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1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Document of THE WORLD BANK TECHNICAL ANNEX REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) PROJECT May 7, 1997 Report No. T-7052-SE

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (as of April 1, 1997) Currency Unit CFA Franc (CFAF) US$1 CFAF 570 CFAF 1 million US$ 1, SDR I US$ 1.38 SDR 1 CFA Franc Weights and Measures Metric System Acronyms AGETIP CAS CETUD CFD CUD DTT DTP EU FAC FDTU FY GDP GOS IBRD ICB IDA IMF MEFP MELT NBF NCB PE PTB SOGECA SOTRAC SSATP SAL TSAIP TSP Agence pour l 'Ex&ution de Travaux d 'lnterdt Public contre le Sous-Emploi Country Assistance Strategy Conseil Ex&utif des Transports Urbains de Dakar Caisse Fran!zaise de Developpement Communaute Urbaine de Dakar Direction des Transports Terrestres du Senegal Direction des Travaux Publics du Senegal European Union French Cooperation Fund/Fonds d' aide et de cooperation Urban Transport Development FundlFonds de Developpement des Transports Urbains Fiscal Year Gross Domestic Product Government of Senegal International Bank for Reconstruction and Development International Competitive Bidding International Development Association International Monetary Ministry of Economy, Finance and Plan Ministry of Equipment and Land Transport Non-Bank Financed National Competitive Bidding Public Enterprise Petit Train Bleu Societe Generale de Credit i l 'Automombile Societe des Transports en Commun du Cap Vert Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program Structural Adjustment Loan Transport Sector Adjustment Investment Program Transport Sector Project FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 Vice President: Country Director: Technical Manager: Task Team Leader: Jean-Louis Sarbib, AFR Mahmood A. Ayub, AFC14 Max Pulgar-Vidal, AFTU2 Patrick Bultynck, AFTU2

3 REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) PROJECT TECHNICAL ANNEX Table of Contents Page Section A. Detailed Project Description I. Background... li II. Urban Transport Sector issues... 3 III. Urban Transport Sector Reform Program IV. Lessons learned and Strategy for IDA assistance to the Urban and the Transport Sector V. Project Description Section B. Projects Costs and Administration I. Projects Costs.14 II. Procurement.14 III. Disbursements.17 IV. Accounting and Auditing.17 Section C. Implementation and Monitoring I. Organization and Management II. Implementation Schedule III. Reporting and Monitoring IV. Supervision Plan V. Mid-Term Review Schedule I Institutional Reform: Establishment of Project Executing Agency (CETUD).. 21 Schedule 2 The Urban Transportation Development Fund (FDTU) Schedule 3 The SOTRAC: A Company Profile A. Operational performance B. Financial performance Schedule 4 The future of SOTRAC: Analysis of scenarios Schedule 5 Impact of the privatization of SOTRAC on the Treasury Schedule 6 Social impact of the project Schedule 7 Performance indicators Schedule 8 Letter of Subsector Policy Schedule 9 Implementation schedule Schedule 10 List of Project Activities and Procurement Method Schedule 1I Supervisio Plan n Map I]BRD 28468

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5 REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) PROJECT TECHNICAL ANNEX SECTION A: DETAILED PROJECT DESCRIPTION Chapter I presents the country background and places the proposed project in the context of past and current economic adjustment as well as the urbanization framnework and the Country Assistance Strategy. Chapter II presents the urban transport issues with a specific focus on the metropolitan area of Dakar, where most of the problems occurs. Chapter III presents the urban transport policy reform prepared by the Government of Senegal, as of September 1996, to address these issues. Chapter IV analyzes the lessons learned from previous IDA assistance to the transport and the urban sectors. Chapter V provides the project description. Countiry Background I. BACKGROUND 1. Senegal is a medium-sized country (196,722 km 2with 550 kilometers of Atlantic coastline. It is located at the westernmost point of the Africa Continent. Senegal is generally flat and lies in the Senegal-Mauritanian depression. Elevation above 100 meters are found only on its eastern and southeastern borders with Mali and Guinea and near Dakar at the tip of the Cap Vert peninsula. Threefourths of the country lies in the Sahel, which has suffered from a lower-than normal average rainfall for the last forty years. The country itself has a tropical subdesert climate, with wet summers and dry winters. Senegal's development options are severely constrained by its arid climate. The rainy season is limited to a seasonal monsoon, wetter in the south (less than 1000 millimeters from May to October) than in the north. Rainfall is about 500 millimeters in Dakar. The duration, intensity, and seasonal distribution of the rains at any location varies considerably from year to year, particularly in areas of lowest rainfall. Economic background 2. At the time of Senegal's independence in 1960, it had one of the most developed economies in West Africa. But its economy declined with the loss of markets in newly independent sister states and because of long periods of bad weather and weak management. A succession of droughts together with a substantial deterioration in terms of trade between 1978 and 1981 led to heavy borrowing to keep on with past spending patterns and this created significant macroeconomic imbalances that were not corrected until Between 1984 and 1988 real GDP grew at an average rate of 4.3 percent, but this could not be sustained. The large real depreciation achieved by many competitor countries and trade partners since 1985, combined with negative terms of trade shocks, led to an increasing overvaluation of Senegal's real exchange rate, and the economy experienced a serious decline in key sectors after According to World Bank and IMF estimates, the gross national product (GNP) of the Republic of Senegal in 1994 was US$ 4,040 million (FCFA 2,060,300 million). Based on the estimated population, the per capita GNP was US$ 610 in 1994.

6 2 Structural Adjustment 4. The government's reform effort began in 1980, and while little structural adjustment took place in the first half of the decade, more substantial structural changes occurred after However, the adjustment programs suffered major setbacks because of negative exogenous shocks and policy slippage. The broad objectives of the adjustment programs have been to reestablish viable balance of payments and public finance positions, promote investment and production in agriculture and industry, and achieve greater efficiency in managing public sector resources. More recently, as the lack of competitiveness of the economy had become more acute, a central focus of the reform effort has been to restore competitiveness through internal deflationary policy. Sector level reforms covered the banking and financial sectors. 5. In early 1994, the Senegalese authorities devaluated by 50 percent the CFA Franc. With the support of an Economic Recover Credit (Cr SE), the Government started to implement a strategy of (a) supporting fiscal and monetary policies to keep inflation in check and ensure the sustainability of the gains in competitiveness, and (b) accelerating structural reforms aimed at improving incentives for the private sector and promoting growth. A number of parastatals in the non-tradable sector, such as the Senegalese Railways, Air Senegal, Cars Rapides and SOTRAC, suffered as imported input cost rose and reduced domestic demand (together with a temporary control on prices) led to pressure on revenues. In the urban transport sector, the private operators as well as the public ones (SOTRAC) faced a drop in the number of passengers carried, and simultaneously to a significant increase in the imported input (fuel increased by 50 percent). Medium-Term Prospects 6. The Government adopted an adjustment program for whose objectives are to achieve real GDP growth of 4.7 percent in 1995 and 4.8 percent in 1996, increase the investment-to- GDP ratio from 14.1 percent in 1993 to 16.7 percent (measured in current prices) in 1996 and contain the external current account deficit, excluding official transfers, to 9.8 percent of GDP in 1994 and reduce it to 7.3 percent in Population and Urbanization 7. While the economy of Senegal grew at an average annual of 2.2 percent from 1982 to 1992, the population also grew at a relatively high rate of 2.6 percent per year. The population was 3.5 million at independence in 1960, 6.9 million in 1988, and 8.3 million in The average urban population growth rate was 2.8 percent from 1950 to 1955, 3.3 percent from 1970 to 1975, 3.7 percent from 1990 to 1995, and estimated to be 3.7 percent from 2010 to 2015 and 3 percent from 2020 to The population growth rate is not expected to slow in the near future and projections based on optimistic assumptions about fertility declines suggest that within the next 25 years, Senegal's population will grow to more than 16 million, 9 of whom (56 percent) will live in urban areas. The Government has announced a population strategy and supported population projects. In line with its Declaration of Population Policy adopted in 1988, the Government has intensified the integration of family planning services with public health facilities. 9. The population is unevenly distributed for both historic and economic reasons, with 48 percent of the population concentrated in the West in the three regions of the country: Dakar, Thies and Kaolack. The national urban population rate has steadily increased from 30 percent in 1970 to 40

7 3 percent in 1992 and an estimated 44 percent by the year Today, this three million urban population is overwhelmingly centered in the capital metropolitan area of Dakar where over 55 percent of Senegal's urban population resides with a yearly growth rate of almost five percent. The urban population of Dakar metro area represents a significant 23 percent share of the total population of Senegal (almost 25 percent in the year 2000). Country Assistance Strategy 10. The goal of the Bank's assistance strategy is to help Senegal achieve its objective of sustainable econoimic growth with equity and targeted poverty reduction. The central focus of the macro-economic strategy is to relaunch economy through the promotion of competitiveness, including regulatory reform in order to create more opportunities for the private sector. 11. Taking into account the need to change the structure of the economy from a natural resource base to an industrial and services base, the central focus of the macro-economic strategy to relaunch growtlh, as defined in the CAS, approved by the Board on February 16, 1995, is: (i) to promote competitiveness, including regulatory reform, in order to make the economy more responsive and to create more opportunities for the private sector; and (ii) to complete structural reforms in agriculture. The success of this private-sector based strategy implies to address problems in five areas: (1) education and health; (2) infrastructure; (3) population growth and the role of women; (4) environment; and (5) capacity building for public sector management. 12. In the transport sector, the Government issued in 1990 a General Policy Letter which sets out a medium-term strategy for the sector. This strategy aims at reforming and modernizing the management of the sector and assigns priority to maintaining infrastructure rather than investing in its expansion. It provides for the contracting of private companies to carry out maintenance work and for the restructuring of the sector's parastatals (SNCS, PAD, AIR SENEGAL) in order to enhance their performance and eliminate the need of subsidies. 13. In September 1996, the Government issued a Letter of Urban Transport Policy. In accordance with its objective, the strategy in the specific sub-sector aims at reforming the institutional and regulatory framework under which the urban transport services are provided, including the privatization of SOTRAC, the reinforcement of the technical capacity and targeted investments with leverage impact on the efficiency, safety and effectiveness of the urban transport services. II. URBAN TRANSPORT SECTOR ISSUES A. Urban Population and Employment Distribution 14. The metropolitan area of Dakar consists of 3 major poles: Dakar-City, Pikine-Guediawaye, and Rufisque which are successively aligned from the West coast to the East inland along the 30 kilometers of the Cap-Vert peninsula. Of the 1.8 million population in the Dakar metro area, about 200,000 reside in Rufisque (12 percent), the remaining splitting evenly between Pikine-Guediawaye and Dakar-City with about 800,000 inhabitants (44 percent) each. 15. The population growth rate within each of those three districts varies substantially from the global 4 percent yearly average rate experienced by the whole Dakar metro area: the greatest growth rate occurs in Pikine-Guediawaye at 5.7 percent per year or over twice as fast as the 2.4 percent growth

8 4 rate experienced in Dakar-City. However, by 1998, Pikine's annual population growth rate will begin to taper slightly while Rufisque's population growth rate will overtake Pikine's with a 6 percent rate. 16. The Dakar metropolitan area job distribution among these three poles is also very unbalanced, with 63 percent of the jobs located in Dakar-City, 30 percent in Pikine and the remaining 7 percent in Rufisque. This double imbalance between population and job distribution is expected to continue and even to increase in the future. This phenomenon generates a massive daily pendulum commuter migration between Dakar-City, where the bulk of the job market occurs, and the two bedroom communities of Pikine-Gu6diawaye and Rufisque. 17. The narrow Cap-Vert peninsula, along which the migration occurs, is limited to three east-west major roads between Dakar-City and the entrance to Pikine-Gu6diawaye, only one major east-west road east of Pikine-Guediawaye, and an east-west railroad line shared between freight and public passenger transportation from Dakar Port to Rufisque. The passenger carrying capability of the railroad is very limited, therefore the bulk of the commuter demand has put a serious strain on the major roads. To compound this problem, another important daily pendulum commuter flow is occurring between Grand Dakar, a very populated suburb just north of Dakar, and Dakar Plateau. 18. The increasing travel demand pressure and the poor performance of the national public bus transportation company (SOTRAC) has caused the private collective transport, Cars Rapides, to greatly develop. This service was created well before SOTRAC under the colonial system for transporting civil servants. Although the Cars Rapides are not authorized in the dense core of Dakar-City (Plateau), a great number of them serve the Greater Dakar area contributing to the saturation of its road network. The rise in user dissatisfaction and exasperation over accidents recently led the public to set fire to some Cars Rapides. 19. In conclusion, this high commuter travel demand has resulted in the deterioration of traffic conditions, the worsening of public transportation services, and an increasing number of road accidents. 20. In addition to their role as bedroom communities, Pikine-Guediawaye and Rufisque have their own significant local industries and job markets generating their own internal traffic demand. In Pikine, there are only two main roadways along which the SOTRAC and the Cars Rapides operate. The remaining bulk of often unpaved streets is serviced by taxis. In Rufisque, with the exception of the main Route Nationale, the local roads are often unpaved and sometimes sandy. As a result, in both cities the lack of adequate roadways accessible to public transport services forces the population to lengthy walks and prohibits local business growth. Both Rufisque and Pikine-Gu6diawaye experience uncontrolled spontaneous urban sprawling in non-equipped districts, contributing to increased distance between the population and the public transport network. B. Urban Transport Supply and Demand 21. About two million daily trips occur in Dakar, half of them involving motorized vehicles, the other walking. Vehicle fleet statistics provided by the DTT (Direction des Transports Terrestres) for all vehicles in Senegal are as follows: 115,000 vehicles in 1980; 118,000 vehicles in 1981; 127,000 vehicles in 1986 and an estimated 100,000 in Figures for years prior to 1993 appear to be inflated and probably do include many old vehicles retired from circulation. Latest 1993 estimations of the various vehicles fleets indicate that of the vehicles in all categories which are registered in Senegal, 85,000 (85 percent) belong to the Dakar region. The majority of these (49,200) are passenger cars including private, administrative, public service, diplomatic and temporary transit usage.

