MUNICIPAL FINANCE AND SERVICE PROVISION

Transcription

1 Report No GZ WEST BANK and GAZA MUNICIPAL FINANCE AND SERVICE PROVISION January 26, 2010 The World Bank Sustainable Development Department Middle East and North Africa Region Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Document of the World Bank

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (As of September 2009) Currency Unit = New Israeli Shekel (NIS) NIS1 = US$0.25 US$1 = NIS3.95 FISCAL YEAR January 1 December 31

3 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS APLA CGAS EMSRP ESW JDECO JSC KFW LAL LGs MDLF MDP MFRP MNA MoF MoLG MoPIC NEDCO NIS O&M PA PCBS PEA TA UNDP UNRWA VAT WBG Association of Palestinian Local Authorities Capital Grants Allocations System Emergency Municipal Services Rehabilitation Project Economic Sectoral Work Jerusalem District Electricity Company Joint Service Council German Development Agency Local Authorities Law Local Governments Municipal Development and Lending Fund Municipal Development Program Municipal Fiscal Restructuring Program Middle East and North Africa Ministry of Finance Ministry of Local Government Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation Northern Electric Distribution Company New Israeli Shekels Operation and Maintenance Palestinian Authority Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics Palestinian Energy and Natural Resources Authority Technical Assistance United Nations Development Program United Nations Relief Works Agency Value Added Tax West Bank & Gaza Vice President Country Director Sector Director Sector Manager Task Team Leader Shamshad Akhtar David Craig Laszlo Lovei Anna Bjerde Meskerem Brhane

4 CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1 1.1Background Objectives Scope of this Study Data Sources and Methodology 3 CHAPTER II: EXPENDITURES Municipal Expenditure Functions According to Law Adequacy of the Assignment of Local Functions Municipal Expenditure Functions in Practice Relationship Between Services Provided and Municipal Size Expenditure Assignment and the Size of the Municipalities Accountability in the Provision of Local Services Executed Expenditures by Service Current and Capital Expenditure Structure Per capita Expenditures by Service Coverage and Quality of Selected Municipal Services Expenditure Efficiency: Constraints and Opportunities Conclusions 60 CHAPTER III: REVENUES Assignment of Revenue Sources Brief Assessment of the Main Revenue Sources Revenue Sources in Practice Current and Capital Revenue Budgets Per Capita Revenues by Source Revenue Growth: Constraints and Opportunities Conclusion 92 CHAPTER IV: MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL SITUATION Comparison of Expenditures and Revenues by Service Municipal Services Financed Primarily through Taxes 99

5 4.3 Financial Sustainability of Local Physical Infrastructure Balance between Expenditures and Revenues Synopsis of the Municipal Financial Situation Conclusion 112 CHAPTER V: MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS Overall Conclusion Short-term Issues and Policy Implications Long-term Issues and Policy Implications 120 Bibliography 124

6 TABLES Table 1: Representativeness of the Municipal Sample 3 Table 2: Providers and Non-providers by Population Class 4 Table 3: Municipal Services According to Law 5 Table 4: Frequency of Municipalities by Number of Services 8 Table 5: Frequency in the Provision of the Municipal Services 10 Table 6: Municipal Classification in terms of Number of services 15 Table 7: Number of Municipalities by Population and Services 18 Table 8: Classification of LGUs by Population and Services 19 Table 9: Recurrent Expenditures: Relative Weight by Service 26 Table 10: Operating Expenditures by Service for non-providers 29 Table 11: Operating Expenditures by Service for providers 32 Table 12: Expenditures by Service as a Percent of the Budget 33 Table 13: Current and Capital Expenditure 34 Table 14: Salaries and Wages as a Percent of the Budget 38 Table 15: Number of Employees and Average Salary 39 Table 16: Average Salaries as a Percent of the Budget 40 Table 17: Per Capita Operating Expenditures by Service 42 Table 18: Per Capita Operating Expenditures for non-providers 44 Table 19: Per capita Operating Expenditures for providers 47 Table 20: Per Capita Expenditures by Service and Municipal Size 48 Table 21: Comparison of Per Capita Expenditures for WB&G 51 Table 22: Quality of Water Supply: Selected Cases 54 Table 23: Quality of Solid Waste Collection: Selected Cases 55 Table 24: Quality of Road Transport Networks: Selected Cases 56 Table 25: Quality of Schools Maintenance: Selected Cases 57 Table 26: Quality of Street Lighting: Selected Cases 58 Table 27: Quality of Sewer systems: Selected Cases 58 Table 28: Institutions with Authority over Local Revenue Sources 64 Table 29: Relative Weight of Municipal Revenues: by Source 75 Table 30: Main Revenue Sources as Percents of the Budget 76 Table 31: The Relevance of the Property Tax 78 Table 32: Relative Weight of Revenue Sources for Providers 81 Table 33: Relative Weight of Revenue Sources for Non-Providers 83 Table 34: Municipal Per Capita Revenues by Source 86 Table 35: Per capita Revenues: Providers versus Non-providers 88 Table 36: Per Capita revenues by source and municipal size 89 Table 37: Per Capita Revenues: West Bank versus Gaza 91 Table 38: Comparison of Per Capita Revenues and Expenditures 95 Table 39: Ranking of Municipalities by Financial Performance 103

