Inequality and Aggregate Demand. November 2017
|
|
- Amy York
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Inequality and Aggregate Demand Adrien Auclert Stanford Matthew Rognlie Northwestern November 217
2 Inequality and macroeconomic performance Can rising income inequality cause poor macro performance? Two major arguments (Stiglitz, etc.): 1. MPCs are negatively correlated with income, so higher income inequality lowers aggregate consumption 2. If inequality comes from more volatile and uncertain incomes, it could raise precautionary savings Both supported by empirical evidence, both correct in partial eqbm
3 Inequality and macroeconomic performance Can rising income inequality cause poor macro performance? Two major arguments (Stiglitz, etc.): 1. MPCs are negatively correlated with income, so higher income inequality lowers aggregate consumption 2. If inequality comes from more volatile and uncertain incomes, it could raise precautionary savings Both supported by empirical evidence, both correct in partial eqbm Neither survives general eqbm in standard neoclassical models These forces lower real interest rates and raise investment
4 Inequality and macroeconomic performance Can rising income inequality cause poor macro performance? Two major arguments (Stiglitz, etc.): 1. MPCs are negatively correlated with income, so higher income inequality lowers aggregate consumption 2. If inequality comes from more volatile and uncertain incomes, it could raise precautionary savings Both supported by empirical evidence, both correct in partial eqbm Neither survives general eqbm in standard neoclassical models These forces lower real interest rates and raise investment We show that inequality lowers output if monetary policy is slow or unable to react to it (e.g. at the zero lower bound) Quantify the potential effect of 1 & 2 under various mp rules Investment usually falls ( paradox of thrift ) Depressed economy even in long run ( secular stagnation )
5 What we do Take canonical Huggett-Aiyagari model Add downward nominal wage ridigidites (DNWR) Parsimonious, allows focus on household demand Calibrate to 213 U.S. Binding zero lower bound (ZLB): r = π = i = % Mildly depressed employment L < 1 Main qstn: what happens if inequality unexpectedly rises further? Temporarily (income redistribution) Permanently (change in income process) under various assumptions about fiscal policy Key: binding ZLB + DNWR most of equilibrium adjustment happens via unemployment In particular steady state r fixed, L adjusts to clear markets
6 Long-run adjustment in asset market 1 Asset Demand Real interest rate r (bps) Asset Supply Total assets B + K
7 Long-run adjustment in asset market 1 Asset Demand Real interest rate r (bps) Asset Supply Total assets B + K
8 Long-run adjustment in asset market 1 Asset Demand Real interest rate r (bps) Asset Supply Total assets B + K
9 Long-run adjustment in asset market 1 Real interest rate r (bps) S Total assets B + K
10 Contributions 1/2 Foundation for the transmission mechanism of inequality to output via an aggregate demand channel We find that the effects of increasing inequality: are small when inequality = temporary redistribution are small when inequality = permanent redistribution (fixed effects) are potentially large if inequality = increasing risk Always depend on the degree of endogenous inequality and the fiscal response (government spending and public debt)
11 Contributions 2/2 Our results rely on a new two-step approach to quantifying magnitudes: Output effect = (GE multiplier) (PE sufficient statistic) Sufficient statistics are measurable: Short run: Cov ( ) MPC, dy Y Long run: elasticity of savings to idiosyncratic risk Multiplier characterizes the response to any aggregate demand shock Depends only on model parameters and policy
12 Related literature Incomplete markets, inequality, and aggregate savings Aiyagari (1994), Krusell-Smith (1998), Heathcote, Storesletten, Violante (21), Krueger, Mitman and Perri (215), Athreya, Owens, Schwartzman (214)... Interaction with nominal rigidities Guerrieri-Lorenzoni (215), Oh-Reis (213), McKay-Reis (216) Gornemann, Kuester and Nakajima (214), Sheedy (214), McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (215), Auclert (216), Werning (215), Kaplan, Moll and Violante (216) Ravn-Sterk (213), den Haan, Rendahl and Riegler (214), Bayer et al (214), Challe et al (215), Heathcote-Perri (216) Secular stagnation Eggertsson-Mehrotra (214), Caballero-Farhi-Gourinchas (216), Benigno-Fornaro (216), Eggertsson, Mehrotra, Singh and Summers (216) Sufficient statistics approaches in macro Shimer-Werning (29), Auclert (216), Berger et al (215)
13 Outline 1. Model and equilibrium definition 2. Calibration 3. Income inequality in the short run 4. Income inequality in the long run
14 Outline 1. Model and equilibrium definition 2. Calibration 3. Income inequality in the short run 4. Income inequality in the long run
15 Households Mass ρ(ω i ) of individuals of type ω i ex-ante identical within type, facing purely idiosyncratic risk idiosyncratic state σ it S, Markov process Λ (ω), at stat. distrib. combined state s it (ω i, σ it ) Separable preferences, constant EIS ν: u (c) = c1 ν 1 1 ν 1 Incomplete markets: bonds and shares + positive nw constraint max s.t. [ ] E β t u (c it ) t c it + b it + p t v it = y t (s it ) + (1 + r t 1 ) b it 1 + (p t + d t ) v i,t 1 b it + p t v it
16 Households Mass ρ(ω i ) of individuals of type ω i ex-ante identical within type, facing purely idiosyncratic risk idiosyncratic state σ it S, Markov process Λ (ω), at stat. distrib. combined state s it (ω i, σ it ) Separable preferences, constant EIS ν: u (c) = c1 ν 1 1 ν 1 Incomplete markets: bonds and shares + positive nw constraint max s.t. [ ] E β t u (c it ) t c it + b it + p t v it = y t (s it ) + (1 + r t 1 ) b it 1 + (p t + d t ) v i,t 1 b it + p t v it Perfect foresight: 1 + r t 1 = pt+dt p t 1
17 Households Mass ρ(ω i ) of individuals of type ω i ex-ante identical within type, facing purely idiosyncratic risk idiosyncratic state σ it S, Markov process Λ (ω), at stat. distrib. combined state s it (ω i, σ it ) Separable preferences, constant EIS ν: u (c) = c1 ν 1 1 ν 1 Incomplete markets: bonds and shares + positive nw constraint max s.t. [ ] E β t u (c it ) t c it + b it + p t v it = y t (s it ) + (1 + r t 1 ) b it 1 + (p t + d t ) v i,t 1 b it + p t v it Perfect foresight: 1 + r t 1 = pt+dt p t 1 Assets a i,t = b i,t + p t v i,t summary state, composition indifferent Household with a i,t holds fraction θ (a i,t ) in stocks Take θ ( ) directly from data
