Iraq, the Surge, Partition, and the War: Public Opinion by City and Region

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1 Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. Suite 400 Washington, DC Phone: 1 (202) Fax: 1 (202) Web: Iraq, the Surge, Partition, and the War: Public Opinion by and Region Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy acordesman@aol.com Updated: October 19, 2007

2 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 2 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION... 4 SETTING THE STAGE: THE OVERALL TRENDS IN IRAQI PUBLIC OPINION... 5 DECLINING EXPECTATIONS... 5 BUT A CONTINUING HOPE FOR UNITY AND THE NATION... 5 Table One...6 Declining Expectations, But Still A Desire For Unity (In Percent)...6 Figure One: Iraqi Expectations: LIVING UNDER CONSTANT THREAT FROM MANY KINDS OF VIOLENCE... 8 Iraqi Perceptions of Different Types of Violence... 8 Ongoing Sectarian and Ethnic Cleansing... 9 Perceptions of Unnecessary Violence... 9 Table Two...10 Kinds of Violence Iraqis Reported as Occurring Nearby, and Perceptions of Unnecessary Violence...10 IRAQI VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN IRAQ Broad National Trends in Perceptions of the US Role in Iraq Iraqis Who Think It is Acceptable to Attack US Forces Iraqi Reactions to the US Surge IRAQI VIEWS OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT Figure Two: Iraqi View of US Role and Presence...14 Figure Three: The Presence of US Forces and their Effect on the Security Situation...15 Figure Four: The Acceptability of Attacks on Coalition Forces...16 Figure Five: Impact of US Surge: Perceptions of Change in the Security Situation...17 in the 6 Months Prior to August, Figure Six: Impact of the Surge: Perceptions of Change in the Security Situation...18 in the 6 Months Prior to August, 2007 by Sect and Ethnic Group...18 Figure Seven: Iraqi Popular Approval of the Iraqi Government...19 SOURCE: ABC NEWS POLLING UNIT, BASED ON ABC/BBC/NHK POLL IRAQ, WHERE THINGS STAND, AUGUST, REGIONAL, SECTARIAN, ETHNIC, AND TRIBAL DIVISIONS IN IRAQ REGIONAL, SECTARIAN, ETHNIC, AND TRIBAL DIVISIONS IN IRAQ Table Three...21 If asked your religion, what do you prefer the answer to be?...21 Figure Eight: Iraq by Governorate and Summary Demographics...23 Figure Nine: Iraq s Ethnic and Sectarian Character: CIA Estimate...24

3 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 3 LOOKING AT IRAQI DIVISIONS BY CITY AND GOVERNORATE: IRAQI PERCEPTIONS OF VIOLENCE Figure Ten: Percent of Iraqis rating key aspects of personal security as bad ABC Poll (August 2007)...27 Figure Eleven: Percent of Iraqis Rating Security Situation as Bad in Own Neighborhoods March and August 2007 ABC Poll (August 2007)*...28 Figure Twelve: What Kinds of Violence have occurred nearby? ABC Poll (August 2007)...29 Figure Thirteen: What is the single biggest problem facing your life these days? ABC Poll (August 2007)...30 LOOKING AT IRAQI DIVISIONS BY CITY AND GOVERNORATE: IRAQI PERCEPTIONS OF CIVIL WAR Figure Fourteen: Has the Separating of People Been Happening In Your Mahallah or Not? Has this been mainly forcible or mainly peaceful? ABC Poll (August 2007)*.32 Figure Fifteen: Percentage of Iraqis reporting separation and forcible separation in Their Neighborhood ABC Poll (August 2007)*...33 Figure Sixteen: Do you think the separation of people on sectarian lines is a good thing or a bad thing? ABC Poll (August 2007)*...34 LOOKING AT IRAQI DIVISIONS BY CITY AND GOVERNORATE: IRAQI PERCEPTIONS OF LIFE, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, AND IRAQI SECURITY FORCES Figure 17: Overall, how good would you say things are going in your life these days? (Iraqi responses in percent) ABC Poll (August 2007)*...36 Figure 18: Lack of Confidence in Iraqi National and Local Leaders (Iraqi not confident * responses in percent) ABC Poll (August 2007)*...37 Figure 19: Lack of Confidence in Iraqi Security Forces and Militias (Iraqis saying not confident * responses in percent) ABC Poll (August 2007)*...38 US AND COALITION FORCES Figure Twenty: What kinds of unnecessary violence have you seen against Iraqi citizens? ABC Poll (August 2007)...41 Figure Twenty-One: Percent of Iraqis Expressing No Confidence in US, UK, or Iraqi Military or Security Force ABC Poll (August 2007)*...42 Figure Twenty-Two: Percent of Iraqis saying they feel the US and Coalition forces have done a good or bad* job of carrying out their responsibilities ABC Poll (August 2007)*...43 Figure Twenty-Three: Percent of Iraqis saying attacks on Coalition and Iraqi Forces are acceptable ABC Poll (August 2007)*...44 Figure Twenty-Four: Percentage of Iraqis saying that that bringing more US forces into Baghdad and Anbar will make security worse or have no effect (Iraqi responses in percent) ABC Poll (March 2007)*...45 Figure Twenty-Five: Iraqi opinion of how long US and Other Occupation Forces Should Remain in Iraq* ABC Poll (August 2007)**...46 PERCEPTIONS OF AID, THE ECONOMY, AND SERVICES Figure Twenty-Six: Percent of Iraqis saying the reconstruction efforts in their area have been ineffective or never effort took place ABC Poll (August 2007)*...48 Figure Twenty-Seven: Percent of Iraqis rating Water, Electricity and Fuel services as bad ABC Poll (August 2007)*...49 Figure Twenty-Eight: Percent of Iraqis Rating Schools and the Availability of Medical Services as bad ABC Poll (August 2007)*...50 ABC/BBC/NHK POLL: METHODOLOGY AND SURVEY TECHNIQUES STATISTICAL TABLES... 53

