Foreign Competition and Banking Industry Dynamics: An Application to Mexico
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1 Foreign Competition and Banking Industry Dynamics: An Application to Mexico Dean Corbae Pablo D Erasmo 1 Univ. of Wisconsin FRB Philadelphia June 12, The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the FRB Philadelphia or The Federal Reserve System.
2 Objective We build a general equilibrium model to study the effects of global competition on banking industry dynamics and welfare.
3 Objective We build a general equilibrium model to study the effects of global competition on banking industry dynamics and welfare. We apply the framework to Mexico which underwent major structural changes during 1990 s Question What are the welfare consequences of government policies which promote global competition in highly concentrated banking industries?
4 Outline 1. Brief description of the Mexican experience.
5 Outline 1. Brief description of the Mexican experience. 2. A Dynamic Model of the Banking Industry
6 Outline 1. Brief description of the Mexican experience. 2. A Dynamic Model of the Banking Industry Underlying Static Strategic Model as in Allen & Gale (2000) embedded in a dynamic model of entry and exit as in Ericson & Pakes (1995).
7 Outline 1. Brief description of the Mexican experience. 2. A Dynamic Model of the Banking Industry Underlying Static Strategic Model as in Allen & Gale (2000) embedded in a dynamic model of entry and exit as in Ericson & Pakes (1995). Dynamic equilibrium allows us to examine how policy changes spill over to the rest of the economy and welfare.
8 Outline 1. Brief description of the Mexican experience. 2. A Dynamic Model of the Banking Industry Underlying Static Strategic Model as in Allen & Gale (2000) embedded in a dynamic model of entry and exit as in Ericson & Pakes (1995). Dynamic equilibrium allows us to examine how policy changes spill over to the rest of the economy and welfare. Most quantitative macro models (e.g. Diaz-Gimenez, et. al. (1992)) assume perfect competition & CRS indeterminate size distn.
9 Outline 1. Brief description of the Mexican experience. 2. A Dynamic Model of the Banking Industry Underlying Static Strategic Model as in Allen & Gale (2000) embedded in a dynamic model of entry and exit as in Ericson & Pakes (1995). Dynamic equilibrium allows us to examine how policy changes spill over to the rest of the economy and welfare. Most quantitative macro models (e.g. Diaz-Gimenez, et. al. (1992)) assume perfect competition & CRS indeterminate size distn. 3. Calibration using averages of Mexican bank industry data.
10 Outline 1. Brief description of the Mexican experience. 2. A Dynamic Model of the Banking Industry Underlying Static Strategic Model as in Allen & Gale (2000) embedded in a dynamic model of entry and exit as in Ericson & Pakes (1995). Dynamic equilibrium allows us to examine how policy changes spill over to the rest of the economy and welfare. Most quantitative macro models (e.g. Diaz-Gimenez, et. al. (1992)) assume perfect competition & CRS indeterminate size distn. 3. Calibration using averages of Mexican bank industry data. 4. Tests: Crisis/default - Concentration; Business cycle correlations
11 Outline 1. Brief description of the Mexican experience. 2. A Dynamic Model of the Banking Industry Underlying Static Strategic Model as in Allen & Gale (2000) embedded in a dynamic model of entry and exit as in Ericson & Pakes (1995). Dynamic equilibrium allows us to examine how policy changes spill over to the rest of the economy and welfare. Most quantitative macro models (e.g. Diaz-Gimenez, et. al. (1992)) assume perfect competition & CRS indeterminate size distn. 3. Calibration using averages of Mexican bank industry data. 4. Tests: Crisis/default - Concentration; Business cycle correlations 5. Counterfactual: Foreign Bank Competition ( Υ f ).
12 The Mexican Experience External events and government policy interacted to generate wide swings in market share and ownership structure in Mexico s banking system. In 1982, following an oil price shock which brought on a major economic crisis (GDP declined by 4.7%), Mexico nationalized 58 of its 60 existing banks. The number of commercial banks was reduced to 29 in 1983 and in 1990, when the process of full re-privatization started, only 18 of these remained active. Foreign banks were not allowed to buy Mexican banks with market share greater of 1.5%.