18 Household labor income: pre-tax Pre-tax labor income: { Wt z t (s it ) = P t e t (s it ) L t = 1 W t P t L t e t (s it ) γ (s it, L t ) L t 1 Wt P t real wage, e t (s it ) labor endowment, E I [e t (s it ) γ (s it, L t )] = 1 L t 1 fraction of aggregate endowment demanded by firms γ: incidence of employment L < 1
19 Household labor income: pre-tax Pre-tax labor income: { Wt z t (s it ) = P t e t (s it ) L t = 1 W t P t L t e t (s it ) γ (s it, L t ) L t 1 Wt P t real wage, e t (s it ) labor endowment, E I [e t (s it ) γ (s it, L t )] = 1 L t 1 fraction of aggregate endowment demanded by firms γ: incidence of employment L < 1 Equal incidence at L when γ (s, L) = 1 for all s Other cases: (in)equality multiplier
20 Household labor income: pre-tax Pre-tax labor income: { Wt z t (s it ) = P t e t (s it ) L t = 1 W t P t L t e t (s it ) γ (s it, L t ) L t 1 Wt P t real wage, e t (s it ) labor endowment, E I [e t (s it ) γ (s it, L t )] = 1 L t 1 fraction of aggregate endowment demanded by firms γ: incidence of employment L < 1 Equal incidence at L when γ (s, L) = 1 for all s Other cases: (in)equality multiplier e t main exogenous source of change in labor income inequality Proxy for many plausible underlying causes Can affect separately fixed effect, persistent, or transitory component
21 Household labor income: post-tax Post-tax labor income: y t (s it ) = T t + (1 τ t ) (1 τ r ) z t (s it ) Rate τ r earmarked for lump-sum rebate Tt = τ r (1 τ t ) E I [z it ] Govtt adjusts τt to satisfy its budget constraint
22 Household labor income: post-tax Post-tax labor income: y t (s it ) = (1 τ t ) (τ r E I [z it ] + (1 τ r ) z t (s it )) Rate τ r earmarked for lump-sum rebate Tt = τ r (1 τ t ) E I [z it ] Govtt adjusts τ t to satisfy its budget constraint (τ r t alternative exogenous source of change in income inequality)
23 Firms and factor markets Perfect competition, CRS production Y t = F (K t 1, L t ) No adjustment cost to labor: labor demand F L (K t 1, L t ) = W t P t Convex capital adjustment costs: investment demand ( ) 1 + ζ It δ = q t K t 1 with share price p t = q t K t. In steady state q = 1, F K (K, L) = r + δ. Dw wage rigidities: impose W t κw t 1, when binding L t < 1 Assume < κ 1: wages cannot fall too fast Why? NK sticky prices have counterfactual implications in HA models
24 Government policy and equilibrium Fiscal authority has budget constraint τ t W t P t L t + B t = G t + (1 + r t 1 ) B t 1 follows rules for spending and deficits G t Y ss = G ss Y ss ɛ GL (L t L ss ) B t B t 1 Y ss = ɛ DL (L t L ss ) ɛ DB B t 1 B ss Y ss Calibrate elasticities ɛ DL, ɛ DB, ɛ GL to historical U.S. experience cf fiscal rules literature (Leeper, Gali-Perotti, etc.)
25 Monetary policy Central bank sets nominal interest rate i t, follows either 1. Neoclassical rule: set i t to achieve L t = 1. Obtain real rate rt n. 2. ZLB rule: { ) } φ 1 + i t = max 1, (1 + r n t ) ( Pt P t 1 with φ > 1 (Taylor principle) 3. Constant-r rule 4. Simple Taylor rule in inflation and/or unemployment Equilibrium definition standard
26 Outline 1. Model and equilibrium definition 2. Calibration 3. Income inequality in the short run 4. Income inequality in the long run
27 Benchmark calibration Gross income process from Kaplan, Moll, Violante 216. Has form log e it = ξ it + χ it with ξ it persistent, χ it transitory. Matches: Earnings dynamics from W2 data (Guvenen, Ozkhan, Song 214) Cross-sectional earnings distribution without fixed effects τ r = 17.5% from Congressional Budget Office (26) Details Incidence rule γ(s, L) matches W2 worker betas from Guvenen, Schulhofer-Wohl, Song and Yogo (217) [GSSY] Alternative: equal incidence (γ = 1) Asset allocation θ (a) imported parametrically from 213 SCF Details
28 Calibrated γ function Elasticity of gross earnings to employment GSSY Equal incidence (γ = 1) Earnings percentile
29 Parameters Description Main calibration Target ν EIS.5 Standard calibration β Discount factor.962 r = ɛ K L elasticity 1 Standard calibration α Labor share 87.2% α = 1 (r + δ) K Y δ Depreciation rate 4.% NIPA 213 K Y Capital-output ratio 321% FoF hh. net worth 213 I Y Investment rate 12.8% δ K Y ɛ I Elasticity of I to q 1 Macro invtt literature i Nominal interest rate % ZLB r Eqbm real rate % TIPS yields 213 L Employment gap.975 CBO output gap estimate 1+i κ Wage deflation rate 1 1+r B ss Y Govtt debt 55.4% Domestic holdings 213 G ss Y Govtt spending 18.7% NIPA 213 ɛ GL Response of spending to L.1 Estimated fiscal rule ɛ DL Response of deficits to L.75 Estimated fiscal rule ɛ DB Response of deficits to debt.7 Estimated fiscal rule
30 Increasing labor income inequality (1/2) Recall income process: Our experiments change this to: log e it = ξ it + χ it log e it = ω i + A t ξ it + B t χ it C t for various paths (ω i, A t, B t ) that achieve target path for sd (log e it ) Ct ensures E [e it ] = 1 Main case: ω i =, A t = B t cf. Gottschalk Moffitt (1994), Kopczuk Saez (24) Alternatives: increase entirely due to ω i, A t, or B t
31 Increasing labor income inequality (2/2).96 US labor income inequality.92 Log points Year sd log earnings Calibration Short-run experiment Source for historical data: Song, Price, Guvenen, Bloom and von Wachter (216)
32 Increasing labor income inequality (2/2).96 US labor income inequality.92 Log points Year sd log earnings Calibration Short-run experiment Source for historical data: Song, Price, Guvenen, Bloom and von Wachter (216)
33 Increasing labor income inequality (2/2).96 US labor income inequality.92 Log points Year sd log earnings Calibration Short-run experiment Long-run experiment Source for historical data: Song, Price, Guvenen, Bloom and von Wachter (216)
34 Outline 1. Model and equilibrium definition 2. Calibration 3. Income inequality in the short run 4. Income inequality in the long run
35 Partial eqbm effect Consider first partial equilibrium effect, holding (r t, L t ) fixed Consumption Assets sd log earnings.6.96 Percent of s.s. output Percent of s.s. output Level Result 1: For any change in after-tax incomes dy i st E [dy i ] =, the partial equilibrium change in the path for C t is given by C t = Cov I (MPC it, dy i ) where MPC it = is i s spending at date t of date income. In particular, NPV ( C) =.