7 Table 40: Municipalities Running Surpluses and Arrears 106 Table 41 Financial Performance of Providers (West Bank) 106 Table 42 Financial Performance of Non-Providers (West Bank) 107 Table 43 Municipal Financial Performance in the Gaza Strip 109 Table 44 Summary of Municipal Financial Situation in WBG 110 Table 45 Municipal Financial Performance in WBG 111 Table 46 Financial Situation in Modified-Accrual Basis 112 CHARTS Chart 1: Distribution of Frequency of No. of Services Provided 9 Chart 2: Representativeness of the Sample: Frequency in Services 13 Chart 3: Relative Distribution of LGUs by No. of Services Provided 15 Chart 4: Relative Distribution by Services and Population Class 17 Chart 5: Operating Expenditures: Relative Weight (RW) by Service 25 Chart 6: Operating Expenditures: RWs for non-providers 28 Chart 7: Operating Expenditures: R.Ws for providers 31 Chart 8: Share of Operating and Capital Expenditures 35 Chart 9: Expenditure Structure: Comparison between WB&G 36 Chart 10: Per Capita Operating Expenditures by Service 43 Chart 11: Per Capita Operating Expenditures for providers 45 Chart 12: Per Capita Service Expenditures for WB&G 52 Chart 13: Municipal Revenues: Relative Weight by Source 74 Chart 14: Per Capita Revenues by Source 85 Chart 15: Relationship between Surplus or Deficit and Arrears 104 ANNEXES (In separate Volume) Annex 1: Text of Art.15: Assignment of Functions to Local Councils Annex 2: Services Provided by Municipalities and Other Institutions Annex 3: Municipal Expenditures by Service in Annex 4: Municipal Revenues by Source in Annex 5: Coverage and Quality of Selected Services Annex 6: Number of Employees and Per Capita Employees Annex 7: Municipal Staff Salaries Annex 8: Municipal Financial Situation 2007 (with and w/out arrears) Annex 9: Services Questionnaire Annex 10: Expenditure Questionnaire Annex 11: Revenue Questionnaire Annex 12: Coverage and Quality of Services Questionnaire Annex 13 MoLG s Classification of Municipalities Annex 14 Data Sources and Methodology

8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The task team for this report consisted of Meskerem Brhane, Task Team Leader (Senior Urban Specialist, MNSSD); Hernando Garzon (Intergovernmental Finance Economist, Consultant); John Nasir (Senior Country Economist, MNSED); and Mark Ahern (Senior Public Sector Specialist, MNSED). Hernando Garzon is the primary author of the report. This report was prepared in close collaboration with the Municipal Development and Lending Fund. Special thanks goes to Dr. Iyad Rammal, Director of Operations, for sharing his valuable knowledge and deep understanding of local governments; Mr. Mohammed Al-Ramahi, (Director of the Financial Department), Mr. Khaled Rajab (Director of the Strategic Planning & External Relations Department) and Mr. Nizar Samhan for their continued support, especially in ensuring municipalities responded to the questionnaire and developing the database. Mr. Samhan assisted in following up on the municipal responses and inquiries and preparing consolidated spreadsheets on municipal services and the expenditures and revenues associated with each of those services for FY 07 and 08. The team also worked closely with the Ministry of Local Government, especially the Budget Director Mr. Mahmoud Zubaidi and his staff Ms. Ibtisam Marabeh who provided information on municipal executed budgets for The team also wishes to express his gratitude to Mr. Yousef Nasser, Mayor of Birzeit Municipality, and Mr. Mutazz Muhasien (Manager of MDLF s Office in the Gaza Strip) who generously contributed with critical inputs. Last and not least important, the institutional and logistical support given by the MDLF proved vital in the completion of this task.