9 5 22. The number of SOTRAC buses in Dakar has decreased from 505 buses in 1987, to 461 buses in 1989, 439 buses in 1990 and 200 buses by the end of The number of Cars Rapides, estimated at 7,500 in 1985 and 7,900 in 1990, varies, depending on the source, from 6,700 to 8,000 in 1994, 2,500 of them being in Dakar. The number of urban taxis has progressively increased from 4,600 in 1985 to 5,000 in 1990 and to about 5,100 in The resulting estimated motorization rate for Senegal is about 13 vehicles per 1,000 population, while in Dakar it is over 3,5 times as much with 47 vehicles per 1,000 population. However, this Dakar motorlization rate is probably in regression as the urban population steadily increases and becomes more dependent upon public transportation. Following the liberalized import policy of 1986 the rate of "new registrations" of passenger vehicles in Senegal has continued to increase at a rate of about 10 percent per year. However, this increase is essentially due to the share of imported "used vehicles" which has steadily increased from 19 percent in 1985 to 70 percent in 1990 and to 77 percent of total vehicles in 1994, as new vehicles have become increasingly unaffordable for the majority of the public. 24. As a result, the passenger car pool of Senegal is very quickly getting older with 70 percent of the used cars being over 10 years old. This is worrisome from a traffic safety view point. All motorized vehicles over 3 years old are submitted, in theory, to a yearly technical safety inspection (every 6 months for Cars Rapides and taxis). In practice, however, such control is more administrative than technical. C. The Urban Public Transport System 25. In Dakar where almost two thirds of all motorized daily trips are made by public transport, the public sector offers two systems: the bus company, SOTRAC, and the railway company, Petit Train Bleu (PTB). The private sector offers three basic systems: the Cars Rapides, a very popular system of minibuses (25 to 45 places), the urban taxis, and the suburban taxis. 26. Comparison of the evolution of the market share distribution between the two modes indicates a high transfer of the demand from SOTRAC to Cars Rapides between 1980 and 1990 within all three poles. The Cars Rapides gained an additional 39 percent of the Dakar-City market (away from SOTRAC), an additional 38 percent in Pikine, and an additional 35 percent in Rufisque resulting in a 1990 market share of 59 percent, 76 percent and 91 percent respectively. Even in Dakar-City (where Cars Rapides are not allowed in Plateau), Cars Rapides have seized the majority 59 percent of the market where in 1980 SOTRAC had a predominant share of 79 percent. In other terms, from 1980 to 1990, in spite of a 32 percent increase in the area ridership market, SOTRAC ridership for the whole area clecreased by 37 percent while Cars Rapides ridership increased by 23 percent. C.1. The private sector 27. The private sector is not only dominating more and more of the urban collective transport market, particularly in Dakar, but also has captured a significant share of the employment sector providing about 30,000 jobs (18,000 direct and 12,000 indirect). The main underlying reason for this spectacular growth was the increasing demand which a rigid transport system, such as SOTRAC, could not frilly satisfy in spite of government aid. 28. Cars Rapides are organized in small enterprises owned by various transport operators who consist of artisans, transport professionals, private individuals with personal financial resources, investing into this market on a secondary basis and a few capitalists investing into the various activities

10 6 of the transport sector such as spare parts imports, motor fuel distribution etc. Two transport operators have fleets of over 50 vehicles monopolizing the market and even competing with SOTRAC for specialized services (political rallies, pilgrimages). A dozen other enterprises have fleets between 10 and 50 vehicles, 16 fleets of between 4 and 9, the remaining multitude of artisan possessing up to 3 vehicles. The transport profession is organized into two main organizations of transport owners and two trade unions of drivers, mainly utilized as platforms for union-type demands rather than for the improvement of the transport service operation. 29. The Cars Rapides fleet consists essentially of two types of vehicles: Renault SG2 mini-buses with 20 to 25 seats, and Mercedes mini-buses of various capacities from 32 to 42 seats. The number of Mercedes mini-buses is increasing as the increase of capacity is perceived as a means to decrease the operating costs. The great majority of the fleet is very old and in poor condition except for a few operators who maintain their fleet in good condition by importing spare parts through specialized channels. 30. Theoretically, vehicles must be registered, have a valid public transport license, a property tax sticker, and a safety sticker. Transporter insurance is required, and the vehicle must pay a parking fee to the various cities. The vehicle owner must possess a transporter authorization, while the driver must have a public transport driver's license and a driver's record register delivered by the police. In practice, however, few owners have transport licenses, but instead, have temporary licenses renewable every three months. 31. Technical control consisting essentially of checking the lights, tires, brakes, and condition of the paint, is more an administrative than a safety constraint as the technical services have no control services available. Since the collective transport operators have been publicly reluctant to submit their vehicles to such controls, the public services have also been reluctant to enforce their control. Cars Rapides have a high accident rate, in part due to the vehicles' poor condition, and in greater part due to the unsafe driving habits of their drivers. The public is getting increasingly frustrated with their unsafe practices. 32. The vehicles are leased to the driver on a long-term but infornal basis. While receiving a monthly salary from the owner, the driver is required to provide a fixed daily income to the owner of approximately 15,000 CFAF. Drivers are responsible for fuel purchases and minor maintenance and repairs. The surplus goes to the owner. The accredited driver often hires a second driver and each one has his own apprentice to help him for various tasks such as collecting fares. 33. Banks are not interested in providing credit for public transport. Therefore, the operator must request credit from specialized credit societies such as the Societe GeWnerale de Credit Automobile (SOGECA), that specializes in automobile credit, but offer higher interest rates due to the accumulated effect. As for the short duration of the credit, it is essentially related to the expected short life of the vehicle due to its difficult and intensive operation, although in reality buses are operated for an extended length of time, even though they are often purchased "used". The insufficient solvency of transport operators represents a too high risk for bankers and other credit organizations. The majority of those operators have no checking account or accounting records. In the event the vehicle must be repossessed, the judicial system is often siding with the transporter, extending the judgment procedure for sometimes up to two years. 34. The public transport sector also has difficulties in acquiring proper insurance. The Mutuelle Senegalaise d'assurances des Transporteurs (MSAT) regrouping over 80 percent of the public transport sector members is in financial difficulty due to unpaid insurance premiums as well as to poor

11 7 performance in other secondary activities. Some insurance companies known for selling bargain insurance or simply delivering insurance attestations on credit also have financial difficulties. Finally, more reputable insurance companies just refuse to provide insurance for this type of transport operators as they have a bad credit record and accident risks are too high. 35. The financial difficulty in renewing the Cars Rapides fleet, compounded by poor insurance practices jeopardizes the future of this transport system and is considered as a major hindrance to its existence. Taxis 36. Urban taxis are not really a public transport as it offers individualized services to its customers. These four to five-seat vehicles, normally painted in black and yellow, are often in poor condition and their rmeters are very rarely used. There are about 6,800 urban taxis licenses for an estimated fleet of only 5,100 vehicles, of which 3,000 are probably in circulation, for the most part in the urban perimeter of the Dakar commune. The majority of the fleet consists of small owners with about 3 vehicles each. Vehicle, owner, and driver regulations are somewhat similar to those for Cars Rapides. As in the case of the Cars Rapides, there is usually a second driver. Most of the time these urban taxis circulate freely in search of customers except at locations of higher demand (hospitals, airports, universities) where they are organized to pick up customers in turn. Since 1990, when the official fares were increased by the gcvernment, fare bargaining has increased as the official fares are not affordable to the majority of the patrons. Clandestine Taxis "Clandos" 37. The number of Clandos are, by definition, unknown. In addition to the above, otherwise legal, taxis operating outside of their territory in a clandestine fashion, this type of service (relatively recent and increasing) consists of individuals possessing private passenger vehicles,. These individuals ask their drivers to operate the taxis in the collective transport mode once the owner has been dropped off near his workplace. They operate principally round-trip between Dakar and the suburb of origin recuperating an average of 3 passengers per trip. Often these clandestine taxis carry the same patrons everyday. 38. Public transport fares are officially set by the government for all transport operators and urban taxis according to vehicle capacity and origin and destination trip. Due to the decreasing purchasing level of the population, a direct result of the on-going economic crisis, the private sector in Dakar has more and more practiced reduced fare haggling. For instance, during off-peak periods a Car Rapides fare, already officially cheaper than a SOTRAC fare, is often lowered down to 60 percent of its official price.. C.2. Public sector 39. Collective transport services of the public sector only exist in the Dakar District and consist of two major enterprises: the Societe de Transports en Commun du Cap-Vert (SOTRAC), a public bus transport system and the Petit Train Bleu (PTB), a public railroad transport system issued from the Soci&6te Nationale des Chemins de Fers du Senegal (SNCS). SOTRAC 40. A detailed company profile of SOTRAC is provided in schedule 3.

12 8 Petit Train Bleu 41. The Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fers du Sene'gal (SNCS), within which the PTB operates, is the national railway enterprise society. The PTB, which was created in December 1987 for transporting passengers, shares the same line from Dakar to Rufisque replacing an old suburban service abandoned years ago. The PTB line includes 14 passenger stations. 42. The PTB carries only 2 percent of the total combined daily trips provided by PTB, SOTRAC and Cars Rapides. The number of passengers transported by the PTB increased from 1988 to 1991 but has since substantially decreased to about 3.5 million passengers per year at a yearly rate of about 13 percent. For SNCS, the semi-autonomous PTB is viewed as a minor operation representing only 2.6 percent of SNCS revenues but 6.4 percent of its expenses. The PTB staff consists of 74 employees. D. Urban Infrastructure 43. With the exception of the SNCS railroad system, which provides for the transport of both freight and passengers between the port of Dakar, Rufisque and the interior cities, all of the remaining urban land transport modes such as walking, non-motorized or motorized vehicles are accomplished almost exclusively along roadways. 44. From a jurisdiction point of view, Senegal's roadway system is classified in two basic systems: a primary system or "classified" system, and a local or "non-classified" system. The government is generally responsible for the construction and reinforcement of both primary and local roads, but provides routine maintenance only for the primary system. Theoretically, each locality is responsible for the maintenance of its respective local system. In Dakar, the government assumes responsibility for the 240 km of primary streets including a 6 km expressway section, while the remaining 700 km of local streets are the responsibility of the Communaute Urbaine de Dakar (CUD). The distribution of these roads, however, is very unbalanced between districts. In the older part of Dakar (Plateau, MMdina, Grand Dakar) the road density supply varies between 100 and 150 linear meters of road per hectare. In the newly settled areas, such as Pikine and Guediawaye, the density drops to 40 meters per hectare. There are over 15 important, but poorly equipped, public transport terminals, only 2 of which being adequately equipped, scattered throughout Dakar-City and its suburbs. E. Urban Transport Safety 45. In 1995, a total of 2,318 traffic accidents were reported in Dakar metropolitan area, killing 380 persons, 68 percent of which in Pikine. 46. Based on the accidents statistics, it is estimated that traffic accidents are due to human error 80 percent of the time (vehicle drivers or pedestrians) resulting from a lack of respect of basic traffic laws and regulations. In particular, public transport vehicles of the private sector (Cars Rapides) are reported to have been involved in almost half of the accidents. Among the human aspect, a major cause is the intense and very competitive mode of operation of these vehicles resulting in a frequent fatigue of the drivers. The operation of Cars Rapides is perceived by the public as been particularly unsafe with a pedestrian-vehicle related accident rate higher than those of other modes. A significant number of these accidents can be attributed to the lack of basic pedestrian safety amenities where they are most needed along corridors and bus terminals which experience a high concentration of pedestrians.

13 9 47. The second cause of accidents is the poor condition of the vehicles. The intense conditions of operation contribute to an increasing frequency of mechanical failures. The vehicle is old, 70 percent of the vehicles are over 10 years old. In order to "pass" Safety Inspection Controls, transport operators often switch parts (tires, lights) between cars, just for the test. Many vehicles are unregistered. Finally, transport operators have been openly reluctant to submit their old vehicles to such controls, as they contend that government's high import duties and taxes have prevented them from upgrading their fleet with new safer vehicles. 48. In 1994, the DTT started a program to computerize all the statistics on road accidents, but road safety is not yet receiving the attention it deserves. A Road Safety Advisor is expected to be hired by the CETUD in order to coordinate an action plan on (a) the design of engineering remedial measures, (b) drivers and vehicles owners (Cars Rapides) training, (c) the design and implementation of educational and publicity schemes directed at pedestrians, (d) review the vehicle inspection and driver's licensing programs; and (d) traffic management measures to promote orderly traffic flow. The action plan should be based, to the largest extend possible, on community participation and awareness campaigns. F. Urban Transport Regulation 49. SOTRAC was originally given a 15-year monopoly for the collective urban transport in the greater Dakar area. The existence of the private sector (Cars Rapides and taxis} was officially acknowledged when the fourth performance contract for the SOTRAC no longer referred to this monopoly. Since its creation in 1987 the Petit Train Bleu (PTB) has remained under the Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fers du Senegal (SNCS) without any specific regulatory status. 50. The Cars Rapides, taxis, etc. do not have an official "Public Service" status and therefore do not benefit from the corresponding compensatory advantages. Only SOTRAC benefits from such advantages as it has been officially given "public service" missions, in particular for the transport of school children, students and uniformed staff. Yet the Cars Rapides and suburban taxis do perform a public service by providing public transport for the less advantaged population class, often in remote suburban areas not serviced by SOTRAC. 51. The public transport fare grid for the private sector is fixed by the Ministere du Commerce and the MELT, while SOTRAC/PTB fares are fixed in the performance contracts. Although SOTRAC/PTB respect the official fares, the private sector often bypasses them by practicing fare staging, particularly during peak hours, forcing patrons to disembark and re-embark at an intermediate station. Such a practice is the result of inadequate and inconsistent fares whereas a direct trip without transfer from point A to point C (via point B) is much cheaper than a two-stage trip from point A to B and then from point B to C. 52. In summary, all these inadequate regulations affect the economics of the public transport sector by preventing it to perform in a coherent way, under clear and fair rules of competition according to market demand. It is recommended to renew the regulations concerning these issues (public service status better respect of traditional rules of market exploitation, etc.) from a global perspective integrating both the public and private sectors.

14 10 III. URBAN TRANSPORT SECTOR REFORM PROGRAM 53. To find sustainable solutions to these problems, the Government of Senegal (GOS) has deployed a major effort in designing reforms in the urban transport sector with broad participation of stakeholders. Policy reforms have been led by an ad-hoc Committee (the "Comite de Suivi des Transports Urbains") set up under the auspices of the Ministry of Equipment and Land Transport in May 1993 with support from the sub-saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP) coordinated by the World Bank. The urban transport component of the SSATP, which dealt with the preparation of the policy reform, is supported by donors including France, Belgium and the EU. 54. Taking into account the conclusions of (a) the Sector Policy Document issued by the Comite de Suivi in June 1995, and (b) the recommendations of a national seminar organized in September 1995 and further sector dialogue, the GOS issued in September 1996 a Letter of Urban Transport Sector Policy defining its strategy to solve the urban transport crisis. The issues addressed in the Letter of Sector Policy provide the guidelines for the reform to be introduced. A translation of this Policy Letter is provided in schedule 8. The key elements of this reform are: 1. Institutional Reform: a "Conseil Executif des Transports Urbains de Dakar" (CETUD) has been set up to carry out the institutional and regulatory coordination of the urban transport sector. The CETUD is composed by members of the Ministries, the local government (the Communaute Urbaine de Dakar and the Municipalities) and the transport industry. II. Financial Reform: an Urban Transport Development Fund (FDTU) will be set up to mobilize sustainable resources for the sector. In the same way as for the membership of the CETUD, contributions to the FDTU would come from national budget, local government and the urban transport. industry. Through the equal participation to the CETUD, the urban transport industry will be associated to the decisions related to the investments to be covered by the FDTU. Priorities will be given to investments promoting the use of public transport services. Direct and indirect beneficiaries (such as the insurance companies, the employers) of the urban transport system are due to make contributions to the FDTU. III. Regulatory Reform: GOS has committed itself to privatize SOTRAC and to put the future operation of the company under a regulated competition framework. Effective coordination will be carried out between the three main urban transport operators, namely (privatized) SOTRAC, the informal sector (Cars Rapides) and the Petit Train Bleu (PTB, which is due to be restructured on a commercial basis). IV. Human resource development: training programs and awareness campaigns are to be organized for: (a) bus drivers from the informal sector and owners of the Cars Rapides (small entrepreneurs), pedestrians, road users on road safety issues; and (b) civil servants (national as well as local governments) dealing with urban transport on regulation, planning, monitoring and coordination. 55. The implementation of such a comprehensive reform will provide the background for the implementation of a progressively modulated intermodal coordination program. The design of such an intermodal policy had been prepared in 1992, based on three scenarios (respectively, continuation of current trends, emphasis on coordination between PTB and SOTRAC, and emphasis on SOTRACI Cars Rapides/PTB coordination). With the support of the project, the GOS is expected to promote a policy of full coordination between Cars Rapides, SOTRAC and PTB.

