Optimal Public Debt with Life Cycle Motives
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1 Optimal Public Debt with Life Cycle Motives William Peterman Federal Reserve Board Erick Sager Bureau of Labor Statistics QSPS May 20, 2016 **The views herein are the authors and not necessarily those of the BLS, US DOL, Board of Governors or their staffs.
2 Motivation Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 1 / 66 Q: What level of debt should the Government hold? Government Debt Welfare Costs: Crowds out capital lower output Financed by distortionary taxes Welfare Benefits (financial liquidity): return to savings reduces cost of holding precautionary savings Aiyagari & McGrattan (1998) Incomplete markets, infinitely lived Optimal debt = 2 3 of output Ignores life cycle Agents transition through different phases of life cycle
3 Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 2 / 66 Intro Model Calibration Results Conclusion This Paper Question: What is optimal level of gov t debt in life cycle model? Effect of Life Cycle on Optimal Pubic Debt Large effect on optimal public debt Life cycle model: savings = 160% of output Infinitely lived agent model: debt = 87% of output Welfare of adopting misspecified optimal tax policy: CEV = 3.5% Different policies due to different phases of life cycle
4 Mechanism: Example (I) Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 3 / 66 Accumulation Stationary Phase Decumulation Consumption Savings Hours Age Life cycle all three phases; Infinitely lived only one phase Changing prices has different effects
5 Mechanism: Example (II) Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 4 / 66 Affect of Gov t Debt on Factor Prices: Decreases Government Debt (increases Gov t. savings) Crowds in Productive Capital Interest rate Wage Infinitely Lived Agent Model Only stationary phase Lower interest rate decreases liquidity Life Cycle Model Accumulation, Stationary, Decumulation Phases Higher wage more accommodative during accumulation phase
6 Literature Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 5 / 66 Effects of government debt with incomplete markets 1. Steady State Aiyagari & McGrattan (1998) - optimal debt large Floden (2001) - if transfers below optimal then gov t debt Dyrda & Pedroni (2015) - if taxes optimized then less debt optimal Winter & Roehrs (2015) - skewed wealth leads to gov t savings being optimal 2. Transition Dydra & Pedron (2015); Winter and Roehrs (2015); Desbonnet & Weitzenblum (2012): Considerable welfare costs in transition Previous analysis of question done with infinitely lived agent model
7 Outline Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 6 / Introduction 2. Life cycle Model with Public Debt 3. Calibration 4. Results 5. Conclusion
8 Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 7 / 66 Life cycle Model with Public Debt
9 Overview of Model Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 8 / 66 General Equilibrium incomplete markets model Overlapping generations of heterogenous agents Idiosyncratic uninsurable shocks: Agent s labor productivity Unemployment spells Mortality Labor is supplied elastically Agents choose when to retire Social Security and UI programs modeled similar to U.S.