9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Objective The main general objective of this study is to promote a deeper understanding of municipal finance in the West Bank and Gaza, including identification of the key issues that local governments currently face. The paper discusses the policy implications associated with its main findings as potential policy options for future decision making on local government reforms. As such, this study aims at facilitating the process for a future policy dialogue between the World Bank and the Palestinian Authority (PA)/Ministry of Local Government (MoLG). Furthermore, it is expected that the identification of the main issues, together with their policy implications, may assist the PA/MoLG in the selection of the key areas that could potentially benefit from the World Bank s technical assistance. In particular, this study attempts to: (i) Clarify the actual role that municipalities play in the provision of local services; (ii) evaluate the current assignment of municipal revenue sources and determine their adequacy to cover current expenditure functions, including an analysis of whether there are unfunded mandates, and if so, identify the main contributing factors ; and (iii) determine the balance between expenditures and revenues aiming primarily to assess whether the current revenue sources cover the estimated costs of the municipal services that are being provided, and draw the corresponding conclusions on the current municipal fiscal situation. Furthermore, this ESW highlights the nature and magnitude of current fiscal imbalances across municipalities in the West Bank and Gaza. Data Sources and Methodology Considering the severe data limitations on the municipal sector, this study has relied mainly on three questionnaires sent out to each of the 132 municipalities. These questionnaires were specifically designed to address the main areas of interest: (i) Services being provided; (ii) actual expenditures by service; and (iii) revenue sources being used for the financing of local public goods and services. The questionnaires refer to FYs Other sources of information included: (i) the approved and executed municipal budgets provided by the MoLG for FY 07. The executed budgets for FY 08, unfortunately, were not available. Given this situation, the recurrent and capital expenditures by functions and the revenues by source for FY 08 were obtained from the 94 municipalities that responded both to the expenditure and revenue questionnaires; (ii) the municipal arrears for electricity and water for FY 07 provided by the Ministry of Finance (MoF); and (iii) the property tax data for FY 08 on collections and assessment for 29 municipalities was provided by the MoF. More details on the data sources and the methodology may be found in Annex 14. i

10 Classification of Municipalities The current MoLG classification of municipalities is based on political considerations rather than objective criteria. It is therefore impossible to use it to assess the service delivery capacity of a municipality. A description and assessment of the current classification system are offered in Annex 13. Consequently a new classification system is suggested, in terms of both population size and number of services provided, as indicators of their capacity to deliver services. The importance of the proposed classification system is that it identifies, among other things, the municipalities that in principle may be considered target groups for policies related to amalgamation and/or partnerships among municipalities to enhance delivery capacities. Also, the proposed classification contributes to policies related to the identification of the basic services that do, and the basic services that do not, constitute a priority to most municipalities. Service Provision and Actual Expenditures This paper examines different views regarding the actual role of local governments in service provision and the key issues they face. Among these different perceptions are the following: (i) Municipalities provide multiple local services but the largest among them are best suited to play this role; (ii) it is argued that there is a distortion in municipal service provision because those municipalities that collect revenue from electricity distribution have what is practically a subsidy from this revenue source (equivalent to a soft-budgetary constraint), in contrast to those that are non-electricity providers; (iii) also, given the current circumstances, municipal service provision in the Gaza Strip is more limited and needs a greater support than that of local governments in the West Bank; (iv) furthermore, it is claimed that part of the problem in the provision of local services is that municipalities are not held accountable for the services they are supposed to provide; (iv) in addition some of the financial problems that many of them face are due to overstaffing; and (v) finally, larger municipalities (in terms of population) offer more economies of scale than smaller municipalities and therefore amalgamation needs to be promoted. Briefly, and based on the analysis of empirical evidence, the findings of this report, on each of the above arguments, are presented below. What services do the municipalities actually provide? Despite the large variation in population size across municipalities, all local councils have been ii

11 assigned by law the same responsibilities regarding service provision. The law mandates about 27 different local public goods and services. This means, at least in principle, that in the case of small local governments (LGs), the scope of services may be too broadly defined for them to be capable of fulfilling their mandate, whereas the larger municipalities may be, perhaps, better able to do so. In practice, however, the empirical results indicate that most municipalities provide relatively few services. About six main local services are provided (to some extent) by most municipalities, nearly regardless of the size of their populations. These are: i) Solid waste collection, ii) street maintenance, (iii) water supply, (iv) street lighting, (v) roads maintenance, and (vi) school maintenance. The first three services are provided by at least 80% of the municipalities, while the last three are provided, in some proportion, by at least half. However, in terms of the relative importance of the actual expenditures on each of these services, the results suggest that only the first five have actually received a significant amount of yearly budgetary resources for their provision. Do larger municipalities provide more services? Based on a classification of the 132 municipalities in terms of their population size and the number of services they provide (given the corresponding level of expenditures allocated to them), the empirical results suggest that larger municipalities actually execute expenditures in more services. These results, all together, seem to suggest that larger cities (municipalities) have a greater capacity to provide more services than do the smaller ones. For instance, the larger cities (above 100,000 inhabitants ), such as Nablus, Khan Yunis and Gaza, rank in Group III, which refers to those municipalities that provide more than 12 services and up to 18. In contrast, very small towns (almost small enough to be termed villages) with under 5,000 inhabitants, such as Al Newe emeh, Al Zahra, and Al Fokhari, rank in Group I, which refers to local governments that provide less than five (5) services. However, the relationship between number of services provided and municipal population size is not linear, so that it cannot be generally expected that larger municipalities will provide more services. Therefore, the above results may only support the PA policy on amalgamation and other equivalent means and ways to enhance the provision of a greater number of services to a certain extent. Do larger municipalities spend more in services? The results suggest that service provision is on the average better in the larger cities than in the smaller towns and villages. The larger municipalities generally spend more in per capita iii