15 11 IV. LESSONS LEARNED AND STRATEGY FOR IDA ASSISTANCE TO THE URBAN TRANSPORT SECTOR Projects in the Urban Sector 56. The Public Works and Employment Project (Cr SE, approved in FY 90) created an autonomous agency, AGETIP, to quickly and effectively carry out procurement and supervision of public works. The lessons learned, which were taken into account in the ongoing Second Public Works Project (Cr SE, approved in FY 93) include: (a) requiring the deposit of counterpart funds before the review of sub-project batches to offset the slow disbursement of funds by the government; (b) increasing community participation and environmental impact consideration: (c) considering proposed projects' effects on current projects; and (d) the effectiveness of setting up an autonomous, commercially oriented agency with stakeholders representatives on its Governing Board. These lessons have been taken into consideration in the preparation of the proposed Urban Transport Project as well as its implementation arrangements. Projects in the Transport Sector 57. On June 13, 1991, the Bank approved a Credit (Cr SE) to help finance part of Senegal's five-year Transport Sector Adjustment/Investment Program (TSAIP), the total of which was about US$ 604 million. The IDA Credit was in the amount of SDR 49.9 million equivalent, of which SDR 11.5 million equivalent was to support policy measures in the transport sector and finance the purchase of general imports, specific goods and services in the transport sector. The closing date of this Credit is currently scheduled for December 31, 1997, but the Government of Senegal has requested an extension until December 31, 1998 to complete ongoing works. 58. The main policy areas of the TSAIP are centered on: (a) the introduction of an efficient road management capacity based on assured minimum financing, works execution by private contractors and restructuring of the Public Works Administration; (b) the operational and financial restructuring of transport sector parastatals (railways, ports, civil aviation) as public enterprise to be run on a commercial basis; and (c) the modernization of sector administration. 59. The investment funds under the Credit are for: road maintenance and rehabilitation works and related studies and training (79 percent), rehabilitation of railway equipment, consulting services for railways restructuring and training equipment (14 percent); consulting services for the rehabilitation of various airports, operational and financial rehabilitation of the national airline and restructuring of airport administration (2 percent); consulting services for the implementation of data processing systems including provision of equipment and preparation of master-plan for long-term development of port of Dakar (2 percent); and technical assistance for the sector modernization including computerization of vehicle permits and licenses. Lessons learned 60. Previous experience with transport as well as with urban projects in Senegal hold the following useful lessons: * Project design must reflect the intent, interests and priorities of the beneficiaries and the stakeholders to ensure ownership of the project. Such a lesson has been integrated through the extensive dialogue established since 1993 within the Comite de Suivi set up with the

16 12 assistance of the SSATP. The informal sector (Cars Rapides) is a key actor in the reform process. The sector involvement will be ensured in the implementation of the project through the participation of the transport industry in the CETUD. * Capacity building is the key for long term development of the sector. The Bank has financed improvement in urban roads in the greater Dakar area through the Urban Projects. The main objective of these investments was to facilitate motorized transport. The proposed operation will improve public transport services which are the ones that are of most concern for the urban poor. The capacity building component of the project is therefore essential to ensure the development of public transport services and the success of the operation. * Explicit provision for adequate and stable domestic funding for the urban transport must be made to ensure sustainability after project completion. The establishment of the FDTU takes into account this lesson, by building a public-private partnership which will contribute to stable investments in the sector. * Urban transport development and investment has to be placed in a policy-based framework. Such an approach has been promoted by the GOS, the SSATP and the donors traditionally involved in the sector in Senegal. This dialogue has provided a consensus to consider policy reform as a prerequisite for any major investment in the sector. V. PROJECT DESCRIPTION 61. Objectives. With the assistance of the proposed project, the Government intends to reform the urban transport system in the metropolitan area of Dakar. The main objective of the operation is to provide more affordable, reliable and safer public transport services in the metropolitan area of Dakar. This objective will be pursued through: (i) the strengthening of the institutional and regulatory framework and the development of a coordination mechanism between the public and the private actors (operators, national and local agencies); (ii) the privatization the public transport company, the SOTRAC; (iii) stakeholders involvement in the decision-making and regulation process; (iv) the development of road safety actions plan and traffic management measures; and (v) civil works targeted on the promotion of public transport services. 62. Technical assistance, training and seminars. To help the Government of Senegal achieve the objective of the reform, the credit would finance 674 person-months of consulting services for policy support, support to institutional development, institutional development studies and policy support, at a cost of about US$ million. Consulting services would consist of studies (219 person-months), training sessions and short-term missions (455 person-months), including services purchased for assisting the Government to (a) privatize SOTRAC, and (b) increase the technical capacity of the CETUD. Person-Months by Type of Technical Assistance Support to Institutional development Foreign 26 L--eocal 30 Tt 56 Institutional Development Studies Project Implementation Engineering studies for civil works Training

17 Terms of reference of the main project activities have been prepared during appraisal and agreed during negotiations and will be included in the Project Implementation Manual. When appropriate, they will indicate that transfer of know-know is expected in the core output, and evaluation of consultants by the counterparts. Performance of consultants will be reviewed to determine how the objectives of the assignment were achieved and how consultants were able to transfer skills and knowhow to their counterparts, and to strengthen the local agencies to which they were assigned, mainly the CETUD. 64. During negotiations, the Government has been requested to have the CETUD operational, key staff appointed and remaining in post at least until the completion of the project. The CETUD staff will be responsible for preparing the project activities and for presenting papers on the conclusions and recomimendations of the studies. Terms of reference would detail tasks to be carried out by the CETUD staff as part of their training. Consultant's proposals should include the time necessary to train CETUD staff and other counterparts during execution of the studies, and the corresponding budget. 65. The list of studies to be financed by the project has been agreed during negotiations. The list of studies is provided in schedule 9. The list would be regularly reviewed and updated, if necessary in the course of Bank supervision missions, and in light of study results already known, and of development in the sector. Terms of reference of the major consulting activities will be included in the Project Implementation Manual. 66. Six seminars and 455 training sessions will be held on road safety, traffic management, and users participation. Particular attention will be given to awareness campaigns including strong community involvement in the design and implementation of road safety measures. At project start, training would be provided on Bank procedures and project management for CETUD's staff in charge of pro ject execution. The total cost of training is estimated at US$ million. 67. Civil Works. Complementary to the capacity building component, physical investments will be included in the project encompassing the financing of construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of public infrastructure and facilities such as bus stations, road encroachment for the public transport services, traffic management improvement, equipment of bus terminals and accident reduction measures. The equipment of the "Ilot Peterson" intermodal station construction of which has been financed under the third Urban Project, will be considered as part of the present operation. 68. Such investments will be targeted on the promotion of public transport services and will be complementary to those to be carried out under the FDTU financing. 69. The total cost of this component is estimated to US$ 2.54 million. The civil works will be carried out with labor-intensive methods and are due to reinforce the local construction industry through the participation of AGETIP or any other qualified agency.

18 14 SECTION B: PROJECT COSTS AND ADMINISTRATION I. PROJECT COSTS 70. Total projects costs, including prices contingencies and taxes, are estimated at US$ million. The costs, net of taxes and duties, are estimated at US$ 8.7 million, with a foreign exchange component of US$ 2.69 million or 31 percent. The Government would bear the cost, estimated at US$ 3.17 million, of taxes and duties levied. The costs estimates include about US$ million in physical contingencies or about three percent of the total base costs, and US$ million in price contingencies or about three percent of the total base costs. A summary breakdown of the project costs net of taxes is given below. Estimated project Costs (US$ million, net of taxes and duties) Category UToa ots Percentg f 1. Civil works Goods and equipment % of foreign and 90% of local 3. Consultants' Services and Studies (a) Support to Institutional Development (b) Institutional Development Studies (c) Project Implementation (d) Engineering studies Training and Seminars Operating costs of CETUD Project Preparation Advance Amount due 7. Contingencies II. PROCUREMENT 71. The table below summarizes the project elements by disbursement category, their estimated costs and proposed procurement methods. Procurement (US$ million, net of taxes and duties) ICB NCB Other NBF Total Civil Works Goods and Equipment Consulting Services Training and Seminars CETUD operating costs A Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) was completed in July For the project, findings of the CPAR remain valid. In general, Senegal's procurement laws and regulations do not

19 15 conflict with IDA Guidelines. No special exceptions, permits, or licenses need to be specified in the Credit documents for International Competitive Bidding (ICB), since Senegal's procurement practices allow IDA procedures to take precedence over any contrary provisions in local regulations. IDAfinanced goods and works will be procured in accordance with Bank's Guidelines under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits (January 1995). For fixed-price contracts, the invitation to bid shall provide that, when contract award is delayed beyond the original bid validity period, the successful bidder's bid price will be increased for each week of delay by a predisclosed correction factor acceptable to the Bank. Such an increase shall not be taken into account in the bid evaluation. National Competitive Bidding (NCB) advertised locally would be carried out in accordance with Senegal's procurement laws and regulations, provided that: (i) any bidder is given sufficient time to submit bids (three to four weeks); (ii) bid evaluation and bidder qualification are clearly specified in bidding documents; (iii) no preference margin is granted to domestic manufacturers; (iv) eligible firms are not precluded from participation; (v) award will be made to the lowest evaluated bidder; and (vi) prior to issuing the first call for bids, draft standard bidding documents are submitted to IDA and found acceptable. Procurement arrangements are in Schedule Procurement of Civil Works. All IDA-financed civil works contracts for pilot operations (totaling US$ 2.6 million) which would not exceed US$ 200,000 per contract, would be carried out under NCB advertised locally, in accordance with procedures satisfactory to IDA. Procurement of civil works contracts would be managed by AGETIP or another qualified agency through specific delegation under an agreement to be signed between CETUD and AGETIP. AGETIP's procedures manual which is acceptable to IDA provides detailed procurement procedures according to which the agency will select contractors and award contracts. AGETIP will maintain a roster of contractors eligible for NCB. Pilot operation investment will use labor-based methods and should generate employment generation and the development of local small and medium-size contractors or another qualified agency. 73. Procurement of Goods. Contracts for goods (totaling US$ 350,000) will be grouped to the extent possible into substantial bid packages. There will be no bid packages exceeding US$ 200,000. Therefore, National Competitive Bidding (NCB) advertised locally, can be used in accordance with procedures acceptable to IDA. Items such as office supply, spare parts and furniture which are available locally at a reasonable cost, and estimated to cost the equivalent of US$ 20,000 or less per contract, will be procured through prudent shopping under contracts awarded on the basis of comparison of price quotations obtained from at least three suppliers, up to an aggregate amount equivalent to US$ 20,000 from national suppliers and US$ 30,000 from foreign suppliers. 74. Employment of Consultants. In order to ensure the satisfactory execution of the project, the Goveimment has been requested during negotiations, to provide the assurance that qualifications, experience and terms and conditions of employment of consultants will be satisfactory to IDA. Consultant services contracts financed by IDA will be procured in accordance with the Bank's Guidelines for the Selection of Consultants by World Bank Borrower published in January Selection of consultants will normally be addressed through competition among qualified short-listed firms in which the selection will be based both on the quality of the proposal and on the cost of the services to be provided. Short-lists for contracts estimated under US$ 200,000 may be comprised entirely of national consultants if a sufficient number of qualified firms (at least three) are available at competitive costs. However, if foreign firms have expressed interest, they will not be excluded from consideration. The standard Letter of Invitation and Form of Contract as developed by the Bank will be used for appointment of consultants. Audit services totaling US$ 230,000 which are of a standard nature will use "least-cost selection" procedures (para 3.6). Technical audits for the transport sector which would be carried out under contracts not exceeding US$ 100,000 dollars each (totaling US$ 250,000) will be selected on the basis of "Consultants' qualifications" (para 3.7). The

20 16 Government has already selected AGETIP on a single-source basis (para 3.9) to manage civil works contracts for the pilot operations, and has submitted to IDA for review during negotiations a draft contract between AGETIP and CETUD not exceeding US$ 2.6 million Services for lectures and small studies (totaling US$ 200,000), which can be delivered by individual consultants, will be selected through comparison of qualifications among those expressing interest in the assignment or approached directly. Simplified contracts will be used for short-term assignments, i.e. those not exceeding six months, carried out by individual consultants. The Government will be briefed during negotiations about the special features of the new guidelines, in particular with regards to advertisement and public bid opening. Model letter of invitation issued by the Bank Group shall be used. For complex, timebased and/or lump sum assignments, the Borrower will employ such consultants under contracts, using standard form of contract for consultants' services issued by the Bank Group, with such modifications as shall have been agreed by IDA. 75. Review by IDA of procurement Decisions. IDA-financed contracts for works and goods above US$ 200,000 will be subject to IDA's prior review procedures. Selective post-review of contracts awarded below the threshold levels will apply to about one in three contracts. Draft standard bidding documents for NCB will be reviewed by and agreed upon with IDA. The review process would cover [801 percent of the total value of the amount contracted for goods and [60] percent of the amount contracted for civil works. The Bank will also review the selection process for the hiring of consultants proposed by the Borrower. The Borrower will be reminded that, for consultants contracts estimated to cost the equivalent of US$ 200,000 or more, opening of the financial envelopes will not take place before receiving the Bank's no-objection to the technical evaluation. For consulting services contracts with firms above US$ 100,000 and with individuals above US$ 50,000 equivalent, IDA's prior review will include the draft letter of invitation packages, short-lists, terms of reference, evaluation criteria, bid evaluation reports and draft contracts. Prior IDA review will not apply to contracts for the recruitment of consulting firms and individuals estimated to cost less than US$ 100,000 and US$ 50,000 equivalent respectively. However, the exception to prior IDA review will not apply, regardless of the contract value, to the terms of reference of such contracts, to single-source hiring, to assignments of a critical nature as determined by IDA, or to amendments of contracts raising the contract value above the prior review threshold. 76. Modification of Waiver of the Terms and Conditions of Contracts. Before agreeing to any material modification of waiver of the terms of reference of a contract that would increase its cost by more than 15 percent of the original price, the Borrower should specify the reasons thereof and seek IDA's no objection for the proposed modification. 77. Procurement arrangements. To enable satisfactory procurement process, the following measures has been discussed and agreed during negotiations: (a) short-lists shall be a minimum of three and a maximum of six firms; (b) the practice of requesting bid and performances securities shall be discontinued for consulting services; and (c) quality shall be the main criterion for the selection of consultants -- the price factor, when it is taken into account, would not exceed 20 percent. A manual of procedures (including procurement procedures) has been prepared, and agreed, during negotiations. Apart from the pilot operations which contain exclusively civil works activities, the newly created CETUD entity will be responsible to manage procurement activities. To allow CETUD to manage a large number of contracts with consultants, it is envisaged under the project that CETUD will set a project division, comprising of a procurement specialist with sufficient experience with Bank's procurement procedures. Civil works contracts for pilot operations will be managed by AGETIP, which management system has established a proven record of low cost service delivery and independence of action in critical areas such as project implementation and disbursement. AGETIP or

21 17 another qualified agency will be acting as a contract management agency. They will receive fees not exceeding 5 percent of the amount of contracts managed by them and they will receive an advance payment not exceeding 15 percent of the annual program to facilitate payments to contractors. During negotiations, it has been agreed that the hiring of the project auditor would be a condition of Credit effectiveness. Standard times for various procurement steps up to contract signing has been agreed during negotiations, in particular all contracts must be signed within the original bid validity period. A detailed procurement plan for civil works, goods and services to be procured under the project has been prepared in accordance with and agreed during negotiations. The procurement plan will be updated on a regular basis during project implementation. III. DISBURSEMENTS 78. The percentage of expenditures to be financed is 100 percent of the cost net of taxes and duties for consultants' services, training and seminars, and operating costs, and 100 percent of the foreign expenditures and 90 percent of the local expenditures for CETUD operating costs and works. 79. To facilitate disbursement and to ensure that funds are available on time to finance the costs of services to be provided under the project, the Government will establish a Special Account in a commercial bank on terms and conditions acceptable to IDA. The Special Account will be managed by the C'ETUD. The authorized amount of the Special Account is CFAF 400 million; request for replenishing the account will be submitted to IDA quarterly or at such intervals as IDA shall specify. 80. Disbursements will be made against standard Bank documentation, except for contracts of less than ljs$ 50,000 for individual consultants; US$ 100,000 for consulting firms; and US$ 200,000 for goods; and works, for which certified statements of expenditures would be used. These statements of expenditure will be subject to review by supervision missions and periodic financial audits. The minimum application size for payments directly from the credit account will be US$ 50,000. Accounting IV. ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 81. The CETUD will maintain records and accounts adequate to reflect, in accordance with sound accounting practices, the operations, resources and expenditures in respect of the Project. Accounting procedures are defined in a manual prepared by the MELT, to be part of the Project Implementation Manual to be agreed by IDA. The project includes financing for hiring a qualified accounting firm, acceptable to IDA, to establish a computerized accounting system. Auditing 82. The signature of a three-year contract with the project auditors is a condition of Credit effectiveness. During negotiations, agreement has been reached to: a) have the records and accounts referred to in the preceding paragraph for each fiscal year audited, in accordance with international auditing principles consistently applied by independent auditors acceptable to IDA;

22 18 b) furnish to IDA as soon as available, but in any case not latter than six months after the end of each such year, the report of such audit by said auditors, of such scope and in detail as IDA shall have reasonably requested; c) furnish to IDA other information concerning said records and accounts and the audit thereof as IDA shall from time to time reasonably request; and d) have the records and accounts of the Special Account audited in accordance with paragraphs (a) through (c) above: (i) every four months during the first twelve months after the Effective Date; (ii) every six months during the second twelve months after the Effective Date; and (iii) thereafter, annually until the completion of the Project; and furnish such audits to IDA within two months following the end of the period audited. 83. For all expenditures with respect to which withdrawals from the Credit Account were made on the basis of statement of expenditure, the Borrower shall: a) maintain or cause to be maintained, records and accounts reflecting such expenditures; b) retain, until at least one year after IDA has received the audit report for the fiscal year in which the last withdrawal from the Credit Account or payment out of the Special Account was made, all records (contracts, orders, invoices, bills, receipts and other documents) evidencing such expenditures; c) enable IDA's representatives to examine such records; and d) have the records and accounts of the statements of expenditure audited in accordance with paragraph a) above: (i) every four months during the first twelve months after the Effective Date; (ii) every six months during the second twelve months after the Effective Date; and (iii) thereafter, annually until the completion of the Project; furnish such audits to IDA at the latest within two months following the end of the period audited; and ensure that the report of such audits contains a separate opinion by said auditors as to whether the statements of expenditure submitted during the period preceding such audit, together with procedures and internal controls involved in their preparation, can be relied upon to support the related withdrawals.