36 Evaluating C = Cov I (MPC i, dy i ) Quality of approximation within model? Date consumption effect dc, % Y Change in sd log earnings dσ Fit to data on joint distribution of (MPC i, y i )? (Use Italian SHIW 21) Sufficient ( statistic ) Value, Data Value, Model Cov MPC i, dy i 1 Y dσ.49.45
37 General eqbm effect under alternative monetary policies Percent of s.s. output Output Consumption Investment Government Spending Percent of s.s. output Government Bonds Capital.5.1 Employment vs s.s ZLB Real Interest Rate (bps)
38 General eqbm effect under alternative monetary policies Percent of s.s. output Output Consumption Investment Government Spending Percent of s.s. output Government Bonds Capital.5.1 Employment vs s.s ZLB Neoclassical Real Interest Rate (bps)
39 General eqbm effect under alternative monetary policies Percent of s.s. output Output Consumption Investment Government Spending Percent of s.s. output Government Bonds Capital.5.1 Employment vs s.s ZLB Neoclassical constant-r Real Interest Rate (bps)
40 Relating partial and general equilibrium effect (1/2) Result 2: the general equilibrium path of aggregate output Y t is dy = G Y C where G Y is the GE matrix, independent of the source of shock Reflects many equilibrium forces In a benchmark case with no investment, no endogenous spending, and constant r monetary policy: G Y = k= M k where M t,s is incidence-weighted matrix of MPCs Intertemporal Keynesian Cross (Auclert, Rognlie and Straub 217) Here, for ZLB and constant-r, we have G Y I, so GE PE.
41 Relating partial and general equilibrium effect (2/2) dy Y = G Y C Y Percent of s.s. output PE consumption C/Y Level GE multipliers for dyt t = t = 5 t = 1 t = 15 t = 2 t = Percent of s.s. output GE output dy /Y Actual path dy/y Approximation GY C/Y
42 Paradox of Thrift Why does investment fall? Q-theory given a change in {r t, L t }, net investment responds by d (I t δk t 1 ) = ɛ I I s= ( ) 1 s+1 {dmpk t+s+1 dr t+s} 1 + r where MPK t F K (K t 1, L t ) Race between cost of capital effect ( ) and MPK effect ( ) Under constant-r policy, latter always dominates Typically also at ZLB, due to limited r response Consistency with market clearing? Savings = Investment Redistribution rise in desired household savings But in equilibrium, L aggregate savings, consistent with investment
43 Outline 1. Model and equilibrium definition 2. Calibration 3. Income inequality in the short run 4. Income inequality in the long run
44 Partial equilibrium effect Consider again partial equilibrium effect, holding (r t, L t ) fixed Consumption Assets sd log earnings Percent of s.s. output Percent of s.s. output Benchmark Only transitory Only persistent Only fixed effects Level Convergence to higher SS asset level if inequality implies risk
45 Partial equilibrium effect Consider again partial equilibrium effect, holding (r t, L t ) fixed Consumption Assets sd log earnings Percent of s.s. output Percent of s.s. output Benchmark Only transitory Only persistent Only fixed effects Level Convergence to higher SS asset level if inequality implies risk Are these magnitudes plausible? Compare to micro literature on savings effect of earnings risk Large literature, large range of estimates (Browning Lusardi 1996)
46 Empirical evaluation Carroll-Samwick (1997) run in PSID: log a i = α ξ s 2 iξ + α χs 2 iχ + βz i + u i with siξ 2 variance of innovations to permanent component of earnings, siχ 2 variance of transitory Compute equivalent semielasticity in the model Value, Data Value, Model α ξ α χ Semielasticities in line with empirical estimates
47 General eqbm effect under alternative monetary policies Percent of s.s. output Percent of s.s. output Output Consumption Investment Government Spending Government Bonds Capital 1 Employment vs s.s. Real Interest Rate (bps) ZLB
48 General eqbm effect under alternative monetary policies Percent of s.s. output Percent of s.s. output Output Consumption Investment Government Spending Government Bonds Capital Employment vs s.s. Real Interest Rate (bps) ZLB Neoclassical
49 General eqbm effect under alternative monetary policies Percent of s.s. output Percent of s.s. output Output Consumption Investment Government Spending Government Bonds Capital Employment vs s.s. Real Interest Rate (bps) ZLB Neoclassical constant-r
50 Steady state long-run effect: a special case Consider first the following special case: Constant income incidence (γ = 1) No endogenous fiscal policy (ɛ GL = ɛ BL = ɛ BG = ) Monetary policy: either ZLB or constant-r Experiment: increase index of inequality σ Asset market clearing: A (r, σ, τ, WP ), L = B + K
51 Steady state long-run effect: a special case Consider first the following special case: Constant income incidence (γ = 1) No endogenous fiscal policy (ɛ GL = ɛ BL = ɛ BG = ) Monetary policy: either ZLB or constant-r Experiment: increase index of inequality σ Asset market clearing (from homotheticity): (1 τ) W P Lâ (r, σ) = B + K â (r, σ) partial eqbm savings schedule at r (income=1)
52 Steady state long-run effect: a special case Consider first the following special case: Constant income incidence (γ = 1) No endogenous fiscal policy (ɛ GL = ɛ BL = ɛ BG = ) Monetary policy: either ZLB or constant-r Experiment: increase index of inequality σ Asset market clearing: ( W P L ( G + rb ) ) â (r, σ) = B + K â (r, σ) partial eqbm savings schedule at r (income=1) Government budget constraint: τ W P L = G + rb
53 Steady state long-run effect: a special case Consider first the following special case: Constant income incidence (γ = 1) No endogenous fiscal policy (ɛ GL = ɛ BL = ɛ BG = ) Monetary policy: either ZLB or constant-r Experiment: increase index of inequality σ Asset market clearing: ( w (r) L ( G + rb )) â (r, σ) = B + κ (r) L â (r, σ) partial eqbm savings schedule at r (income=1) Government budget constraint: τ W P L = G + rb Factor demand conditions: K L κ (r), W P w (r)
