DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN ASIA AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (PPPs)

Transcription

1 Washington DC Development Forum Brown Bag Lunch Series No. 239 Tuesday, JICA Office DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN ASIA AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (PPPs) Toshiro NISHIZAWA, Professor Graduate School of Public Policy The University of Tokyo

2 Asian economies have shown a relatively robust growth performance. % Developing Asia Emerging market and developing economies Advanced economies Source: IMF, WEO Database. Toshiro Nishizawa 2

3 Per capita income grew as well. 12,000 Int'l dollars 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 Thailand China Indonesia Vietnam 0 Source: IMF, WEO Database. Toshiro Nishizawa 3

4 However, there are signs of slowing economic growth in Asia... % Projections after 2014 Developing Asia Emerging market and developing economies Advanced economies Source: IMF, WEO Database. Toshiro Nishizawa 4

5 Concerns about the middle-income trap are emerging. (An excerpt from the concept note prepared by the Government of Indonesia for the international seminar "Avoiding the Middle-Income Trap" organized on December in Nusa Dua, Bali) Toshiro Nishizawa 5

6 How should we interpret a change in the savings-investment balance after the Asian Financial Crisis? % of GDP Gross national savings in developing Asia Investment in developing Asia Gross national savings in emerging market and developing economies Investment in emerging market and developing economies Source: IMF, WEO Database. Toshiro Nishizawa 6

7 Is investment in "capital" sufficient? Probably not, but why? Domestic financial intermediaries are still not well developed for longer term investments. Perhaps not only in physical capital, but also in human capital to strengthen institutions. Therefore, How to enhance "development finance" remains a challenge. Toshiro Nishizawa 7

8 How could we define "development finance"? "financing from domestic and external sources, both public and private, for investment serving development purposes in developing countries" Toshiro Nishizawa 8

9 How could we define "development finance"? (continued) investment in hard infrastructure with risks difficult for the private sector to bear alone investment in soft infrastructure (e.g., technology transfer, institutional capacity building), not likely feasible without public sector involvement investment in hard and soft infrastructure (hybrid type) "investment in developing countries with a public good nature" Toshiro Nishizawa 9

10 Changing sources and nature of development finance in Asia The excess of savings over investment is a distinctive feature of the Asian economies during the last decade. In this setting, policymakers should find ways to mobilize domestic savings for investment within the national boundaries. Toshiro Nishizawa 10

11 Changing sources and nature of development finance in Asia (continued) What about external sources... the continued dominance of foreign direct investment (FDI) the volatile and procyclical nature of portfolio flows and bank lending a relatively small share of official flows Toshiro Nishizawa 11

12 Changing sources and nature of development finance in Asia (continued) Billions of dollars Toshiro Nishizawa Direct investment, net Private portfolio flows, net Other private financial flows, net Official flows, net Change in reserves Source: IMF, WEO Database. 12

13 Changing sources and nature of development finance in Asia (continued) % Net ODA received in percent of gross capital formation, East Asia & Pacific (developing countries) Source: World Bank Open Data. Toshiro Nishizawa 13

14 Changing sources and nature of development finance in Asia (continued) Most evident in East Asia and the Pacific are: the mainstreaming of private sources of finance from abroad a diminishing share of official financial flows from abroad and, AGAIN, the emergence of domestic resources potentially available for development purposes Toshiro Nishizawa 14

15 Changing sources and nature of development finance in Asia (continued) As a consequence, one of the policy challenges in developing Asia now is the effective use of public sources of finance, both domestic and external, as a catalyst for mobilizing private sources of finance into investment for development purposes. Toshiro Nishizawa 15

16 A key question would be... What are the respective roles of the public and private sectors for enhancing the effectiveness of development finance in Asia? the key to success is... "incentive design and risk mitigation" Toshiro Nishizawa 16

17 Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) as a typical example Toshiro Nishizawa 17

18 Why are governments willing to promote PPPs? to seek efficiency gains to fill public sector funding gaps Despite the improved fiscal conditions, for longer-term public investments, the public sector is faced with institutional or structural constraints, resulting in a limited share of investment spending. Toshiro Nishizawa 18

19 Nature and potential benefits of PPPs Toshiro Nishizawa 19

20 What is the basic nature of PPPs? PPPs are a long-term contractual arrangement between a public sector procurer and private parties, typically by means of the project company created by private sector equity investors to undertake the activity defined in the contract. Toshiro Nishizawa 20

21 What is the basic nature of PPPs? (continued) This arrangement also involves: contracts with subcontractors to build, operate, and maintain the facility, and credit agreements with lenders to finance a PPP project (or project bonds, still to a limited extent). Toshiro Nishizawa 21