23 19 SECTION C: IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING I. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 84. The CETUD will be responsible for the institutional and regulatory reform program including consulting services and training activities, in consultation with other interested Government agencies. AGET][P or another qualified agency will be responsible for civil works in pilot operations under an agreement with CETUD. 85. A Project Implementation Manual has been prepared to help the project coordinator (CETUD) implement and monitor the project. The plan includes all project procedures with IDA, standard bidding documents for consultants, the list of consulting services to be procured and the type of procurement, detailed project costs, terms of reference of the studies and support services to be carried out, and standard forms for progress reports. A draft of the Project Implementation Manual has been preparedfor negotiations and the final version of the Manual will be completed as a condition of credit effectiveness. Most terms of reference for critical project activities (financial advisors for the privatization of SOTRAC, institutional development studies) has been agreed with the Government during appraisal. Other terms of reference, letters of invitation and short-lists has been agreed during negotiations. 86. The organization of the first General Assembly of the CETUD leading to the appointment of the CE,TUD chairman is a condition of Credit effectiveness. The terms of reference of the CETUD chairman has been agreed during negotiations. He will be responsible for the administrative and financial coordination and management of the project. He will: (a) ensure that procurement documentation sent to the Bank complies with the directives and legal agreements; (b) monitor project execution and review progress in implementing the project, compliance with the implementation schedule, updating requirements, and implementation issues; and (c) make arrangements for Bank supervision missions and for mid-term review. The project will provide the goods necessary for project management and will finance incremental costs-trips, communications, purchase and maintenance of computers and salary of key staff under CETUD's contract. II. IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE 87. During negotiations, agreement has been reached on the implementation schedule of the project. A draft implementation schedule is provided in Schedule 9. It was prepared on the assumption that the credit would become effective on July 1, The project would be executed over a 36- month period, and the Credit would be closed by June 30, The CETUD Executive Secretary should: a) establish, within three months after the Effective Date, a short list of experienced consultants, acceptable to the Bank, qualified to carry out services under the Project; and b) furnish the Bank at yearly intervals a program of seminars, workshops and training for the next twelve months, acceptable to the Bank. Il. REPORTING AND MONITORING 89. During negotiations, agreement has been reached on the content and the timing of progress reports. A standard form of progress report will be included in the Project Implementation Manual.

24 20 The final form will be included in the Project Implementation Manual. Progress reports would be prepared quarterly and in advance of each Bank supervision mission. The reports would review progress on financial execution and studies. The Ministry of Equipment and Transport would submit an Implementation Completion Report to IDA no later than six months after the closing date of the Credit. IV. SUPERVISION PLAN 90. Bank staff input in the supervision of the project would take the following form: a) Portfolio management, procurement documents, terms of reference and reports (progress, final, studies, financial statements) would be reviewed at Bank headquarters. b) Field supervision. Missions would review the progress of technical assistance and studies in policy, institutional development and project implementation. Missions would monitor the impact of project activities and discuss action plans for implementing study recommendations. A supervision plan for the years is proposed in Schedule 11. V. MID-TERM REVIEW 91. Not later than December 31, 1998, the CETUD chairman would convene a workshop to review progress at midway through project execution. The workshop would be attended by representatives of ministries, local agencies, transport industry, operators, the Bank supervision mission and representatives of donor agencies active in the sector. The review process would include progress in meeting project's objectives, amounts and adequacy of local counterpart funding, especially those channeled through the FDTU, mechanisms to improve project implementation, including impact of the project on the urban mobility in Dakar. Performance indicators defined in the project preparation for monitoring the implementation of the reform will be used to assess the progress made. 92. The mid-term review would provide the opportunity for IDA to assess the Government continued commitment to the project's objectives and the reform in the urban transport sector.

25 21 REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) PROJECT SCH[EDULE 1: Institutional Reform - Establishment of Project Executing Agency (CETUD) A. Establishment, legal structure, organization, powers and functions of CETUD as institutional coordination agency CETUD, the Dakar Urban Transportation Executive Council (Conseil executif des transports urbains de Dakar), will have the legal status of a statutory body engaged in providing professional services. In the technical arena, it will come under the supervision of the Ministry of Land Transport and in the financial arena under that of the Ministry of Finance. It will consist of a Plenary Assembly presided over by a Chairman, and a Permanent Secretariat managed by a Chief Executive Officer answerable to the Chairman. CETUD has been established by act of the legislature and an accompanying implementing decree. The law has been voted on February 24, The implementing decree has been signed on April 8, In addition to its Chairman, the Plenary Assembly will consist of members of (a) state representatives, (b) representatives of the local authorities of the Dakar Region, and (c) representatives of transport operators and professional associations. The functions of CETUD, exercised on behalf of the state and its agencies, will be to: a) determine routes to be served and the technical means to be employed; b) draw up specifications, terms of reference and bidding documents; evaluate bids; award contracts to approved transportation enterprises; and monitor execution of such contracts; c) propose urban transportation tariffs and rate schedules; d) identify any public utility constraints and assess their possible financial implications; e) prepare and manage the budget of the Urban Transportation Development Fund, authorize expenditure of these resources, and where appropriate act to recover them; f) conduct studies, carry out training, information and promotion activities, and formulate proposals of all types to foster the harmonious operation and development of public transport in the Dakar Region; g) coordinate the different modes of transport, and arbitrate revenue sharing where integrated fares are in effect; and h) put forward proposals for the improvement of transport infrastructure, traffic flows, and road safety.

26 22 The Chairman, as the officer with ultimate responsibility for matters of administration and technical execution, will be expected to prepare and put into effect the decisions of the Plenary Assembly. He will perform his duties on a full-time basis. He will be appointed by the President of the Republic, on the recommendation of the Minister of Land Transport, from a short list of three names proposed by the Plenary Assembly. His term of office will be three years. CETUD will be endowed with an Urban Transportation Development Fund (FDTU, Fonds de developpment des transports urbains), resources whose administration and management will be subject to audit by the Public Enterprises and Statutory Bodies Audit Commission (Commission de verification des comptes des entreprises et etablissements publics). CETUD investment expenditure will be charged to the Urban Transportation Development Fund. After a period of three years from the date the implementing decree takes effect, CETUD operating expenses will also be charged to the Fund. During the project execution phase, most of the CETUD operating budget will be covered by the proceeds of the IDA credit. B. CETUD as project executing agency CETUD will serve as the executing agency for the project. In order to enable it to operate in accordance with private sector management principles, while at the same time retaining its legal status as a statutory body engaged in providing professional services, dispensation from the government procurement code to which this type of agency is subject will have to be obtained from the National Government Contracting Commission. A special CETUD account will be opened for the duration of the IDA project for disbursements in connection with goods, supplies, and services eligible for project funding. Where the execution of urban infrastructure works is concerned, CETUD will enter into an agreement with AGETIP delegating project contracting authority to the latter. In addition to the required audit by an IDA-appointed specialist of its specifically project-related disbursements, CETUD will also be subject to audit by the Public Enterprises and Statutory Bodies Audit Commission. Pending appointment of the Chairman of the CETUD Plenary Assembly, the Minister of Land Transport may appoint an acting Chief Executive Officer ("Secretaire Executif")by ministerial order. The Permanent Secretariat of CETUD will consist, in addition to the Chairman, of a Chief Executive Officer, three senior specialists in the transportation field (an economist, an engineer, and a legal expert), an administrative assistant and bookkeeper, two secretaries, and a messenger. With the exception of any acting Chief Executive Officer appointed to serve temporarily during the project start-up period, Secretariat personnel will be appointed and dismissed by the Chairman, who will hold ultimate authority within CETUD. Employment contracts will be governed by the general law and by the specific laws pertaining to labor matters. In order to lay the foundations for permanency in the core staff team, and to enable performance results to be evaluated, each employment contract will provide for a probationary period of six months. The professional profiles for the three senior specialist positions will be the subject of terms of reference included in the procedures manual. The Permanent Secretariat will be run on private sector management lines, subject to such budgetary checks and controls and audit requirements as may be prescribed by law or under the IDA Credit Agreement. A proportion of the total Secretariat payroll may be earmarked for performance-related bonuses, to be awarded-in keeping with the performance indicators detailed in Schedule 7-after the first 18 months of Secretariat operations (i.e. as of December 31, 1998) and after

27 23 36 months (i.e. as of June 30, 2000). The final details of this payroll bonus system has been finalized during negotiations with IDA and will be included in the Project Implementation Manual. During the project period, CETUD, through its Permanent Secretariat, will pursue a program of studies, training, and sensitization and promotion activities related to public transportation, as per the list appearing in Annex 1. In doing so, it will make use of outside specialists, prescribing the methods by which their services are to be provided and evaluated. The project execution manual will contain terms of reference for the major studies and training plan. One of the main functions of the Permanent Secretariat will be to seek ways to achieve substantial improvements in the volume, flows, safety and effectiveness of public transportation in the Dakar metropolitan area. As part of the project, the Secretariat will have access to means of technical audit that will enable it to measure developments in the transportation picture in the Dakar region, and also in Thies and Kaolack with regard to road safety. IDA attaches great importance to success in the following project-related areas: (i) sustainable development of the institutional expertise "stored" in CETUD; (ii) greater professionalization of leading public transportation enterprises; and (iii) development of a sustainable partnership between private sector and public sector (state and local authorities) with regard to planning, regulation, coordination and financing in the urban transportation sector.

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29 24 REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) PROJECT SCHEDULE 2: THE URBAN TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENT FUND General principles; objectives Establishment of the Urban Transportation Development Fund (FDTU) will enable the Dakar Urban Transportation Executive Council (CETUD) to mobilize the funding needed to reform urban transportation and inaugurate a new strategy for the sector. The general principles underlying the establishment of FDTU, which mean moving away from funding; allocated entirely by the public sector, are: (i) direct collection of resources from sector economic agents and users or beneficiaries (in the broad sense) of urban transportation, without an added lax burden; (ii) provision and guarantee of adequate funding based on a sustainable flow of resources; and (iii) achievement of an economic and social impact commensurate with what contribuitors to FDTU and the users of urban transportation services can afford. Sector economic agents will have guarantees regarding the uses made of FDTU resources, in the sense that as participants in the Plenary Assembly of CETUD, on an equal footing with representatives of the public sector, they will have an impact on: (i) decisions affecting intervention and investment programs; (ii) evaluation of the results of these programs; and (iii) decisions to reshape or adjust these programs over time in accordance with changes in sector needs and the volume of resources mobilized annually. The legislation establishing FDTU will specify contributors, resource categories, methods of setting resource requirements, types of expenditure eligible for funding, and procedures, checks and controls applicable to utilization of resources. The legislation itself and its implementing decree, the latter needed principally to spell out regulations and arrangements for the collection of resources, will be enacted in good time prior to the scheduled CETUD start-up date. Origin and level of resources Origin of resources. FDTU resources, reflecting the partnership principles governing CETUE), will come from three sources: (i) the state, including the proceeds of bilateral and multilateral lending; (ii) the urban local government entities belonging to the Dakar Region; and (iii) the major sector economic agents, in particular urban transportation enterprises, insurance companies, the automobile guarantee fund, real estate developers, and Dakar metropolitan region employers. This partnership arrangement is patterned on the example provided by other major institutional entities, in the sens,e that economic agents will contribute to reform and improvement of the urban transportation sector in proportion to the costs generated by their own activity in the sector and to the benefits they will derive from an improved urban transportation system, and in terms of their specific professional standing (fewer accidents, worker access to places of employment, real estate appreciation generated by availability of a nearby public transportation network, etc.).

30 25 Level of resources. Without waiting for the National Assembly vote on FDTU and CETUD enabling legislation, the Government of Senegal decided in December 1996 to allocate CFAF 400 million a year to CETUD for a period of five years from In other words, CETUD would have a total of CFAF 2 billion with which to sustain FDTU, at least over the period Once in full operation, FDTU can be expected to command a minimum of CFAF 1.2 billion annually, given the potential contributing ability of its partners. Expenditures The key objectives of the project are: (a) reinforcement of the institutional expertise and management capabilities of sector agents, with a view to reform of the sector; and (b) an investment program that will result in improved sector performance. Actions will be selected on the basis of their potential for providing urban transportation users with better service at affordable prices and under improved safety conditions. The following categories of expenditure will draw FDTU funding: (i) urban transportation promotion campaigns, especially in the areas of road safety and user information; (ii) training programs for sector agents; (iii) infrastructure works; and (iv) CETUD running costs. During the projectexecution period, most CETUD administrative expenses will be covered by the project. The types of investment eligible for FDTU funding will be infrastructure works to improve sector functioning -- in particular: renovation and construction of bus stops and bus shelters, line terminus facilities, traffic management measures, works to improve both passenger and pedestrian safety. An inventory of investments examined by the mission focuses on: (i) the "visibility" of investments to transport system users and the public in general, and the leverage effect of sector works and their incorporation as parts of the transportation system; and (ii) physical criteria, chiefly in terms of the extent to which works are scaled to be within the scope of local SMEs, whether they are highly labor-intensive or not, and the execution periods required (6-8 months). During the project period, some works will be executed on the basis of contractual arrangements for the delegation of contracting authority from CETUD to AGETIP. Management and supervision Establishment of effective coordination (CETUD) among the various economic agents in the sector will improve the overall management and programming of sector actions and strengthen local sector management/administrative capabilities. FDTU will be under the supervision of CETUD and its Plenary Assembly, with the latter discussing investment priorities and programming in light of the combined flow of contributions from the public sector and sector economic agents. Mobilization of funds and deposit of them in the FDTU banking account opened in the name of CETUD will guarantee resource availability. Since FDTU administrative matters will be handled entirely by the CETUD Secretariat, they will occasion no specific operating costs. Government oversight of CETUD and FDTU, conducted on an ex post basis, will (i) leave to sector agents the responsibility for identifying what investments are necessary and deciding what levels of resources are required to attend to these priorities, and (ii) ensure that resources are utilized in accordance with the regulations issued pursuant to CETUD and FDTU enabling legislation and decrees. Specifically, provisions prescribing mandatory checks and controls will be embodied in the law and decree governing FDTU.