12 terms on the main services, than do the smaller local councils. This is the case, for example, in electricity distribution, water supply, solid waste collection, and roads. On the other hand, expenditures on services such as street maintenance and street lighting seem with some exceptions to be rather proportional to the municipalities population size i.e., their per capita expenditures tend to remain fairly similar across different sizes of municipalities. In the aggregate, however, the average per capita expenditure for each of the four classes increases with population size. Do municipalities with soft-budgetary constraints provide more services than those with hard-budgetary constraints? In 2008, based on the entire sample of 94 municipalities, the services and public works with the largest per capita expenditures included: (i) Electricity (NIS 96.80); (ii) water supply (NIS 38.36); (iii) solid waste (NIS 36.92); (iv) street maintenance (NIS 16.01); and (v) roads (NIS 11.76). However, in order to isolate potential fiscal distortions of electricity-providers, the sample was divided into two sub-samples, one for providers of electricity (which may be characterized as those municipalities having a relatively soft-budgetary constraint), and the other, for non-providers (which operate with a relatively hard-budgetary-constraint). The empirical results of comparing these two sub-samples indicate that the main general pattern regarding municipal service provision remains practically the same. However, as expected, the per capita analysis of expenditures shows that the group of municipalities that enjoys a relatively soft-budgetary constraint spends significantly more, in per capita terms, than the group that operates with a hard-budgetary constraint (NIS13.00 versus NIS4.20). Three services have mainly benefited from this greater spending. These are: Water (NIS55.20 versus NIS21.20), roads (NIS17.90 versus NIS5.50), and streets (NIS17.70 versus ). It may be inferred that the future municipal fiscal restructuring adjustment (due to the transfer of the electricity service) will most probably affect these three services. What are the differences in service provision between Gaza and the West Bank? The empirical results confirm that the municipalities in the Gaza Strip are worse off than West Bank municipalities in terms of service provision. There are only three main services that stand out in Gaza based on the magnitude of their per capita spending. These services include: (i) Solid waste collection and disposal; (ii) water supply; and (iii) sewer systems. For most services per capita spending in Gaza municipalities is lower than in the West Bank. However, per capita spending in sewer systems is particularly high in Gaza -- in contrast to the West Bank municipalities. Services such as street maintenance and street iv

13 lighting have necessarily become less of a priority given the current municipal budgetary limitations. In general, it could be argued that there is fairly limited provision of services in the Gaza Strip, and the public services being provided mainly relate to sanitation, which in a way reflects the minimum priorities in municipal service provision when local governments have to face fairly severe budgetary constraints. The differences in expenditure structure between Gaza and the West Bank are mainly due to differences in budgetary expenditure capacities, rather than to differences in the assignment of the actual local functions. Is there clear accountability in local service provision? It is necessary to clarify exactly what institutions are ultimately responsible for the numerous local functions established in the law. For example, it is not clear which of these functions are mandatory and which ones are optional. Also, a distinction should be made regarding whether some of these services are supposed to be provided in concurrence with other suppliers, including the PA, or whether some of them are the exclusive responsibility of the local council. This lack of clarity compromises accountability. Are municipalities over-staffed? Some municipalities are overstaffed, while others are understaffed. The empirical results indicate that the average number of employees per thousand inhabitants for the West Bank and Gaza, as a whole, is about 2.7, which is fairly consistent with international standards. However, the actual range in number of employees across municipalities fluctuates between 0.9 and 11 employees per thousand inhabitants, which supports the argument of overstaffing. Municipalities in the Gaza Strip seem to have a greater number of employees (2.9) than municipalities in the West Bank, as compared to either providers (2.7) or non-providers (2.4). In contrast, there are a significant number of municipalities, particularly among those with a relatively small economic base, whose operating budgets cannot even cover the cost of the average number of employees. This seems to be illustrative of the inherent constraints in the performance of small municipalities. Are there economies of scale in the administrative costs of larger municipalities? The empirical results do not show a pattern in the number of employees in the general administration as the municipal population size increases. In fact, the results from a regression analysis indicate that there is no linear relationship between municipal population-size and number of employees (per thousand inhabitants) in municipal general administration. As such, it may be concluded that amalgamation, in and of itself, will not automatically result in v