22 Why do PPPs need many contracts between various parties? The core task of structuring a PPP project is to reconcile the interests of various parties from the private and public sectors (i.e., investors, lenders, contractors, the government and other related entities), or in other words, PPPs are a risk sharing arrangement among various parties from the private and public sectors. Agreements creating enforceable obligations are needed. Toshiro Nishizawa 22

23 How and why are risks shared among private and public parties? In a PPP project, the public authority specifies the requirements of public services to be provided by the facility, but leaves the private sector to decide how to meet these specific requirements. Therefore, risks are transferred to the private parties. One of the potential benefits of PPPs is encouraging the public sector to identify project risks and consider risk transfer. Toshiro Nishizawa 23

24 How and why are risks shared among private and public parties? (continued) Private sector investors and lenders involved in a PPP project have capital at risk, and therefore a greater financial incentive to ensure that the service is provided as required in the contract. Moreover, lenders may provide benefits through independent due diligence in order to ensure that the project is viable and that all obligations in a contract can be safely fulfilled. Toshiro Nishizawa 24

25 But, are they always in conformity with each other? Public interests versus private interests, and inevitable contingencies Toshiro Nishizawa 25

26 Could the inherent conflict between public and private sector interests be compromised, most notably in price setting? The government under political and social pressures tends to prefer reduced prices. On the other hand, private sector investors pursue sufficient cash flows by setting prices high enough to ensure that the project is commercially viable and to secure higher equity returns. Toshiro Nishizawa 26

27 How could they fill the gap? Subsidies, financing, or guarantee provided by the government are likely options. Toshiro Nishizawa 27

28 Are private sector parties always comfortable with government action? Private sector parties may not be certain that the government is financially capable of and committed to ensuring the soundness of public utilities or maintaining conducive policy and regulatory environments. political risk Toshiro Nishizawa 28

29 Are private sector parties always comfortable with government action? (continued) If perceived risks are large, private sector parties ask for additional premium for taking such risks. Therefore, the commercial viability of PPP projects depends, to a large extent, on government capacity, commitment, and policy. But, in reality, PPPs may be promoted for shortterm political advantage without firmly establishing government capacity, commitment, and policy. Toshiro Nishizawa 29

30 Could a risk be borne by the party who can manage that particular risk with least cost? A PPP contract, as a typical incomplete contract, cannot provide for all possible future eventualities, and even worse with infrastructure investment because the longer the term of the contract, the more difficult to provide for unforeseeable circumstances. Toshiro Nishizawa 30

31 What would be the likely consequences? The inherent conflict between the public and private sectors as well as the inevitable contingencies could entail risks for the government to assume excessive fiscal burden through subsidies or in the form of contingent liabilities. Ironically though, the growing popularity of PPPs is due to public sector fiscal constraints. Toshiro Nishizawa 31

32 What are the pitfalls? For financing PPPs, the bigger the perceived risks for the private sector, the higher the costs incurred on the government or eventually on taxpayers. Mitigation measures can help reduce perceived risks. However, without removing the root causes of risks perceived by the private sector, either the government or users will eventually have to bear the cost that private sector parties require for their risk assumption. Toshiro Nishizawa 32

33 What are the pitfalls? (continued) Also important is the management of government contingent liabilities. PPPs may entail significant fiscal risks arising from bypassing spending controls and moving public investment off the budget and debt off the government balance sheet. Toshiro Nishizawa 33

34 Are PPPs a panacea? PPPs sound promising, but are in reality very complex and most likely costly. Risk allocations are challenging because of the public nature of infrastructure services provision and inherent uncertainties over the long term. PPPs are clearly not a panacea. Toshiro Nishizawa 34

35 Then, how could we make the most of PPPs? Incentive design and risk mitigation Toshiro Nishizawa 35

36 How could we attract private sources of finance for infrastructure investment? In an effort to attract private financing for infrastructure investment, we should avoid what is generally appealing, but not commercially viable. The key to success is interim risk mitigation measures and incentive design more fundamentally, rather than heralding elusive benefits brought about by private sector participation. Toshiro Nishizawa 36

37 How could we attract private sources of finance for infrastructure investment? (continued) Private sector parties need to be convinced that the government is financially capable of and committed to ensuring the soundness of public utilities or maintaining conducive policy and regulatory environments. Another caveat is that risk mitigation or any public support to correct market failure should be designed to avoid moral hazard on both the public and private sector sides. Toshiro Nishizawa 37

38 Washington DC Development Forum Brown Bag Lunch Series No. 239 DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN ASIA AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (PPPs) Thank you. Toshiro NISHIZAWA, Professor Graduate School of Public Policy The University of Tokyo