31 26 As far as internal supervision arrangements are concerned, the CETUD procedures manual will set olit rules and arrangements for FDTU financial audits. Timetable Maturation of resource flow pattern. At the start of the project, most funding will be from the State, allowing participation by sector economic agents and users to grow progressively. The increasing volume and sustainability of contributions from sector agents should mean that a new balance can gradually be struck in the funding flows coming from FDTU's three partner groups. Contribution phases and levels. A first phase is expected to be completed by December 31, 1998 with authenticated collection in the FDTU bank account of an annual contributions figure (at least CFAF 400 million) drawn from local governments and sector economic agents jointly. In the course of the third year of the project-execution period and not later than June 30, 2000, each of the three partner groups (state, local governments, and sector agents) will assume responsibility for an equivalent amount in FDTU resources (i.e. 3 x CFAF 400 million at least), thereby assuring total annual financing of CFAF 1.2 billion once the full-operations stage has been reached.

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33 27 REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) PROJECT A. Olperational performance SCHEDULE 3: THE SOTRAC: A COMPANY PROFILE SOTRAC, created in 1971, is a 65-percent state-owned company (with foreign partners sharing the remaining 35 percent), operating in the greater Dakar area including Pikine and Rufisque. Originally, SOTRAC was given a 15-year monopoly for public urban transport within the greater Dakar limits. However, the existence of the private sector (Cars Rapides) was finally officially acknowledged in The three first contrat-plans from 1981 to 1990 suspended this monopoly by defining specific financial, economical, and technical commitments between SOTRAC and the government in order to improve the operation of public transport services to be provided by SOTRAC. The fourth contratplan , no longer referred to the monopoly concept and explicitly recognized the existence of the private sector. The contrat-plans have never been properly implemented: delays in payment of compensations by the State, postponement of purchase of buses and equipment by SOTRAC, absence or incomplete payment by SOTRAC of some taxes and duties, have provided a "vicious circle" of commitments never fully respected and cross-debts incompletely paid by each party at the contract. In 1995, SOTRAC had 2,400 employees, 67 percent of them being directly related to fleet operations, 20 percent to the technical services and the remaining 13 percent to administrative management support. Basically, SOTRAC receives its revenue from fares collected on the buses and from governmental fare subsidies. The government pays SOTRAC a lump sum operational subsidy to compensate for imposed low fares, and additional compensations for the reduced fares granted to students and for the free transport to uniformed patrons. The share of revenues from reduced fares has reached 61 percent in The Communaute Urbaine de Dakar (CUD) which is also committed to help cover the operation deficit of SOTRAC has never done so in reality. SOTRAC pays only about 7 percent of the total taxes on fuel, equipment and parts, the remaining balance being deferred due to other cross-debts with the government. The government still tampe:rs with SOTRAC's own strategies by regulating routes and fares, thereby contributing to operation deficits. The bus fleet has progressively decreased from 505 buses in 1987 to 200 end of The majority of the fleet consists of S-105 type Saviem or RVI buses of 100 places and of 3 articulated PR-180 buses of 180 places. The SOTRAC network consists of 23 bus lines; nine of which are urban, representing 194 kilometers, the 14 remaining being suburban, representing 311 kilometers. In the urban area, all the bus lines end in the center core of Plateau, the street network being dense enough to allow SOTRAC to provide satisfactory service to the area. During peak hours, however, the frequency of service is insufficient for the demand. The SOTRAC passenger distribution by ticket type indicates that only 39 percent of the passengers are private patrons paying full fare, whereas the remaining 61 percent consists of: (a) government employees and students-children of government employees and retirees benefiting from

34 28 reduced monthly fare subscriptions; (b) uniformed patrons; and (c) SOTRAC agents and their family members benefiting from free access. Such an important 61 percent captive share, for which SOTRAC is eventually compensated by the government after lengthy delays, is a poor incentive for higher productivity practices since the competing private sector is essentially shut off from it. B. Financial performance Because of the steady decline in market share against the "Car Rapides" and individual means of transportation, SOTRAC revenues have not kept pace with inflation. In 1994, revenues in CFAF were only 8.4 percent above 1993 revenues whereas average inflation measured as increase in the consumer price index was 35 percent during that year. Operating expenses increased by only 5.3 percent in 1994 in spite of major increases on certain imported entrants such as fuel (43.8 percent increase for that item in 1994 over 1993) but this moderation in increase in operating expenses was obtained in part through the deferral of certain purchases such as spare parts which show an increase of 49.1 percent in 1995 over 1994 after an increase of only 9.6 percent in 1994 over As a result of this catch-up effect, operating revenues represented only 73.4 percent of operating expenses in 1995, the worst performance since 1991 when the same ratio was 73.1 percent. With a negative operating cash flow of CFAF 1,755 million in 1995 and a total negative operating cash flow of CFAF 8,000 million during the five-year period from 1991 to 1995, the financial situation is now unsustainable and SOTRAC is technically bankrupt. As a result, the company was unable to renew its fleet of buses and had accumulated substantial arrears with the Government and with other suppliers or short-term creditors as of December 31, 1994, date of the latest balance sheet made available to the Bank. On that date, SOTRAC had CFAF 7,949 million of short-term liabilities to the Government, essentially import duties on vehicles and spare parts, and CFAF 6,617 million of short-term liabilities to other creditors. The largest part of import duties and taxes were forgiven through a compensation agreement signed between the company and the Ministry of Finance on November 24, According to this agreement, CFAF 6,457 million of taxes and duties due to the Government were forgiven as a compensation for the costs incurred by SOTRAC in the exercise of its obligations as a supplier of a public service regulated by the Government. A complete Statement of Income for the period and an analysis of the SOTRAC Balance Sheet for the period of is provided below.

35 29 Statement of Income 199M Revenues from Operations Passenger Revenues, Standard Fare 5,737 3,804 4,056 3,538 3,038 Passenger Revenues, Reduced Fares 6,396 4,855 4,989 6,289 5,897 Other Revenues from Operations 1,618 1, Total Operating Revenues 13,751 9,756 9,575 10,379 9,513 Share of Revenues from Reduced Fares 46.5% 49.8% 52.1% 60.6% 62.0% Operating Expenses Personnel Expenses ,165 5,134 5,467 5,313 Spare Parts 2,057 1,315 1,011 1,108 1,652 Fuel 1,697 1,245 1,314 1,889 1,716 Taxes and Import Duties 2,754 1,515 1,423 1, Interest Charges Other Charges 1,971 1,352 1,792 1,611 1,508 Depreciation 2,288 1,804 1,826 1,738 1,700 Total Operating Expenses 18,813 12,554 12,659 13,335 12,968 Net Operating Income (Loss) (5,062) (2,798) (3,084) (2,956) (3,455) As a Percentage of Operating Revenues (36.8%/6) (28.7%) (32.2%) (28.5%) (36.3%) Ratio Operat. Revenues/Operat. Expenses 73.1% 77.7% 75.6% 77.8% 73.4% Non Opeirating Income (Loss) 222 (208) 1 (388) n.a. Corporate Income Tax (1) (1) (1) (1) n.a. Net Incotne After Tax (4,841) (3,007) (3,084) (3,345) n.a. Operating Cash Flow (2,774) (994) (1,258) (1,218) (1,755) As a % ofrevenues (20.2%) (10.2%) (13.1%) (11.7%) (18.4%) Balance Sheet Assets Land and Buildings, Net Value 1,190 1, Fleet of Vehicles, Gross Value 15,012 15,061 14,727 Less Depreciation 8,631 9,884 10,699 Fleet of Vehicles, Net of Depreciation 6,381 5,177 4,028 Other Fixed Assets, Net 1,626 1,258 1,027 Total Fixed Assets, Net 9,197 7,528 6,040 Inventor, Net of Provision Receivables, Government Receivables, Other 1,895 1,821 1,772 Bank and Cash Total Assets 11,646 10,672 9,592 Net Worth and Liabilities Capital and Legal Reserve 3,073 3,073 2,934 Accumullated Losses (3,073) (6,105) (9,363) Net Worth 0 (3,032) (6,429) Long Te:rm Debt 1,924 1,649 1,455 Accounts Payable, Govt 5,695 7,250 7,949 Other Short Term Liabilities 4,027 4,805 6,617 Total Net Worth and Liabilities 11,646 10,672 9,592

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37 30 REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) PROJECT SCHEDULE 4: THE FUTURE OF SOTRAC - ANALYSIS OF SCENARIOS The different scenarios Five alternative scenarios were analyzed and discussed with GOS. The strengths and weaknesses of each scenario were evaluated on the basis of: (a) its consistency with the objectives of the CAS relevant to the SOTRAC case (completion of the reform and promotion of competition and of the private sector within a regulatory framework), with the objectives of the urban transport reform as set forth in the letter of sector policy of September 25, 1996, (put the urban transport sub-sector on a sound footing to increase its efficiency in a sustainable way) and with the development objectives of the proposed project; (b) the expected benefits and costs; and (c) the potential risks. The five scenarios which were examined are: (i) maintenance of the status quo; (ii) full privatization of the operation and ownership of the SOTRAC bus fleet; (iii) privatization of the management of SOTRAC through a management contract signed with an independent private management company; (iv) outright liquidation of the company (similar to the case of SOTUC, the public bus company which was liquidated in Cameroon because of a lack of any viable alternative and absence of a political commitment to reform the company) and leaving the provision of public transport entirely to the "Cars Rapides" and transport services which might be provided by the informal sector; and (v) full privatization of management and operations but (whole or partial) ownership of the bus fleet to rest with a leasing mechanism independently managed by a private management company under a management contract. As a result of the evaluation, it was concluded and agreed with the GOS that the first four scenarios (status quo, full privatization, management contract and outright liquidation) were either not realistic at this time, not viable, or brought limited benefits relative to the current situation, whereas the merits of the fifth scenario (full privatization of operations and separate ownership of bus fleet, also referred to as "the Leasing Scheme" below) justified its support by the GOS which confirmed the intention to promote this scenario in the Letter of Sector Policy issued in September A summary of the first four scenarios and a more detailed analysis of the Leasing Scheme are found below. Option 1: Maintaining of the status quo This option is inconsistent with the policy adopted by GOS which among other things, provide a reform of the PEs and, specifically, for a restructuring of SOTRAC to improve the efficiency and quality of services. Neither is it sustainable in the long-term since, over the last few years, SOTRAC has operated with a negative cash flow which reached CFAF 1,678 million in 1994, that is 16.2 percent of revenues. Accordingly, it is highly likely that the company will be unable to repay the CFAF 2,637 millions of principal installments on its long and medium-term which fall due during the three years of the contrat-plan.

38 31 Option 2: Fullprivatization of the company Description of the option. Under this scenario, a private operator, selected through open competitive bidding, would purchase SOTRAC as a going concern, including the bus fleet and all other assets and liabilities. The private operator would enter into a concession agreement with the GOS in which he would undertake to provide a certain public transport service in Dakar for a period of, say, 10 years, in accordance with agreed specifications in exchange for charging a predetermined fare to the users of the service. The private operator would have the sole responsibility for making and financing the necessary investments for the renewal or the expansion of the bus fleet. Benefits. This option presents several advantages: (a) once implemented, the structure of the new setup is relatively simple with the operator who has the responsibility of providing the public transport service and the GOS which grants the concession and has the responsibility for deciding the specifications of the services to be provided as well as the tariffs and investment policies; (b) the financing of the renewal or expansion of the fleet is no longer an issue since the private operator ("the concessionaire") undertakes to raise whatever amount of financing is necessary to acquire the vehicles which are required to provide the services according to specifications; (c) in theory, it would be expected that the lowest fare possible would be obtained from the winning candidate as a result of the competitive bidding process; and (d) efficiency gains would be expected and obtained through transparent, objective and fair process of periodic revision of fare structure. Weakness. This option is not realistic for the following reasons: (a) based on the experience of PEs in SSA, and in Senegal in particular, it is highly unlikely that private operators would be willing to finance a major investment in a context where the perceived commercial, political, policy and foreign exchange risks are still high; (b) even assuming that such a private operator could be found, his cost of financing would be prohibitively high and would therefore be reflected in its fare policy, with an increase in the tariffs. Option 3: Management contract Description. The GOS enters into a management contract with a private operator, selected through open competitive bidding, who undertakes to operate the bus company, on a day-to-day basis in accordance with certain specifications and performance criteria in exchange for receiving a management fee which would be tied to his performance. In contrast to option 2, the private operator does not assume any financial risks beyond the risk of not receiving the part of the management fee tied to his performance. The financial risk of operating SOTRAC and of financing the required investments remain with the GOS. The structure of SOTRAC ownership would remain unchanged or even extended State ownership in the equity of the company. Benefits. The main advantages are that (a) the system of performance contract and of remuneration partially tied to the performance of the private operator would encourage efficiency gains in the operation of SOTRAC and an improvement in the quality of service; (b) the risk for the private manager is much lower that under option 2, and, accordingly, it would be reasonable to expect that many more candidates would be interested in bidding due to the limited risks associated with such a scenario (no investment will be required to the private operator). Weakness. (a) The private operator providing only his management expertise, his contribution to the reform of the sub-sector will be limited; he will be inclined to limit his efforts only to actions which affect directly his performance under the management contract; this is borne out by the

39 32 experience with similar management contracts in SSA; accordingly, it is unlikely that a major improvement towards bringing sub-sector to a sounder footing can be achieved in this way. (b) The problern of financing the renewal of the bus fleet and of bringing the sub-sector closer to financial equilib:rium still remains. Option 4: Outright liquidation of SOTRAC Description. Under this scenario, SOTRAC would be liquidated and the provision of the public transport services left to "Cars Rapides", taxis and informal transport operators. Weakness. (a) The experience with similar situations in other SSA countries has proven that the deficit of transport supply following the liquidation of an urban transport company is not covered by other "spontaneous" transport services; the former users of the public transport services end up having to go on foot to their work. (b) The expected costs in terms of traffic congestion, accidents and damage to the environment through the increase in the number of private and public small capacity transport vehicles in the urban area is high. Option 5: The Leasing Scheme General structure. Under this scenario, the responsibility for the provision of the public bus service would be separated from the ownership of the (whole or partial) fleet of buses and transferred to a privately owned operating company ("the operator") selected through open competitive bidding whereas the ownership of the (whole or partial) bus fleet would be transferred to a leasing company ("the Leasing Company") majority-owned by GOS but managed by a private leasing manager, also selected through selected competitive bidding. The (whole or partial) fleet of buses would be leased to the Operator under long-term lease contracts. The operator would be awarded the concession of public bus transport services in Dakar by the GOS (the CETUD in that case) under a concession agreement ("the Concession Agreement"), signed for an initial period of three years renewable by mutual agreement for similar periods. In addition to the concession contract, the operator would enter into a three-year leasing agreement (the "Leasing Agreement") with the Leasing Company. The renewal of the fleet would be financed by the Leasing Company with the initial financial support of donors. Thus, the Leasing Company would have access to sources of financing on favorable terms which, in turn, would translate into lower leasing costs and bus fares for the users. An alternative scenario within this Leasing Scheme would be to have a specific credit line open, under certain conditions, to the private operators. In that case, the management of the credit will be kept in the private banking system. The project is due to help the GOS to identify which scenario would be the more suitable, cost effective and socially equitalble. Private Operator. The Operator would be a new company to be created by the private operator and entirely owned by private shareholders. The majority of the equity capital of the operator would be owned by a strategic investor defined as a company or a consortium of companies of which a significant member having direct proven experience in the operation of an urban bus company in similar conditions. 10 to 15 percent of the equity capital of the operator will be reserved to its staff who will thus have the option of subscribing to the capital of the company on credit at a 20 percent discount from the subscription price for the other initial shareholders. The Operator will have the right, but under no obligation, to purchase from the present SOTRAC whole or part of the equipment and inventory.