4 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 4 Introduction The patterns of conflict in Iraq have grown steadily more complex with time, adding sectarian and ethnic conflicts to what began as a largely Ba athist dominated resistance in mid There are now five major patterns of violence: Sunni Islamist extremist insurgents, where Al Qa ida plays a major role along with at least two other movements. These are the primary source of suicide attacks, car bombings, and attacks on Iraqi and Coalition forces. Iraqi Arab Sunni versus Arab Shi ite conflicts, where Shi ite militias and death squads play a major role, and where sectarian violence, threats, and pressures are forcing the segregation of many areas, leading to displacements, and creating ethnic cleansing. Iraqi Arab versus Iraqi Kurdish ethnic conflicts center around the ethnic fault line, where control of Kirkuk and the oil fields around it have become a major source of tension and potential conflict that extends to the West to the area around Mosul. The future of the Turcomans and other minorities is directly affected by the outcome, as is national unity. This ethnic struggle also interacts with similar Kurdish ethnic tensions and struggles affecting Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Arab Shi ite on Arab Shi ite struggles for political control and power, particularly in Southeastern Iraq. Each of the three major Shi ite parties is a rival for power along with smaller parties that play a major role in key cities like Basra. Clashes between Shi ite factions and militias have so far been limited, but the struggle for control of the Shi ite shrine cites and the oil-rich provinces in the Southeast may have only begun. Arab Sunni on Arab Sunni violence now concentrated largely in Al Anbar but spreading eastwards into Diyala. This is partly a struggle for tribal control of given areas, but also a struggle between Sunni Islamist extremist elements like Al Qa ida in Iraq. These struggles ease the pressure on the ISF and Coalition to some degree, but the enemy of an enemy is not necessarily a lasting friend. These divisions, however, tell only part of the story. Many Iraqis have divided or multiple loyalties, and the patterns of violence in one region, governorate, or city may well differ from another. This becomes far clearer from an examination of the detailed results of a recent public opinion poll by ABC News, the BBC, and NHK. This poll provides important insights into how the trends in Iraqi hearts and minds differ by major city and province. It also shows that any successful effort at counterinsurgency and conciliation must carefully consider regional and local patterns in Iraqi perceptions and civil conflict, and not simply the overall patterns in Iraqi public opinion.

5 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 5 Setting the Stage: The Overall Trends in Iraqi Public Opinion The data in this analysis are provided through the courtesy of the ABC News polling unit. They portray the results of a series of polls, the latest of which was carried out by ABC, BBC, and NHK in August 2007, and published in September 2007, and were designed as part of a national poll on Iraq, and not for the regional and urban purposes presented in this analysis. At the same time, the struggles in Iraq today are ultimately battles for the control of power, force, space, and money where Iraqi perceptions are critical in determining the outcome. The US and its Coalition allies cannot force solutions on the Iraqis, nor can it afford to try to fight a military battle that ignores how Iraqis see US and Coalition forces, the success of the Iraqi government, their overall security situation, trends in the economy, or the course of their daily lives. Most of the results show a deterioration in the situation since the previous poll in March Virtually all show the level of violence and civil conflict is higher than most Iraqi and US government sources like to publicly admit. They also show that most Iraqis see the US and Coalition forces as at least a partial threat, do not trust the US or Coalition, and see their aid efforts as failed or non-existent. Declining Expectations As security conditions have worsened, so have expectations for future improvement in the conditions of life -- an especially troubling result, since hopes for a better future can be the glue that holds a struggling society together. In 2004 and 2005 alike, for example, Table One shows that threequarters of Iraqis expected improvements in the coming year in their security, schools, availability of jobs, medical care, crime protection, clean water and power supply. Today only about 23 percent still expect better, down from 40% in March Figure One puts this analysis in graphic form, and shows the different trends in the expectations of Arab Sunnis, Arab Shi ites, and Kurds. The most striking difference over time is the decline in the expectations of Iraqi Kurds. The has also been a less precipitous decline in the expectations of the Iraq Arab Shi ites. The expectations of Iraqi Arab Sunnis have been so low that little change took place during the course of But A Continuing Hope for Unity and the Nation Yet the results do offer hope in one key areas. As the bottom section of Table One shows, most Arab Sunnis and Arab Shiites still want a unified country, and those Arab Shiites who do not want a strong central government instead want federalism with a weaker central government. Only the Kurds have a large percentage (49%) that wants independence, and 51% want a strong central government or federalism. Iraqis do not want sectarian separation, and many still identify themselves as Muslims and not as Sunnis or Shi ites. Iraqis have not given up on the future of Iraq as a nation.