13 The Mexican Experience (cont.) The Mexican tequila crisis in 1994 resulted in a large increase in non-performing loans. Bank insolvency associated with this episode was estimated to cost Mexican taxpayers 19.3% of GDP. The crisis and the start of NAFTA, induced the Mexican government to gradually remove restrictions on foreign participation. Foreign participation rose from 5.5% in 1993 to 55% in 2000 to 80% in 2002.
14 Foreign Bank Participation Loan Assets Foreign Market Share year
15 Model Overview Banks intermediate between unit-measure infinitely lived risk averse households who can deposit at a bank with deposit insurance risk neutral borrowers who demand funds to undertake iid risky projects. By lending to a large number of borrowers, a given bank diversifies risk that any particular household cannot accomplish individually. Simple bank balance sheet (assets=private loans, liablities=deposits+equity). Corbae and D Erasmo (2012) adds securities and bank borrowing. Dynamic strategic (Cournot competition) MPE in the loan market between domestic and foreign banks. A nontrivial size distribution of banks arises out of entry/exit in response to domestic and global shocks.
16 Households Unit mass of infinitely period lived ex-ante identical households Preferences [ ] E β t u(c t ) t=0 Endowed with one unit of a perishable good at the beginning of each period Have access to a risk-free short term storage technology a t 0 with return (1 + r). They can also deposit d t 0 in a bank with return (1 + r d ). There is deposit insurance. Households hold divisible shares of banks S t+1 that are traded at the end of the period at price P t. Households pay lump sum taxes τ t to pay for deposit insurance.
17 Entrepreneurs Unit mass of infinitely period lived ex-ante identical and risk neutral entrepreneurs. Demand one unit bank loans in order to fund a project at start of t. There is inter-period anonymity, so loan contracts are one period long. Borrowers choose the return of the project R t and have limited liability. Borrower chooses R Receive Pay Probability {}}{ Success 1 + z t+1 R t 1 + rt L {}}{ p( R t, z t+1 ) Failure 1 λ 1 λ 1 p(r t, z t+1 ) + Borrowers have an outside option (reservation utility) ω t [ω, ω] drawn at start of t from distribution Ω(ω t ).
18 Stochastic Processes Aggregate domestic technology shocks z t+1 {z c, z b, z g } follow a Markov Process F (z t+1, z η t+1 ) with z c < z b < z g Worldwide shocks η t+1 {η L, η H } also follow a Markov Process, G(η t+1, η t ). Conditional on z t+1, borrower failure is iid across individuals and drawn from p(r t, z t+1 ).
19 Banks Two types of banks θ {n, f} for national and foreign. Banks maximize expected discounted sum of dividends [ ] E M t Dt θ Entry costs to create national and foreign banks are denoted Υ f Υ n 0 Banks serve the domestic loan market. Loans made by bank θ denoted l θ t=0 Bank s feasibility constraint d θ l θ Net and fixed operating costs: (c θ, κ θ ), c θ = c θ + c θ (1 p(r t, z t+1 ))
20 Bank Profits / Dividends-Exit Policies End-of-period profits for bank of type (θ) are: π θ t = { p(r t, z t+1 )(1 + r L t ) + (1 p(r t, z t+1 ))(1 λ) c θ} l θ t (1 + r D )d θ t κ θ. Banks have access to outside funding (or equity financing) at cost ξ θ (x, η t+1 ) per units of funds raised in state η t+1. National banks has no uncertainty about funding cost ξ n (x, η t+1 ) = ξ n (x) and η L < 1 < η H Bank dividends at the end of the period are D θ t = { π θ t if πt θ 0 πt θ (1 + ξ θ ( πt θ, η t+1 )) if πt θ < 0 (1) Banks choose to exit with exit value max{π t, 0} (i.e., limited liab.)