10 Production Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 9 / 66 Representative Firm: Large number of firms Sell consumption good Perfectly competitive product market Technology: Cobb-Douglas: Y = K ζ L 1 ζ No aggregate uncertainty Resource Constraint: C + (K (1 δ)k) + G = Y
11 Demographics Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 10 / 66 J overlapping generations s j probability of living to j + 1 given one is alive in j Remaining assets are accidental bequests (T r t ). If still alive agents die with certainty at age J Agents retire at endogenously determined age (J ret ), irreversible J ret [J ret, J ret ] Population growth = g n
12 Labor Earnings (I) Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 11 / 66 Earnings: y ij = we ij h ij (1 h ij ) Labor productivity, e ij Choice of hours, h ij [0, 1] Unemployment shocks, h ij Labor Productivity: log(e ij ) = θ j + α i + ɛ ij + ν ij Age-profile: {θ j } J ret j=1 Idiosyncratic type: α i iid N (0, σ 2 α) Transitory shock: ɛ ij iid N (0, σ 2 ɛ ) Persistent shock: ν ij+1 = ρν ij + η ij+1 η ij+1 iid N (0, σ 2 ν) v i1 = 0
13 Labor Earnings (II) Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 12 / 66 Earnings: y ij = we ij h ij (1 h ij ) Labor productivity, e ij Choice of hours, h ij [0, 1] Unemployment shocks, h ij Unemployment Shock: h i,j Fraction of period unemployed Either 0 or d j Probability of non zero: p j Probability and duration are age specific Receive unemployment benefits b ui (we ij )
14 Asset Markets Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 13 / 66 Incomplete Asset Markets: Incomplete w.r.t. idiosyncratic productivity risk, unemployment risk, mortality risk Agents save using non-contingent bond, a 0 Before tax rate of return, r Market Clearing: A = K + B Supply = Aggregate Savings Demand = Productive Capital (K) + Gov t Debt (B)
15 Government Policy Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 14 / 66 Budget Constraint: G + UI + rb = (B B) + Υ y 1. G: Consumes in an unproductive sector 2. UI: Pays insurance when unemployed 3. B: Borrows or saves at interest r 4. Υ y : Finances with progressive income taxation Self Financing Programs: 5. Runs Social Security Program 6. Distributes accidental bequests
16 Social Security Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 15 / 66 Overview: Finances SS with a flat tax on labor income τ ss Half payed by employer (up to cap) Pays benefit b ss i Detail based on Past income AIME: x i Age of retirement: J ret
17 Competitive Equilibrium Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 16 / Agents optimize utility s.t. budget constraint 2. Prices set by marginal product of capital and labor 3. Social Security budget clears 4. General Government budget clears 5. Capital and labor market clear 6. Stationary distribution of individuals over state space Accounting for GDP growth: g Dynamic Programming
18 Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 17 / 66 Calibration
19 Firm Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 18 / 66 Production: Y = K ζ N 1 ζ Notation Parameter Value Source Capital Share ζ.36 CKK I Depreciation δ.0833 Y = 25.5% Growth g 0.02
20 Demographics Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 19 / 66 Agents enter the model at age 20 s j - Bell and Miller (2002) Remaining agents die with certainty age 100(J) Population growth: g n = 1.1%
21 Idiosyncratic Labor Productivity Labor Productivity: log(e ij ) = θ j + α i + ν ij + ɛ ij Notation Parameter Value Source Persistence Shock σν Kaplan (2012) Persistence ρ Kaplan (2012) Ability σα Kaplan (2012) Transitory Shock σɛ Kaplan (2012) Age Profile {θ j } J ret j=1 Kaplan (2012) Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 20 / 66
22 Unemployment Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 21 / 66 Weeks 22 Unemployment Rates and Duration by Age (March CPS, ) Pct 16% Average Unemployment Duration 14% 12% 10% 16 8% 14 6% 4% 12 Unemployment Rate (right axis) 2% Age 0%