14 savings in administrative costs. However, potential economies of scale might still occur in the provision of the different municipal services. Revenues There are different arguments regarding municipal revenues, which are also examined in this study. The most important of them claim that: (i) Most municipalities have adequate revenue sources, which include user charges, local taxes and fees; it is also claimed that (ii) larger municipalities generate more per capita revenues than smaller local governments, and as such, a policy of amalgamation of local governments would be fiscally sound; furthermore, it is argued that (iii) those municipalities that do not have revenue from electricity in practice operate without subsidies, making them face a hard-budgetary constraint which makes their financial performance stronger; last, it is generally asserted that (iv) municipal revenues are fairly low in the Gaza Strip due to the current economic blockade, which compromises the coverage and quality of local services. Following is a brief summary on the empirical results found by this study, regarding the above arguments: How do municipalities finance their services? The empirical findings 1 show that the main municipal revenue sources are comprised of: (i) User charges -- i.e., electricity (36%), water (14%), and solid waste collection (2.9%); (ii) local taxes i.e., the property tax (4.44%) and the education tax (2.3%); and (iii) fees i.e., building licenses (4.23%) and registration of vehicles/transport fees (3.22%). However, it should be noted that in the West Bank the property tax is levied only in 29 municipalities (out of 107), and the education tax is levied only in 46 municipalities. Clearly, there is a large horizontal fiscal inequity across municipalities regarding local taxes, since expenditure responsibilities are the same for all of them. Do larger municipalities raise more revenue? The empirical results show that the average per capita revenue for each population class gradually increases for each group, except for the fourth one. The fourth group includes those municipalities with populations greater than fifty thousand. This drop in revenues in the highest population group appears to be due to the fact that out of the six municipalities in this class, four of them are located in the Gaza Strip, and empirical evidence, as reported in this study, has shown that per capita revenues in Gaza municipalities are significantly lower than per capita revenues in the West Bank for the same revenue sources. Briefly, the empirical results regarding 1 The findings are based on the 94 municipalities that responded the revenue questionnaire. vi

15 revenues show that they increase with municipal size, except for those in the highest population class, apparently due to the Gaza effect. Do municipalities with hard-budgetary constraints raise more local revenues than those with soft-budgetary constraints? The empirical results show that generally the per capita revenues for the sub-sample of municipalities with hard-budgetary constraints are significantly higher than those for municipalities with soft-budgetary constraints. For example, this is the case for the per capita revenues from solid waste collection (NIS13.09 versus NIS6.28), the property tax (NIS29.61 versus NIS0.99) 2, the education tax (NIS10.52 versus NIS4.54), the roofing tax, (NIS9.81 versus NIS0.83), etc. The supporting evidence is also the same for the four different fees. Consequently, it may be argued that local revenue mobilization efforts are much greater among municipalities with hard-budgetary constraints, which make their finances more solid and stable, together with service provision. Briefly, these results illustrate a moral hazard, and an opportunity cost, of allowing municipalities to operate with soft-budgetary constraints. This lack of financial discipline undermines the soundness of the municipal fiscal system. Furthermore, this evidence of the perverse effects in local revenue mobilization of soft-budgetary constraints (or lack of accountability) supports current efforts by the PA, and the energy sector, to correct this municipal fiscal situation. What are the differences in revenues between Gaza and the West Bank? The revenue assignment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are different with respect to three local sources. One, the property tax, is collected in the West Bank by MoF on behalf of the municipalities, but collections are carried out in only 29 out of 107 municipalities; in contrast all of the municipalities in the Gaza strip are currently allowed to directly collect their own property taxes. Secondly, the education tax is only collected by the West Bank municipalities, and thirdly, electricity user charges are only collected by the 59 municipalities that distribute electricity in the West Bank. Hence, except for revenues from electricity, the property tax, and the education tax, the revenue sources of the municipalities in the Gaza Strip and those in the West Bank are generally the same. In practice, however, the empirical results support the argument that the average per capita revenue levied by the Gaza municipalities is usually significantly lower than the revenue collected by West 2 However, this as it appears is the result of the deductions made by the MoF of electricity arrears from property tax proceeds. vii

16 Bank municipalities, from the same or similar sources. For example, this is the case for the per capita revenue of the two most important user charges: water (NIS20.36 in Gaza, versus NIS74.89 in the West Bank), and solid waste collection (NIS3.99 versus NIS13.35). A similar situation characterizes the two local taxes: the property tax (NIS0.29 in Gaza, but equivalent to NIS22.31 in the West Bank), and the education tax (NIS0.00 versus NIS10.87). Among fees, the above pattern generally does not change; for example in construction permits (NIS4.27, versus NIS 17.04). There is, however, one relatively marginal exception in fees, - for vehicle licensing/registration fees (NIS17.89 in Gaza, versus NIS13.92 in the West Bank). In general, it may be argued that the differences in the structure of per capita revenues of the Gaza municipalities, in comparison to the West Bank municipalities, are more attributable to differences in ability to contribute by their residents, rather than due to the few differences in their revenue sources. Municipal Financial Situation There is no clarity regarding the current municipal financial situation, let alone consensus on policy direction and future steps. On the one hand there is the view that (i) most municipalities financial situation, with the exception of those in the Gaza Strip, is rather stable; in fact, many of them close their yearly operations with budgetary operational surpluses in their current accounts. On the other hand, there is the view that (ii) most municipalities are facing a difficult financial situation, as demonstrated by significant deficits in their operating budgets. Furthermore, it is argued that (iii) part of the reason for the financial difficulties is the lack of municipal autonomy to decide both their revenues and their operating expenditures, particularly regarding municipal employees salaries. The empirical results on the above two practically opposite views and the main municipal financial issues are summarized below. How do expenditures and revenues for the main services compare to one another? Based on the empirical evidence of executed revenues and expenditures, comparison of the average per capita revenue with the average per capita expenditure suggests that for services such as electricity and water the current average revenue is much higher than the average expenditure. For example, in FY 08, the per capita revenue from electricity (NIS ) was roughly 23% greater than the per capita expenditure (NIS 96.80). Similarly, the per capita revenue for water (NIS 47.39) was about 23.5% higher than the per capita expenditure on water for that year (NIS 38.36). However, there are viii

