU. By maintaining the current safeguards approaches whilst adopting an attitude of stricter compliance, Euratom Safeguards believes it will be able to better fulfil its over-arching objective of maintaining the most credible and reliable system of safeguards possible. iii

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7 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report provides a summary of the activities carried out by the European Commission in the field of nuclear safeguards in Euratom Safeguards is implemented by Directorate E of the Commission's Directorate-General for Energy. Chapter 7 of the Euratom Treaty requires the European Commission to satisfy itself that in the territories of Member States, [nuclear] materials are not diverted from their intended uses as declared by the users. The Euratom Safeguards system, established for this purpose by the Commission, comprises a set of controls and verification activities covering the whole nuclear fuel cycle and all civil nuclear installations throughout the EU. Euratom Safeguards provides assurance of the peaceful use of nuclear material in the EU. Yearly Safeguards Statement for 2014 No case of nuclear material diversion has been found in 2014 and no irregularities have been reported for the EU by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Positive safeguards conclusions could be drawn for the vast majority of installations. However, for four installations (a radioisotope production facility, a laboratory at a uranium hexafluoride handling plant, a storage facility and a fuel fabrication plant) positive conclusions are dependent on corrective actions on the part of the operator. There is no indication that nuclear material has been diverted at any of the installations. The identified shortcomings stem from the operator's Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) systems. Improved compliance with the reporting norms of Regulation 302/2005 is called for in all four cases. Sanctions are not deemed necessary. The previously identified issues related to the B30 spent fuel pond in Sellafield, UK, persist and the associated actions are on-going. Progress to remedy the situation has been satisfactory as reflected in the 21 st UK progress report received by the Commission in December Bulk handling facilities, such as reprocessing, enrichment and fuel fabrication plants, continue to pose a safeguards challenge due to the complexity of their industrial processes and their large annual throughput. A number of overlapping complementary verification techniques are employed at these installations, and the residual risk of material diversion is further offset by overarching measures including the strong physical protection measures implemented at national level. Euratom Safeguards continued the implementation of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCA) for the peaceful use of nuclear energy between the European Atomic Energy Community and the United States of America, Canada, Australia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Euratom Safeguards continued to function as the focal point for the implementation of the Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA as well as their Additional Protocol (AP). Euratom Safeguards submitted, as required, the necessary nuclear material and AP declarations to the IAEA. v

8 Operational Activities 1,234 nuclear installation inspections were carried out in 2014, equalling 3,793 person-days on inspection (PDI). Of the 1,234 inspections carried out, 643 were joint inspections together with the IAEA as foreseen by the Safeguards Agreements. The number of inspections and PDI in 2014 are in line with previous years. The continued operation of the fleet of nuclear reactors and related installations in the EU requires a steady supply of uranium ore to be processed into fuel. At the same time, the fission process in the reactors during electricity generation creates by-products in the spent fuel. As a consequence, the amount of nuclear material to be safeguarded in the EU continues to rise notably Plutonium and depleted Uranium. This rise in nuclear material results in a corresponding increase in the number declarations of movements of nuclear items has been noted in the EU database on civil nuclear material, in line with expectation. The budget remains unchanged in comparison to previous years, but the staff has decreased proportionately to the Commission's overall reduction targets. Coupled with the increasing nuclear material amounts in the EU, efficiencies are being sought to meet the expected increased workload in coming years. Internal Management One of the on-going initiatives is the implementation of a quality management system across the scope of the directorate's activities (IMS). The IMS supplements the procedures of the Directorate-General for Energy and the Internal Control Standards (ICS) of the Commission and its conception is based on the ISO 9001 & ISO standards. Logistical support to in-field inspection activities (e.g. nuclear measurements, destructive analysis, video surveillance, sealing & containment systems, IT systems and Remote Data Transmission) has proceeded in line with established management priorities. A milestone was reached in 2014 with the deployment of the Inspection Management Integrated System (IMIS) software application. This vital application manages the entire lifecycle of all inspection activities of the directorate. It replaced the outdated EMIS application in use since the early 2000s. The actions identified during a previous health & safety review of the nuclear laboratories at headquarters have all been implemented with the exception of a system to survey isolated workers, planned for The radiation protection laboratory implemented new procedures to improve their quality management system with a view towards ISO accreditation, planned for External Relations Euratom Safeguards regularly interacts with MS authorities, the IAEA, and other safeguards organisations in the world. Safeguards policy and strategic direction are determined by the Commission in consultation with MS. Close contacts were maintained with Member States governmental and regulatory authorities throughout the year. Bilateral meetings and trilateral meetings (including the IAEA) were held with Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and UK. Euratom Safeguards also met with individual operators as necessary for the correct implementation of safeguards implementation issues. vi

9 Collaboration with the IAEA has been smooth and productive during the year. The obligations of all three multilateral Safeguards Agreements have been met as foreseen. The Liaison Committees established by virtue of INFCIRC/193 met at both levels during the year. The High Level Liaison Committee concentrated its efforts on identifying further possibilities for efficiency gains since both organisations continue to face increasing resource constraints. Enhanced cooperation between the inspectorates should allow for maintaining the effectiveness of safeguards in the EU without unnecessary duplication of inspection activities. Besides following up tasks assigned at the higher level, the Lower Level Liaison Committee and its associated Working Groups dealt with implementation issues; a new approach for verifying spent fuel cask loadings for the long-term dry storage of spent fuel, site declarations for small installations, safeguards activities related to waste processing and the increased use of electronic means of communication as well as potential interfaces between Euratom and IAEA IT systems. The IAEA has the intention to further implement their State-Level Concept (SLC). Euratom Safeguards strongly supports the principles of the SLC and its introduction worldwide. Collaboration was also maintained during the year with the Department of Energy (USA), the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (Canada) and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (Australia) to further common understanding and practices with regard to the administration of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. Euratom Safeguards also cooperates with other services and other EU institutions on a frequent basis: the directorate maintains active cooperation with the JRC, focussing on the development of technological solutions that facilitate the implementation of safeguards, the operation of the on-site laboratories in La Hague and Sellafield, and on training of inspectors. Equally, Euratom Safeguards attends the Atomic Questions Group (AQG) of the European Council when so needed and maintains close contacts with the European External Action Service (EEAS), in particular the EU Delegation to the International Organisations in Vienna. vii

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11 This report provides a summary of the activities carried out in the European Union by the European Commission in the field of Nuclear Safeguards in The five sections cover the legal basis, operational activities, resources, internal management and external relations. 2. LEGAL BASIS Chapter 7 of the Euratom Treaty requires the European Commission to satisfy itself that in the territories of Member States, [nuclear] materials are not diverted from their intended uses as declared by the users. In addition, the Commission must assure that the obligations and agreements concluded by the European Atomic Energy Community or Euratom Community with third States and international organisations are complied with 1. The Euratom Community is party to three multilateral Safeguards Agreements and their related Additional Protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), concluded in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 2. The Community is also party to cooperation agreements for the peaceful use of nuclear energy with a number of third States 3. The Euratom Safeguards system, established for this purpose by the Commission, comprises a set of controls and verification activities covering the whole nuclear fuel cycle and all civil nuclear installations throughout the EU. Verification results and conclusions are drawn for the individual operators and holders of nuclear material in every Member State. Euratom Safeguards provides assurance that nuclear material in the EU is used as it was intended. Euratom Safeguards is implemented by the Commission's Directorate-General for Energy, Directorate E - "Euratom Safeguards". 1 The Commission's mandate extends to the Member States of the European Union. The IAEA is the United Nations' independent, intergovernmental organisation for verifying global compliance of the signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Commission draws conclusions for individual operators and holders of nuclear material in the EU. The IAEA draws conclusions for a State. In the MS of the EU, safeguards activities are performed jointly by the Commission and the IAEA. Each organisation acts under its specific mandate and draws its own independent conclusions, but splits inspection tasks and shares verification results to avoid duplication of effort. 2 Euratom/Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS)/IAEA, published in the Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ) as 78/164/Euratom in OJ L51/1 of 22 February 1978 and by the IAEA as Information Circular INFCIRC/193 of 14 September The Additional Protocol was published as 1999/188/Euratom in OJ L67/1 of 13 March 1999 and by the IAEA as INFCIRC/193/Add.8 of 12 January The trilateral agreement Euratom/United Kingdom/IAEA, was published only as INFCIRC/263 in 1976, while the Euratom/France/IAEA agreement was published as INFCIRC/290 in Their Additional Protocols were INFCIRC/263/Add.1 and INFCIRC/290/Add.1 respectively, both signed in USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. 1