21 Industry State The industry state is denoted µ t = {µ t (n), µ t (f)}, where each element of µ t is a counting measure µ t (θ) corresponding to active banks of type θ Denote aggregate state s = {z, η} Information Timing Def. Equilibrium
22 Independent Model Parameters Parameter Value Target Dep. preferences σ 2.00 standard value Agg. shock in good state z g 1.00 normalization Deposit interest rate (%) r 1.94 cost deposits Net. non-int. exp. f bank c n 2.02 net non-interest expense Net. non-int. exp. n bank c r 2.41 net non-interest expense Functional Forms
23 Internally Consistent Model Parameters Parameter Value Targets Agg. shock in bad state z b 0.95 Default Frequency % Agg. shock in crisis state z c 0.86 Borrower Return % Transition prob. φ b cc 0.67 Std dev. Asset Return Foreign % Transition prob. φ b bc 0.10 Std dev. Asset Return Domestic % Weight agg. shock α 0.92 Asset Return % Success prob. param. b 3.74 Loan return % Volatility borrower s dist. σ ɛ 0.06 Std. Dev. Borrower Return % Success prob. param. ψ 0.94 Dividend / Asset Foreign % Max. reservation value ω 0.24 Dividend / Asset Domestic % Charge-off rate λ 0.20 Charge off Rate % Discount Factor β 0.88 Loan Market Share Foreign % Fixed cost n bank κ n Fixed Cost over Assets Foreign % Fixed cost f bank κ f Fixed Cost over Assets Domestic % External finance param. ζ Loan Interest margin % External finance shock η g 0.30 Avg. Equity issuance Foreign % External finance shock η b 1.05 Avg. Equity issuance Domestic % Entry Cost Foreign Υ f Exit Rate Foreign % Entry Cost National Υ n Exit Rate Domestic % Entry Rate % Note: Middle value of possible set of entry costs.
24 Targeted Moments Moment (%) Data Model Default Frequency % 1 p Borrower Return % pz R Std dev. Asset Return Foreign % Std dev. Asset Return National % Asset Return % D θ /l θ Loan return % pr L (1 p)λ Std. Dev. Borrower Return % Fixed Cost over Assets Foreign % κ f /l f Fixed Cost over Assets National % κ n /l n Charge off Rate % (1 p)λ Loan Market Share Foreign % l f /L s Dividend / Asset Foreign % max{π f, 0}/l f Dividend / Asset National % max{π n, 0}/l n Loan Interest margin % pr L r D Avg. Equity issuance Foreign % max{ π f, 0}/l f Avg. Equity issuance National % max{ π n, 0}/l n Exit Rate Foreign % t xf t /T Exit Rate Domestic % t xn t /T Entry Rate % t θ eθ t / θ µ(θ)
25 Other Moments Moment (%) Data Model Exit Rate % Equity Issuance All Loan Interest Rate % Frequency Equity Issuance all % Frequency Equity Issuance Foreign % Frequency Equity Issuance Domestic % Std Dev Equity Issuance all % Std Dev Equity Issuance Foreign % Std Dev Equity Issuance Domestic % Asset Return Foreign % Asset Return Domestic % Std Dev Asset Return all % Dividend / Asset %
26 Equilibrium Properties: Entry We find an equilibrium where: 1. Foreign Entry: 1.1 If there are no competitors (i.e. µ = {0, 0}), then enter when η = η g (i.e. whenever foreign external funding is cheap), or η = η b and z {z b, z g} (foreign external funding is expensive but Mexico is not in a crisis). 1.2 If there is a domestic competitor (i.e. µ = {0, 1}), then enter when z = z g (i.e. when Mexico is in a boom). 1.3 Do not enter otherwise. 2. Domestic Entry: 2.1 If there are no competitors (i.e. µ = {0, 0}), then enter when η = η g and z = z g (i.e. foreign external funding is cheap but Mexico is in a boom), or η = η b (i.e. foreign external funding is expensive). 2.2 If there is a foreign competitor (i.e. µ = {1, 0}), then enter when z = z g (i.e. when Mexico is in a boom). 2.3 Do not enter otherwise.