17 exceptions to this average pattern for both, electricity and water. There are a few municipalities in the West Bank that spend more on the service than they actually collect. Also, in Gaza many municipalities cannot cover the cost of water provision with the revenues that they are able to collect. In contrast, and not surprisingly, the average financial situation for the provision of solid-waste collection and disposal shows a very large operational deficit (-73.86%). Specifically, the per capita expenditure in refuse collection (NIS 36.92) is almost three times higher than the per capita revenue (NIS 9.65). The situation regarding refuse collection generally is more critical among the Gaza municipalities, since they have much lower per capita revenue (NIS3.99). In practice these deficits in specific services are usually financed by general revenue -- from surpluses in other user charges, or through fees, local taxes, or arrears. In contrast to household services that in principle should be financed through user charges, there are several types of physical infrastructure (i.e., internal roads, streets, drainage of rain water, sidewalks, and public parks.) which need to be financed primarily through local taxes. These types of infrastructure are the main municipal public services currently lacking adequate financing sources. Construction Permits and Vehicle Registration Fees generally are not adequate sources of finance for the maintenance of physical infrastructure. In fact, the revenue collected from these two sources is too small, as compared to actual needs. The empirical results in West Bank and Gaza support this argument. By international standards, a typical source of financing the maintenance and rehabilitation of internal roads and streets is the property tax. In West Bank and Gaza, however, the property tax is actually levied in only about 40 percent of municipalities. The municipalities in West Bank and Gaza urgently need adequate local fiscal revenue sources to finance a significant amount of physical infrastructure. For example, about 45% of the municipal roads in West Bank and Gaza are unpaved. In Gaza City, which is the largest urban area in West Bank and Gaza, only 30% of the streets receive regular maintenance. As mentioned above, a property tax would be the most suitable method of financing this much needed building and maintenance of physical infrastructure. Do municipalities have financial autonomy to determine their main revenues and expenditures? Municipalities do not have the financial autonomy to determine, even within some range or limit, on the specific rates for their different revenue sources. User charges, tax rates, and fees need the approval of the PA -- either through the MoLG or the corresponding sectoral authority. ix

18 Furthermore, salaries, which represent about 80 percent of their expenditures, are set by the MoLG. This lack of autonomy in municipal financial management may be compromising, at least to some extent, financial accountability and performance in service delivery. Is there a balance between expenditure functions and revenue sources? Though legally all municipalities have the same expenditure functions (or, at least, are entitled to provide the same set of services), they do not have access to the same local revenue sources. For instance, the property tax is available to only 29 municipalities in the West Bank, while the education tax, which is primarily based on property tax assessments, is also limited to only certain municipalities. As such, it may be concluded that there is a horizontal fiscal imbalance across municipalities, between the services that they are, at least entitled to provide, and the actual revenue sources available to them. Main Conclusions and Recommendations What should be done to improve service provision? First, a distinction should be made among those services that are supposed to be financed through user charges and those that need to be financed through local taxes, or equivalent charges such as fees. Secondly, adequate user charges and tax levies (such as the property tax) would need to be implemented in all municipalities. However, in order to do this, the unit cost of service provision needs to be estimated on a systematic basis, which would also allow for the monitoring of services expenditure efficiency. The provision of services that should be financed through user charges, such as water, solid waste collection and disposal, and electricity are not the main challenges in West Bank and Gaza. Rather, the main challenges are those services that need to be financed through taxes, such as local physical infrastructure for example, roads, streets, public lighting, and sidewalks. It is, however recognized that the financing of water and solid waste is still difficult, especially in the Gaza Strip, given the current economic conditions. Similarly, waste water treatment generally poses a significant challenge. The goal is of course to ensure cost recovery in those services for which user chargers may be applied, within current affordability constraints. On the other hand, the provision of services that need to be financed through local taxes, such as roads and street maintenance, is particularly difficult since a significant number of municipalities lack the most basic local taxes. Consequently, it is critical to consider the implementation of a property tax, x

19 increasing the municipal share of the vehicle registration fee (given the actual expenditure needs in streets and roads maintenance), and, importantly, a new revenue source such as urban and rural betterment levies. Furthermore, municipal finance should move away from soft-budgetary constraints that discourage local revenue mobilization, which is critical for sustainable financing. It is well worth supporting the efforts of LGs to strengthen their tax structure, financial performance (especially through hard-budgetary constraints as well as through performance incentives), and the local revenue administration and monitoring capacities needed to sustain and upgrade municipal services. Last, but not least important, given the current financial/fiscal situation of most municipalities especially among electricity providers, it seems highly useful to consider the option of implementing a Municipal Fiscal Restructuring Program (MFRP). All municipalities should be eligible to benefit from MFRPs, as these comprise specific ways and means to address a broad range of municipal financial/fiscal issues. As such, the proposed MFRPs appear to be a fairly practical and important approach to consider in future discussions on municipal finance policy and the technical assistance needed for its implementation. xi