6 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 6 Table One Declining Expectations, But Still A Desire For Unity (In Percent) Will Life Get Better? Worse? 11/22/05 3/5/07 8/24/07 Much Better Somewhat Better Same Somewhat Worse Much Worse No Opinion /5/07 8/24/07 Desired Political System Sunni Shi ite Kurd Sunni Shiite Kurd One Unified Iraq with Central Government in Baghdad A group of Regional Sates with their own regional governments and a federal government in Baghdad Dividing the Country into separate * 2 49 independent states Source:\. ** ABC, BBC, NHK Poll, Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007.

7 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 7 Figure One: Iraqi Expectations: % 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% : Iraq in a Year Expect Better Sunni Expect Better in a Year Expect Better in a Year Kurd Expect Better in a Year : Iraq in a Year Expect Worse Sunni Expect Worse in a Year Expect Worse in a Year Kurd Expect Worse in a Year Nov-05 69% na na na 0.11 na na na Mar Aug Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007, pg. 2, 16

8 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 8 Living Under Constant Threat From Many Kinds of Violence The ABC News poll conducted in August 2007 did find, however, that 41% percent of all Iraqis saw security as the most serious single issue facing the their life (46% Sunni, 45% Shi ite, and 21% Kurd), up from 18 percent in The poll found that while in 2005, 63 percent of Iraqis said they felt very safe in their neighborhoods in 2005, only 26 percent had said this in August percent did not feel safe at all. In Baghdad, home to a fifth of the country s population, 100% of respondents rated the security situation as bad. Overall, 61% of Iraqis reported that the security situation had become worse in the last 6 months. 1 Iraqi Perceptions of Different Types of Violence The ABC poll asked about nine kinds of violence that broke the security problems Iraqis and ISF forces faced into more detail than the Coalition and US have publicly reported (car bombs, snipers or crossfire, kidnappings, fighting among opposing groups or abuse of civilians by various armed forces). These results are reflected in Table Two: 2 The ABC poll found that any focus on the numbers of Iraqis killed, and/or the number of sectarian incidents involving major acts of violence, sharply underestimates the civil-military challenge. MNF-I, US and Iraqi government statistics on violence in Iraq usually do not include threats, kidnappings, woundings, intimidation, or sectarian and ethnic crimes. Yet, public opinion polls show that such lower forms of violence became far more common in Iraq than killings, and represent the bulk of the real-world challenge to the ISF. The ABC analysis of the poll results reported in March that, 3 Widespread violence, torn lives, displaced families, emotional damage, collapsing services, an ever-starker sectarian chasm and a draining away of the underlying optimism that once prevailed. Violence is the cause, its reach vast. Eighty percent of Iraqis report attacks nearby car bombs, snipers, kidnappings, and armed forces fighting each other or abusing civilians. It s worst by far in the capital, Baghdad, but by no means confined there. The personal toll is enormous. More than half of Iraqis, 53 percent, have a close friend or relative who s been hurt or killed in the current violence. One in six says someone in their own household has been harmed. Eighty-six percent worry about a loved one being hurt; two-thirds worry deeply. Huge numbers limit their daily activities to minimize risk. Seven in 10 report multiple signs of traumatic stress. Most Iraqis in Baghdad said at least one of these had occurred nearby; half reported four or more of them. In the previous poll, in March 2007, some 53 percent of Iraqis said a close friend or immediate family member had been hurt in the current violence. That ranged from three in 10 in the 1 ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, released August, 2007, pp ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, released August, ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, released March 19, 2007, pp. 1.