27 Equilibrium Properties: Exit We find an equilibrium where: 1. Foreign Exit: 1.1 If the Mexican economy goes into a crisis z = z c from z = z b the foreign bank exits if there is no domestic competitor (i.e. µ = {1, 0}) there is a domestic competitor (i.e. µ = {1, 1}) and η = η b (i.e. financing conditions are more favorable for the competitor) 1.2 Do not exit otherwise. 2. Domestic Exit: 2.1 If the Mexican economy goes into a crisis z = z c from z = z b the domestic bank exits if there is no foreign competitor (i.e. µ = {0, 1}) there is a foreign competitor (i.e. µ = {1, 1}) and η = η g (i.e. financing conditions are more favorable for the competitor) 2.2 Do not exit otherwise. Figure Exit Probability
28 Equilibrium Properties: Risk Taking - Credit 0.25 Loans µ ={1,1} and ηg Loans (µ ={1,0} / µ = {0,1}) and ηg l f (µ,z,η) l n (µ,z,η) Aggregate Shock (z) Aggregate Shock (z) 0.25 Loans µ ={1,1} and ηb Loans (µ ={1,0} / µ = {0,1}) and ηb Aggregate Shock (z) Aggregate Shock (z) Foreign owned banks take on more risk except when competition is high, external funding is cheap and domestic times are bad Credit expansions are stronger when there is foreign bank presence
29 Competition and Industry Evolution Global crisis have a small impact if competition is high (7/8) Domestic crisis induces national bank exit when foreign bank is present (15) Global crisis follow by a domestic crisis induces foreign bank exit (25/26)
30 Strategic Interaction: Amplification Effects Changes in competition amplify business cycle contractions After foreign bank exit, even though local conditions improve, output remains low until there is foreign bank entry
31 Importing a crisis 1.5 output (left axis) z (left axis) η (right axis) 4 output / z 1 2 η Period (t) Global conditions affect evolution of output independent of local conditions Reduction in output when domestic times are good (periods 5/6) Output rises even when domestic conditions improve (period 8)
32 Test: Empirical Studies of Banking Crises, Default and Concentration Dependent Variable Crisis t Default Freq. t Concentration t (0.273) (0.014) Output growth t (0.04) (0.015) Loan Supply Growth t (0.31) (0.0164) R Note: se statistics in parenthesis. As in Beck, et. al. (2003), banking system concentration (HHI) is negatively related to the probability of a banking crisis (consistent with A-G). As in Berger et. al. (2008) we find that concentration is positively related to default frequency (consistent with B-D). Test II: BC Corr.
33 Foreign Bank Competition Counterfactual
34 Allowing Foreign Bank Competition Moment Data Υ f = Benchmark Loan Market Share Foreign % Loan Interest margin % Dividend / Asset Foreign % Dividend / Asset National % Avg. Equity issuance Foreign % Avg. Equity issuance National % Exit Rate Foreign % Exit Rate Domestic % Entry Rate % Default Frequency % Charge off Rate % Output Loan Supply Taxes / Output Less concentrated industry with lower interest rate margins, higher exit rates with banks more exposed to risk and more volatile Lower interest rates lower default frequency and charge off rates Higher output, loan supply but higher taxes as well
35 Foreign Bank Competition: Real Effects Foreign bank competition induces higher output, smaller output contractions due to worsening of domestic conditions and larger credit expansions Volatility of output and loan supply increases (+12.91% and 10.11%)
36 Welfare Consequences Question: What are the welfare consequences of allowing foreign bank competition? z c z b z g η L η H η L η H η L η H f(µ = {0, 1}, z, η) α h (µ = {0, 1}, z, η) α h α e (µ = {0, 1}, z, η) α e α e (µ = {0, 1}, z, η) α e Decomposing Effects: Higher Competition vs Foreign Competition
37 Concluding Remarks We provide a general equilibrium model where national banks coexist in equilibrium with foreign banks with better access to external funding A contribution of our model is that the market structure is endogenous and imperfect competition amplifies the business cycle Analyze the welfare consequences of foreign bank competition and find that this policy change was welfare improving A more competitive environment induces output and aggregate loan supply increase (lower interest rates and default) However, bank exit, taxes and volatility are higher
38
39 Information Only borrowers know the riskiness of the project they choose R, their outside option ω, and their consumption. Project success or failure is verifiable only at a cost c θ All other information is observable. Return