54 Equilibrium: (A, L) space ( w (r) L ( G + rb )) â (r, σ) = B + κ (r) L 1.8 Asset Demand Employment L Asset Supply Total assets B + K
55 Equilibrium: (A, L) space ( w (r) L ( G + rb )) â (r, σ) = B + κ (r) L 1.8 Asset Demand S Employment L Asset Supply Total assets B + K
56 Role of incidence and fiscal response 1.95 Employment L S Total assets B + K
57 Role of incidence and fiscal response 1 w. benchmark fiscal policy.95 S Employment L Total assets B + K
58 Role of incidence and fiscal response 1 + GSSY income incidence.95 S Employment L Total assets B + K
59 Sufficient statistic formula for dy Y Differentiating SS asset market clearing and using dl L = dy Y A/A σ dy Y = 1 B B+K + τ 1 τ + η A/A F + η I σ dσ }{{}}{{} PE suff. stat. GE multiplier average semielasticity of individual savings to σ η F mitigation from fiscal response, η I effect of income incidence In special case: η F = η I =, Multiplier = 2.31 In main calibration: η F, η I >, Multiplier =.3
60 Extensions 1. Inequality and the r decline 2. Change in capital-labor distribution: Decline in labor share due to changing technology or relative price of investment (Piketty/Karabarbounis-Neiman) Monopoly profits (Summers/Krugman) 3. Alternative policy at the zero lower bound 4. Taylor-rule monetary policy
61 Conclusion Canonical macro model of inequality + nominal wage rigidities Allows to study effect of aggregate demand shocks on output, including inequality Very tractable and flexible Theory highlights importance of empirical evidence on MPC heterogeneity [Cov (MPC, y)] (short-run) Effect of income uncertainty on savings [ log A σ ] (long-run) Distributional incidence of recessions [γ] (both) Amplification role of private investment Stabilizing role of monetary (r) and fiscal policy (G and B)
62 Thank you!
63 Calibrating the retention function Model relationship between net income y and gross z: ( ) y it z it = (1 τ) τ r + (1 τ r ) E [z it ] E [z it ] CBO data on avg transfers and taxes per nonelderly household by income in 26: overall AMI $95, and Quintiles of market income Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Average market income (AMI) z it 12,6 36,1 59,5 89,9 24,8 AMI + Transfers minus taxes y it 25,2 36,3 51,4 72,7 174,8 Yields y it E[z it ] = z it E[z it ] with R2 =.9988 Implying τ r = Back
64 Calibrating household portfolios Obtain θ (a) parametrically from SCF fraction invested in shares as function of total assets a = b + pv broad definition: all net worth except deposits and bonds narrow definition: only equity and shares Fraction of shares in net worth θ(a) Log (net worth/average net worth) SCF 213: broad capital Fitted curve θ b (a) SCF 213: narrow capital Fitted curve θ n (a) Back
65 Distribution summary statistics Model Data (SCF 213) Percentage of total Consumption Post-tax labor income Pre-tax labor income Wealth Percentage of total Consumption Pre-tax labor income Wealth Percentage of population Percentage of population Back
66 Inequality and the r decline 4 Real rate.95 sd log earnings 38.9 Basis points Level Year Year
67 Policy solutions at the ZLB Wage deflation Effective lower bound Inflation target Steady-state employment Steady state wage inflation κ 1 (%) Steady-state employment Nominal rate lower bound i (%) Steady-state employment Full employment equilibrium Inflation target π (%)
Inequality and Aggregate Demand. USC/INET Conference on Inequality, Globalization, and Macroeconomics April 28, 2017
Inequality and Aggregate Demand Adrien Auclert Stanford Matthew Rognlie Northwestern USC/INET Conference on Inequality, Globalization, and Macroeconomics April 28, 217 Inequality and macroeconomic performance
More informationAggregate Demand and the Top 1% AEA Meetings, Chicago January 7, 2017
Aggregate Demand and the Top 1% Adrien Auclert Stanford Matthew Rognlie Northwestern AEA Meetings, Chicago January 7, 2017 Two canonical models of inequality 1. Income inequality literature: Considers
More informationInequality and Aggregate Demand
Inequality and Aggregate Demand Adrien Auclert* Matthew Rognlie January 218 Abstract We explore the transmission mechanism of income inequality to output. In the short run, higher inequality reduces output
More informationInequality and Aggregate Demand
Inequality and Aggregate Demand Adrien Auclert* Matthew Rognlie April 217 Abstract We explore the effects of transitory and persistent increases in income inequality on the level of economic activity in
More informationHousehold income risk, nominal frictions, and incomplete markets 1
Household income risk, nominal frictions, and incomplete markets 1 2013 North American Summer Meeting Ralph Lütticke 13.06.2013 1 Joint-work with Christian Bayer, Lien Pham, and Volker Tjaden 1 / 30 Research
More informationUninsured Unemployment Risk and Optimal Monetary Policy
Uninsured Unemployment Risk and Optimal Monetary Policy Edouard Challe CREST & Ecole Polytechnique ASSA 2018 Strong precautionary motive Low consumption Bad aggregate shock High unemployment Low output
More informationThe historical evolution of the wealth distribution: A quantitative-theoretic investigation
The historical evolution of the wealth distribution: A quantitative-theoretic investigation Joachim Hubmer, Per Krusell, and Tony Smith Yale, IIES, and Yale March 2016 Evolution of top wealth inequality
More informationLecture 4 HANK. Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian Models. Benjamin Moll. Princeton
Lecture 4 HANK Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian Models Benjamin Moll Princeton EABCN Training School June 4-6, 218 Macroeconomic Policy with Distributions Most macroeconomic policies can be classified
More informationAsset Illiquidity, MPC Heterogeneity and Fiscal Stimulus
Asset Illiquidity, MPC Heterogeneity and Fiscal Stimulus Extremely Preliminary Greg Kaplan Benjamin Moll Gianluca Violante Princeton Princeton NYU Princeton February 6, 25 /33 Empirical Evidence on MPCs