12 3. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES In order to fulfil its primary law obligations, Euratom Safeguards develops and implements a system of nuclear safeguards. This system is based on two parts. The first part is a nuclear material accountancy system implemented by the nuclear operators of the EU, and their related accountancy declarations made to the Commission as mandated by Commission Regulation (Euratom) 302/ This regulation is supplemented by two Commission Recommendations which serve as guidelines 5. The second part is based on the activities of Euratom Safeguards to verify the completeness, correctness and coherence of these nuclear operator accountancy declarations (also referred to as the operator's Nuclear Material Accountancy & Control system, NMAC). An essential part of those activities comprises inspections in the field, where Euratom Safeguards inspectors are sent to perform accountancy, physical, and other verifications on the nuclear material present at the installations to verify the correctness and coherence of these declarations with the physical reality Yearly Safeguards Statement for 2014 With reference to Articles 77a) & 77b) of Chapter 7 of the Euratom Treaty: No case of nuclear material diversion has been found in 2014 and no irregularities have been reported for the EU by the IAEA. Positive safeguards conclusions could be drawn for the vast majority of installations. However, for four installations positive conclusions are dependent on corrective actions on the part of the operator. The first is a radioisotope production facility whose NMAC system is deemed unsatisfactory. Although there is no indication that nuclear material has been diverted from its intended use, the quality of the operator's record keeping system must be improved and a dedicated audit inspection has been planned at the installation in The second is a laboratory at a front-end uranium hexafluoride handling plant where the annual Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) was deemed unsatisfactory. The operator was not able to present the required records. Although there is no indication that nuclear material has been diverted at this installation, the operator is called upon to improve his NMAC to an acceptable level before the next annual inventory. The 4 Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005 of 8 February 2005 on the application of Euratom Safeguards. 5 Commission Recommendation of 15 December 2005 on guidelines for the application of Regulation No 302/2005 & Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2009 on the implementation of a nuclear material accountancy and control system by operators of nuclear installations. 2

13 intensity and frequency of inspections will be increased until the next PIV. The third is a storage facility where a re-measurement campaign to bring the physical reality in line with the accountancy declarations continues to take longer than anticipated, because of technical difficulties encountered by the operator. In addition, some discrepancies in the accountancy declarations have been detected on legacy nuclear material. As a consequence, the operator has proactively launched a global remeasurement campaign. There is no indication of any diversion of nuclear material. The fourth is a fuel fabrication plant where significant weaknesses in aspects of the operator's NMAC call for a concerted effort on the part of the operator to adhere to reporting norms as per Regulation 302/2005. These weaknesses do not warrant a sanction; proposals for improvement have been advanced and are currently under discussion. A national Location Outside Facility (LOF or 'small holder') failed the PIV in 2013 due the inability of the Euratom inspectors to independently validate the accountancy declarations and physical stocks. However, a concerted effort on the part of the national authorities (responsible for the LOF) during the course of the year led to a satisfactory PIV in late 2014 obviating the need for sanctions. At a number of reprocessing plants in the EU there is a lack of efficiency in the way the NMAC is organised by the operator across the sites. At the spent fuel storage ponds at one of the reprocessing plants, delays on the part of the operator were frequently encountered during planned routine inspections. Although the delays were individually explicable, when viewed cumulatively over the year, they significantly impacted the smooth execution of inspection activities, resulting in squandered resources on the part of Euratom Safeguards. The issues included in previous annual reports related to the B30 spent fuel pond in Sellafield, UK, persist and the associated actions are ongoing. In 2004, the Commission issued a directive under Article 82 of the Euratom Treaty upon the UK due to the impossibility to perform mandatory safeguards verifications on the nuclear material stored in pond B30 at the Sellafield site. Since then, progress to remedy the situation has been good and the referral of the infringement procedure to the Court of Justice of the European Union was suspended in The 21 st UK progress report, received by the Commission in December 2014, has confirmed that improvements continue. Bulk handling facilities, such as reprocessing, enrichment and fuel fabrication plants, continue to pose a safeguards challenge due to the complexity of their industrial processes and their large annual throughput often measured in 100s of tonnes of uranium per year. Despite Euratom Safeguards employing the most accurate measurement techniques available, when multiplied a thousand-fold, the resulting margins of error may fall outside of international target values. For this reason, overlapping and complementary verification techniques are 3

14 employed at these installations, such as autonomous measurement systems coupled with permanently installed containment and surveillance systems. These multiple layers of control, when combined, provide a reasonable assurance that no material is diverted from its intended use. Although all risks can never fully be eliminated, any residual risk is offset by the installations' physical protection measures. Euratom Safeguards continued the implementation of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCA) for the peaceful use of nuclear energy between the European Atomic Energy Community and the United States of America, Canada, Australia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The Euratom South Africa NCA was signed during July However, by the end of 2014, the agreement was still awaiting ratification by South Africa and so has not yet entered into force. The NCA with Canada, which has been in force since 1959, is currently being renegotiated in order to update and consolidate the various amendments agreed during its lifetime. The update will also introduce new areas of cooperation in the agreement, such as the nuclear technology transfer and tritium technology transfer. In 2014, the Commission formally adopted a proposal for a mandate for the negotiation of a NCA with South Korea. This is currently under discussion in the responsible working party of the Council. Euratom Safeguards continued to function as the focal point for the implementation of the Safeguards Agreements (SA) with the IAEA as well as their Additional Protocol (AP). Euratom Safeguards submitted, as required, the necessary nuclear material and AP declarations to the IAEA. The coordination and reporting of the Complementary Accesses (CA) performed by the IAEA, pursuant to the AP, was completed fully. The directorate participated in all CAs triggered by the IAEA in Inspection Activities The following tables present the inspection effort of Euratom Safeguards in The effort is shown in the first table by nuclear facility type and in the second table by Member State (MS), both in number of inspections and as person-days spent on inspection (PDI). 4

15 Installation Type PDI Nr of Inspections Joint Inspections Reprocessing Enrichment Fabrication Reactors & Storages Others Total Table 1: Inspection effort by facility type in 2014 Of the 1234 inspections carried out, 643 were joint inspections together with the IAEA. The difference is in part due to the fact that the IAEA does not perform nuclear safeguards in all installations in the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), but only at a small number of designated installations under voluntary offer from the UK and France. It is also due to the fact that the IAEA has since 2010, implemented a scheme of short notice random inspections and unannounced inspections in certain types of nuclear installations, thereby reducing its presence during regularly planned inspections compared to the past whilst also relying more on the complementary results of Euratom inspections. Despite there being relatively few reprocessing and enrichment plants in the EU, the high number of inspections and person days in these plants stems in part from the complexity of their industrial processes, and in part from the strategic value of the nuclear material they hold (separated plutonium and enriched uranium, respectively). Nuclear material at these installations is often in a chemical or physical form that requires verification using specialised inspection equipment and techniques. Member State PDI Nr of Inspections Joint Inspections Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Croatia Cyprus Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland

16 Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden UK WWWW Total Table 2: Inspection effort by MS in 2014 The higher number of PDI in France, UK and Germany is due to the number and nature of installations in these countries, which currently or historically cover most or all installation types of the nuclear fuel cycle. France and UK operate the only industrial reprocessing plants in Europe. These are large scale plants with throughput in the order of hundreds of tonnes of uranium and plutonium per year and which produce and hold large quantities of plutonium dioxide powder. Both France and UK also enrich uranium, manufacture fuel, and have a large fleet of power reactors. Germany also has a large number of power reactors as well as enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants. Belgium, although not as active, has a sizeable number of smaller, closed down, or partly closed down installations the safeguarding of which is manpower-intensive. Sizeable numbers or complex installations are also found in Romania (on-load power reactors and fuel fabrication), in Sweden & Spain (power reactors and fuel fabrication), and in the Netherlands (uranium enrichment and power reactors). In 2014, Euratom Safeguards carried out 1234 inspections. The total number of PDI was 3793 days. In comparison to the last five years, 2014 ranks at the lower end of the scale. However, the amount of nuclear material safeguarded in the EU continues to rise (see Figure 1 in Section 2.3). Year PDI Nr of Inspections Table 3: Number of inspections & Person Days on Inspection over the last 5 years 6 WWWW is a Material Balance Area (MBA) comprising the holders of small amounts of non-strategic nuclear material with limited reporting obligations. 6

17 3.3. Nuclear Material Amounts & Number of Installations As of 31 December 2014, all nuclear installations in the EU were holding the following quantities of nuclear material 7 : Quantity in kg Type of Nuclear Material Depleted Uranium (DU) Natural Uranium (NU) Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) High Enriched Uranium (HEU) Plutonium Thorium Table 4: Quantity of nuclear material in the EU in 2014 Since 2009 the quantities of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Thorium in the EU are stable. Depleted Uranium (DU) and Plutonium stocks continue to rise steadily as a natural consequence of the continued operation of the nuclear reactors and enrichment plants in the EU (see Figure 1). 1,5 1,4 1,3 1,2 1,1 1 0,9 0,8 0, Depleted Natural Low Enriched High Enriched Plutonium Thorium Figure 1: Comparative graph of nuclear material trends over past 5 years (normalised) In total, Euratom Safeguards extended to 989 active Material Balance Areas (MBAs) in the EU. The distribution of all active MBAs by type and country at the end of 2014 was as follows: 7 Based on accountancy declarations received as of 3 February 2015 reporting on stocks as of 31 December

18 Country Research Center and Reactors, Zero Energy Mines, Concentration, Conversion Enrichment Fuel Preparation and fabrication Reprocessing Power Reactors Storage Waste Storage and Treatment Spent Fuel Final Repository U Recovery Nuclear and Non- Nuclear LOFs Transporters, Intermediaries CAM Holders Total Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia 1 1 Cyprus 1 1 Czech Republic Denmark Estonia 1 1 EURATOM Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia 2 2 Lithuania Luxembourg Malta 1 1 Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden United Kingdom Total Table 5: Distribution of MBA by Country and Installation Type in 2014 Of the total 989 active MBAs, 141 have a derogation on the frequency of reporting, usually due to their small holdings or the low strategic value of their holdings. The breakdown of derogated MBAs by NWS and Non- 8

19 Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS), as of 31 December 2014, was as follows: Derogations from form and frequency of notifications Derogations from frequency of notifications New Withdrawn Total end 2014 New Withdrawn Total end 2014 France 1 UK 6 85 NNWS 2 55 Totals Table 6: Derogations from reporting as of 31 December 2014 A decrease of derogations in the UK has been observed due to the grouping of a number of small holders into one single "National LOF". A further decrease is expected in The table below shows the new registrations, modifications, and updates of the MBAs split by NWS and NNWS during 2014: France UK NNWS Total New Registrations: - Active, under construction Active Status Changes: Active, under construction Active, but shut down 0 - Closed down Decommissioned Suppressed 1 1 Modification of Name Modification of Type Table 7: Registrations & operational status changes of installations in Nuclear Material Accountancy Euratom Safeguards maintains the EU database on civil nuclear materials. During 2014, 8,626 accountancy reports (Inventory Change Reports, Physical Inventory Listings, and Material Balance Reports) 9

20 corresponding to approximately 1.9 million accountancy records were received and evaluated from all EU operators. The breakdown by NWS and NNWS is as follows: France UK NNWS Total Nr of ICRs Nr of ICR lines Nr of PILs Nr of PIL lines Nr of MBRs Nr of MBR lines Total nr of reports Total nr of lines Table 8: Accountancy Reports Received Practically all operators provide their accountancy declarations in XML format as required by Regulation 302/ % of these reports are provided by operators using Euratom Safeguards' ENMAS software. In direct relation to the increasing nuclear material quantities in the EU, the number of accountancy entries (lines) received and treated is also increasing. The evolution over the last 5 years shows an increase of approximately 10% since 2010: ICR PIL MBR Total Table 9: Evolution of accountancy entries over the last 5 years Obligations Stemming from the IAEA Safeguards Agreements In conformity with the obligations stemming from the SAs with the IAEA 5,446 accountancy reports, corresponding to approximately 1.9 million accountancy records, were transmitted to the IAEA after being processed in Euratom's headquarters to match the Agency's format. 10

21 France UK NNWS Total Nr of ICRs Nr of ICR lines Nr of PILs Nr of PIL lines Nr of MBRs Nr of MBR lines Total Table 10: Accountancy Reports Transmitted to the IAEA in 2014 The relatively high number of ICR lines transmitted to the IAEA is due to a difference between the two inspectorates' reporting formats. The IAEA system requires two individual lines for certain types of declarations where the Euratom system requires only one Verification of Intra-EU Transfers During 2014, approximately 19,500 transactions of nuclear material transfers within the EU were verified against their corresponding declarations (i.e. transit-matching). Unmatched lines indicating transfers that could not be immediately closed, led to 61 letters to the operators requesting explanations. As in previous years, Thorium and DU (nonfuel) transfers were followed as far as possible by automatic matching. Manual closing and follow-up for Thorium and DU is only done for specific cases due to the low strategic value of the material. Shipments Receipts Total Transfer lines Lines matched Lines unmatched Table 11: Intra-EU transfer matching in 2014 The breakdown of the number of intra-eu nuclear material transfers by material category is represented by the pie-chart below: 11

22 DU Non-Fuel 12% DU Fuel 2% HEU 1% LEU 39% NU 17% Pu 29% Figure 2: Intra-EU Transfers by Element Category in Advance notifications of material transfer In conformity with Articles 20 and 21 of Regulation 302/2005, 3,051 Advance Notification Communications for exports and imports were processed in There were 1,812 export communications and 1,239 import communications. No significant variation has been observed with respect to the previous year. Imports of nuclear material into the EU consisted mainly of natural uranium. During 2014, 16,265 tonnes were supplied; the largest suppliers were the USA, Australia and Kazakhstan. 12