23 Unemployment Insurance Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 22 / 66 Pct 2 Weekly UI Benefit Replacement Rate (March CPS: ) Pct Average log(weekly Earnings) Weekly Replacement Rate log(weekly Earnings) Base Benefit: b ui (we) = rr(we)we h average h Replacement rate: rr(we) = φ ui,0 ln(we) φui,1 b ui [.13 avg. earnings h, 1.1 avg. earnings h]
24 Preferences Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 23 / 66 Preferences: u(c) + v(h, h) = c1 γ 1 γ χ 1 ((1 h)ξ h) 1+ 1 σ 1+ 1 σ χ 2 1(j < J ret ) Notation Parameter Value Source K Conditional Discount β 1.0 Y = 2.7 Risk aversion γ 2.2 Kaplan (2012) Frisch Elasticity σ 0.41 Kaplan (2012) Utility during unemployment ξ 0 Kaplan (2012) Disutility to Labor χ Avg. h j = 1 3 Fixed Cost to Working χ % retire by J nr
25 Government Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 24 / 66 Income tax function: T (ỹ t ; τ 0, τ 1, τ 2 ) = τ 0 (ỹ t (ỹ t τ 1 + τ 2 ) 1 τ 1 ) Notation Parameter Value Source Avg. Tax τ Gouveia & Strauss (1994) Progressiveness τ Gouveia & Strauss (1994) Progressiveness τ Balance budget Gov t Consumption G Debt to GDP Y 15.5% Data B Y 2 3 Aiyagari & McGrattan (1998) UI φ ui, March CPS UI φ ui, March CPS Social Security
26 Results Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 25 / 66 Outline: 1. Illustrative Example 2. Social Welfare Function 3. Optimal Policy 4. Welfare Effects 5. Decompose Mechanisms 6. Transfer Programs & Borrowing Constraints 7. Sensitivity to Social Welfare Function
27 Illustrative Example Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 26 / 66 Accumulation Stationary Phase Decumulation Infinitely lived: only stationary Life cycle: three phases Consumption Savings Hours Age
28 Accumulation Phase Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 27 / 66 Accumulation Stationary Phase Decumulation Accumulating assets Labor income more important Consumption Savings Hours Age
29 Stationary Phase Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 28 / 66 Accumulation Stationary Phase Decumulation Consumption Savings Hours Age May not exist (shorter) in life cycle model Only phase in infinitely lived
30 Effect of Government Debt Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 29 / 66 Comparative Static: Holding less debt Less crowd-out more productive capital Higher wage, w = (1 α)(k/l) α Lower interest rate r = α(k/l) α 1 δ During accumulation phase: Labor earnings is majority of income Higher wage increases income Life cycle only During stationary phase: Lower interest rate decreases interest income Accumulate fewer total assets (less liquid) Less emphasis in life cycle model
31 Computational Experiment Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 30 / 66 Choose B to maximize social welfare function: S(v, λ) max B E 0v 0 (a, ɛ, x; B) (1) Utilitarian SWF: maximizing expected utility of newborn Adjust taxes to clear budgets τ ss to satisfy Social Security budget τ 0 to clear government general budget (G held fixed)
32 Experiment 1 Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 31 / 66 Experiment 1: Optimal Policy Compute optimal policy in life cycle model Compute optimal policy in infinitely lived agent analogue
33 Experiment 1: Optimal Policy Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 32 / 66 Welfare (normalized to 1 at maximum) Life Cycle Infinitely Lived Optimal Policy: Government Savings (% of Output) Life cycle - savings = 160% of output Infinitely lived - debt = 87% of output
34 Welfare Decomposition Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 33 / 66 Experiment 2: Welfare Decomposition Consumption equivalence (CEV) Optimal (160% savings) vs optimal from infinitely lived (87% debt) Decompose into: 1. Level effect: difference in aggregate consumption 2. Insurance effect: difference in volatility of consumption paths 3. Redistribution effect: difference in cross-sectional spread 4. Labor effect: difference in consumption-labor substitution Detail
35 Welfare Decomposition Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 34 / 66 Welfare Decomposition, ex ante CEV (% Change) = 3.47 % Levels Effect = 5.62 % Insurance Effect = % Redistribution Effect = 0.14 % Labor Disutility Effect = % Optimal policy has strong positive Levels Effect Optimal policy somewhat mitigated by labor disutility Benchmark