More informationDistributional Macroeconomics
Distributional Macroeconomics Benjamin Moll Princeton ICRIER-NBER-NCAER Neemrana Conference December 17, 2017 What do I mean by Distributional Macroeconomics? Study of macroeconomic questions in terms
More informationA MODEL OF SECULAR STAGNATION
A MODEL OF SECULAR STAGNATION Gauti B. Eggertsson and Neil R. Mehrotra Brown University BIS Research Meetings March 11, 2015 1 / 38 SECULAR STAGNATION HYPOTHESIS I wonder if a set of older ideas... under
More informationIdiosyncratic risk, insurance, and aggregate consumption dynamics: a likelihood perspective
Idiosyncratic risk, insurance, and aggregate consumption dynamics: a likelihood perspective Alisdair McKay Boston University June 2013 Microeconomic evidence on insurance - Consumption responds to idiosyncratic
More informationDiscussion of Optimal Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy Interaction in a Non-Ricardian Economy
Discussion of Optimal Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy Interaction in a Non-Ricardian Economy Johannes Wieland University of California, San Diego and NBER 1. Introduction Markets are incomplete. In recent
More informationKeynesian Views On The Fiscal Multiplier
Faculty of Social Sciences Jeppe Druedahl (Ph.d. Student) Department of Economics 16th of December 2013 Slide 1/29 Outline 1 2 3 4 5 16th of December 2013 Slide 2/29 The For Today 1 Some 2 A Benchmark
More informationState-Dependent Pricing and the Paradox of Flexibility
State-Dependent Pricing and the Paradox of Flexibility Luca Dedola and Anton Nakov ECB and CEPR May 24 Dedola and Nakov (ECB and CEPR) SDP and the Paradox of Flexibility 5/4 / 28 Policy rates in major
More informationMicroeconomic Heterogeneity and Macroeconomic Shocks
Microeconomic Heterogeneity and Macroeconomic Shocks Greg Kaplan University of Chicago Gianluca Violante Princeton University BdF/ECB Conference on HFC In preparation for the Special Issue of JEP on The
More informationDiscussion of Kaplan, Moll, and Violante:
Discussion of Kaplan, Moll, and Violante: Monetary Policy According to HANK Keith Kuester University of Bonn Nov 5, 215 1 / 25 The idea Use the formulation of Kaplan and Violante s (KV) wealthy hand-to-mouth
More informationMonetary Policy According to HANK
Monetary Policy According to HANK Greg Kaplan Princeton University Ben Moll Princeton University Gianluca Violante New York University Cornell March 17th, 216 HANK: Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian models
More informationA MODEL OF SECULAR STAGNATION
A MODEL OF SECULAR STAGNATION Gauti B. Eggertsson and Neil R. Mehrotra Brown University Portugal June, 2015 1 / 47 SECULAR STAGNATION HYPOTHESIS I wonder if a set of older ideas... under the phrase secular
More informationThe Risky Steady State and the Interest Rate Lower Bound
The Risky Steady State and the Interest Rate Lower Bound Timothy Hills Taisuke Nakata Sebastian Schmidt New York University Federal Reserve Board European Central Bank 1 September 2016 1 The views expressed
More information. Fiscal Reform and Government Debt in Japan: A Neoclassical Perspective. May 10, 2013
.. Fiscal Reform and Government Debt in Japan: A Neoclassical Perspective Gary Hansen (UCLA) and Selo İmrohoroğlu (USC) May 10, 2013 Table of Contents.1 Introduction.2 Model Economy.3 Calibration.4 Quantitative
More informationHousehold Heterogeneity in Macroeconomics
Household Heterogeneity in Macroeconomics Department of Economics HKUST August 7, 2018 Household Heterogeneity in Macroeconomics 1 / 48 Reference Krueger, Dirk, Kurt Mitman, and Fabrizio Perri. Macroeconomics
More informationDiscussion of The Transmission of Monetary Policy through Redistributions and Durables Purchases by Silvana Tenreyro and Vincent Sterk
Discussion of The Transmission of Monetary Policy through Redistributions and Durables Purchases by Silvana Tenreyro and Vincent Sterk Adrien Auclert Stanford (visiting Princeton) Conference on Monetary
More informationState Dependency of Monetary Policy: The Refinancing Channel
State Dependency of Monetary Policy: The Refinancing Channel Martin Eichenbaum, Sergio Rebelo, and Arlene Wong May 2018 Motivation In the US, bulk of household borrowing is in fixed rate mortgages with
More informationDoes the Social Safety Net Improve Welfare? A Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis
Does the Social Safety Net Improve Welfare? A Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis University of Western Ontario February 2013 Question Main Question: what is the welfare cost/gain of US social safety
More informationA MODEL OF SECULAR STAGNATION
A MODEL OF SECULAR STAGNATION Gauti B. Eggertsson and Neil R. Mehrotra Brown University Princeton February, 2015 1 / 35 SECULAR STAGNATION HYPOTHESIS I wonder if a set of older ideas... under the phrase
More informationTransmission of Monetary Policy with Heterogeneity in Household Portfolios JOB MARKET PAPER Go to Latest Version
Transmission of Monetary Policy with Heterogeneity in Household Portfolios JOB MARKET PAPER Go to Latest Version Ralph Luetticke November 22, 215 Abstract This paper assesses the importance of heterogeneity
More informationCredit Crises, Precautionary Savings and the Liquidity Trap October (R&R Quarterly 31, 2016Journal 1 / of19
Credit Crises, Precautionary Savings and the Liquidity Trap (R&R Quarterly Journal of nomics) October 31, 2016 Credit Crises, Precautionary Savings and the Liquidity Trap October (R&R Quarterly 31, 2016Journal
More informationEstimating Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises: An Endogenous Regime-Switching Approach
Estimating Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises: An Endogenous Regime-Switching Approach Gianluca Benigno 1 Andrew Foerster 2 Christopher Otrok 3 Alessandro Rebucci 4 1 London School of Economics and
More informationHow Much Insurance in Bewley Models?