23 Uzbekistan 9,0% Australia 11,6% Brazil 0,6% Canada 4,1% USA 27,4% Kazakhstan 10,8% Kyrgyzstan 0,8% South Africa 3,0% Niger 8,6% Namibia 6,1% Mixed Origin (Peaceful use) 17,9% Figure 3: Imports of NU on the basis of Advance Notification by Country of Origin Uzbekistan 9,0% Australia 2,3% Brazil 0,6% USA 20,7% Canada 38,0% South Africa 3,0% Niger 8,6% Namibia 6,1% Kyrgyzstan 0,8% Kazakhstan 10,8% Figure 4: Imports of NU on the basis of Advance Notification by Shipping Country 13

24 3.5. Euratom Nuclear Cooperation Agreements In 2014, Euratom Safeguards continued the implementation of the seven Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCAs) for the peaceful use of nuclear energy between the European Atomic Energy Community and third States. Euratom maintains NCAs with the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. During 2014, 437 files were treated relating to the implementation and administrative arrangements of the seven NCAs. This is very similar to the 2013 figure. About 94% of the files concerned the agreements with USA, Canada, and Australia. The Euratom South Africa NCA was signed in July 2013 during the Sixth South Africa-Europe Summit. However, by the end of 2014, the agreement was still awaiting ratification by South Africa. Because entry into force requires an exchange of a "note verbale" confirming the mutual acceptance of the Administrative Arrangements, the NCA has not yet entered into force. In 2014, the Commission formally adopted a proposal for a mandate for the negotiation of a NCA with South Korea. This is currently under discussion in the responsible working party of the Council Euratom-USA Agreement The U.S. Department of Energy s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has been working since 2008 to reconcile all civilian HEU exports from the United States as a part of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. At the end of 2013, the NNSA had successfully worked with over 20 countries to reconcile transactions of HEU material exported from the United States. With regards to EU countries, the NNSA requested the collaboration of Euratom in addressing this un-reconciled material for the NNWS. The collaboration between Euratom and the NNSA to reconcile the shipments of HEU from USA to the Euratom is on-going fruitfully. Several exchanges have taken place during the year. This collaboration facilitates the continued support by the USA to the provision of HEU for the production of medical radioisotopes in the EU Euratom-Canada-Agreement A reconciliation exercise for deuterium and tritium balances, as well as related equipment under the Euratom-Canada Agreement was started in March 2013 and was completed in The NCA with Canada, which has been in force since 1959, is currently being renegotiated. The objective is to update and consolidate the 14

25 various amendments made during its lifetime, to include nuclear technology transfer, as well as tritium and tritium technology transfer. Negotiations continued during the year between both parties on subjects ranging from implementation requirements to administrative arrangements. Completion and approval is sought towards the end of IAEA Safeguards Agreements Revision of the Subsidiary Arrangements to INFCIRC 193 The Subsidiary Arrangements (General Part) to the Safeguards Agreement of 1978 (78/164/Euratom in OJ L51/1, also known as INFCIRC 193) for the NNWS, were revised and came into force on 1 March This was the culmination of prolonged negotiations with the IAEA. It was long necessary since the updated text now takes into account the accession of new MS of the EU and the entry into force of the Additional Protocol to INFCIRC 193. The Subsidiary Arrangements (General Part) define the implementation details of INFCIRC 193 and its AP such as reporting formats, correct channels of communication between the inspectorates, coordination arrangements for joint inspections and the planning & announcement of inspections & Complementary Accesses (CA) Implementation of the Additional Protocol In addition to the AP of INFCIRC 193, the Euratom Community is a party to the AP of the two NWS under their voluntary Safeguards Agreements (INFCIRC/263/Add.1 for the UK and INFCIRC 290/Add.1 for France). For the NNWS, the Additional Protocol helps to allow the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities in a state or the misuse of declared facilities. To this end, the IAEA receives annual and quarterly declarations from Euratom Safeguards on nuclear installations and other locations related to the nuclear fuel cycle, as well as information on exports of certain equipment. For the NNWS, Euratom Safeguards collects all required data on nuclear sites and other locations holding nuclear material either directly from the individual operators, or from the Member State. Eleven MS, so called Side-Letter States 8 (SLS) have in addition asked the Commission to collect data concerning dual-use goods, research & development activities and development plans for the nuclear fuel cycle and to transmit these to the IAEA on their behalf. During 2014, 8 new AP sites were registered in the EU and 1 was suppressed. At year end, the total number of AP sites registered was 184, of which 117 were located in SLS and 67 in non-sls. 8 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 15

26 Sweden Spain Slovenia Slovakia Romania Portugal Poland Netherlands Malta Luxembourg Lithuania Latvia JRCs Italy Ireland Hungary Greece Germany Finland Estonia Denmark Czech Republic Cyprus Bulgaria Belgium Austria Figure 5: Distribution of AP declared sites by MS During the year, Euratom Safeguards provided 429 declarations to the IAEA for the 27 MS 9 under the regular reporting requirements. In comparison to previous years, 448 reports were provided in 2013, 399 reports were provided in 2012 and 403 reports were provided in The Commission's Additional Protocol Editor (CAPE) is the software application that has been developed by Euratom Safeguards specifically for AP reporting. A new version was issued in 2014 and is available on the Commission s CIRCA platform. Its use by MS and operators is encouraged because it simplifies the reporting procedure for all parties. Two dedicated training workshops were held with German operators in November 2014 and Dutch operators in January With the aim of increasing the number of CAPE users during the coming years, Euratom Safeguards will maintain such specific training and dedicated workshops 9 Croatia has not yet acceded to INFCIRC

27 with interested MS and operators. Requests have been received to organise workshops in Italy and the Netherlands. 40,0 35,0 30,0 25,0 20,0 15,0 10,0 5,0 0,0 38,4 14,3 % Cape % Protocol Reporter 25,3 22,1 % Excel % Other format Figure 6: Breakdown of AP declaration by reporting software At the beginning of 2014, 11 IAEA AP requests for clarifications were open. During the year 10 new requests were submitted by the IAEA, while 10 were answered by correspondence or specific declarations. Most clarifications concerned site declarations. Several joint technical visits with the IAEA were carried out during the course of the year which helped to resolve and reduce a number of open issues Requests for clarification 2 h CA h CA Table 12: Evolution of IAEA AP activities in EU countries Complementary Accesses The IAEA has the right to access locations it considers necessary for verifying the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The minimum notification time before such a Complementary Access (CA) is either 24 hours, or 2 hours if announced during an inspection. A total of 15 CAs took place during 2014, all of which were at installations declared as "sites". 11 of the CAs were performed with 24 hour notification and 4 with 2 hour notification. Euratom Safeguards was present at all CAs. 17

28 Year 2 hr CAs 24h CAs CAs in sites CAs in other locations Total nr of CAs % with Euratom presence Table 13: Number of CAs over the last 5 years As in previous years, Euratom Safeguards provided support to the IAEA's Additional Protocol Training Exercise (APEX) in Vienna and provided support during the associated practical exercise at the Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Karlsruhe, Germany. Euratom Safeguards also contributed to and participated in an AP & CA training course given to the Serbian authorities in cooperation with the US Department of Energy and the IAEA. 4. RESOURCES 4.1. Staff The staff of Directorate E consists of nuclear safeguards inspectors, technical staff, administrative staff and management. Directorate E comprises 196 persons, down from 202 in 2013, and down from 213 persons in 2012 in line with the Commission's overall reduction targets. 161 staff are accredited nuclear safeguards inspectors. Retirements of experienced inspectors continue to provide a challenge in maintaining nuclear safeguards expertise, and as a consequence training across the directorate has been intensified Budget The operational budget for the execution of the Commission's safeguards obligations in 2014 was , which is effectively unchanged from the budget in 2013 of The budget breaks down approximately as follows: Services (including maintenance, laboratories & informatics) Equipment Inspection missions A large part of "Services" is related to the running costs of on-site laboratories at the reprocessing plants in La Hague, France and Sellafield, UK, for the preparation, analysis and transport of samples. 18