40 Timing At the beginning of period t, 1. Starting from state (µ t, z t, η t ), entrepreneurs draw ω t. 2. Banks θ {n, f} choose how many loans l θ i,t to extend and how many deposits d θ i,t to accept. 3. Borrowers choose whether or not to undertake a project of technology R t. Households choose whether to deposit in a bank d t or to store a t. 4. Shocks z t+1 and η t+1 are realized, as well as idiosyncratic borrower shocks. 5. Banks choose whether to pay dividend/issue equity and continue or exit under limited liability. 6. Entry occurs. 7. Households pay taxes τ t+1 to fund deposit insurance, choose the amount of shares S t+1 and consume. Return
41 Markov Perfect Equilibrium Return A pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) is a set of value functions and decision rules for entrepreneurs, households, and banks, loan interest rates r L, a deposit interest rate r D, an industry state µ, and a tax function τ such that: Given r L, ι(ω, r L, s) v(r L, s) and R(r L, s) are consistent with entrepreneur s optimization. At r D = r, the household deposit participation constraint is satisfied so d + a = 1. At P θ (µ, s, s ) households demand for shares equals supply. Given L d (r L, s), the value of the bank, loan decision rules, exit rules and entry decisions are consistent with bank optimization. The law of motion µ = T (µ) is consistent with bank entry and exit decision rules. The interest rate r L (µ, s) is such that the loan market clears Across all states (µ, z, s, z, s ), taxes cover deposit insurance. The aggregate resource constraint is satisfied and bank discounting is consistent with hh s problem
42 Functional Forms Borrower outside option is distributed uniform [0, ω]. Let y = αz + (1 α)ε e br ψ with ε e N(0, σ 2 ε) We define success to be the event that y > 0, so ( αz p(r, z br ψ ) ) = Φ (1 α) Household preferences: u(c t ) = C1 σ t 1 σ External financing cost ξ n (x, η ) = ξ 1 x and ξ f (x, η ) = η ξ 1 x Transition matrices G(η, η ) and F (z, z, η ) Values Return
43 Transition Matrices Transition global shocks G(η, η ) = Transition when η = η L F (z, z, η L) = Transition when η = η H F (z, z, η H) = η g η b η L η H z c z b z g z c z b z g z c z b z g z c φ b cc 1 φ b cc 0.0 z b φ b bc φ b bc z g Return
44 Exit Probability Exit Prob. µ ={1,1} and ηg foreign domestic Exit Prob. (µ ={1,0} / µ = {0,1}) and ηg Aggregate Shock (z) Aggregate Shock (z) 0.2 Exit Prob. µ ={1,1} and ηb Exit Prob. (µ ={1,0} / µ = {0,1}) and ηb Aggregate Shock (z) Aggregate Shock (z) Banks take on more risk when industry is more concentrated When µ = {1, 1}, foreign banks take on more risk when global conditions are bad Return
45 Business Cycle Correlations Moment Data Benchmark Corr(Y, L s ) Corr(Y, l f ) Corr(Y, l n ) Corr(Y, r L ) Corr(Y, (1 p)) Corr(Y, R) Corr(Y, entry) Corr(Y, exit) Return
46 Decomposing Effects: Higher Competition or Foreign Competition? Question: What are the welfare consequences of allowing foreign bank competition from a domestic banking sector with high competition? z c z b z g η L η H η L η H η L η H α h (µ = {0, 1}, z, η) α h (µ = {1, 0}, z, η) α h (µ = {1, 1}, z, η) α h α e (µ = {0, 1}, z, η) α e (µ = {1, 0}, z, η) α e (µ = {1, 1}, z, η) α e α e (µ = {0, 1}, z, η) α e (µ = {1, 0}, z, η) α e (µ = {1, 1}, z, η) α e Return Moments Industry Evolution
47 Increase in Foreign Bank entry cost Return Υ f = Moment Data One Nat. Two Nat. Benchmark Loan Market Share Foreign % Loan Interest margin % Dividend / Asset Foreign % Dividend / Asset National % Avg. Equity issuance Foreign % Avg. Equity issuance National % Exit Rate Foreign % Exit Rate Domestic % Entry Rate % Default Frequency % Charge off Rate % Output Loan Supply Taxes / Output lower interest rate and margins, higher exit rates with banks more exposed to risk and volatile
48 Foreign Bank Competition Drops in output and credit due to a domestic crisis are more pronounced when there are no foreign banks A global crisis induces a larger drop in output when foreign banks are present but recovery is faster Return
Foreign Competition and Banking Industry Dynamics: An Application to Mexico
Foreign Competition and Banking Industry Dynamics: An Application to Mexico Dean Corbae University of Wisconsin at Madison and NBER Pablo D Erasmo Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia September 8, 2014
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