How Much Insurance in Bewley Models? Greg Kaplan New York University Gianluca Violante New York University, CEPR, IFS and NBER Boston University Macroeconomics Seminar Lunch Kaplan-Violante, Insurance
More informationKaplan, Moll and Violante: Unconventional Monetary Policy in HANK
Discussion of Kaplan, Moll and Violante: Unconventional Monetary Policy in HANK Workshop on Current Monetary Policy Challenges Jirka Slacalek European Central Bank www.slacalek.com ECB, December 2016 The
More informationAtkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999), Taxing Capital Income: A Bad Idea, QR Fed Mpls
Lucas (1990), Supply Side Economics: an Analytical Review, Oxford Economic Papers When I left graduate school, in 1963, I believed that the single most desirable change in the U.S. structure would be the
More informationUnderstanding HANK: Insights from a PRANK
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports Understanding HANK: Insights from a PRANK Sushant Acharya Keshav Dogra Staff Report No. 835 February 018 This paper presents preliminary findings and is being
More informationFiscal Policy and MPC Heterogeneity
Fiscal Policy and MPC Heterogeneity by Tullio Jappelli and Luigi Pistaferri Discussion by: Fabrizio Perri Bocconi, Minneapolis Fed, IGIER & NBER Macroeconomic Dynamics with Heterogeneous Agents, June 2013
More informationIdiosyncratic risk and the dynamics of aggregate consumption: a likelihood-based perspective
Idiosyncratic risk and the dynamics of aggregate consumption: a likelihood-based perspective Alisdair McKay Boston University March 2013 Idiosyncratic risk and the business cycle How much and what types
More informationOn the Merits of Conventional vs Unconventional Fiscal Policy
On the Merits of Conventional vs Unconventional Fiscal Policy Matthieu Lemoine and Jesper Lindé Banque de France and Sveriges Riksbank The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those
More informationFiscal Multipliers and Heterogeneous Agents
Fiscal Multipliers and Heterogeneous Agents Yongquan CAO April, 6 Abstract The paper analyzes the impacts on different agents from the fiscal shocks under a heterogeneous agent New Keynesian model, where
More informationWhat is the role of the automatic stabilizers in the. U.S. business cycle?
What is the role of the automatic stabilizers in the U.S. business cycle? Alisdair McKay Boston University Ricardo Reis Columbia University February, 212, PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE Abstract Every developed
More informationDay 5. Monetary Policy in Models with Heterogeneous Agents
Day 5 Monetary Policy in Models with Heterogeneous Agents Gianluca Violante New York University Mini-Course on Policy in Models with Heterogeneous Agents Bank of Portugal, June 15-19, 215 p. 1 /16 Automatic
More informationOPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY FOR
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY FOR THE MASSES James Bullard (FRB of St. Louis) Riccardo DiCecio (FRB of St. Louis) Swiss National Bank Research Conference 2018 Current Monetary Policy Challenges Zurich, Switzerland
More informationCapital Misallocation and Secular Stagnation
Capital Misallocation and Secular Stagnation Ander Perez-Orive Federal Reserve Board (joint with Andrea Caggese - Pompeu Fabra, CREI & BGSE) AEA Session on "Interest Rates and Real Activity" January 5,
More informationBalance Sheet Recessions
Balance Sheet Recessions Zhen Huo and José-Víctor Ríos-Rull University of Minnesota Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis CAERP CEPR NBER Conference on Money Credit and Financial Frictions Huo & Ríos-Rull
More informationA Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics
A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics Mark Gertler, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Andrea Prestipino NYU, Princeton, Federal Reserve Board 1 March 218 1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors
More informationSelf-fulfilling Recessions at the ZLB
Self-fulfilling Recessions at the ZLB Charles Brendon (Cambridge) Matthias Paustian (Board of Governors) Tony Yates (Birmingham) August 2016 Introduction This paper is about recession dynamics at the ZLB
More informationOptimal Taxation Under Capital-Skill Complementarity
Optimal Taxation Under Capital-Skill Complementarity Ctirad Slavík, CERGE-EI, Prague (with Hakki Yazici, Sabanci University and Özlem Kina, EUI) January 4, 2019 ASSA in Atlanta 1 / 31 Motivation Optimal
More informationA Model of the Consumption Response to Fiscal Stimulus Payments
A Model of the Consumption Response to Fiscal Stimulus Payments Greg Kaplan 1 Gianluca Violante 2 1 Princeton University 2 New York University Presented by Francisco Javier Rodríguez (Universidad Carlos
More informationGovernment spending shocks, sovereign risk and the exchange rate regime
Government spending shocks, sovereign risk and the exchange rate regime Dennis Bonam Jasper Lukkezen Structure 1. Theoretical predictions 2. Empirical evidence 3. Our model SOE NK DSGE model (Galì and
More informationInflation Dynamics During the Financial Crisis
Inflation Dynamics During the Financial Crisis S. Gilchrist 1 1 Boston University and NBER MFM Summer Camp June 12, 2016 DISCLAIMER: The views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors and
More informationMacroprudential Policies in a Low Interest-Rate Environment
Macroprudential Policies in a Low Interest-Rate Environment Margarita Rubio 1 Fang Yao 2 1 University of Nottingham 2 Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect
More informationSimple Analytics of the Government Expenditure Multiplier
Simple Analytics of the Government Expenditure Multiplier Michael Woodford Columbia University New Approaches to Fiscal Policy FRB Atlanta, January 8-9, 2010 Woodford (Columbia) Analytics of Multiplier
More informationOptimal monetary policy when asset markets are incomplete
Optimal monetary policy when asset markets are incomplete R. Anton Braun Tomoyuki Nakajima 2 University of Tokyo, and CREI 2 Kyoto University, and RIETI December 9, 28 Outline Introduction 2 Model Individuals
More informationHousehold Debt, Financial Intermediation, and Monetary Policy