29 Included in "Services" are also the rental costs for in-field offices, secure cabinets and other services provided by operators as foreseen by Art 6 of Regulation 302/2005. The budget foreseen for 2015 is , an increase in line with the envisaged needs, as identified by the Commission's Multi-annual Financial Framework for INTERNAL MANAGEMENT 5.1. Integrated Management System Euratom Safeguards is in the process of implementing a quality management system across the scope of its activities named Integrated Management System (IMS). The IMS supplements the procedures of the Directorate-General for Energy and the Internal Control Standards (ICS) of the Commission and is based on the ISO 9001, ISO 17020, ISO & ISO standards. The description and mapping of the high level processes has been completed and the documentation of these processes is well advanced, including the formalisation of the annual Nuclear Safeguards Conclusions and Annual Safeguards Statement as main products of the directorate. The inspection management system is currently being documented, beginning with inspection schemes, where the conformity assessment activities performed in different MBAs are detailed. Next steps include the documentation of facility type approaches and inspectors' competency requirements. Continuous improvement tools are being introduced. A procedure for the disposition of non-conformities has been drafted, as well as a procedure for peer and desk review of inspection activities. Next steps include the performance of management reviews and internal quality audits. Internal communication and training continue to be an important support task of the team in charge of the Integrated Management System Technical support Extensive logistical support is needed to ensure that in-field inspections can be carried out efficiently and smoothly. This logistical support includes activities such as the identification of needs and specifications for new equipment, the follow up of technological developments, the testing of promising technologies, the purchase of equipment, spare parts & consumables, the installation and maintenance of equipment installed on-site, the calibration, provision & maintenance of hand-held equipment, assistance with the interpretation of measurement data and finally the removal and disposal of obsolete equipment. 19

30 Many of these technical and administrative tasks are performed at Euratom Safeguards' headquarters in Luxembourg, while others are performed on-site at the nuclear installations. These logistical support activities relate mainly to nuclear measurements, destructive analysis, video surveillance, sealing & containment systems, IT systems and Remote Data Transmission (RDT) Nuclear Measurements For the verification of nuclear material flows and inventories, inspectors use both portable and fixed measurement equipment. Mobile Permanent 35 Number of measurement units jan feb mar apr may jun jul aug sep oct nov dec Figure 7: Number of portable/fixed gamma spectrometry equipment prepared & distributed to inspectors in 2014 Around 200 sets of portable gamma spectrometry equipment were calibrated, tested, and made available to inspectors. The figure above shows the distribution of gamma spectrometry equipment throughout the year. The figure displays both mobile equipment, which is returned to headquarters after the inspection, and equipment which remains on site. As technology and production processes evolve in the nuclear fuel cycle, this also creates new challenges for safeguards. New verification tools must be developed in step with technological advances. A relevant example is the advances being made in fuel fabrication. As fuel designs are further refined, more neutron poisons are applied and more complex designs are constructed. This makes safeguards measurements more difficult. Euratom Safeguards is following two paths to address this challenge. 20

31 Firstly, an increased use of computer modelling will reduce the reliance on measurement calibration curves. The JRC's Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) has developed new software, named X-Fuel Builder, which allows inspectors to easily build a model of the fuel assembly to be verified and thereby facilitate measurements. Once tests have been completed, the new tool will be made available to inspectors routinely. Figure 8: Screenshot of Fuel Builder Software Secondly, the measurement chain is being improved as well. In cooperation with the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in the USA, a new neutron coincidence counter, named Euratom Fast Collar (EFC), has been designed, built and successfully tested at the Areva fuel fabrication plant in Lingen, Germany. By counting fast neutrons with high efficiency, the effect of neutron poisons on the calibration can be reduced and the counting times remain short. Following successful trials in 2014, the instrument is now available for use in the field. 21

32 Figure 9: The new Euratom Fast Collar; calibration exercise at LANL At the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, Euratom Safeguards continues to collaborate with various partners to develop verification tools which aim to ensure the correctness of declarations for material destined for final disposal in geological repositories. A framework approach and documentation for the technical safeguards measures for the encapsulation plant at Olkiluoto, Finland has been developed. The tomographic verification tool was developed in cooperation with various partners. Together with the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) and LANL, a series of characterisation measurements on spent fuel were carried out which will be very valuable for further detector development. Evaluation of ion fork measurement data for such purposes has also progressed. The IAEA has introduced the use of Digital Cerenkov Viewing Devices (DCVD) as replacement for ion fork detectors. In cases where this presents savings, Euratom Safeguards has also agreed to replace fork measurements with DCVDs. 22

33 Destructive Analysis Total samples OSLsamples LSS samples Total missions missions to OSL missions to LSS missions to LSS missions to OSL Total missions LSS samples OSLsamples Total samples Figure 10: Sample analysis performed in the on-site laboratories at Sellafield and La Hague The reprocessing plants at La Hague and Sellafield pose a specific challenge to safeguards because of their high annual throughput which runs to hundreds of tons of heavy metal per year. This requires a similarly high number of sample measurements on the nuclear material flows. In order to obtain accurate and timely results Euratom Safeguards operates analytical laboratories on each of these sites through an agreement with the JRC's ITU. The figure above shows the number of samples analysed and the number of missions carried out by ITU staff over the last five years Video Surveillance The Digital Camera Module 14 (DCM14) systems have been used with success for almost 15 years. However, these systems are not always able to provide Remote Data Transmission (RDT) capability (see section 5.2.6) and are gradually coming to the end of their useful life. The Next Generation Surveillance System (NGSS) will replace the DCM14 systems. Built-in data authentication and encrypted communication mean that the NGSS can be used jointly with the IAEA, including for RDT. The system has a modular design and is backwards compatible with existing cables and housings. 23

34 After intensive trials of all components the first 5 NGSS were installed infield during Experience to date is very positive. For 2015, the replacement of an additional 60 cameras is planned, often in conjunction with the installation of RDT. Since a total of approximately 600 cameras and 170 surveillance systems needs to be replaced in the EU, this campaign will take several years. The replacement schedule will be determined in principle by the age of the existing DCM14 systems and staff availability Sealing As the number of nuclear fuel transfers from spent fuel ponds to dry storage containers increases (e.g. as the result of nuclear de-fuelling in some MS), the need to improve in-field efficiency of inspections increases. Sealing of the casks by Euratom and IAEA inspectors is very resource intensive, since the operator's loading schedules frequently change at short notice. An approach has been developed by the inspectorates in conjunction with a number of operators which has the scope to benefit all parties. The approach allows an operator to place seals on the containers whilst they remain under inspectorate surveillance. Inspectors verify the correct operator placement of a seal during a later inspection. For this reason a new tool to help operators to place the Electronic Optical Sealing System (EOSS) with confidence has been developed and field tested with positive results. Routine use is expected in Figure 11: New interface to assist operators with the application of an EOSS seal and obtain a confirmation of the correct placement. Another development in spent fuel cask sealing technology is the Ultrasound Optical-fibre Sealing Bolt (UOSB) developed by the JRC in Ispra. The UOSB combines a traditional ultra-sound sealing bolt with an optic fibre seal, thereby doubling the tamper prevention barriers. This also allows for easy verification of the integrity of the UOSB, including remote monitoring from headquarters. A field test has begun at an installation in Ignalina, Lithuania. Routine use is foreseen in It is expected that 24

