The Transmission of Monetary Policy through Redistributions and Durable Purchases

Transcription

1 The Transmission of Monetary Policy through Redistributions and Durable Purchases Vincent Sterk and Silvana Tenreyro UCL, LSE September 2015 Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

2 The Monetary Transmission Mechanism Workhorse models of monetary policy: are centred on nominal rigidities (New Keynesian model) Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

3 The Monetary Transmission Mechanism Workhorse models of monetary policy: are centred on nominal rigidities (New Keynesian model) abstract from redistributional e ects (representative agent) Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

4 This paper Study di erent channel of monetary transmission. Simple DSGE model no sticky prices or nominal wages Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

5 This paper Study di erent channel of monetary transmission. Simple DSGE model no sticky prices or nominal wages integrate later Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

6 This paper Study di erent channel of monetary transmission. Simple DSGE model no sticky prices or nominal wages integrate later heterogeneous households Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

7 This paper Study di erent channel of monetary transmission. Simple DSGE model no sticky prices or nominal wages integrate later heterogeneous households parsimonious life-cycle structure Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

8 This paper Study di erent channel of monetary transmission. Simple DSGE model no sticky prices or nominal wages integrate later heterogeneous households parsimonious life-cycle structure government or scal authority: net debtor Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

9 This paper Study di erent channel of monetary transmission. Simple DSGE model no sticky prices or nominal wages integrate later heterogeneous households parsimonious life-cycle structure government or scal authority: net debtor key role for durables Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

10 This paper Study di erent channel of monetary transmission. Simple DSGE model no sticky prices or nominal wages integrate later heterogeneous households parsimonious life-cycle structure government or scal authority: net debtor key role for durables in line with VAR evidence Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

11 This paper Study di erent channel of monetary transmission. Simple DSGE model no sticky prices or nominal wages integrate later heterogeneous households parsimonious life-cycle structure government or scal authority: net debtor key role for durables in line with VAR evidence monetary policy implemented through open market operations Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

12 This paper Study di erent channel of monetary transmission. Simple DSGE model no sticky prices or nominal wages integrate later heterogeneous households parsimonious life-cycle structure government or scal authority: net debtor key role for durables in line with VAR evidence monetary policy implemented through open market operations contrast to helicopter drops Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

13 Monetary policy implementation Open Market Operation (OMO): central bank sells/buys short-term bonds Modern practice Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

14 Monetary policy implementation Open Market Operation (OMO): central bank sells/buys short-term bonds Modern practice more sophisticated OMOs since nancial crisis (e.g., longer-term securities) Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

15 Monetary policy implementation Open Market Operation (OMO): central bank sells/buys short-term bonds Modern practice more sophisticated OMOs since nancial crisis (e.g., longer-term securities) Theoretical literature: irrelevance results found in: Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

16 Monetary policy implementation Open Market Operation (OMO): central bank sells/buys short-term bonds Modern practice more sophisticated OMOs since nancial crisis (e.g., longer-term securities) Theoretical literature: irrelevance results found in: Wallace (1981), Sargent & Smith (1982), Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

17 Monetary policy implementation Open Market Operation (OMO): central bank sells/buys short-term bonds Modern practice more sophisticated OMOs since nancial crisis (e.g., longer-term securities) Theoretical literature: irrelevance results found in: Wallace (1981), Sargent & Smith (1982), Eggertsson & Woodford (2003), Woodford (2011)... Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

18 Monetary policy implementation Open Market Operation (OMO): central bank sells/buys short-term bonds Modern practice more sophisticated OMOs since nancial crisis (e.g., longer-term securities) Theoretical literature: irrelevance results found in: Wallace (1981), Sargent & Smith (1982), Eggertsson & Woodford (2003), Woodford (2011)......but all of the above rule out redistributional e ects Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

19 Monetary policy implementation Open Market Operation (OMO): central bank sells/buys short-term bonds Modern practice more sophisticated OMOs since nancial crisis (e.g., longer-term securities) Theoretical literature: irrelevance results found in: Wallace (1981), Sargent & Smith (1982), Eggertsson & Woodford (2003), Woodford (2011)......but all of the above rule out redistributional e ects Fiscal authorities do not undo the redistributive e ects from MP Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

20 Monetary policy implementation Open Market Operation (OMO): central bank sells/buys short-term bonds Modern practice more sophisticated OMOs since nancial crisis (e.g., longer-term securities) Theoretical literature: irrelevance results found in: Wallace (1981), Sargent & Smith (1982), Eggertsson & Woodford (2003), Woodford (2011)......but all of the above rule out redistributional e ects Fiscal authorities do not undo the redistributive e ects from MP when researchers estimate the transmission mechanisms, these e ects are present... Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