9 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 9 Kurdish provinces to nearly eight in 10 in Baghdad. Even outside Baghdad, 74 percent reported at least one form of violence, and 25 percent reported four or more (34 percent excluding the Kurdish area, which was far more peaceful than the country overall). The poll results also show a significant rise in the level of violence reported by Arab Sunnis and Kurds since the poll in May, largely in car bombs and suicide attacks. These results show that popular perceptions of violence do not necessarily correlate to the declines in violence reported by the MNF-I. Ongoing Sectarian and Ethnic Cleansing Nationally, 11 percent of all Iraqis surveyed in August 2007 reported that ethnic cleansing -- the forced separation of Sunnis and Shiites -- had occurred in their neighborhoods. Table Two shows that by August, 27% of all Iraqis reported that they had had an encounter with sectarian fighting, and that this included 35% of all Arab Sunnis and 30% of all Arab Shi ites. The figure was only 2% for Iraqi Kurds partly because of added security in the Kurd areas and partly because Kurds may see such violence as ethnic, rather than sectarian. In mixed-population Baghdad, 27 percent of all Iraqis surveyed in August 2007 reported that ethnic cleansing -- the forced separation of Sunnis and Shiites -- had occurred in their neighborhoods. As of March 2007, one in seven Iraqis overall -- rising to a quarter of Sunni Arabs, and more than a third of Baghdad residents -- said they themselves have moved homes in the last year to avoid violence or religious persecution. Perceptions of Unnecessary Violence Table Two does not show a rise in Iraqi perceptions of unnecessary use of force by US and coalition forces during the surge. This reflects well on the US operation since the sharp increase in US operations and the embedding (hold phase) by US forces might well have produced a different result. Nevertheless, a slight increase did take place in Arab Sunni perceptions (60% to 63%), and the decline in Arab Shi ite perceptions while more significant still leaves a high percentage (46% to 38%). These figures should, however, be kept in context. Far more Iraqis encounter US forces on a day-to-day basis than other forces in Iraq, and perceptions of the US military are colored by encounters with civilian contractors that are often far less sensitive to Iraqi concerns. The trend in perceptions of unnecessary violence by local militias, Iraqi police, and the Iraqi Army are also favorable -- perhaps reflecting the impact of the surge and US efforts to make sure that the ISF act to protect Sunnis as well as Shi ites. Sunni perceptions of unnecessary violence by militias, the police, and army dropped significantly during the surge period. The significant rise in Shi ite perceptions may reflect the impact of operations against Shi ite militias, but could be a warning of rising Shi ite sensitivity to operations that are perceived as pro-sunni.

10 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 10 Table Two Kinds of Violence Iraqis Reported as Occurring Nearby, and Perceptions of Unnecessary Violence (In percent) Type of Violence Encountered (Percent reporting) 3/5/07 8/24/07 All Sunni Shi ite Kurd All Sunni Shi ite Kurd Kidnappings for ransom 40% 50% 42% 10% 40% 52% 42% 6% Gov t/anti-gov t fighting Car bombs, suicide attacks Snipers, crossfire Sectarian fighting Perceive Unnecessary Violence by: (Percent reporting) U.S./coalition forces Local militia Iraqi police Iraqi Army Source: ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, released August 24, 2007, pp

11 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 11 Iraqi Views of the United States Role in Iraq One key result of the August 2007 poll is that most Iraqis still do not see the US and Coalition forces as allies or liberators, and the US has failed to win the battle for hearts and minds. These results are portrayed in far more detail later in this report, but are presented in graphic form in Figure Two, and may be summarized as follows. Broad National Trends in Perceptions of the US Role in Iraq Iraqi views of the US role in Iraq are summarized in Figures Two and Three. The poll result found that Iraqis as a whole divided sharply over whether the United States was right (37 percent), or wrong (63 percent) to invade in spring Once again, however, there were sharp sectarian and ethnic splits within this total. A total 49 percent of Shiites and 71 percent of Kurds polled endorsed the invasion; but 96 percent of Sunni Arabs said it was wrong. Figure Two shows that a total of 47% of all Iraqis felt US forces should leave Iraqi immediately. This percentage has been steadily rising, from 35% in March 2007 and 26% in November In contrast, about one third (34%) of Iraqis felt that US and Coalition forces should stay until security is restored. Other analysis of the polling results showed that nineteen percent of Iraqis polled blamed either US and coalition forces for the current violence in Iraq, and eight percent blamed George W. Bush personally. Al Qa ida and foreign jihadi fighters were blamed by 21 percent (far more by Shiites and Kurds than by Sunnis). Indeed, one of the top instances of local violence measured in the poll was unnecessary violence against Iraqi citizens by U.S. or coalition forces. Forty-one percent of Iraqis -- including 63 percent of Sunni Arabs -- reported such violence as having occurred nearby. Figure Three shows there was little overall confidence in US forces: Eighty-six percent of the Iraqis polled in August said that they were not confident in US and UK forces percent of Shiites as well as 99 percent of Sunni Arabs. (That fell to about half of generally pro-us Kurds.) In spite of allocating $38 billion in development funds (some $33 billion of which were US funds) Reconstruction is another complaint: Nationwide, 72 percent of Iraqis say post-war reconstruction efforts in their area have been ineffective or nonexistent. Sixty-eight percent of Shiites say so; among Sunnis, it s 89 percent. (Again, attitudes were different in the Kurdish area, where 45 percent call reconstruction effective, down from 70% in March 2007.) In the first ABC News poll in Iraq, in February 2004, 51 percent of Iraqis opposed the presence of U.S. forces on their soil. By November 2005 that jumped to 65 percent. In February/March 2007, it was 78 percent, and as of August 2007 it was 79%. More than eight in 10 Shiites (as well as 98