35 inspector's working conditions will improve and radiation dose uptake during inspections should be much lower in future. Figure 12: UOSB bolt installed on a container IT Systems and Infrastructure Euratom Safeguards maintains its own IT infrastructure on the larger nuclear sites and transmits data to headquarters at regular intervals. In the reprocessing plants of La Hague, Sellafield and the fuel fabrication plant at Melox, France, Euratom Safeguards operates multiple interconnected data acquisition computers (DA-PCs) from installed measurement devices and surveillance systems. The data is stored locally for subsequent evaluation by inspectors using the irap data analysis software (see section 5.4.2). At the Melox plant, the IT infrastructure was completely refurbished in Most of the DA-PCs and all evaluation servers, including the operating system and safeguards applications were upgraded. Euratom Safeguards operates its largest on-site IT infrastructure in cooperation with the JRC at the Sellafield reprocessing plant. The system has been built up gradually since the early 1990s. In 2014, the network infrastructure was documented in detail and completely refurbished to improve its robustness. The last network components will be exchanged in the first quarter of 2015, after which the DA-PCs will also be replaced Remote Data Transmission The automated electronic transfer of safeguards data from nuclear installations to Euratom Safeguards' headquarters, known as RDT, is an important step towards more efficient working methods and safer delivery of safeguards data. RDT has been in successful operation at large number of installations in the majority of EU MS since the late 2000's. 25

36 In 2014, progress was made with the additional implementation of RDT in 3 installations in Germany and 3 installations in Finland. This brings the total number of MBAs equipped with RDT in the NNWS to 27. Plans to install RDT capability are also well developed for a number of additional installations in Germany, Sweden and Spain. In addition to data transfer, RDT also has the capacity to detect faults and correct errors in equipment in a timely manner. This has allowed the directorate to make technical interventions without the need of having to travel to the installation. In this way, remote maintenance improves the efficiency of the directorate while reducing the burden on the nuclear operators. An IT security risk analysis was performed in the context of the RDT pilot project between the site of La Hague and Euratom headquarters in The results were positive and a security plan has been established to allow for the expanded use of RDT at La Hague. These security measures are also applicable for other French installations and have already been applied in other MS as well Satellite Imagery Since early 2013, the directorate together with the IAEA have profited from the opportunity to obtain satellite imagery offered by DG GROW in the context of the Copernicus programme (previously the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security GMES initiative). The satellite imagery is used to verify and supplement information gained in the field on the correctness of operators' declarations of Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) and gives an assurance of the correct use of installations Equipment Management A commercial software package for the management of equipment was identified and purchased for in-house testing. This package supports inventory management (stock control and purchasing), documentation management and maintenance management. Once accepted it will be deployed across the directorate to ensure the effective and efficient management of all safeguards equipment. 26

37 Equipment and Sample Transport total transports inspection samples equipment packages mail radioactive material transports transports with drivers Figure 13: Transports of Equipment and Samples in 2014 The figure above shows that Euratom Safeguards organizes between transports per year. This includes equipment transports with Commission vehicles and drivers (~60-70), by freight forwarders (50-80), but also radioactive material transports (~10) and the shipment of inspection samples (~10). Radioactive material transports include ion fork detectors with fission chambers. Two of the directorate's staff are certified Dangerous Goods Safety Advisors. The planned replacement of DCM14 surveillance systems might increase the number of transports significantly in the coming years Developments in specific facilities and new facility types The first geological repositories for the final disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste are expected to become operational in the EU shortly after 2020 (at first in Finland as of 2022 and later in France and Sweden). This new type of facility, along with its associated spent fuel encapsulation plants, presents significant safeguards challenges at various levels: in addition to the definition of inspection approaches, specialized equipment and measurement systems will have to be developed and installed. Euratom Safeguards is collaborating with the JRC, the IAEA, national authorities and operators in Finland & Sweden, as well as other specialised laboratories around the world. A special Encapsulation Plants Geological Repositories (EPGR) Liaison Group of the Low-Level Liaison Committee (LLLC) of INFCIRC 193 has been set up to follow up the development of safeguards approaches and their implementation at the final disposal projects in the two Nordic countries. Two EPGR Liaison Group meetings were held in the first quarter of The main outcome was the establishment of the safeguards infrastructure and equipment requirements, as agreed between Euratom Safeguards and the IAEA for the Finnish Encapsulation plant. These safeguards requirements of both inspectorates are now 27

38 known to the Finnish national authorities and the Finnish operator of the spent fuel repository who will take them into account in the design of the Finnish encapsulation plant. In addition, a successful verification of the Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) was carried out in the underground tunnel of the Finnish geological repository in November A 3-D Laser Scanning technique was utilised, with the cooperation and support of JRC in Ispra and the IAEA, to verify that the Onkalo tunnel has been constructed as declared by the operator, Posiva Oy. In Sweden, a number of new technologies are also being investigated for spent fuel verification as well as canister identification and sealing. Progress on safeguards applications at final disposal facilities is also being made in France and a delegation of Euratom Safeguards staff visited the ANDRA site in Bure, France, in February 2014 to learn more about the French disposal project, Cigeo Development of Data Evaluation Software Euratom Safeguards Software Development The obligations placed on Euratom Safeguards by the Euratom Treaty, Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA, and agreements with third States, require the Commission's safeguards service to receive, treat and transmit a very large amount of safeguards related information of a disparate nature on a continuous basis. For that reason Euratom Safeguards relies on a number of specific IT tools in order to discharge its tasks effectively. These IT tools are maintained and developed by the Shared Resources Directorate (SRD) of the Directorates-General for Energy and Transport. In January 2014, a milestone was reached with the deployment of the Inspection Management Integrated System (IMIS) software application. This vital application manages the entire lifecycle of all inspection activities of the directorate. It replaced the outdated EMIS application in use since the early 2000s. Essential for the service, the first phase release of IMIS introduced a modern database platform and user interface with much improved functionality to the inspector corps. As is to be expected with the release of any major application, and in particular with a system as ubiquitously used as IMIS, an adjustment period was experienced during the first half of the year. The adjustment period slowed - to some extent - the preparation of the post-inspection letters to operators. However, in conjunction with the close and dedicated support of SRD's IT developers, at year end, IMIS is running to the service's satisfaction. At the same time, a number of other safeguards specific IT tools have undergone maintenance and development during the course of the year. Notably, the Commission Additional Protocol Editor (CAPE) has been given additional features and a simpler user interface. The Advance Notification and International Agreements (ANIA) application has been developed to allow for easier implementation of the USA, Canadian and Australian NCAs. Finally, the Euratom Nuclear Material Accountancy 28