21 The transmission channel in our model - preview Expansionary OMO triggers: an increase in prices, surprise destruction of nominal private wealth Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

22 The transmission channel in our model - preview Expansionary OMO triggers: an increase in prices, surprise destruction of nominal private wealth a negative wealth e ect for households, particularly old Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

23 The transmission channel in our model - preview Expansionary OMO triggers: an increase in prices, surprise destruction of nominal private wealth a negative wealth e ect for households, particularly old increased incentive save for retirement =) lower real interest rate Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

24 The transmission channel in our model - preview Expansionary OMO triggers: an increase in prices, surprise destruction of nominal private wealth a negative wealth e ect for households, particularly old increased incentive save for retirement =) lower real interest rate a substitution towards durables Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

25 The transmission channel in our model - preview Expansionary OMO triggers: an increase in prices, surprise destruction of nominal private wealth a negative wealth e ect for households, particularly old increased incentive save for retirement =) lower real interest rate a substitution towards durables durable boom: increase in employment and output Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

26 The transmission channel in our model - preview Expansionary OMO triggers: an increase in prices, surprise destruction of nominal private wealth a negative wealth e ect for households, particularly old increased incentive save for retirement =) lower real interest rate a substitution towards durables durable boom: increase in employment and output with search and matching frictions: increase in investment in durable matches (employment rises) Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

27 The transmission channel in our model - preview Expansionary OMO triggers: an increase in prices, surprise destruction of nominal private wealth a negative wealth e ect for households, particularly old increased incentive save for retirement =) lower real interest rate a substitution towards durables durable boom: increase in employment and output with search and matching frictions: increase in investment in durable matches (employment rises) reduction in real government debt and persistent increase in central bank revenues Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

28 The transmission channel in our model - preview Expansionary OMO triggers: an increase in prices, surprise destruction of nominal private wealth a negative wealth e ect for households, particularly old increased incentive save for retirement =) lower real interest rate a substitution towards durables durable boom: increase in employment and output with search and matching frictions: increase in investment in durable matches (employment rises) reduction in real government debt and persistent increase in central bank revenues rebated to tax-payers via the Treasury (2-3% of G) Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

29 The transmission channel in our model - preview Expansionary OMO triggers: an increase in prices, surprise destruction of nominal private wealth a negative wealth e ect for households, particularly old increased incentive save for retirement =) lower real interest rate a substitution towards durables durable boom: increase in employment and output with search and matching frictions: increase in investment in durable matches (employment rises) reduction in real government debt and persistent increase in central bank revenues rebated to tax-payers via the Treasury (2-3% of G) breakdown Ricardian Equivalence Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

30 Empirical evidence VectorAutoRegresson Figure: Responses to an expansionary monetary policy shock, identi ed following Gertler and Karadi (2015). Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

31 Model Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

32 Setup Closed economy, overlapping generations. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

33 Setup Closed economy, overlapping generations. 2 life cycle stages (young, old), stochastic ageing (prob. ρ o ) and death (prob. ρ x ), Gertler (1999). Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

34 Setup Closed economy, overlapping generations. 2 life cycle stages (young, old), stochastic ageing (prob. ρ o ) and death (prob. ρ x ), Gertler (1999). Following retirement, immediate death shock may occur. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

35 Setup Closed economy, overlapping generations. 2 life cycle stages (young, old), stochastic ageing (prob. ρ o ) and death (prob. ρ x ), Gertler (1999). Following retirement, immediate death shock may occur. Population size normalized to one. Stationary population: ρ o ν = ρ x (1 ν + ρ o ν) where ν is the fraction of young agents in the population (#newborn=#aging=#dying). Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

36 Setup Young agents supply labor (h t ), old agents are not productive Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

37 Setup Young agents supply labor (h t ), old agents are not productive Agents derive utility from non-durables (c t ), durables (d t ) and money (m t ). No utility from bequests. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

38 Setup Young agents supply labor (h t ), old agents are not productive Agents derive utility from non-durables (c t ), durables (d t ) and money (m t ). No utility from bequests. Agents can also save in bonds (b t ) Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

39 Setup Firms are perfectly competitive, producing durables and non-durables with the same technology y t = h t. They rent labor on an competitive labor market. Pro t maximization implies w t = 1. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

40 Setup Firms are perfectly competitive, producing durables and non-durables with the same technology y t = h t. They rent labor on an competitive labor market. Pro t maximization implies w t = 1. Government consists of a central bank and a Treasury. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

41 Setup Firms are perfectly competitive, producing durables and non-durables with the same technology y t = h t. They rent labor on an competitive labor market. Pro t maximization implies w t = 1. Government consists of a central bank and a Treasury. The treasury makes a transfer τ s t to each household of type s. We denote an agent s life-cycle status by superscript s 2 fn, y, og, with n denoting a newborn young agent, y a pre-existing young agent, and o an old agent. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