40 33 The SOTRAC staff will have the right to be considered first for recruitment by the private operator, if qualified; indeed, the Operator will be under no obligation to recruit the personnel of SOTRAC if the determines, in his sole judgment, that the SOTRAC candidate does not have the competence and experience required for the position to be filled. All SOTRAC personnel which will not be recruited by the operator will be eligible to the benefits and services under the social plan to be prepared and implemented by the GOS with the technical support of the project. The Leasing Company. The Leasing Company would be a new company to be created with an equity capital to be initially majority-owned by the GOS and will be operated under the supervision of the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Budget. Other financial institutions, Senegalese nationals, and donors would be eligible to hold shares in the company. The long-term objective of the sector reform would be to privatize entirely the Leasing company and make it fully-free standing and solely responsible for raising on the national or regional capital markets all funds necessary for financing its leasing portfolio. However, it is not realistic to expect that such objective can be reached within the next few years. The general manager of the Leasing Company will be a professional with proven experience in the leasing field preferably in an emerging capital market. He will be selected through international competitive bidding. The Leasing Company will have the option of purchasing at market price the part of the existing SOTRAC bus fleet still in good operating condition. Only the buses which the Operator has agreed to lease will be purchased by the leasing Company, according to technical specifications prepared by the Operator who will identify the kind of buses he needs to meet its operational and financial objective. A fleet management policy will be the basis of its commercial activity. In accordance with this fleet management policy, the renewal of the fleet could be made would with new buses as well as second-hand ones. Leasing Agreement. Under this agreement to be signed between the Operator, the Leasing Company and the GOS, the Operator undertakes to pay monthly lease payments to the Leasing Company in exchange for the right to use the fleet of buses being the object of the Leasing Agreement. Monthly lease payments for new buses will be calculated in a such a way that they cover the following costs: (a) amortization of the acquisition price of the buses over an useful economic life deemed to be 10 years; (b) interest charges on the debt; (b) management fee to the private manager of the Leasing Company, which fees will include the costs of general administration and bookkeeping of the Leasing Company; (d) the remuneration of the equity capital of the Leasing Company. Under the Leasing Agreement, the Operator is responsible for assuming the costs of operation and maintenance of the leased buses and buying adequate assurance cover to them. When a bus is fully amortized under the lease, the Operator has the option to buy it at a price equal to the residual value of 5 percent of the acquisition price. Monthly lease payments for used buses are calculated according to the same principle as for new buses but the amortization period is diminished pro rata to reflect the remaining useful economic life of the used buses instead of 10 years. Benefits of the Leasing Scheme. The proposed scheme would: (a) permit a radical restructuring of bus operation in the Dakar urban area since SOTRAC, as it exists today, would be liquidated at the same time as the operating company would be created; (b) provide for a sharing of risk between the GOS and the private sector since private shareholders of the operating company assume the operational and financial risks; (c) facilitate the initial financing of new investment by donors on favorable terms; (d) allow the whole private sector, including the Cars Rapides, to get the access to credit facilities and therefore make possible the renewal of their fleet, which is unfeasible under the present financial conditions market; (e) bring more transparency to the sub-sector by ending the current

41 34 confusion between the various roles now played by the GOS which is, at the same time, operator, controlling shareholder, regulator and important client of the urban bus services. Issues requiring special attention and mitigating factors. The main issues are: (a) the relative complexity of the scheme at the time of the set up; technical support to the GOS will be financed under the proposed project to help support the scheme and investigate the kind and scope of ownership of the leasing company or the arrangement to be made under the credit line; once the private operator and the private management of the Leasing Company have been selected and are in place, monitoring of the scheme and enforcing the various contract are within local capacities; and (b) the risk of inadequate competition in the selection of the private operator; measures will be taken to ensure that maximlum publicity is made around the selection both in Senegal and abroad.

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43 35 REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) PROJECT SCHEDULE 5: IMPACT OF THE PRIVATIZATION OF SOTRAC ON THE TREASURY The figures below indicate the amount of subsidies and tariffs compensations due to be paid by the State and the CUD to SOTRAC for the period in accordance with the latest Contrat-Plan signed on December 1995 between the State and SOTRAC. Due to the policy reform under discussion during the first 1996 semester and confirmed by the Letter of Sector Policy issued in September 1996, this contrat-plan has not been implemented and is considered as defacto void. The present SOTRAC will be legally liquidated before the formal award of the concession to a private operator. Amount in million of currency units, unless otherwise indicated CFAF US$ Total Total 3 years 3 years Budgeted subsidies Tariff Subsidies as Compensation or Cap on tariffs Subsidies to partly offset operating costs Total Treasury Subsidies to be paid by the Urban Community Total Treasury andurban Community Total SOTRAC operation charge Total Subsidies as % of operation charge 23% 19% 18% 20% 20% Passengers years (millions) Average Subsidies/Passenger

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45 36 REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) PROJECT SCHEDULE 6: SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROJECT Introduction: Public transport as a tool for social and economic development Public transport services, whether run by the private or the public sector, play a key role in the access of an effective mobility for the urban population. This is particularly relevant in sub-saharan countries, where most of the urban population do not have access to private cars. The alternatives for urban trips are either a trip on foot or the use of public transport services, including, to a certain extent, collective taxis. Such a situation is more specifically relevant in the case of Dakar, because of (a) the spatial configuration of the peninsular topography of the metropolitan area, with an average distance trip of 9 kms and an average population density of 2,200 persons per square kilometer; (b) the urban population growth averaging at 5% a year, with 6% in the case of the suburban area, such as Pikine and Rufisque; and (c) the traditional dependency of the population on the provision of bus services, with 70% of the motorized transport being made by public transport. In that sense, Dakar has a specific "culture" or "tradition" of public transport in the urban landscape of sub-saharan Africa, through a combination of buses and railways services. Although urban transport is not a social service by itself, it provides access to job opportunities, markets for goods, schools, hospitals and other educational/social facilities. It also plays a key role in the urban productivity --in the case of Dakar, a survey carried out in 1992 shows that public transport in the metropolitan area of Dakar accounts for 7% of the Senegalese GDP. It also provides jobs to an estimated 32,000 persons, 30,000 of which work in the private sector, the Cars Rapides (small scale entrepreneurs, the so-called informal sector), compared to the 38,000 that are employed in the formal/traditional sector. The informal sector of the Cars Rapides provides employment mostly to the urban poor (e.g. drivers, fares collectors, technicians, tires and spare parts retailers). The type of urban transport that people use in their daily business is determined by the availability, reliability and affordability of the different modes. Any disruption in the quantity, quality and alffordability of the public transport services has a direct impact on the existence of the system and the accessibility for those who depend the most on public transport services, the urban poor. The impact and the role of public transport services in the urban mobility has to be considered on the supply as well as the demand point of view. A. Supply side: the number of buses of SOTRAC as well as those of the Cars Rapides has significantly dropped for the last few years, under the combined effect of (a) increased cost of some imported spare parts and fuel in the aftermath of the FCFA devaluation in January 1994; (b) aging of the bus fleet with an average age of 70% of the buses over ten years old and a decline in the maintenance of vehicles; (c) a drop in the profitability of Cars Rapides for the last years, due to the economic crisis and the strong competition in the sector. Because of its cost structure, the urban transport sector did not benefit from the FCFA devaluation. Some costs (fuel, tires) went up, while the fares did not increase at the same level. Hence, the revenues from operation do not allow the renewal of the fleet which is fully amortized.

46 37 B. Demand side: while the population of the metropolitan area of Dakar grew at roughly 5% per year for the last decade, total daily mobility did not increase at the same pace -- based on the population growth, the total number of passengers/trips was supposed to be multiplied by 2.6 between 1980 and 2001, when in fact, it only grew by 1.8 between 1980 and 1995 due to the drop in supply. It is estimated that around 2 million urban trips are made daily in the metropolitan area of Dakar, half of which on foot, the other half using motorized mode of transport. This mobility ratio (2 passengers/trip/day) is relatively low compared with other cities in sub-saharan Africa (2.8 in Bamako, 2.7 in the case of Nairobi, as an example). Social impact of the project The project is expected to have an impact on the economic and social conditions of the urban population of Dakar through the following main changes. Access to public transport services. The project is expected to allow operators to keep coping with the increase in demand for urban transport. The services provided by the Cars Rapides will be keeping up with the increase in demand, especially in the suburban areas. Overall, the urban transport services will be extended to benefit those who need them the most. As far as SOTRAC is concerned, the new private environment is due to give an impetus to the quantity and quality of services to be provided. As of today, these services are declining (poor quality and reliability) since most of the users ( 61 %) represent a "captive market" (students, civil servants who benefit from subsidized or free tariffs). The cost of these services are expensive for the regular users. The regulated competition in which the future private management will operate will have a positive impact on the fare structure through better maintenance, financial and operational management. Finally, the configuration of the urban transport network for the urban metropolitan area of Dakar will be updated under the project's activities (latest exercise done in 1990) and will be extended to urban and suburban areas which are not yet reached by operators. Safety of the urban mobility. The combination of a road safety action plan with a metropolitan traffic management scheme is due to have a positive impact on the frequency and seriousness of road accidents. In 1995, 390 persons were killed in traffic accidents occurring in the metropolitan area of Dakar, which is an important figure compared with the average standard. Most of the accidents involved public transport users (Cars Rapides mostly) and pedestrians. Studies have shown that migrants from rural areas represent a significant share of the road's victims, since they are not familiar with the motorized traffic of the urban environment. The road safety action plan will (a) target mostly public transport drivers and pedestrians; and (b) be based on extensive users' participation and awareness campaigns (students) in order to properly address the issues (for example, safety lessons which will be prepared for the Cars Rapides drivers will be given in the local language, the Woloff; in order to have the messages correctly delivered). Employment generation: (a) the owners of the Cars Rapides will be able to renew their fleet on a sustainable basis through the leasing scheme. Rather than declining, the number of services offered by the operators will increase, providing additional employment opportunities for low-income population or at least preventing a decline on the effect of the urban transport crisis; (b) the execution of the minor civil works, such as construction of bus/stops, business arrangements, bus terminals, will be carried out using labor-based methods, which will promote the development of local small and medium size contractors. The scope of the works will be tailored to benefit local contractors.

47 38 REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) PROJECT SCHEDULE 7: PERFORMANCE INDICATORS Une grille d'evaluation des performances du projet figure ci-apres. Elle sera utilis6e pour juger l'etat d'avancement des reformes a deux dates cles du projet: la mi-parcours (30 decembre 1998) et la fin de l'execution du projet (30 juin 2000). Afin de permettre de mesurer l'impact des actions men6es, les parametres chiffrees de la grille de reference (tel le nombre d'accidents corporels des douze demiers mois precedant la mise en application du projet) sera etablie lors de la mise en vigueur du projet, debut juillet Les memes criteres de reference seront utilises durant le projet pour mesurer son impact sur la mobilite urbaine. Un audit technique leger sera effectue aux deux p6riodes concemrnes (fin decembre 1998 et juin 2000). Le degre de r6alisation des indices de performance est pris en compte en terme de bonus salarial du Secretariat permanent du CETUD, y inclus son President selon des valeurs ponderees qui ont ete finalisees lors des negociations du projet. Le systeme de bonus salarial est inclus dans le Manuel d'execution du Projet. Les crit&es de performance retenus sont fonction des objectifs du projet. Ces criteres sont: -Critares d'evaluation Au 31 decembre Au 30 juin - - : Reduction de pourcentage du nombre des accidents corporels 10% 20% impliquant les transports en commun et les deux roues dans les agglomerations urbaines de Dakar, Thies et Kaolack Augmentation --en pourcentage-- de la vitesse commerciale sur 3 5% 5% axes lourds empruntes par les transports en commun par route durant les heures de pointe Axe I :Route de Rufisque entre le pont de Pikine et le carrefour Cymos; Axe 2: Rue 13 entre Castor et Malick Sy; Axe 3: Route des Niayes entre l'ecole Keur Pauline et le Pont de _]'Amitie Augmentation du taux de satisfaction de la clientele des 30% 50% transports en commun dans l'agglomeration de Dakar Montee en charge des contributions du secteur et des 50% 100% collectivites locales r6unies par rapport a la contribution actuelle,de l'etat: (400 millions annuellement) en pourcentage de la 'contribution cumulee des collectivites locales et du secteur Augmentation de la part de marche des transports en commun 10% 20% par rapport aux autres modes de transport Reception provisoire des infrastructures urbaines prevues au 60% 100% calendrier d'execution globale du projet en matiere d'infrastructures

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49 39 REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) PROJECT SCHEDULE 8: LETTER OF SUBSECTOR POLICY Schedule 8 is the translation into English of the original Letter signed on September 25, 1996 by H.E.M. Landing Sane, Minister of Equipment and Land Transport and H.E.M. Lamine Mamadou Loum, Minister of Budget.

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51 40 REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL I LETTER OF SUSBSECTOR POLICY ON URBAN TRANSPORTATION IN SENEGAL L- ~~~~~~~~~~~~SEPTEMBER 25, 19

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53 41 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. NEED FOR REFORM A. URBANIZATION B. THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND C. THE INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK D. HUMAN RESOURCES II. III. REFORMS ALREADY IMPLEMENTED OBJECTIVES OF THE REFORM A. INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK B. FINANCIAL CONTEXT C. RESTRUCTURING OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION D. HUMAN RESOURCES IV. ACTIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT A. IN THE INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FIELD B. IN THE FINANCIAL FIELD C. WITH REGARD TO THE RESTRUCTURING OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION D. WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RESOURCES V. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS REFORM

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55 42 INTRODUCTION Availability of public transportation services is vital for movements and travel of persons in urban areas and, therefore, for the economic and social development of cities. This is particularly true in the case of Sub-Saharan African cities, where more than half the urban population is without access to individual means of transportation. From this standpoint, the deficiencies of the transportation services represent a cost for the user, for the community and for the city as such. In the context of urban Sub-Saharan Africa, Dakar is in a special position as regards public transportation, in light of the range of services it has available (SOTRAC, "Cars Rapides ", "Petit Train Bleu", taxis, etc.) and the large number of users of these services (the last statistics to hand show that 63 percent of motorized trips are made by public transportation). However, this special position is in jeopardy. The fact is that the shortcomings of the present system point up the fragility of the formulas in use and the pressing nature of the problems connected with the growth of the urban population's transportation needs: absence of intermodal coordination, institutional weaknesses, poor financial and operating performance of SOTRAC combined with its inability to maintain its equipment in good shape, aging of the vehicle fleet, and the inadequacy of the funding allocated for a policy aimed at promoting public transportation. Realization of the urgency of finding lasting solutions to the structural problems of urban transportation led the Senegalese authorities to organize a seminar at Saly in May 1992 on urban transportation in Senegal and subsequently to set up a "Comite de Suivi des Transports Urbains" [Follow-up Committee on Urban Transportation] charged with drawing up an in-depth reform of urban transportation. The formation of this committee made up of the chief parties involved in urban transportation in Senegal is an original experiment in the context of the Sub-Saharan African Transport Prograim (SSATP) coordinated by the World Bank. The objective of the SSATP is to spur reforms of public transportation, which represent the sole option capable of providing a lasting solution to the growing urban transportation problems in Sub-Saharan Africa. In July 1994 the committee produced a sector policy document on urban transportation in Senegal giving a detailed description of the parties concerned, their role and interfaces and summarizing the studies made of the sector in recent years. In order to define the actions to be undertaken, the committee and the World Bank decided to prepare a document summarizing the committee's work and setting out scenarios for the main components of the actions. This was also the option adopted by the French Ministry of Cooperation, which has assisted the committee in its work since its establishment. This document was used as a resource for the seminar held in Dakar in September 1995, at the end of which the decision was taken to move ahead with the formulation and implementation of new reforrms in Senegal's urban transportation sector. The effectiveness of these reforms and their swift implementation are essential for ensuring the sustainable development of urban transportation in Senegal which is one of the Government's priorities.