39 System (ENMAS) now allows for electronic reporting of Advance Notifications by operators to Euratom Safeguards. Emphasis was also placed on the continued development of VARO (Verification of Accountancy Records of Operators). VARO is a directorate-wide software application that allows a consistent evaluation of safeguards data in line with IMS. VARO now figures as a standard inspection tool used by Euratom inspectors, which is also available in a so called "Mobile Kit". This allows inspectors to synchronise data and so work almost seamlessly between inspections in-field and headquarters. Euratom Safeguards is striving to replace paper documentation as far as possible with electronic data for reasons of efficiency, effectiveness, and data security. In this respect it is essential that all nuclear operators provide data in electronic format to the maximum extent possible. IT development is guided by the principle of 'end-to-end' cyber-security, which aims to ensure that data acquired in the field is encrypted at source and only decrypted during review by the inspector. At headquarters, cyber-security is ensured by isolated IT networks which have been tested and hardened against known security threats International cooperation on software development The Integrated Review and Analysis Program (irap), is Euratom Safeguards' automated analysis tool for Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) data. The application includes a database system which allows inspectors to perform an efficient, easy and quick review of huge amounts of safeguards relevant data especially in large complex facilities. irap analyses measured data in a multi sensor system and compares the results with item movement declarations provided by the plant operator. It is used in-field as well as in headquarters. With a view to expanding the technical cooperation between the inspectorates, a joint development partnership between Euratom and the IAEA was established in 2013 to allow the IAEA to gain from irap's use. This partnership also relies on support and contributions from the JRC and the US Department of Energy (notably, Sandia National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory). The development of irap began in 2001 and has been based on principles of modularity, standardization and openness to third party suppliers. The entire project cycle, design, development, deployment, optimisation and in-field maintenance is supervised and coordinated by Euratom Safeguards' technical support unit E.1. The licence agreement has been drafted to share intellectual property rights, costs for development, and combines features that are beneficial to both inspectorates. This allows the IAEA to make use of already existing code and make smaller investments in tailoring the application to the needs of IAEA inspectors. 29

40 5.5. Training Nuclear safeguards inspectors are required to be adequately trained and technically skilled in performing their duties. The directorate's safeguards training team works closely with the inspection units, the JRC, IAEA and MS to ensure that training needs are properly analysed, training processes developed and implemented in the most effective and efficient way possible. During 2014, 69 training courses were provided to a total of 572 participants. The number of participants includes the directorate's staff as well as a number of external attendees from MS authorities, operators and the IAEA. The Euratom Member State Training course was held in March 2014 with a full number of participants. In addition to the regularly scheduled course to be held in Luxembourg for all MS in 2015, a dedicated course was held in Germany in January There are also plans for another French session in France in April Figure 14: Participants during the 2014 MS Training Course The Advisory Training Board (ATB) consisting of the training team, middle management and unit representatives met three times during 2014 to identify training needs and agree on priorities Health & Safety of Nuclear Inspectors Euratom Safeguards places a large emphasis on health and safety issues. This applies both to the staff working in the laboratories at headquarters and to the nuclear inspectors when performing on-site activities. Health & safety measures at work have been adopted on the basis of Article 153 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (former Article 137 TEC). Euratom Safeguards complies with the requirements laid down by the Commission Decision C/2006/1623 of 26 April 2006 establishing a Harmonised Policy for Health and Safety at Work for all Commission staff. This Decision provides for production of 30

41 detailed Health & Safety rules and evaluation of the risk associated with each post. Under Article 30 of the Euratom Treaty, the Union laid down Basic Safety Standards for the protection of workers and the general public against the hazards arising from ionising radiations. Furthermore, Euratom Safeguards fully applies, as appropriate, Luxembourg national law on health and safety at workplace, as far as radiation safety is concerned. ENER D.3 is responsible for the implementation of radiological protection, occupational health and safety rules at Euratom Safeguards' headquarters and issues an annual report on Health & Safety on Euratom staff. In 2014, there were no work accidents involving radioactivity or ionising radiation. There we no work accidents resulting in temporary or permanent incapacity. Staff working in the laboratories are exposed to chemical and physical agents and there are high voltage electrical equipment and cryogenic liquids. ENER D.3 regularly reviews the health & safety conditions of all staff as mandated by Commission Decision and also makes efforts to further improve the existing safety culture; in 2014 a number of training sessions were organised on health and safety at work. The actions identified during the health & safety review of the laboratories have all been implemented with the exception of a system to survey isolated workers. This system will be installed in At the same time, inspectors in the field are exposed to ionising radiation. They are classified as Category A exposed workers and receive regular medical and radioprotection follow-up. After following an extensive radioprotection course prior to their first inspection, inspectors also have to follow a radioprotection refresher training course every 2 years. 6. EXTERNAL RELATIONS Euratom Safeguards regularly interacts with MS authorities, the IAEA, and other safeguards organisations in the world. Safeguards policy and strategic direction are determined by the Commission in consultation with MS Member States Close contacts were maintained with Member States governmental and regulatory authorities throughout the year. Bilateral meetings and trilateral meetings (including the IAEA) were held with Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and UK. Euratom Safeguards also met with individual operators as necessary for the smooth implementation of safeguards implementation issues. Support to nuclear operators and MS authorities was offered on a number of occasions during the year, by means of several training courses (see Section 5.5). 31

42 Croatia In conjunction with Croatia's accession to the EU in 2013, extensive meetings and exchanges with Croatian authorities were held in order to assure reporting compliance with Commission Regulation 302/2005. Discussions were also held in preparation for Croatia's accession to the Safeguards Agreement of 1978 (78/164/Euratom in OJ l51/1 aka INFCIRC 193). Some progress was noted in 2014, and it is hoped that accession preparations can be completed in Tlatelolco Treaty During 2014, negotiations were held between Euratom Safeguards, the UK and French authorities, as well as the IAEA, on amending the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to the trilateral Safeguards Agreements related to the territories under the responsibility of the UK and France in connection with the Tlatelolco Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Progress in the negotiations has been made, but a number of issues remain to be clarified. Agreement is expected to be reached with France and the UK in 2015 regarding the distribution of responsibilities between the two MS and Euratom in the implementation of the SQP International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) The IAEA's verification activities in the EU rely on Euratom Safeguards and apply to all nuclear material in the NNWS. They also apply to a small number of specifically selected installations under voluntary offer in the NWS. Euratom Safeguards' and the IAEA's activities strongly complement each other. This requires close day-to-day cooperation both in scheduling joint inspections and for their in-field implementation. Inspections in the NNWS and in certain installations in France and the UK are carried out jointly by Commission and IAEA inspectors. For the efficient use of staff, such inspections are carried out applying the principles of One-Job-One-Person (OJOP) and joint-teams. The Safeguards Agreement between the NNWS, Euratom and the IAEA provides for a Liaison Committee to review the performance of and to agree on arrangements for the implementation of common safeguards activities in the EU 10. The Committee meets annually at a higher level (HLLC) and more frequently at a lower level (LLLC). Representatives of the MS and the European External Action Service (EEAS) are invited to participate in all HLLC meetings. 10 The two separate Safeguards Agreements between Euratom, the IAEA and France and the UK, respectively have similar provisions on Liaison Committees. They are implemented respectively through regular trilateral meetings. 32

43 HLLC The High Level Liaison Committee (HLLC) met in Luxembourg on 15 October The meeting in 2014 concentrated its efforts on identifying further possibilities for efficiency gains since both organisations continue to face increasing resource constraints. Enhanced cooperation should allow for maintaining the effectiveness of safeguards in the EU despite decreasing resources. In 2012, the HLLC initiated a review of the implementation of all arrangements of the New Partnership Approach (NPA) signed in Remote Data Transmission from nuclear installations, the potential use of unannounced IAEA inspections and safeguards activities at new types of facilities were identified as areas where there is a specific need for the improvement of cooperation. The HLLC requested the LLLC to establish a list of Facility Attachments that are outstanding or in need of revision together with a realistic time schedule for their updating. The HLLC also requested the LLLC to prepare a report on IT security in the area of safeguards. Finally, the HLLC concluded that the ongoing process of updating IAEA State-Level Approaches under the IAEA State-Level Concept requires close cooperation for its implementation and that mechanisms are in place for the updating of Partnership Approaches, if needed (see section 6.2.4). The representatives of the EEAS and MS fully support efforts for closer cooperation LLLC The Lower Level Liaison Committee (LLLC) met for its 62 nd 15 May 2014 in Luxembourg. meeting on Besides the follow-up of the specific tasks assigned by the HLLC, the LLLC mainly dealt with implementation issues. These issues included a new approach for verifying spent fuel cask loadings for the long-term dry storage of spent fuel, site declarations for small installations, safeguards activities related to waste processing and the increased use of electronic means of communication as well as potential interfaces between Euratom and IAEA IT systems. The new approach for the verification of spent fuel cask loading (based on the use of the Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device (DCVD) and the application of seals by operators) was successfully deployed in It is especially important for longer loading campaigns, for instance during the defueling of shutdown reactors in Germany LLLC Working Groups There are 3 LLLC Working Groups (WG) dealing with: Inspection Planning, Logistical & Technical Support and Safeguards Implementation which includes accounting & reporting issues. As part of the continuous process of coordinating common inspection activities, the WG on Inspection Planning met in March, June, September and December