42 Setup Firms are perfectly competitive, producing durables and non-durables with the same technology y t = h t. They rent labor on an competitive labor market. Pro t maximization implies w t = 1. Government consists of a central bank and a Treasury. The treasury makes a transfer τ s t to each household of type s. We denote an agent s life-cycle status by superscript s 2 fn, y, og, with n denoting a newborn young agent, y a pre-existing young agent, and o an old agent. Wealth of deceased agents equally distributed among the young. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

43 Old agents Optimization problem old agent (s = o) in real terms: V o (a, Γ) = max U(c, d, m) + β (1 ρ c,d,m,b x ) EV o (a 0, Γ 0 ) s.t. c + d + m + b = a + τ o a 0 (1 δ) d + m (1 + r) b π0 1 + π 0, c, d, m 0, where V o (a, Γ) is the value function, a denotes individual wealth, Γ is the aggregate state and π is the net rate of in ation. Also, β is the agents subjective discount factor, δ is the depreciation rate of durables and E is the conditional expectations operator. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

44 Young agents Optimization problem young agents (s = n, y) V s (a, Γ) = max U(c, d, m) ζ h1+κ c,d,m,b,h 1 + κ + β (1 ρ o ) EV y (a 0, Γ 0 ) +βρ o (1 ρ x ) EV o (a 0, Γ 0 ) s.t. c + d + m + b = a + wh + τ bq + τ s, a 0 (1 δ) d + m (1 + r) b π0 1 + π 0, c, d, m 0, where w is the wage rate and τ bq is a bequest transfer. n the utility function ζ > 0 is a scaling s parameter and κ > 0 determines the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

45 Central Bank The central bank controls the nominal money supply, M t, by conducting open market operations. n particular, the central bank can sell or buy government bonds. We denote the stock of bonds held by the central bank as B cb t. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

46 Central Bank The central bank controls the nominal money supply, M t, by conducting open market operations. n particular, the central bank can sell or buy government bonds. We denote the stock of bonds held by the central bank as B cb t. The use of these open market operations implies that: B cb t B cb t 1 = M t M t 1. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

47 Central Bank The central bank controls the nominal money supply, M t, by conducting open market operations. n particular, the central bank can sell or buy government bonds. We denote the stock of bonds held by the central bank as B cb t. The use of these open market operations implies that: B cb t B cb t 1 = M t M t 1. The central bank transfers its accounting pro t -seigniorage- to the treasury. The remittance, labeled τ cb t, is given by: t = r t 1bt cb π t τ cb Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

48 Central Bank The central bank controls the nominal money supply, M t, by conducting open market operations. n particular, the central bank can sell or buy government bonds. We denote the stock of bonds held by the central bank as B cb t. The use of these open market operations implies that: B cb t B cb t 1 = M t M t 1. The central bank transfers its accounting pro t -seigniorage- to the treasury. The remittance, labeled τ cb t, is given by: t = r t 1bt cb π t τ cb To analyze monetary policy shocks, we assume that M t is driven by an exogenous process subject to stochastic shocks. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

49 Treasury We abstract from government consumption/investment. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

50 Treasury We abstract from government consumption/investment. The treasury runs a balanced budget, but starts o with an initial level of bonds B g t 1 (which will be negative). The treasury s budget constraint in real terms is: r t 1 b g t π t + τ cb t = νρ o τ n t + ν (1 ρ o ) τ y t + (1 ν) τ o t where the total amount of transfers is adjusted to balance the government s budget Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

51 Treasury We abstract from government consumption/investment. The treasury runs a balanced budget, but starts o with an initial level of bonds B g t 1 (which will be negative). The treasury s budget constraint in real terms is: r t 1 b g t π t + τ cb t = νρ o τ n t + ν (1 ρ o ) τ y t + (1 ν) τ o t where the total amount of transfers is adjusted to balance the government s budget Net bene ciary is the government. Key how it redistributes gain. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

52 Treasury Retired agents are assumed not to be subject to transfers/taxes, i.e. we set τ o t = 0. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

53 Treasury Retired agents are assumed not to be subject to transfers/taxes, i.e. we set τ o t = 0. To render the model tractable, we assume that transfers to newborns equal the after tax wealth of pre-existing young agents. This is achieved by setting: a y t + τ y t = τ n t where a y t is the average wealth among pre-existing young agents. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