12 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 12 percent of Sunni Arabs) opposed the presence of U.S. and other forces in their country. (Kurds, again, differed significantly: 70 percent support the U.S. presence.) More than seven in 10 Shiites and nearly all Sunni Arabs thought the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq was making security worse. Iraqis Who Think It is Acceptable to Attack US Forces Figures Two and Four show that the poll found that the number of Iraqis who called it acceptable to attack U.S. and coalition forces totaled only 17 percent in early 2004, but that the percentage had more than tripled to 57 percent in August The main source of this antipathy was disaffected Sunni Arabs, the group that lost power with the overthrow of Saddam. Ninety-three percent of Sunni Arabs called attacks on U.S. forces acceptable. That compared with 50 percent of Arab Shiites (still a large number to endorse violence), and only five percent of Kurds, who re far more favorably inclined toward the United States. Polls taken in 2004 that found attacks on Coalition forces were approved by roughly 63% percent of Sunni Arabs and 11 percent of Shiites. Iraqi Reactions to the US Surge Some of the negative attitudes of Arab Sunni in the August poll may reflect the fact that the poll was being take at a time when many Arab Sunnis did not know of development in Anbar and the tribal awakening that led large numbers of Sunnis to turn on the Taliban and begin cooperating with the US. This may also help explain the negative overall view Iraqis had of developments in during the surge period reflected in Figures Five and Six. The poll does cover a period of intense combat and when population displacements and sectarian and ethnic cleansing continued to have a major impact. Figure Five is almost certainly correct, however, in showing that most Iraqis did see a decline in their personal economic well-being and saw little evidence of improved government services, reconstruction, and the pace of economic development. The key issue in terms of the longer-term impact of the surge is how Iraqis saw the change in the security situation. These results are shown by sect and ethnicity in Figure Six. The figures for Sunnis seem too negative to reflect the real impact of the surge, are the percentages seem likely to improve in future polls. This may well be true of the other indices in Figure Five as well. The full security impact of the surge did not take place until the late summer of 2007, and this meant a substantial lag almost certainly took place before improved security could have an impact on other aspects of Iraqi life.

13 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 13 Iraqi Views of the Iraqi Government What is less clear is that the decline in popular approval of the Iraqi government shown in Figure Seven will be reversed in the near term. The number of all Iraqis describing the central government as bad rose from 53% in March 2007 to 65% in August This shift was driven by the fact that the number of all Iraqis describing the central government as very bad rose from 26% in March 2007 to 38% in August What is particularly disturbing about these numbers is the sharp decline in Sunni approval of the government at a time when political accommodation was a critical priority, a decline in Sunni support that probably reflects internal Shi ite feuding and a continuing lack of government services, and a decline in Kurdish support that other polls show may reflect a growing popular Kurdish desire for independence and feeling that the central government is too pro-shi ite. The unfortunate fact is that the Iraqi central government Failed to make progress in serving the interests of any key element of the Iraqi population as well as in national accommodation and reconciliation.

14 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 14 Figure Two: Iraqi View of US Role and Presence 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Invasion was Wrong Coalition Forces Should Leave Now Attacks on US Forces "Acceptable" Feb-04 39% NA 17% Nov-05 50% 26% NA Mar-07 52% 35% 51% Aug-07 63% 47% 57% Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007, pg. 25.

15 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 15 Figure Three: The Presence of US Forces and their Effect on the Security Situation 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% Better Worse No Effect 30% 20% 10% 0% All Sunni Kurd Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007, p. 26

16 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 16 Figure Four: The Acceptability of Attacks on Coalition Forces 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% All Sunni Kurd Acceptable 3/5/ % 94% 35% 7% Acceptable 8/24/ % 93% 50% 5% Not Acceptable 3/5/ % 6% 65% 93% Not Acceptable 8/24/ % 7% 50% 94% Acceptable 3/5/2007 Acceptable 8/24/2007 Not Acceptable 3/5/2007 Not Acceptable 8/24/2007 Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, Pg. 26.

17 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 17 Figure Five: Impact of US Surge: Perceptions of Change in the Security Situation in the 6 Months Prior to August, % 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Political Dialogue Security in Surge Areas Security in Other Areas Pace of Reconstruction Pace of Economic Development Government's Ability to Function Security in Iraq overall Better 10% 18% 12% 9% 6% 12% 11% Worse 70% 70% 61% 67% 67% 65% 31% No Effect 20% 11% 28% 24% 26% 22% 45% Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007.