20 CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background Several research efforts have been made in the past 3 to broaden knowledge regarding the operations of the municipal sector in West Bank and Gaza. Most of these efforts have been of a general character, and have given only limited attention to the provision of local public services. No previous endeavor has explicitly offered a comprehensive description of the actual services provided and the sources of municipal finance. Considering that local governments face an increasing demand for public services, however, it is important to determine the actual role of municipalities, and their revenue sources for local service provision. About 70 percent of the population of the West Bank and Gaza is urban, spread throughout 132 municipalities. Municipalities predate the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and have historically provided a variety of services such as electricity, water, solid waste management, roads, parks and recreation, slaughterhouses, markets, schools, and health clinics. Prior to FY 00, close to 90 percent of the municipalities budgets came from local revenue collection. However, in the past five years, due to the ongoing conflict and contraction in the economy, municipal budgets have declined by an average of 30 percent. This has created a financial crisis, causing stress on the ability of the municipalities to provide these services. Moreover, the closure of Gaza over the past year led to a near collapse of the municipal sector there; municipalities, providing key services such as water, sewage, solid waste, etc., faced a serious financial crisis. The impoverishment of the population and the near absence of private sector activities imply that not only have municipalities been unable to collect significant revenue from fees for service provision, but they have also been unable to pay their staff salaries. The ability of municipalities to provide basic services has been also severely constrained, particularly in Gaza, by the Israeli restrictions on imports of the spare parts and supplies necessary for the provision of basic services such as 3 This ESW complements the Policy Note of June 29, 2006 (The World Bank, West Bank and Gaza: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Municipal Finance Policy Note, Report No WBG); and the West Bank and Gaza: Intergovernmental and Municipal Finance, Sector Study Report. The World Bank: Washington, D.C., November 2000, which were the first attempt to identify key policy issues on municipal finance in WB&G. 1

21 water and sanitation. This situation has been severely exacerbated by the recent invasion and destruction of institutional, economic, and social infrastructure. 1.2 Objectives The main general objective of this study is to promote a deeper understanding of municipal finance in the West Bank and Gaza including the identification of the key issues that local governments currently face. The paper explores the policy implications associated with its main findings, in order to offer some guidance on policy options for future decision making on municipal policy reforms. As such, this study aims at facilitating the process for a future policy dialogue between the World Bank and the Palestinian Authority (PA)/Ministry of Local Government (MoLG). Furthermore, it is expected that the identification of the main issues, together with their policy implications, may assist the PA/MoLG in the selection of the key areas that could potentially benefit from the World Bank s technical assistance (T.A.) to the MoLG. In particular, this study attempts to contribute the following: (i) (ii) A clear understanding of the actual role municipalities play in the provision of local economic and social services, supported by an examination of their expenditure structure; an analysis of the main revenue sources and the factors that might be contributing to unfunded mandates; and (iii) an evaluation of the current balance between expenditures and revenues aimed primarily at enabling municipalities to cover the costs of the services that they provide. Furthermore, part of the objective is to examine the nature and magnitude of fiscal imbalances across municipalities, based on their executed operating revenue and expenditure budgets, in order to have a deeper understanding of their current fiscal/financial performance. 1.3 Scope of this Study This study addresses the following basic questions: (i) What are de facto the major municipal expenditure responsibilities in both the West Bank and Gaza and how do these responsibilities compare to the law? 2

22 (ii) What are de facto the main revenue sources 4 for municipalities in the West Bank and Gaza, and how do they compare to other municipalities and in respect to current applicable laws? (iii) What are the main constraints preventing growth in municipal revenues in municipalities throughout both the West Bank and Gaza? (iv) What are the main constraints obstructing the improvement of municipal expenditure efficiency? 1.4 Data Sources and Methodology One of the main challenges in carrying out this study has been the lack of data sources on municipal finance. Currently, there are no official publications put out by any Palestinian institution on the municipal revenues and expenditures or indicators on municipal fiscal/financial performance. There is not any official public information either on the municipal services being provided and their unit cost. Similarly, there is no public information on local government finances across different types of municipalities. Considering the objectives and the key questions put forward by this study, as well as the severe data limitations on the municipal sector, this ESW has relied primarily on municipal budgetary information, supported by specific questionnaires sent out to the 132 municipalities. Data was also obtained directly from MoLG and MoF. The methodology, verification of information, data quality, and sampling are explained in Annex 14, which also describes the seven main sources of data collection for the period FY 07 and FY 08. TABLE 1 REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE MUNICIPAL SAMPLE Municipal Demographic Structure Sample of 94 Municipalities Class Population Class # of Mun. % of Mun. % of Pop. # of Mun. % of Mun. I 1,000 to 5, % 3.7% % 69, % II 5,001 to 10, % 16.3% % 292, % III 10,001 to 25, % 17.1% % 302, % IV 25,001 to 50, % 16.7% 9 9.6% 329, % V 50,001 to 75, % 9.8% 2 2.1% 130, % VI 75,001 to 100, % 3.3% 1 1.1% 82, % VII 100,001 and over 4 3.0% 33.1% 3 3.2% 709, % Total % 100% % 1,916, % Source: Elaborated for this report, based on number of responders by population class. Pop. = Population Pop. % of Pop. 4 Main revenue sources refer to both own local revenue collections and central government transfers from local taxes collected on their behalf, as well as discretionary or emergency transfers and capital grants. 3