54 Treasury Retired agents are assumed not to be subject to transfers/taxes, i.e. we set τ o t = 0. To render the model tractable, we assume that transfers to newborns equal the after tax wealth of pre-existing young agents. This is achieved by setting: a y t + τ y t = τ n t where a y t is the average wealth among pre-existing young agents. What arises is a representative young agent. We preserve heterogeneity between old and young agents, as well as heterogeneity among old agents. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

55 Market clearing Market clearing constraints durables and non-durables: c t = νct y + (1 ν) ct o d t = νdt y + (1 ν) dt o, Resource constraint, clearing conditions for money and bond market: Magnitude bequest transfer: c t + d t = νh y t + (1 δ) d t 1, m t = νm y t + (1 ν) m o t, 0 = b g t + b cb t + νb y t + (1 ν) b o t τ bq t = R ρ x i :s=o a i,t di + ρ o ρ x νa y t ν Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

56 Equilibrium De nition. A recursive competitive equilibrium is de ned by policy rules for non-durable consumption, c s (a, Γ), durable consumption, d s (a, Γ), money holdings, m s (a, Γ), bond holdings, b s (a, Γ), labor supply, h s (a, Γ), with s = n, y, o, cb, g, as well as laws of motion for in ation, the nominal interest rate and the real wage, such that households optimize their expected life-time utility subject to their constraints and the law of motion for the aggregate state, the treasury and central banks follow their speci ed policies, the markets for bonds, money, goods and labor clear in every period. The aggregate state Γ includes the value of the monetary policy shock, the distribution of wealth among agents, as well as the initial holdings of assets by households, the treasury and the central bank. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

57 Representative agent version f we set ρ x = 1 old agents are e ectively removed from the model. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

58 Representative agent version f we set ρ x = 1 old agents are e ectively removed from the model. Given the transfers to newborns, the model becomes observationally equivalent to one with an in nitely-lived representative agent with subjective discount factor eβ = β (1 ρ o ). Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

59 Representative agent version f we set ρ x = 1 old agents are e ectively removed from the model. Given the transfers to newborns, the model becomes observationally equivalent to one with an in nitely-lived representative agent with subjective discount factor eβ = β (1 ρ o ). Easy to show that monetary policy becomes neutral with respect to real activity when utility is separable in money and consumption. No wealth e ects (Weil (1991)). Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

60 Monetary neutrality Following arguments similar to Sidrauski (1967) one can show that, provided that money and goods enter the utility function separably, monetary policy does not a ect real outcomes. To show this, consider the representative agent s rst-order conditions for durables, labor supply, and the aggregate resource constraint: U c,t = U d,t + eβ (1 δ) E t U c,t+1 U c,t = ζh κ t c t + d t = h t + (1 δ) d t 1 where U c,t and U d,t are, respectively, the agents marginal utilities with respect to non-durables and durables. Under preference separability, this is a closed dynamic system of 3 equations and 3 endogenous variables. No nominal variables enter this system. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

61 Adding search and matching frictions Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides style matching friction. Young workers live in representative family, as in Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996). Workers are born without a job, lose job with xed probability. Search for jobs when unemployed, accept any job o er in equilibrium. ) shut o labour supply chanel. Employment determined by rms endogenous vacancy posting decision. ) worker- rm relationships are durables. Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

62 Quantitative implementation Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

63 Computation Models with wealth heterogeneity and aggregate uctuations typically di cult to solve, because wealth distribution is part of the economic state (Krusell and Smith (1998)). Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

64 Computation Models with wealth heterogeneity and aggregate uctuations typically di cult to solve, because wealth distribution is part of the economic state (Krusell and Smith (1998)). Despite the presence of heterogeneity, our model can be solved using standard methods ( rst-order perturbation), under the following preferences: U(c i,t, d i,t, m i,t ) = u1 i,t σ 1 1 σ, u i,t hc ɛ 1 ɛ i,t + ηd ɛ 1 ɛ i,t + µm ɛ 1 ɛ i,t σ, ɛ, η, µ > 0. Baseline: σ = ɛ = 1 (separability). i ɛ ɛ 1, Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

65 Shock process Money growth rule: M t M t 1 = 1 + z t where z t is a mean reverting process following: z t = ξ (m m t 1 ) + ε t, ξ 2 [0, 1), where ε t is an i.i.d. shock innovation. (mplicit in ation target is zero.) Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

66 Parameter values (quarterly model) Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

67 Expansionary monetary policy shock Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

68 Young versus old Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

69 Monetary expansion OMO vs helicopter drop Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28

70 Conclusions Simple life-cycle DSGE model without nominal rigidities Responses to monetary policy shocks in line with VAR evidence: key role for durables can help the NK model in tting the data Transmission mechanism: two redistributional channels: Among households Between households and government mplementation of monetary policy matters (OMO vs helicopter drop) Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September / 28