18 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 18 Figure Six: Impact of the Surge: Perceptions of Change in the Security Situation in the 6 Months Prior to August, 2007 by Sect and Ethnic Group 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% Better Worse Same 30% 20% 10% 0% Total Sunni Kurd Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, Pg. 21

19 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 19 Figure Seven: Iraqi Popular Approval of the Iraqi Government 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Total August 2007 Total March 2007 August March Kurd August Kurd March Sunni August Sunni March Very Good 6% Quite Good Quite Bad Very Bad Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007.

20 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 20 Regional, Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Divisions in Iraq Understanding key national trends, however, is only one part of putting Iraqi public opinion into perspective. To understand how Iraqi hearts and minds affect the course of the fighting and nation building, it is necessary to understand how Iraq divides into key cities and the nature of its governorates. This is anything but easy. Over four million Iraqis have been displaced inside the country or forces in to exile, no meaningful census exists that describes Iraq s sectarian and ethnic composition, and virtually every sectarian and ethnic group feels it is larger than current estimates indicate, and that population movements, displacements, and cleansing are making guesstimates more uncertain by the day. There seems to be no official US or Iraqi government guesstimate of the country s Sunni vs. Shiite Arab populations, and no single authoritative source of empirical data on the subject. The most commonly cited estimate is an unsourced reference in the CIA World Factbook ( According to the factbook, percent of Iraqis are Shiite Muslims, percent Kurds and three percent non-muslims. Although it is not explicitly stated in the CIA Factbook, that leaves room for 12 to 22 percent Sunni Arabs. 4 While it is not certain what the CIA source is, according to the ABC poll: This estimate may derive from a 1988 book, Iraq: a Country Study produced by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. This book (pp ) characterizes data on ethnicity and religious doctrine in Iraq as not absolutely reliable. It says, Officially the government sets the number of Shias at 55 percent. In the 1980s knowledgeable observers began to question this figure, regarding it as low. a more reasonable estimate of their number would seem to be between 60 and 65 percent. It adds, the Sunni Arabs constitute a decided minority of only about 13 percent... These data also are unsourced. The percent Shiite estimate matches that in the CIA World Factbook; the 13 percent Sunni Arab estimate compares to the World Factbook s unstated range of 12 to 22 percent. 5 The August ABC survey found that Iraqis identified themselves as 48 percent Shiite Arab, 33 percent Sunni Arab, 16 percent Kurdish and three percent other. 6 4 ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, August ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, August ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, August

21 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 21 D3 Systems reports that its previous surveys found that Shiite Arabs ranged from the high 40s to low 50s, and Sunni Arabs in a range from the high 20s to mid-30s. The 35 percent Sunni Arab estimate in this poll is at the high end of its previous data, but within that range. This poll had more sampling points than any previous individual national study in Iraq by D3/KARL. The August ABC poll warned that: Other Iraq surveys are difficult to compare because they ask religious doctrine different ways, often reporting significant numbers of Muslims of unspecified doctrine, and use different weights, including, in some cases, weighting to a predetermined assumption of distribution by religious doctrine. 7 An earlier ORB poll, for example, drew on 5,019 interviews carried out in home between 10 and 22 February, 2007, using probability samples based on the 1997 census. It was never intended to estimate sect or ethnicity. However, it found that 82% of those surveyed thought of themselves as Arab, 16% as Kurds, 2% as Turcomans, with less than 1% for any other faction. It also found that when the survey base was asked about its religion, 14% identified themselves as Sunni, 24% as Shi ites, and 61% as Muslims giving faith a clear priority over sect. As for minorities, no minority reached 1%. A total of 58% in urban areas and 68% in rural areas identified themselves as Muslims, rather than by sect. The figures by governorate are shown in Table Three below, and show that many Iraqis still thought of themselves as Muslims, although some Sunnis in threatened regions may have been afraid to respond, and Shi ites are clearly more likely to identify themselves by sect than Sunnis: Sunni Arab Shiite Arab Kurdish Anbar 100% 0 0 Babil Baghdad Basra Dhi Qar Diyala Irbil Ninevah Sulaimaniyah Tamim Table Three If asked your religion, what do you prefer the answer to be? 7 ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, August

22 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 22 Source: ABC News 8/07 That said, the following figures, drawn from CIA and Department of Defense sources, do provide a useful overview of Iraq s divisions by city and province, and by sect and ethnicity. They also allow the reader to orient the poll results by governorate and city that follow in terms of location and where the area is dominated by Arab Sunni, Arab Shi ite, or Kurd. Figure Eight shows the location of the governorates (provinces) and major cities in Iraq, and the CIA estimate of Iraq s sectarian and ethnic distribution. It should be note that it makes no estimate of how Iraq Arabs are divided by sect, and does not provided detailed breakouts of the percentages of the smaller minorities. Estimates of such data are extremely uncertain. ABC polls found a much larger percentage of Arab Sunnis, for example, than are reported in most sources. Figure Nine provides a rough estimate of the sectarian and ethnic population by region and governorate, and also shows that size of the minority vote in each governorate in the December 2005 election. This figure shows which provinces are clearly dominated by one ethnic and sectarian group and which are mixed. The December 2005 election showed, however, that almost all provinces have very substantial minorities that would oppose any form of federalism that gave the majority sectarian or ethnic group control. Moreover, a map this general cannot show that there are minority enclaves, mixed cities, and other sectarian and ethnic islands in most governorates. Similarly, it cannot reflect the fact that many Iraqis see their national identity as more important than their sectarian or ethnic identity, or are in mixed families and marriages.