56 43 L NEED FOR REFORM This need is evidenced by the present urban transportation crisis and the efforts made so far by the State to improve the sector's efficiency. This crisis derives from the rapidly quickening pace of urbanization and growth of the cities, especially Dakar, the inadequacy of the institutional and legal framework and deficient control of the supply of and demand for transportation. A. Urbanization The urban transportation sector in Senegal, and in Dakar in particular, has been deteriorating for several years as a result of the combined effect of the rapid rate of urbanization, the economic crisis that has persisted since the end of the 1970s and, more recently, the January 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc. The devaluation suddenly pushed public transportation rates up 20 percent, which has been a severe blow in the Dakar metropolitan area especially where a large proportion of the population is greatly dependent on these services. Out of Senegal's total population of 8 million, 3 million live in the country's urban areas. Of these 3 million, it is estimated that 55 percent to 60 percent (i.e million) live in the Dakar metropolitan area. The two next-largest cities are Thies and Kaolack, with populations of 210,000 and 180,000 respectively, from which it will be apparent that the transportation problems are much more acute in Dakar than in the regional population centers. The Dakar metropolitan area is made up of three main hubs: Dakar-Ville (Plateau and Grand- Dakar), Pikine-Guediawaye and Rufisque, located successively from west to east over 30 km of the length of the Cap-Vert peninsula. Of the area's 1.8 million inhabitants (1993 figure), about 800,000 (or 44 percent) live in each of the first two hubs, and the remaining 200,000 (12 percent) in Rufisque. Unfortunately, the distribution of employment is quite different from that of the population, so that there is very considerable daily commuter traffic from Pikine-Guediawaye and Rufisque (58 percent of the population) to Dakar-Ville (where 64 percent of the jobs are). In the same way, within Dakar-Ville itself similar daily commuting occurs between Grand-Dakar (residential neighborhoods) and the Plateau (business district). B. The Supply and Demand The data are very uncertain and unreliable for the regional cities because they have not been updated. For Dakar, the most recent modal studies are based on surveys made in It is accordingly essential to integrate the updating of these modal distribution studies with the reform of urban transportation policy. It is estimated that one half of the daily trips made in Dakar are made by motorized means, while the other half are made basically on foot. The motorized movement index in 1989 was estimated at 1.02 motorized trips per inhabitant and per day. In 1980, 39 percent of trips were of the home-school category, which was almost twice the number of home-work trips (20 percent), reflecting the young age of the population (58 percent under 20 years). Part way between these two categories came home-other destinations at 30 percent, which probably included trips to markets, shopping centers and other social and administrative services, etc.

57 44 The breakdown into motorized trips versus trips on foot indicates that the majority of homeschool and home-other destinations trips are made on foot (67 percent and 52 percent respectively) whereas by far the majority of home-work trips are motorized (74 percent). While the motorized trips are distributed roughly evenly among these three categories (29 percent, 26 percent and 29 percent), 84 percent of trips on foot are made for home-school and home-other destinations reasons (52 percent and 32 percent respectively), which suggests that efforts should be made to improve the comfort and safety of foot trips to schools and to the various other destinations: markets, shopping centers, social services, etc. It should be added that for 1980, the majority (53 percent) of the trips by motorized vehicles in Dakar were made by public transportation, and II percent by taxis. Dakar is a major urban area in which public transportation plays a very important role, which puts it iin a special situation compared with most of Sub-Saharan Africa's larger cities As a result, there is a public transportation "culture" and "tradition" which is specific to the Dakar area. Back in 1949 the Compagnie Sen6galaise des Transports en Commun [Dakar Public Transportation Company] was already in existence. With the passing of the years, changes in legal status combined with the winding up of existing companies led successively to the creation of: the Garage du Gouvernment [Government Transportation Service] the Regie des Transports du Senegal (RTS) [Senegal Transportation Corporation] * and finally, SOTRAC. In addition, "Cars Rapides" have been in operation since 1947, and the "Petit Train Bleu" (PTB) since These three modes (SOTRAC, the PTB and "Cars Rapides ") today form the backbone of Dakar's public transportation, with the "Cars Rapides" handling over 66 percent of present daily trips and SC)TRAC less than 30 percent, while the PTB accounts for a marginal share (about 2 percent). The total supply offered by these three modes is characterized primarily in terms of inadequacy compared with demand from both the quantitative and the qualitative standpoints. In point of fact the sector's future could be severely compromised by the age of its vehicle fleet, which is generally not renewed but rather run into the ground because of the difficulty of obtaining funding for new equipment. This is particularly the case with the "Cars Rapides ", the average age of which is over 16 years. The same is also true of SOTRAC, whose fleet is shrinking steadily (average vehicle age close to 11 years). The various performance contracts signed with SOTRAC between 1980 and the present time, together with the express bus renewal programs of 1976 and the contracts on assistance for the PTB,

58 45 have failed to produce lasting and efficient solutions for meeting demand since the necessary associated measures based on an overall approach to the sector were never taken. In the transportation sector the State's divestiture policy has resulted in a steady whittling down of operating subsidies, which by now have been completely eliminated. However, this new policy has not unfortunately been accompanied by replacement mechanisms and SOTRAC, like all Sub-Saharan African urban transportation enterprises, has found it difficult to adapt to its new operating context in the setting of a difficult economic situation (low user incomes which limit any possibility of raising rates, soaring production costs following the devaluation, scarcity of funds in the capital market, etc.). The studies included in the transportation plan for Dakar have focused on: the absolute necessity of a global approach covering the three modes in the quest for solutions to the transportation problems; organization of transportation services based on the rail line, which follows the configuration and spatial development of the city; - integration of the three modes as a prerequisite for generation of a financial and social return by the urban transportation system. As regards the total transportation supply, no reliable statistics are currently available. However, according to recent estimates of vehicle fleet in Senegal and Dakar, about 85 percent of the 100,000 vehicles estimated to be operating in Senegal are concentrated in the Dakar region. The motorization rate in Dakar is consequently put at 47 vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants, i.e. 3.5 times the average for Senegal as a whole (13 vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants). However, it is likely that this rate may be declining, especially in the suburbs of Dakar where the population is continuing to grow and is greatly dependent on public transportation. It is also important to note the small (but nevertheless significant from the road safety standpoint) number of horse-drawn vehicles in Rufisque and Thies, of taxi-mopeds in Kaolack and even handcarts for goods in Dakar-Ville. Following the liberalization of imports in 1986, the rate of new vehicle registrations in Senegal has been rising steadily. However, the majority of the vehicles concerned are used ones, since new cars and trucks are beyond the means of most of the urban population. As a result, 60 percent of the used autos are currently over 10 years old. This trend could not only lead to road safety problems, but also atmospheric pollution as well. At the same time, consumption of (leaded) gasoline, which declined by about 4 percent per year from 1986 to 1992, now seems to have stabilized. On the other hand, diesel consumption has risen at 7 percent per year. It is currently estimated that about 20 percent of private cars are diesel powered. In terms of infrastructure, road transportation is the primary mode used. Rail transportation plays a marginal role, but only in Dakar where the PTB serves about 2 percent of public transportation needs.

59 46 In Dakar, the configuration of the roads is such that many traffic hold-ups occur, which slows down the operating speeds of the vehicles using them. The roads and streets are narrow, poorly drained and in bad shape, while also lacking in signs. The at times unplanned urbanization that is taking place is a serious obstacle to the design and construction of anything approaching real freeways. In the other regional cities the roads are in an advanced stage of deterioration. Only the State roads that run through these cities are in an acceptable condition. C. The Institutional and Legal Framework The institutional framework of a city's urban transportation system has a major influence on the organization of the transportation services provided. Unfortunately, however, in most cases the importance of this framework is often underestimated by decisionmakers when seeking solutions to problems, because it is generally considered to be a factor exogenous to the transportation system. Moreover, this institutional framework, which at times has roots that go back deep into the past, induces specific ways of thinking and forms of behavior that are hard to modify and adapt to the development of the sector. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that for some time now the Senegalese authorities have been aware of everything that is at stake and the problems involved. They have accordingly embarked on a detailed reassessment of the institutional and legal framework of urban transportation in Dakar; - first in 1989, in the context of the study of the rail solution recommended in the conclusion of the Dakar transportation and traffic plan; - and secondly, in the context of the Saly Portudal seminar held in 1992 (choice of Dakar as an SSATP pilot city) on urban transportation with a view to formulation of a policy on urban transportation. The findings of the diagnostic study made to that end by the Coordination Unit for the studies for the suburban rail project and the SSATP "Comite de Suivi" revealed that: too many jurisdictions are involved in the supervision of the enterprises, the oversight of the transportation industry, the issuance of the required permits, control of road traffic and rate-setting, with a resultant lack of coordination among those concerned; the central level plays a heavy role in decisionmaking, which tends to seriously crimp the system's efficiency; the legal set-up is not clearly defined and is characterized by inadequacy of economic resources and outdated regulation with a low level of compliance.

60 47 D. Human Resources Because of the lack of sufficient specialists, technical assistance is commonly the resource used for certain services. This gives rise to problems in monitoring actions carried out in the context of development projects. The qualifications of the private-sector parties involved, especially the operators and drivers, are substandard. There are no arrangements for ensuring the continuous training of these individuals. This situation is an obstacle to implementation of a permanent policy. In conclusion, the impact of urbanization, especially in the Dakar conurbation, contributes to increasing of the urban population's need for transportation services and underscores the necessity of public transportation trends that will probably continue and even intensify in the immediate future. In response to this transportation crisis in the Dakar conurbation, the State of Senegal began laying the foundations for reform of this sector some ten or so years ago. II. REFORMS ALREADY IMEPLEMENTED Several international assistance programs, organized by the World Bank and including land transportation in Senegal, have been implemented prior to this reform. The Urban Management and Development Project made it possible, among other things to launch the following transportation projects in Dakar: (a) restoration and improvement of key stretches of urban roadway; (b) execution of a Traffic and Parking Master Plan in the Plateau; and (c) program of assistance and technical training of the former Traffic Bureau of the Dakar Urban Community (DUC). The Transport Sector Adjustment Program is designed to assist the State in rehabilitation and maintenance of the main infrastructure for road, rail, port and air transportation, in order to improve the efficiency of the sector, although essentially aimed at the national system. Finally, it was following the Saly seminar of May 1992, organized under the aegis of the World Bank and the French cooperation agency in the context of the SSATP-Urban transport program, that the process of this reform was actually started. A follow-up committee ("Comite de Suivi") on Urban Transportation was formed by Ministerial Decree of May 27, This committee is made up of representatives of the various State services concerned with public transportation together with representatives of the private, semipublic and public sectors, of transportation service operators and of the Dakar Urban Community. In July 1994 this committee produced a "Sector Policy Document on Transportation in Senegal", which was finalized in June 1995 in a summary report on Urban Transportation Sector Policy that was discussed at a seminar held in Dakar on September 20 and 21, 1995.

61 48 This seminar was organized under the topic "Deciding for Urban Transportation", in order to emphasize the Senegalese authorities' desire to implement the reforms identified by the Follow-up Committee without delay. All parties involved in the question of urban transportation in Dakar have in fact stressed the urgency of implementing a reform plan. The Government created for this purpose a budget item to enable the Fund to commence operations in 1996 with an appropriation of CFAF 400 million earmarked, initially, for funding investments aimed at improving the quality of urban travel and transportation. A consensus subsequently emerged for increasing the amount of this budget item so as to enable it to function on a more permanent basis. This is the context in which the three main parties involved in the sector -- the State, the local authorities and the transportation professionals -- will contribute to this Fund and will decide in mutual agreement on how its resources will be used. The realization of the need for urgent action is also behind the adoption of a global sector approach to its institutional and regulatory environment, the permanent financing of its expenses and upgrading of the public transportation services. It is this global approach that the Senegalese Government intends to promote in the implementation of a new urban transportation policy. This approach is based on the three key components of a development strategy for the sector: the institutional and legal framework the financial framework, and the restructuring of public transportation. III. OBJECTIVES OF TIHE REFORM The fundamental objective of the reform is to rehabilitate the urban transportation sector in Senegal with a view to bringing about a sustainable improvement of its efficiency. This objective is consistent with the State's overall policy, defined by the Ninth Guidance Plan for Economic and Social Development ( ) and which includes among other aims: - "making the regulatory framework better suited for promoting healthy competition among the different parties and favorable to increased investments", - "developing private enterprise and furthering the changes in the field of selforganization", "improving the quality of State actions in the provision of services and basic infrastructure".

62 49 Four fields are essentially involved: - the institutional and legal framework, - the financial framework, - the restructuring of public transportation, - the development of human resources. A. Institutional and Legal Framework The reform aims to: combine, under the aegis of one single specialized institution, the preparation of a consistent road safety policy for Senegal's different cities and Dakar in particular by means of, inter alia, establishment of a program for the gathering and continuous monitoring of accident statistics; remedying the dispersal of authority and responsibilities among the various central and local institutions, which encourages inaction and means that no single authority assumes final responsibility for urban transportation or public transportation services in Dakar; organizing better coordination of the formulation of urban transportation sector policy, with the participation of the DUC as an essential prerequisite. B. Financial Framework The reform aims at: - financial reorganization of the sector to make it more attractive; - ensuring better distribution of the financing of transportation among the different direct and indirect beneficiaries; - identifying the cost of the public-service constraints and having this cost borne by the party or parties concerned (State, local authorities, enterprises or any other structure); - putting the appropriate human, financial and logistic resources in place with a view to autonomous management of the system. C. Restructuring of Public Transportation This reform aims at: improving the conditions for organization and operation of the different modes of public transportation; organizing urban space;

63 50 making the PTB ("Petit Train Bleu") the backbone of urban transportation in Dakar by reevaluating its legal status and studying different options for operation that could serve to improve its autonomy and productivity with an eye to coordination and complementarity with the other modes involved (SOTRAC and "Cars Rapides"); upgrading the express bus sector by helping it to structure itself into a more homogeneous organization and to reestablish its financial credibility; reevaluating the legal and operating status of SOTRAC, according to different scenarios all designed to clarify the relations with and role of the State in SOTRAC, after first having cleared its financial debts and obligations. D. Human Resources The reform in this sphere aims at: developing a system of user information; developing the sector's human resources (public and private). IV. ACTIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT A. In the Institutional and Legal Field The Government will set up a Conseil Executif des Transports Urbains de Dakar - CETUD [Dakar Urban Transportation Executive Council] having the legal status of a professional public establishment. The CETUD will be under the technical oversight of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Land Transportation and will have extensive operating autonomy and the financial and legal resources necessary for the accomplishment of its task. The CETUD's main responsibilities will be: - determination of the routes to be served and the technical means to be employed; - drafting of specifications, terrns of reference and calls for bids, evaluation of bids, conclusion of agreements with the approved transportation enterprises and verification of the performance of contracts; - proposal to the competent authorities of a new rate-setting policy for transportation; - identification of the public-service constraints and determination of any financial compensation to be provided; the preparation and management of the budget of the Urban Transportation Development Fund and authorization of expenditures and collection of revenues;

64 51 formulation of studies and of training, information or promotion actions and of all types of proposals designed to foster the harmonious operation and development of public transportation in the Dakar region; intermodal coordination, with special reference to the allocation of receipts in the event of adoption of an integrated tariff. The CETUD will be made up of a Plenary Session and a Permanent Secretariat. The Plenary Session, the Council's deliberation and decisionmaking organ, headed by a Chairman and made up of equal numbers of the members listed below: - members representing the State; members representing the local authorities of the Dakar region; members representing the economic operators and users of public transportation in Dakar. The Permanent Secretariat, the Council's implementing body, will be under the authority of the Chairman of the CETUD and provided with the technical means to perform its functions. B. In the Financial Field To ensure better distribution of the financing of transportation among the different parties involved, the Government has undertaken to set up an Urban Transportation Development Fund. The Fund will be established in the legal form that will ensure the greatest flexibility in its operation. It will be used to finance the following: - actions to strengthen road safety and improve traffic movement; - the operating and equipment expenditures of the CETUD; - infrastructure and urban facilities targeted on the promotion of public transport services; - operating expenditures and costs relating to studies and information training and promotion activities concerning urban public passenger transportation; - expenditures for which the State is responsible under the agreements signed with the operators of urban public passenger transportation services. The CETUD, in virtue of its structure, will be the body that will identify and mobilize the resources and approve the Fund's expenses.