Household Debt, Financial Intermediation, and Monetary Policy Shutao Cao 1 Yahong Zhang 2 1 Bank of Canada 2 Western University October 21, 2014 Motivation The US experience suggests that the collapse
More informationSlow Recoveries and Unemployment Traps: Monetary Policy in a Time of Hysteresis
Slow Recoveries and Unemployment Traps: Monetary Policy in a Time of Hysteresis Sushant Acharya 1 Julien Bengui 2 Keshav Dogra 1 Shu Lin Wee 3 1 Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2 Université de Montréal
More informationThe Role of Firm-Level Productivity Growth for the Optimal Rate of Inflation
The Role of Firm-Level Productivity Growth for the Optimal Rate of Inflation Henning Weber Kiel Institute for the World Economy Seminar at the Economic Institute of the National Bank of Poland November
More informationMonetary Policy and the Redistribution Channel
Monetary Policy and the Redistribution Channel Adrien Auclert MIT Mortgage Contract Design Conference New York Fed May 20, 2015 Adrien Auclert (MIT) Redistribution Channel May 20, 2015 1 / 34 Introduction
More informationThe Tail that Wags the Economy: Belief-driven Business Cycles and Persistent Stagnation
The Tail that Wags the Economy: Belief-driven Business Cycles and Persistent Stagnation Julian Kozlowski Laura Veldkamp Venky Venkateswaran NYU NYU Stern NYU Stern June 215 1 / 27 Introduction The Great
More informationReallocation of Intangible Capital and Secular Stagnation
Reallocation of Intangible Capital and Secular Stagnation Ander Perez-Orive Federal Reserve Board (joint with Andrea Caggese - Pompeu Fabra & CREI) Workshop on Finance, Investment and Productivity BoE,
More informationThe Power of Forward Guidance Revisited
The Power of Forward Guidance Revisited Alisdair McKay Boston University Emi Nakamura Columbia University December 11, 2015 Jón Steinsson Columbia University Abstract In recent years, central banks have
More informationIdiosyncratic Risk and the Business Cycle: A Likelihood Perspective
Idiosyncratic Risk and the Business Cycle: A Likelihood Perspective Alisdair McKay Boston University April 214 Abstract This paper asks whether uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk affects aggregate consumption
More informationUnemployment (Fears), Precautionary Savings, and Aggregate Demand
Unemployment (Fears), Precautionary Savings, and Aggregate Demand Wouter J. Den Haan (LSE/CEPR/CFM) Pontus Rendahl (University of Cambridge/CEPR/CFM) Markus Riegler (University of Bonn/CFM) June 19, 2016
More informationUnemployment (Fears), Precautionary Savings, and Aggregate Demand
Unemployment (Fears), Precautionary Savings, and Aggregate Demand Wouter J. Den Haan (LSE & CEPR), Pontus Rendahl (University of Cambridge & CEPR), and Markus Riegler (LSE) January 27, 2014 Overview Heterogeneous
More informationA Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics
A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics Mark Gertler, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Andrea Prestipino NYU, Princeton, Federal Reserve Board 1 September 218 1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the
More informationA Demand Theory of the Price Level
A Demand Theory of the Price Level Marcus Hagedorn University of Oslo and CEPR This Version: June 11, 217 Abstract In this paper I show that the price level is globally determinate in incomplete market
More informationCREDIT CRISES, PRECAUTIONARY SAVINGS, AND THE LIQUIDITY TRAP
CREDIT CRISES, PRECAUTIONARY SAVINGS, AND THE LIQUIDITY TRAP VERONICA GUERRIERI AND GUIDO LORENZONI We study the effects of a credit crunch on consumer spending in a heterogeneous-agent incomplete-market
More informationDebt Burdens and the Interest Rate Response to Fiscal Stimulus: Theory and Cross-Country Evidence.
Debt Burdens and the Interest Rate Response to Fiscal Stimulus: Theory and Cross-Country Evidence. Jorge Miranda-Pinto 1, Daniel Murphy 2, Kieran Walsh 2, Eric Young 1 1 UVA, 2 UVA Darden School of Business
More informationEscaping the Great Recession 1
Escaping the Great Recession 1 Francesco Bianchi Duke University Leonardo Melosi FRB Chicago ECB workshop on Non-Standard Monetary Policy Measures 1 The views in this paper are solely the responsibility
More informationDoves for the Rich, Hawks for the Poor? Distributional Consequences of Monetary Policy. September 19, 2014
Doves for the Rich, Hawks for the Poor? Distributional Consequences of Monetary Policy Nils Gornemann 1 Keith Kuester 2 Makoto Nakajima 3 1 Board of Governors 2 University of Bonn 3 Federal Reserve Bank
More informationThe Transmission of Monetary Policy through Redistributions and Durable Purchases
The Transmission of Monetary Policy through Redistributions and Durable Purchases Vincent Sterk and Silvana Tenreyro UCL, LSE September 2015 Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September 2015 1 / 28 The
More informationPublic Investment, Debt, and Welfare: A Quantitative Analysis
Public Investment, Debt, and Welfare: A Quantitative Analysis Santanu Chatterjee University of Georgia Felix Rioja Georgia State University October 31, 2017 John Gibson Georgia State University Abstract
More informationConsumption and House Prices in the Great Recession: Model Meets Evidence
Consumption and House Prices in the Great Recession: Model Meets Evidence Greg Kaplan Kurt Mitman Gianluca Violante MFM 9-10 March, 2017 Outline 1. Overview 2. Model 3. Questions Q1: What shock(s) drove
More informationSTATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY Department of Economics. Ph. D. Comprehensive Examination: Macroeconomics Fall, 2010
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY Department of Economics Ph. D. Comprehensive Examination: Macroeconomics Fall, 2010 Section 1. (Suggested Time: 45 Minutes) For 3 of the following 6 statements, state
More informationFiscal Consolidation in a Currency Union: Spending Cuts Vs. Tax Hikes
Fiscal Consolidation in a Currency Union: Spending Cuts Vs. Tax Hikes Christopher J. Erceg and Jesper Lindé Federal Reserve Board October, 2012 Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations
More informationFiscal Policy Stabilization: Purchases or Transfers?