23 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 23 Figure Eight: Iraq by Governorate and Summary Demographics Population: 27,499,638 Ethnic Groups: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian or other 5% Religions: Muslim 97% (Shi a 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian or other 3% Languages: Arabic, Kurdish (official in Kurdish regions), Assyrian, Armenian

24 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 24 Figure Nine: Iraq s Ethnic and Sectarian Character: CIA Estimate Minority Votes by Province Province Majority Minority Vote in December 2005 Election Anbar Sunni 26% Baghdad 43% Basra Shi ite 23% Diyala 62% Dhi Qar Shi ite 13% Najaf Shi ite 18% Maysan Shi ite 13% Qadisiyah Shi ite 19% Muthanna Shi ite 14% Wasit 19% Babil 24% Karbala Shi ite 24% Salahaddin 67% Ninewa Sunni 73% Kirkuk 57% Dahuk Kurd 10% Sulaymaniyah Kurd 13% Arbil Kurd 5%

25 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 25 Looking at Iraqi Divisions by and Governorate: Iraqi Perceptions of Violence The following figures show the results of the August 2007 polling effort by major city and governorate where the ABC News Polling Unit felt the sample was large enough to provide statistically valid results. Some important cities and areas like Mosul have to be omitted for this reason, although the sampling that was done in this city produced anything but optimistic results. Once again, it should be stressed that the ABC Poll was not designed to support detailed analysis of the trends in the insurgency and civil violence, and any interpretation of the results that goes beyond the obvious implications of the results shown is necessarily somewhat speculative. The reader should also be careful to read the actual spread sheets providing detailed polling results attached at the end of this paper. Graphs can do a great deal to illustrate the diversity in Iraq regarding virtually every issue, and the importance of looking beyond a narrow focus on the insurgency. They can also illustrate the dangers of generalizing by sect or ethnicity. At the same time, it is dangerous to take individual poll results out of the context of the full results for a given question and the overall results of the poll. Figure Ten shows how Iraqis feel about key aspects of security like freedom of movement, freedom from persecution, and freedom from crime. The same broad patterns emerge, but significant differences do emerge by governorate that do not reflect the levels of Sunni Islamist insurgent activity, and civil violence and threats are generally seen as significantly more threatening than crime. This was not the case in 2003 and The urban figures are disturbing because they show very high levels of concern with all aspects of security, especially in Baghdad, which was a key focus of the surge. The levels in Basra, however, are also very high, and reflect significant Shi ite on Shi ite tension. The Kirkuk data reflect Kurdish-Arab tensions. The data for governorates do show considerably better data for the two Kurdish governorates (although some of the data for Irbil are disturbing), but only one of the Shi ite governorates shows similar levels of security. Again, Shi ite on Shi ite tensions are a serious issue as is sectarian cleaning in some of the areas involved. Figure Eleven addresses perceptions of neighborhood security. Perceptions of local security are better than perceptions of security on a broad level. At the same time, it is clear that aside from the Kurdish areas and the most secure Shi ite dominated governorates, Iraqis generally do not feel safe in their own neighborhoods, and this is often true in cities and governorates dominated by one sect or its militias. The shift in the fighting resulting from the tribal awakening in Anbar and the rise of violence in Diyala are clearly reflected in the shifts in opinion between March and August. There are, however, no broad trends toward improved perceptions of security in most areas, and perceptions of local security in Baghdad grew worse. This again, however, may reflect the lag between successful military operations and public perceptions of day-to-day security. The surge had led to more visible military operations but had not yet taken hold in providing a stable increase in local security. Figure Twelve shows Iraqi perceptions of violence that has occurred nearby. As is the case with the polling results that follow, Iraqis tend to perceive very different mixes and causes of violence by city and governorate. Urban Iraqis tend to experience more violence than the population as a whole. Car bombings and