44 The WG on Logistical & Technical Support agreed on a multi-annual schedule for the replacement of the current DCM-14 based surveillance systems by the NGSS. The WG further followed-up technical developments, such as the introduction of new sealing systems (RMSA, glass seals, icobra seal readers, and EOSS interfaces for operators) as well as improvements to NDA systems (HM-5 Identifinder 2 & upgraded ICVD). A first version of irap, Euratom Safeguards' automated analysis software was deployed in The WG continued to review the arrangements between both organizations related to common equipment needs and cost splitting, shared analytical capabilities, sharing of analysis results, as well as environmental sampling and cooperation in R&D. The WG on Safeguards Implementation tabled a number of facility type partnership approach papers for approval by the LLLC. The WG continued to put a large effort on the resolution of issues related to the implementation of the Additional Protocol, in particular related to site declarations for small installations, and on safeguards activities related to waste processing installations. The WG also began updating Facility Attachments in line with the priorities agreed between the inspectorates, i.e. starting with bulk handling facilities. With regards to accounting & reporting issues, the participants met twice in Issues discussed included the particularities of reporting codes used at waste facilities. The accounting & reporting group also discussed the changes that can be expected as and when the IAEA introduces its new accountancy system in The introduction of this system presents an opportunity for Euratom Safeguards to begin reporting both 'original' and 'accounting' dates to the IAEA based on a new reporting scheme. Following an IAEA request, IT support was provided so that the new accountancy system will accept accountancy reports in an XML format. This improvement should lead to a significant reduction of Euratom Safeguards interventions on operators reports before their transmission to the IAEA (retroactive corrections) Joint approaches, Support and Developments Integrated Safeguards (IS) have been successfully introduced in all NNWS with significant nuclear activities since January IS is an optimised combination of safeguards measures which allows the IAEA to relax certain inspection criteria. The IAEA concept of IS has become an integral part of the common system of Euratom/IAEA inspections in all NNWS. Inspections are carried out based on Partnership Approaches (PA) agreed between the Commission and the IAEA. The IAEA inspection approach includes the use of Random Interim Inspections with short notification (RII) or Unannounced Inspections (UI). RIIs are now usually announced by the IAEA 48 hours in advance to both Euratom Safeguards and the facility operator. UI are restricted to a small number of installations in the NNWS where there is no possibility of introducing alternative inspection regimes (e.g., RII) or no possibility of using technical measures in order to allow the IAEA to fulfil its goals. A practical consequence for the operator and the 34

45 MS is that Euratom inspectors cannot participate in all the IAEA UI due to the declining number of staff. In order to maintain coordinated inspection activities between both inspectorates, the most optimised scheme of UI possible should be the common goal. The IAEA has the intention to further implement their State-Level Concept (SLC) by taking into account all information available on a state and considering a number of state-specific factors, amongst them the effectiveness of state and regional systems of accountancy and control when determining their verification activities. Euratom Safeguards strongly supports the principles of the SLC and its introduction worldwide. With respect to SLC's further introduction in the EU, it is expected that this will be a step-wise process. The IAEA s emphasis is on updating existing State-Level Approaches (SLA) for MS under IS. This is expected to be followed by developing SLAs for MS with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. At the end of 2014, the IAEA informed Euratom Safeguards of SLA draft updates for two MS and began consultations to work towards their implementation. Euratom Safeguards provided support in the production of two IAEA guidance documents; the "Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities" and the "Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Provision of Information to the IAEA". Euratom Safeguards also provided support to the IAEA's Additional Protocol Training Exercise in Vienna and during the practical exercise at the JRC in Karlsruhe, Germany Senior Officials Meeting On February 2014, senior officials of the IAEA, Commission and EEAS met to discuss all areas of cooperation between the organisations. Topics ranged from nuclear safety, security & safeguards, to nuclear energy and nuclear sciences and applications. The Commission reiterated its support for the SLC whilst noting that as a regional safeguards system, Euratom's activities and results should be taken into account when implementing the SLC in the EU SIR 2014 The IAEA issues an annual Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) which summarizes its findings and conclusions. The report is issued to IAEA Member States authorities in April/May each year and covers safeguards implementation of the preceding year. In the SIR for 2014 (issued on 6 May, 2015) the IAEA did not report on any specific issues related to any of the EU Member States; conclusions for the EU were satisfactory. The SIR notes that 3 IAEA/Euratom Safeguards partnership approach papers were either developed or improved during the course of the year. It also notes that a Liaison Group was formed together with Sweden and 35

46 Finland for the development of specific safeguards approaches for encapsulation plants and geological repositories (EPGR) ESARDA, INMM and ENEF Euratom Safeguards plays an active role in the framework of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA). It has observer status in the ESARDA Steering Committee and participates regularly in the meetings of the Steering Committee and Executive Board. Euratom Safeguards is also involved in the work of all WGs and committees of ESARDA. Through the Editorial Committee, the directorate contributes regularly to the preparation and issuing of the ESARDA Bulletin and ESARDA symposia. Through the JRC, the directorate also provides secretarial and organizational support for ESARDA. A workshop on "Novel Measurement Techniques for Safety, Security and Safeguards" was organised by the ESARDA WG on Novel Approaches & Novel Technologies, held in March 2014 in Oxford, UK. In May 2014, as in every even-numbered year, Euratom Safeguards hosted ESARDA s 36th Annual Symposium at their premises in Luxembourg. Figure 15: ESARDA Symposium in Luxembourg, May 2104 The ESARDA Working Groups on Implementation of Safeguards and on Verification Technologies & Methodologies held meetings in Ispra, Italy in November The outreach activities of Euratom Safeguards extend to the US Institute of Nuclear Material Management (INMM) and the International 36

47 Safeguards Division (ISD) of the INMM. Euratom Safeguards presented technical papers at the INMM Information Analysis Workshop in May The directorate also presented technical papers and participated in panel discussions at the INMM's 55th Annual Meeting in Atlanta, USA, in July Euratom Safeguards together with the JRC also participated with a stand at the IAEA Safeguards Symposium in Vienna, in October Figure 16: Euratom Safeguards & JRC stand at the IAEA Safeguards Symposium Euratom Safeguards is represented in the European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF) in the non-proliferation sub-working Group "Risks" Third countries and organisations Euratom Safeguards maintains relations with third States with whom agreements have been signed, and with other international safeguards organisations. The directorate supported and contributed to an Additional Protocol/Complementary Access training course given to the Serbian authorities in cooperation with the US Department of Energy and the IAEA. Under the Agreement on Technical Cooperation in Nuclear Safeguards and Security, concluded in 2010 between Euratom and the US Department of Energy, fourteen Action Sheets were open in 2014, covering projects in non-destructive assay, destructive assay, outreach, informatics and export control. The work is reviewed annually. Euratom 37