36 Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 35 / 66 Welfare Decomposition by Age (Weighted) 30 CEV Levels 20 Insurance Redistribution Labor Age Level Effect: Higher wages more consumption early Lower r less consumption later, work longer Benchmark
37 The Effect on Life Cycle Profiles Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 36 / 66 Hours Profile Savings Profile Consumption Profile Misspecified Optimal Age Misspecified Optimal Age Misspecified Optimal Age Optimal policy: More government savings, wage, r
38 Experiment 3 Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 37 / 66 Decompose the Effect of Life Cycle Features: Sequentially remove life cycle features 1. Age-varying aspects 2. Demographics 3. Endowment Recalibrate each model Calculate optimal policy
39 Models Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 38 / 66 Less Less Less Age- Mortality Pop. Extend Eliminate Inf. Bench. Spec. Risk Growth Life Accum. Lived I II III IV V Retirement Yes No No No No No No Soc. Sec Yes No No No No No No Age H.C. Yes No No No No No No Age Unemp Yes No No No No No No Mort. Risk Yes Yes No No No No No Pop. Growth Yes Yes Yes No No No No Life Length Infinite Save Endow Avg. IV Dist. Age-secific I Demographics II-IV Endowment V
40 Optimal Policy (Age-specific) Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 39 / 66 Less Less Less Age- Mortality Pop. Extend Eliminate Inf. Bench. Spec. Risk Growth Life Accum. Lived I II III IV V Optimal (% of GDP) 160% 173% 287% 307% 360% -100% -87% Retirement Yes No No No No No No Soc. Sec Yes No No No No No No Age H.C. Yes No No No No No No Age Unemp Yes No No No No No No Mort. Risk Yes Yes No No No No No Pop. Growth Yes Yes Yes No No No No Life Length Infinite Save Endow Avg. IV Dist. optimal savings because work throughout whole life
41 Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 40 / 66 Intro Model Calibration Results Conclusion Life cycle Profiles Labor Profiles Benchmark (I) Less: Age Specific Savings Profiles Benchmark (I) Less: Age Specific Age Competing effects on optimal policy Wage more important Less building time Age
42 Optimal Policy (Demographics II) Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 41 / 66 Less Less Less Age- Mortality Pop. Extend Eliminate Inf. Bench. Spec. Risk Growth Life Accum. Lived I II III IV V Optimal (% of GDP) 160% 173% 287% 307% 360% -100% -87% Retirement Yes No No No No No No Soc. Sec Yes No No No No No No Age H.C. Yes No No No No No No Age Unemp Yes No No No No No No Mort. Risk Yes Yes No No No No No Pop. Growth Yes Yes Yes No No No No Life Length Infinite Save Endow Avg. IV Dist. optimal savings because agents live to older age
43 Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 42 / 66 Intro Model Calibration Results Conclusion Savings Profiles 8 7 Savings Profiles (I) Less: Age Specific (II) Less: Mortality Age Removing mortality lengthens accumulation phase
44 Optimal Policy (Demographics III) Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 43 / 66 Less Less Less Age- Mortality Pop. Extend Eliminate Inf. Bench. Spec. Risk Growth Life Accum. Lived I II III IV V Optimal (% of GDP) 160% 173% 287% 307% 360% -100% -87% Retirement Yes No No No No No No Soc. Sec Yes No No No No No No Age H.C. Yes No No No No No No Age Unemp Yes No No No No No No Mort. Risk Yes Yes No No No No No Pop. Growth Yes Yes Yes No No No No Life Length Infinite Save Endow Avg. IV Dist. optimal savings: more old agents affects aggregate dynamics
45 Increased Population of Old Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 44 / 66 Elasticity of Private Savings wrt Government Savings Model II Model III Young are more responsive to interest rates changes Model III compared to II: Fewer young agents Government savings crowds out less private savings Public saving is more productive Government saves more