Fiscal Policy Stabilization: Purchases or Transfers? Neil R. Mehrotra Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Both government purchases and transfers figure prominently in the use of fiscal policy for counteracting
More informationDeterminants of Wage and Earnings Inequality in the United States
Determinants of Wage and Earnings Inequality in the United States Ctirad Slavík and Hakki Yazici July 28, 2015 The skill premium in the United States has gone up significantly between the 1960 s and the
More informationLorant Kaszab (MNB) Roman Horvath (IES)
Aleš Maršál (NBS) Lorant Kaszab (MNB) Roman Horvath (IES) Modern Tools for Financial Analysis and ing - Matlab 4.6.2015 Outline Calibration output stabilization spending reversals Table : Impact of QE
More informationFiscal Multipliers and Financial Crises
Fiscal Multipliers and Financial Crises Miguel Faria-e-Castro New York University June 20, 2017 1 st Research Conference of the CEPR Network on Macroeconomic Modelling and Model Comparison 0 / 12 Fiscal
More informationWealth inequality, family background, and estate taxation
Wealth inequality, family background, and estate taxation Mariacristina De Nardi 1 Fang Yang 2 1 UCL, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, IFS, and NBER 2 Louisiana State University June 8, 2015 De Nardi and
More informationUnemployment benets, precautionary savings and demand
Unemployment benets, precautionary savings and demand Stefan Kühn International Labour Oce Project LINK Meeting 2016 Toronto, 19-21 October 2016 Outline 1 Introduction 2 Model 3 Results 4 Conclusion Introduction
More informationCredit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy
Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy Vasco Cúrdia FRB New York Michael Woodford Columbia University Conference on Monetary Policy and Financial Frictions Cúrdia and Woodford () Credit Frictions
More informationOil Price Uncertainty in a Small Open Economy
Yusuf Soner Başkaya Timur Hülagü Hande Küçük 6 April 212 Oil price volatility is high and it varies over time... 15 1 5 1985 199 1995 2 25 21 (a) Mean.4.35.3.25.2.15.1.5 1985 199 1995 2 25 21 (b) Coefficient
More informationThe Intertemporal Keynesian Cross. Auclert-Rognlie-Straub
The Intertemporal Keynesian Cross Auclert-Rognlie-Straub Discussion Gianluca Violante Princeton University Outline of my discussion 1. Background, insight, and contribution 2. Empirics of the IMPC 3. The
More informationInflation Dynamics During the Financial Crisis
Inflation Dynamics During the Financial Crisis S. Gilchrist 1 R. Schoenle 2 J. W. Sim 3 E. Zakrajšek 3 1 Boston University and NBER 2 Brandeis University 3 Federal Reserve Board Theory and Methods in Macroeconomics
More informationThe Intertemporal Keynesian Cross
The Intertemporal Keynesian Cross Adrien Auclert* Matthew Rognlie Ludwig Straub August 28 Abstract We demonstrate the importance of intertemporal marginal propensities to consume (impcs) in disciplining
More informationExchange Rates and Fundamentals: A General Equilibrium Exploration
Exchange Rates and Fundamentals: A General Equilibrium Exploration Takashi Kano Hitotsubashi University @HIAS, IER, AJRC Joint Workshop Frontiers in Macroeconomics and Macroeconometrics November 3-4, 2017
More informationIs Government Spending: at the Zero Lower Bound Desirable?
Is Government Spending: at the Zero Lower Bound Desirable? Florin Bilbiie (Paris School of Economics and CEPR) Tommaso Monacelli (Università Bocconi, IGIER and CEPR), Roberto Perotti (Università Bocconi,
More informationHousehold Saving, Financial Constraints, and the Current Account Balance in China
Household Saving, Financial Constraints, and the Current Account Balance in China Ayşe İmrohoroğlu USC Marshall Kai Zhao Univ. of Connecticut Facing Demographic Change in a Challenging Economic Environment-
More informationEmployment prospects and the propagation of fiscal stimulus
NBP Working Paper No. 296 Employment prospects and the propagation of fiscal stimulus Paweł Kopiec NBP Working Paper No. 296 Employment prospects and the propagation of fiscal stimulus Paweł Kopiec Economic
More informationEconomic stability through narrow measures of inflation
Economic stability through narrow measures of inflation Andrew Keinsley Weber State University Version 5.02 May 1, 2017 Abstract Under the assumption that different measures of inflation draw on the same
More informationThe Power of Forward Guidance Revisited
The Power of Forward Guidance Revisited Alisdair McKay Boston University Emi Nakamura Columbia University July 14, 2015 Jón Steinsson Columbia University Abstract In recent years, central banks have increasingly
More informationFrom Wages to Welfare: Decomposing Gains and Losses From Rising Inequality
From Wages to Welfare: Decomposing Gains and Losses From Rising Inequality Jonathan Heathcote Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and CEPR Kjetil Storesletten Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and CEPR
More informationReforms in a Debt Overhang
Structural Javier Andrés, Óscar Arce and Carlos Thomas 3 National Bank of Belgium, June 8 4 Universidad de Valencia, Banco de España Banco de España 3 Banco de España National Bank of Belgium, June 8 4
More informationUnemployment (fears), Precautionary Savings, and Aggregate Demand
Unemployment (fears), Precautionary Savings, and Aggregate Demand Wouter den Haan (LSE), Pontus Rendahl (Cambridge), Markus Riegler (LSE) ESSIM 2014 Introduction A FT-esque story: Uncertainty (or fear)
More informationTaxes and the Fed: Theory and Evidence from Equities
Taxes and the Fed: Theory and Evidence from Equities November 5, 217 The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the author and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff
More informationUncertainty Shocks In A Model Of Effective Demand
Uncertainty Shocks In A Model Of Effective Demand Susanto Basu Boston College NBER Brent Bundick Boston College Preliminary Can Higher Uncertainty Reduce Overall Economic Activity? Many think it is an
More informationAging, Social Security Reform and Factor Price in a Transition Economy
Aging, Social Security Reform and Factor Price in a Transition Economy Tomoaki Yamada Rissho University 2, December 2007 Motivation Objectives Introduction: Motivation Rapid aging of the population combined
More informationConcerted Efforts? Monetary Policy and Macro-Prudential Tools
Concerted Efforts? Monetary Policy and Macro-Prudential Tools Andrea Ferrero Richard Harrison Benjamin Nelson University of Oxford Bank of England Rokos Capital 20 th Central Bank Macroeconomic Modeling
More informationInfrastructure and the Optimal Level of Public Debt
Infrastructure and the Optimal Level of Public Debt Santanu Chatterjee University of Georgia Felix Rioja Georgia State University February 29, 2016 John Gibson Georgia State University Abstract We examine
More informationThe Transmission of Monetary Policy Operations through Redistributions and Durable Purchases
The Transmission of Monetary Policy Operations through Redistributions and Durable Purchases Vincent Sterk and Silvana Tenreyro UCL, LSE June 2014 Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO June 2014 1 / 52 The
More informationTax Cuts for Whom? Heterogeneous Effects of Income Tax Changes on Growth & Employment
Tax Cuts for Whom? Heterogeneous Effects of Income Tax Changes on Growth & Employment Owen Zidar University of California, Berkeley ozidar@econ.berkeley.edu October 1, 2012 Owen Zidar (UC Berkeley) Tax
More informationPrivate Leverage and Sovereign Default
Private Leverage and Sovereign Default Cristina Arellano Yan Bai Luigi Bocola FRB Minneapolis University of Rochester Northwestern University Economic Policy and Financial Frictions November 2015 1 / 37
More information