23 Table 1 above compares the relative weights of all the 132 municipalities with the corresponding relative weights of the sample, for each of the seven population classes, in order to illustrate on the representativeness of this sample. Given the different behavioral patterns that were observed among electricity providers and non-providers, the sample of 94 municipalities was divided into two subsamples to be able to analyze each of these two groups separately. Table 2 below illustrates the breakdown of the number of municipalities in each group. TABLE 2 NUMBER OF PROVIDERS AND NON-PROVIDERS BY PUPULATION CLASS Distribution of the 132 Municipalities by Population Size For Electricity Providers and Non-Providers Pop. Class Population Providers Non. Providers Total I 5000 or less II III IV more than Total Distribution of the Sample of 94 Municipalities by Population Size For Electricity Providers and Non-Providers Pop. Class Population Providers Non. Providers Total I 5000 or less II III IV more than Total Source: Table 1 4

24 CHAPTER II: EXPENDITURES 2.1 Municipal Expenditure Functions According to Law Despite the large variations in population size across municipalities, all of them have been assigned the same responsibilities regarding service provision. These current legal functions were established by the Palestinian National Authority in Article 15 of the Local Councils Law No. (1) of Article 15 refers to the functions, authorities, and powers of the local council. These mandates are grouped into 26 different areas of authority 5. Disaggregating these areas based on the main local services, the legal functions cover 27 services that in practice cover about 28 different functions, listed in Table 3 below. TABLE 3 MUNICIPAL SERVICES ACCORDING TO LAW 1. Town planning 2. Street construction, rehabs, paving, and roads 3. Rain water drainage system* 4. Street names and numbering 5. Sidewalks 6. Street lighting 7. Public transport stands and terminals 8. Water supply 9. Electricity supply 10. Sewer system 11. Waste water treatment 12. Public lavatories 13. Solid waste collection and disposal 14. Solid waste treatment 15. Fruit and vegetable markets 16. Public parks 17. Social assistance programs** 18. Sports facilities 19. Libraries 20. Museums and culture 21. Regulation, control and monitoring*** 22. Cemeteries 23. Schools 24. Health centers 25. Slaughterhouses 26. Fire fighting 5 The entire text of Article 15 is included in Annex 1. 5

25 27. Transit management (traffic lights, signs, meters, and others) 28. Other (the law explicitly allows for other functions) Source: Based on the legal functions, as established in Art. 15 of the PNA LCL of 1997 * These functions are not explicit in the law; however, they are understood to be part of the expenditure responsibilities of the local councils. ** Such as shelter for the homeless, food donations, and other local social programs. *** Regulation, control and monitoring of: public health standards, slaughterhouses, food safety, restaurants, hotels, and public facilities, weight and scales control, craft and industry hazards, clinic and health center standards, street vendors and stands, public transport, animal control, advertisement control, building demolition, lot fencing, etc. 2.2 Adequacy of the Assignment of Local Functions The local government functions, as established by law, are fairly comprehensive. They include most of the services typically deemed as municipal. From a normative viewpoint, most of the current functions have inherent benefits which may be characterized as local in their own nature. As such, the decision-making process regarding the provision and financing of these services should, in principle, be the responsibility of the local governments since local responsibility would most likely enhance economic efficiency and interpersonal equity in access to local service provision. However, there appear to be some exceptions regarding the intrinsic benefits of these local functions. It could be argued that some of their benefits spill across municipal boundaries. As such, the benefit principle suggests the importance of actual financing coming from central government sources in order to achieve the goals of economic efficiency in resource allocation, as well as inter-jurisdictional fiscal equity. This is the case, for instance, for the actual benefits of schools, health centers, and social assistance programs currently being financed by the PA. These services are of national interest given the inter-jurisdictional nature of their benefits. However, as it appears from the municipal functions listed in Table 3 above, the law also allows the local governments to contribute to some of these programs, and in practice a limited number of local governments do in very small amounts as will be illustrated below. 2.3 Municipal Expenditure Functions in Practice This section attempts to identify not only which services municipalities actually provide, but aims at developing a classification of LGs based on service provision and population size. This classification is expected to assist the PA, 6