46 Optimal Policy (Demographics IV) Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 45 / 66 Less Less Less Age- Mortality Pop. Extend Eliminate Inf. Bench. Spec. Risk Growth Life Accum. Lived I II III IV V Optimal (% of GDP) 160% 173% 287% 307% 360% -100% -87% Retirement Yes No No No No No No Soc. Sec Yes No No No No No No Age H.C. Yes No No No No No No Age Unemp Yes No No No No No No Mort. Risk Yes Yes No No No No No Pop. Growth Yes Yes Yes No No No No Life Length Infinite Save Endow Avg. IV Dist. optimal savings: extend building period
47 Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 46 / 66 Intro Model Calibration Results Conclusion Savings Profiles 8 7 Savings Profiles (III) Less: Population Growth (IV) Extended Life Age Lengthens accumulation phase
48 Optimal Policy (Endowment) Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 47 / 66 Less Less Less Age- Mortality Pop. Extend Eliminate Inf. Bench. Spec. Risk Growth Life Accum. Lived I II III IV V Optimal (% of GDP) 160% 173% 287% 307% 360% -100% -87% Retirement Yes No No No No No No Soc. Sec Yes No No No No No No Age H.C. Yes No No No No No No Age Unemp Yes No No No No No No Mort. Risk Yes Yes No No No No No Pop. Growth Yes Yes Yes No No No No Life Length Infinite Save Endow Avg. IV Dist. Eliminate building phase Optimal to hold debt
49 Takeaways Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 48 / 66 Why savings optimal in life cycle and debt in infinitely lived? In infinitely lived no accumulation phase Link between stationary phase (endowment) and gov t savings/debt Less gov t savings increases agents liquidity In life cycle agents experience an accumulation phase More public savings increases wage Particularly helpful during accumulation phase Liquidity not affected until stationary phase
50 Experiments 4 & 5 Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 49 / 66 (4) Interactions With Government Transfers Remove UI and solve for optimal Remove Social Security and solve for optimal Recalibrate each model Very small effect on optimal debt (5) Interaction With Borrowing Constraint Allow for individual borrowing, ad hoc constraint Optimal public savings increases from 160% to 220% Precautionary savings less important when borrowing allowed
51 Experiment 6 Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 50 / 66 Social Welfare Criteria We use ex ante Utilitarian social welfare function Equivalent to welfare weight of 1 for newborn and 0 for others What if put different weight on cohorts?
52 Welfare weights Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 51 / 66 Allow for welfare weights on each generation {α j } J j=20 : ( J J j α j E 0 [v j (a j, ɛ j, x j )] = α t β j t µ j )E j [U j (c j, h j, J j )] j=20 j=20 t=20 We assumed α j=20 = 1 and α = 0 for other j
53 Illustrative example Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 52 / 66 What is relationship between cohorts weights and optimal policy? Assuming ˆβ j µ j j t=20 α tβ j t µ j can rewrite: S ˆβ(v, λ) = max B J j=20 ˆβ j ( µ j E j [U j cj, h j, J j ; v j ( ; B) ) ] λ j ( ; B) Allows us to reweight each age s stream Demonstrates effect of different weights Larger ˆβ more weight on older generations
54 Effect of Cohort Weights Government Savings (% of Output) Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 53 / Optimal Government Policy ^- weights on older less savings (more debt) optimal Putting more weight on ages after building phase
55 Alternative Criteria Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 54 / 66 SWF=total expected future utility from population α j = 1 j J α j E 0 [v j (a j, ɛ j, x j )] j=20
56 Equally Weight Population Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 55 / 66 Welfare (normalized to 1 at maximum) Utilitarian: Newborn Utilitarian: Current Population Government Savings (% of Output) Examine population average expected future utility Optimal debt is 100% of GDP