65 52 It is understood that the cost of the public-service constraints is to be the subject of a separate allocation and shall be borne by the requester of such service, whether the State, the local authorities, enterprises or any other structure. The CETUD will itself directly, or through the intermediary of the most appropriate agency, collect and manage these contributions and the compensation payments resulting from the publicservice constraints. C. With Regard to the Restructuring of Public Transportation In this connection the Senegalese Government undertakes to implement the following: Redefinition of the routes of SOTRAC, the "Cars Rapides" and the PTB with a view to intermodal complementarity; Renewal of the equipment of SOTRAC, the "Cars Rapides " and the PTB; Reorganization of the operation of the PTB (coordination with the domestic train service, through service, specification of its legal position with respect to the parent company, i.e. the Societe Nationale de Chemins de Fer du Senegal - SNCS [Senegalese National Railway Company]; - Furtherance of the physical and tariff-related integration of the different modes, starting with integration of SOTRAC with the PTB and then proceeding progressively to the express buses, which will be encouraged to adopt new operating methods; - Redefinition of the tariff policy for urban passenger transportation. To this end the Senegalese Government intends to divest itself of its interest in SOTRAC's capital to the benefit of the private sector. The approach adopted will separate the investment from the operating account by means of the establishment of two separate structures. On the investment side, the leasing formula will be adopted to enable operators to find the financing needed for procurement of transportation equipment by means of monthly payments. This leasing formula, based on concessional credits, will enable repayment schedules that are more attractive than longer-running bank credit. Under this arrangement, it is expected that it will also be possible to take into account the needs of the "Cars Rapides " bus operators, who will be able to benefit from the leasing company's assistance to renew their fleet. The State will study how best to utilize this formula, either by establishment of a new company in which the State will hold a majority interest, or else by setting up a specific line of credit at the level of the banking system and financial establishments specialized in leasing. Regarding the operating side, the State's short-term objective is privatization of SOTRAC; the residual minority interest reserved for the public sector will then be limited to that of the Dakar local

66 53 authorities involved. In the event that the leasing option is adopted, the leasing company would also be able to hold an interest in the capital. During a transitional phase, the State will take all necessary steps required for setting up the new private operating company. D. With Regard to Human Resources The Government intends to implement an entire training program for the public and private parties involved in the sector: The purpose of this program will be to assure: - the training of public transportation drivers, and especially the drivers of "Cars Rapides" buses, in order to improve the technical safety of the vehicles, traffic safety and observance of the regulations; - the training of police officers in strategies for traffic and parking control and road safety together with the preparation of accident reports; - the training and information of the public, especially pedestrians; - the professional training of transportation operators in operations and financial management; - the professional training of municipal and central government staff in the planning of urban transportation, the engineering aspects traffic movement and transportation technologies. V. FINANCIAL IM4PLICATIONS OF THIS REFORM The implementation of this reform will require financial resources to cover: the SOTRAC social plan that would follow from the restructuring of the company; the renewal of SOTRAC's fleet; the renewal of the "Cars Rapides" buses, that will be put into operation in a totally reorganized market capable of enabling operation of the service to generate a return (redefinition of SOTRAC's routes and the areas that SOTRAC and the "Cars Rapides" will develop, driver training, etc.); rehabilitation of the urban road infrastructure forming the main public transportation routes in all the pilot cities, viz. Dakar, Thies and Kaolack; the procurement of new or rehabilitated railway equipment, together with the other facilities and infrastructure (track renewal, construction of interchange stations) for the PTB in order to enable it to provide a through service and to form the backbone of Dakar's urban transportation by means of an efficient pricing system;

67 54 the establishment of a modem vehicle testing station; road safety infrastructure; training. For the Government of Senegal The Minister of Infrastructure and Land Transportation The Minister of Economy, Finance and Planning [Stamp: Ministry of Infrastructure and Land Transportation Republic of Senegal The Minister] /s/landing SANE [Stamp: Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning Republic of Senegal The Minister in charge of the Budget] /s/mamadou LOUM

68

69 55 REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) PROJECT SCHEDULE 9: IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE Cat6gorie et nature des activitis T Debut d'activitis Fin : -d'activit6s 1. Travaux infrastructures urbaines Equipements et consommablesecurite routiere 1/10/ /6/2000 Complement d'amenagement des terminus existants (ilot Petersen et Lat 1/7/ /6/1998 Dior) Amenagement d'une centaine d'arrets sur les axes prioritaires 1/7/ /6/2000 Am6nagement d'un terminus peripherique A Gwediawaye 1/7/ /6/1999 Amenagement de 11 stations pour Cars Rapides 1/1/ /12/1999 Amenagemnent de 100 arr8ts (encoches) sur 2 axes prioritaires 1/ /12/1999 Traitement. de points noirs ( y inclus Thies et Kaolack) 1/7/ /6/2000 Amenagenient de deux terminus pour autobus A Pikine et Yoff Village 1/1/ /6/1999 Amenagenient pistes securitaires Thies et Kaolack 1/9/ /12/ Fournitures Equipements et consommablesdcurite routiere 1/7/ /6/2000 Equipemenits et consommables CETUD 1/7/ /6/ Services de consultants et etudes 3.A. Support au d6veloppement institutionnel Analyse des conditions et modalites d'adaptation du nouveau cadre 1/10/ /12/1997 reglementaire des transports en commun Appui institutionnel aux organisations professionnelles (proprietaires de 1/10/ /6/1998 Cars Rapides, chauffeurs, operation dite de regroupement), en y incluant l'analyse des conditions d'amelioration des conditions sociales des chauffeurs de Cars Rapides Analyse des conditions du developpement du reseau ferroviaire urbain, 1/7/ /12/1998 y compris modalites de commercialisation du PTB. Audit technique du respect du cahier des charges et des performances 1/10/ /12/1998 du concessionnaire prive. 1/10/ /12/1999 1/10/ /12/2000 Audit financier du concessionnaire prive, y compris modalites 1/10/ /12/1998 d'adaptations eventuelles 1/10/ /12/1999 1/10/ /12/2000 Audit financier du mecanisme de "leasing" 1/7/ /9/1998 1/7/ /9/1999 1/7/ /9/2000

70 56 3.B. Etudes de developpement irnstitutionnel Etude de restructuration globale du reseau des transports en commun, y 1/10/ /9/1998 compris analyse origine-destination et hierarchisation du reseau, la quantification de l'offre de transport, definition d'amenagements de corridors de desserte pour les Cars Rapides, definition des amenagements et equipement des points d'arret et enquete fonciere Analyse des couts de dysfonctionnement du systeme de transport urbain 1/10/ /3/1998 dans l'agglomeration de Dakar, en 2 phases 1/1/ /6/2000 Analyse des consequences financieres des contraintes de service public 1/7/ /6/2000 et identification des compensations tarifaires eventuelles et modalites de r6partition Assistance juridique et financiere A la montee en charge du FDTU 1/7/ /9/1998 1/7/ /9/1999 Actualisation du plan d'actions en matiere de securite routiere, y 1/10/ /12/1997 compris cahier des charges des actions de sensibilisation et formation en milieu scolaire 3.C. Execution du projet Analyse de la faisabilite et des modalites d'integration tarifaire 1/10/ /3/1999 Etude d'impact des actions de sensibilisation en mati&re de s_curit6 1/10/ /12/1998 routiere 1/10/ /12/2000 Analyse des conditions techniques de la codification du reseau et de la 1/10/ /12/1997 decentralisation du systeme informatique de securite routiere Assistance au regroupement des operateurs de Cars Rapides 1/7/ /12/1998 Etude des modalites de respect des normes techniques propres A 1/1/ /6/1999 1'exploitation des transports en commun, y compris analyse de faisabilite de la creation d'un centre de contr6le technique. Audit exterieur du projet 1/7/ /9/1998 1/7/ /9/1999 1/7/ /9/2000 Etude relative a I'elimination des points noirs en matiere d'accidents 1/1/ /9/1998 Informatisation du fichier de l'offre de transport 1/10/ /12/1997 1/10/ /12/ D. Etudes de faisabilite technique des infrastructures urbaines Etude de faisabilite et mission de supervision/controle des travaux d'infrastructures 4. Formation et seminaires Seminaire de lancement du projet 1/7/ /9/1997 Programme de formation des chauffeurs professionnels 1/30/ /6/2000 Modules de fonnation en matiere d'exploitation et de gestion financiere 1/7/ /6/2000 pour les proprietaires de Cars Rapides Campagne de sensibilisation grand public sur securite routiere 1/7/ /6/2000

71 57 Formation de cadres techniques et financiers municipaux en matiere de 1/1/ /3/1998 planification des transports urbains 1/1/ /3/1999 1/1/ /3/2000 Renforcement de la capacite technique et de gestion du ministere des 1/1/1/998 30/3/1998 Transports en matiere de transports urbains 1/1/ /3/1999 1/1/ /3/2000 Diagnostic des besoins en renforcement des expertises des collectivites 1/1/ /3/1998 locales autres que celle de l'agglomeration de Dakar en matiere de 1/1/ /3/1999 transports urbains 1/1/ /3/2000 Programme d'information/formation des principaux intervenants du 1/1/ /3/1998 secteur en rnatiere de transports urbains 1/1/ /3/1999 1/1/ /3/ Preparation du projet Etude du perimntre de concession du futur operateur 1/3/ /6/1997 Audit financier et comptable de la SOTRAC 1/3/ /6/1997 Audit technique des actifs de la SOTRAC 1/3/ /6/1997 Assistance A la mise en place du mecanisme de "leasing" 1/3/ /6/1997 Assistance A la privatisation de la SOTRAC (appel d'offres) 1/3/ /6/1997 Mise en place procedure de contr6le du concessionnaire 1/3/ /6/1997 Etude sur la capacite de payer 1/3/ /6/1997 Support de communication a la reforme 1/3/ /6/1997 Assistance a l'identification des contributions du FDTU 1/3/ /6/1997 Frais de de]marrage du CETUD (y compris budget d'investissement, de 1/3/ /6/1997 demarrage et de fonctionnement sur une periode de six mois)

72

73 58 REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) PROJECT SCHEDULE 10: LIST OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES AND PROCUREMENT METHOD Travaux de genie civil Categories Montant Passation de Agence (US$) marche Amenagement terminus Petersen et Lat Dior 300,000 NCB AGETIP Centaine arrets sur axes prioritaires 400,000 NCB AGETIP Terminus p6ripherique a Guediawaye 200,000 NCB AGETIP 11 stations pour Cars Rapides 220,000 NCB AGETIP 100 encoches sur voies prioritaires 580,000 NCB AGETIP Amenagement terminus Pikine et Yoff Village 440,000 NCB AGETIP Traitement points noirs 200,000 NCB AGETIP Pistes securitaires Thies et Kaolack 200,000 NCB AGETIP Total travaux genie civil 2,540,000 Fournitures et equipements Equipernents et consommables securit6 routiere 203,000 NCB CETUD Equipenments et consommables CETUD 129,100 NCB CETUD Total fournitures et equipements 332,100 Service de consultants Support au de'veloppement institutionnel Analyse adaptation cadre reglementaire 87,600 SL CETUD Appui institutionnel conditions sociales Cars Rapides 48,300 SL CETUD Analyse developpement reseau ferroviaire SL CETUD Audit technique respect cahier charges 50,100 LC CETUD Audit financier concessionnaire prive 35,400 LC CETUD Audit financier societe leasing 44,400 LC CETUD Sous-Total 360,700 Etude de de'veloppement institutionnel Etude restructuration globale reseau 203,000 SL CETUD Analyse coots de dysfonctionnement 140,100 SL CETUD Analyse csq. financieres contraintes ser. public 67,800 SL CETUD Assistance mont6e en charge du FDTU 47,200 SL CETUD Actualisation plan securite routiere 27,700 SL CETUD Sous-Total 485,800 Exicution du projet Analyse faisabilite integration tarifaire 43,000 SL CETUD Etude impact actions sensibilisation sec. routiere 24,200 SL CETUD Analyse cdt. decentralis. fichier sec. routiere 17,100 SL CETUD Assistance regroupement Cars Rapides 17,100 SL CETUD Etude respect normes techniques 64,600 SL CETUD Audit exterieur du projet 91,800 LC CETUD Elimination points noirs 116,800 SL CETUD Informatisation fichier offre de transport 53,000 SL CETUD Sous-Total 427,600 Etudes et supervision travaux 254,000 NCB CETUD/AGETIP d'infrastructures urbaines Total services de consultant 1,528,100

74 59 Formation Seminaire lancement de projet 27,600 IC CETUD Programme formation chauffeurs professionnels 172,000 IC CETUD Formation proprietaires Cars Rapides 50,100 IC CETUD Campagne sensibilisation grand public 39,300 IC CETUD Formation exploitation privee infra. urbaines 28,200 IC CETUD Formation cadres municipaux 55,300 IC CETUD Formation ministere Transports 55,300 IC CETUD Diagnostic besoins expertises collect. locales 55,300 IC CETUD Formation intervenants 32,600 IC CETUD Total formation 515,700 Coats de fonctionnement Fonctionnement du CETUD 732,000 NCB CETUD Total couts de fonctionnement 732,000 Les coots n'incluent pas les revisions de prix et les divers physiques NCB = National Competitive Bidding SL = Short List LC = Least-Cost IC = Individual consultant

75 60 REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) PROJECT SCHEDULE 11: SUPERVISION PLAN En prenant pour hypothcse la mise en vigueur du projet le I er juillet 1997 et sa cloture en terme d'activites au 30 juin 2000, au terme d'une periode de 36 mois, le plan de supervision du projet par l'ida se presente comme suit: Periode Activites Type de qualification Staff IDA Missions.1 1 (semaines) (semaines) 1997 S6minaire de lancement de Specialiste transports urbains eme semestre projet Specialiste privatisation Specialiste passation marches Gestion du projet Examen du projet et des Specialiste transports urbains er semestre marches selon le Specialiste passation marches programme d'activites Gestion du projet Mission annuelle de Gestion de projet supervision 1998 Examen du projet et des Specialiste transports urbains eme semnestre marches selon le Specialiste passation marches programme d'activites et Specialiste privatisation evaluation mi-parcours Specialiste s6curite routiere Audit mi-parcours Gestion de projet Examen du projet et des Specialiste transports urbains ler semestre marches selon le Specialiste passation marches programme d'activites Gestion du projet Mission annuelle de Gestion de projet supervision 1999 Examen du projet et des Specialiste transports urbains eme semestre marches selon le calendrier Specialiste passation marches d'activites Gestion du projet Evaluation detaillee des Specialiste transports urbains ler semestre performances du projet et Specialiste passation marches des marches Specialiste securite routiere Specialiste gestion infrastructures Gestion du Projet TOTAL

76 I

77 MAPSECIQrN

78

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