57 Conclusion Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 56 / 66 Optimal debt policy is different in life cycle model Instead holding debt optimal for government to save Facilitates accumulation phase Stationary phase less important Large welfare consequences to ignoring life cycle model Overall conclusion not sensitive to gov t transfers or agents allowed some borrowing For optimal debt assuming infinitely lived for tractability has large economic consequences
58 Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 57 / 66 Thank you
59 Optimal Policy (With Endowment Shock) Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 58 / 66 Less Less Less Hetero. Age- Mortality Pop. Extend Savings Savings Bench. Spec. Risk Growth Life Endow. Endow. I II III IV V VI Optimal (% of GDP) 160% 173% 287% 307% 360% 233% 273% Soc. Sec Yes No No No No No No Retirement Yes No No No No No No Age H.C. Yes No No No No No No Age Unemp Yes No No No No No No Mort. Risk Yes Yes No No No No No Pop. Growth Yes Yes Yes No No No No Life Length Endowment Save Endow Avg. IV Dist. Idio. Shock Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Hetero Removing age-specific: competing effects Exposed more periods to idiosyncratic shock No need to accumulate for retirement
60 Social Security Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 59 / 66 Benefit Formula: b ss = [Replacement Rate] x [Past Earnings(x)] (1) Past earnings: x x = y+(j 1)x j if j 35, max{x, y+(t j)x j } if 35 < j < J ret, x if j J ret, (2) Replacement rate (piecewise linear) τ r1 for 0 x R < b 1 τ r2 for b 1 x R < b 2 τ r3 for b 2 x R < b 3 0 for b 3 x R, (3) Retirement Age Credits/Deductions (b ss adjusted s.t.): 64-66: 6.7% reduction per year 62-63: 5% reduction per year 67-70: 8% increase per year Back
61 Dynamic Programming: Worker Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 60 / 66 v j (a, ɛ, x) = max c,a,h s.t. [ u(c, h)] + βsj ɛ π j (ɛ ɛ)v j+1 (a, ɛ, x ) c + a we(ɛ)h(1 h) + (1 + r)(a + T r) T (h, a, ɛ) + b ui(we) h a 0 ε (θ j, α i, ν ij, ɛ ij, h ij)
62 Dynamic Programming: Could Retire Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 61 / 66 Agents could retire (j [J ret, J ret ]) but have not: [ v j (a, ɛ, x) = max u(c, h)]+ βs j ɛ c,a,h,1(j=j ret ) π j (ɛ ɛ)(1(j < J ret)v j+1 (a, ɛ, x ) + (1 1(j < J ret))v ret j+1 (a, x )) s.t. c + a (1 + r)(a + T r) T (a) + b ss(x) if j J ret c + a we(ɛ)h(1 h) + (1 + r)(a + T r) T (h, a, ɛ) + b ui(we) h else a 0
63 Dynamic Programming: Retired Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 62 / 66 vj ret (a, x) = max c,a u(c) + βs j v ret j+1(a, x) s.t. c + a (1 + r)(a + T r) T (a) + b ss(x) a 0 Back
64 Social Security Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 63 / 66 Parameter Value Source κ 1a Year % U.S. SS Program κ 1b Year 4 & 5 5% U.S. SS Program κ 2 8% U.S. SS Program b 1.21 x Avg Earnings Huggett and Parra (2010) b x Avg Earnings Huggett and Parra (2010) b x Avg Earnings Huggett and Parra (2010) τ r1 90% U.S. SS Program τ r2 32% U.S. SS Program τ r3 15% U.S. SS Program τ ss 10.3% Mrkt Clearing j nr 66 Data J ret 62 U.S. SS Program J ret 70 U.S. SS Program Back
65 Decomposition Details Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 64 / 66 Define Welfare: S = S c + S h E 0 J β j 1 s j u (c j ) dλ 1 + E 0 j=1 j=1 J β j 1 s j ϕ (h j ) dλ 1 CEV Decomposition: (1 + CEV ) = (1 + level ) (1 + insure ) (1 + distr ) (1 + hours ) ( S opt S h S c ) 1 1 σ = C opt C C opt / C C opt /C (S opt c /S c) 1 1 σ C opt / C ( S opt ) 1 S h 1 σ Sc opt where: Consumption Equivalent: (1 + CEV ) 1 σ S c + S h = S opt Labor Substitution Effect: (1 + hours ) 1 σ Sc opt Certainty Equivalent: C = j µ j c(a, ε, x)dλ1 Back = S opt c + (S opt h S h )
66 Welfare Decomposition Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 65 / 66 Welfare Decomposition, ex ante CEV (% Change) = 2.33 % Levels Effect = 4.36 % Insurance Effect = % Redistribution Effect = 0.11 % Labor Disutility Effect = % Similar to misspecified Back
67 Peterman and Sager Optimal Debt 66 / 66 Welfare Decomposition by Age (Weighted) 20 CEV 15 Levels Insurance 10 Redistribution Labor Age Level Effect: Higher wages more consumption early Lower r less savings and consumption later Back
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