26 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 26 suicide attacks are experience most often in governorates with strong Sunni Islamist insurgent activity. Kidnappings are common, but show significant geographic variations as do snipers, crossfire attacks, and sectarian clashes. What is also striking about such data, however, is the fact that the net perceptions of violence are not significantly lower in many Shi ite dominated areas than mixed areas, although the mix of violence is different. Somewhat ironically, Anbar s data reflect the fact that fewer Sunnis have experienced violence near them than Shi ites in supposedly more secure governorates. Crime and extortion are particularly serious problems in some Shi ite governorates. The data for cities are somewhat surprising, although the fact that Shi ites dominate Basra has never been thought to have brought a meaningful degree of security in the city, The high levels for Kirkuk may reflect the fact that its residents live in a constant state of ethnic tension and perceive higher levels of violence than have actually taken place. Figure Thirteen shows that most Iraqis -- aside from the Kurds -- continue to list a lack of security as the single biggest problem facing their lives today. They do, however, perceive the main cause of that violence in very different ways. In Anbar, for example, the fact that violence is Sunni on Sunni leads to low percentages for sectarian violence and ethnic religious tension. Similar trends emerge in Shi ite dominated Basra, but not in Babil. It is also striking that violence is seen as more generic than sectarian in Diyala. Any analysis of the reasons for these differences must be speculative, but it may reflect the fact that many Iraqis still do not think in sectarian or ethnic terms and characterize violence in more generic terms.

27 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 27 Figure Ten: Percent of Iraqis rating key aspects of personal security as bad ABC Poll (August 2007) Cities Governorates 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Total National Baghdad Basra Kirku. -Anbar Sunni Freedom from Crime 65% 100% 55% 64% 100% 60% 10% 51% 62% 100% 93% 76% 11% 15% Freedom of Movement 74% 100% 75% 86% 100% 76% 17% 66% 84% 100% 100% 86% 15% 31% Freedom from Persecution 77% 100% 71% 84% 100% 74% 31% 81% 83% 100% 100% 89% 21% 46% Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala Suleyma -Ninewah -niyah Irbil-Kurd Kurd

28 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 28 Figure Eleven: Percent of Iraqis Rating Security Situation as Bad in Own Neighborhoods March and August 2007 ABC Poll (August 2007)* Cities Governorates 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Total National Baghdad Basra Kirku. -Anbar Sunni -Basrah Mar-07 54% 80% 59% 75% 100% 59% 5% 31% 69% 81% 81% 74% 2% 9% Aug-07 57% 100% 70% 79% 61% 69% 22% 25% 80% 100% 100% 58% 13% 9% -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah Suleymani yah-kurd Irbil-Kurd Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll Iraq, Where Things StandAugust, 2007.

29 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 29 Figure Twelve: What Kinds of Violence have occurred nearby? ABC Poll (August 2007) 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% Cities Governorates 0% Car Bombs or Suicide Attacks 42% 52% 65% 75% 42% 59% 2% 56% 63% 52% 48% 79% 4% 25% Snipers or Crossfire 30% 43% 20% 21% 27% 14% 50% 6% 30% 44% 37% 71% Fighting Among Sectarian Factions 28% 53% 54% 37% 27% 56% 4% 12% 38% 54% 34% 32% Kidnappings for Ransom 41% 44% 67% 81% 23% 79% 14% 67% 83% 44% 27% 63% 2% 2% Fighting between Iraqi Government and Anti- Government Forces Total Baghd Nation ad al Basra Kirku. Anbar- Sunni Basra h- Dhi Qar- Babil- Tami m- Baghd ad- Ninew Diyalaah- 34% 56% 32% 48% 22% 30% 49% 34% 53% 55% 34% 17% 4% Suley maniy ah- Irbil- Kurd Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007.

30 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 30 Figure Thirteen: What is the single biggest problem facing your life these days? ABC Poll (August 2007) 35% Cities Governorates 1 Lack of security/safety 2 War/civil war/unrest 3 Sectarian violence 4 Terrorist attacks 5 Ethnic-religious tension/ Persecution/Discrimination 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Total Baghda Nationa d l Basra Kirku 1 Lack of security/safety 17% 13% 14% 25% 33% 19% 5% 11% 25% 13% 27% 10% 4% 2% 2 War/civil war/unrest 4% 11% 5% 4% 3% 3% 1% 3% 10% 4% 7% 1% 1% 3 Sectarian violence 6% 7% 8% 10% 3% 5% 23% 11% 7% 5% 5% 3% 2% 4 Terrorist attacks 7% 7% 11% 8% 1% 11% 1% 22% 6% 6% 8% 10% 5% 2% 5 Ethnic-religious tension/ Persecution/Discrimination 4% 6% 2% 6% 3% 1% 7% 5% 6% 1% 5% 2% 2% Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, Anbar- Sunni Basrah-Dhi Qar- Babil- Tamim- Baghda d- Diyala- Ninewa h- Suleym aniyah- Kurd Irbil- Kurd

31 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 31 Looking at Iraqi Divisions by and Governorate: Iraqi Perceptions of Civil War Given the previous data, it should be clear why asking Iraqis whether they face a state of civil war can produce uncertain results. The nature of violence in Iraq is extremely complex, and Iraqis who see US and other Coalition forces as a major threat, or feel that way about foreign jihadists, may not see civil conflict as a civil war even if it is a serious problem in their area. Nevertheless, the ABC poll, and a recent ORB poll, both show that many Iraqis do see themselves as in a civil conflict. Figure Fourteen approaches the issue differently by asking Iraqis about sectarian and ethnic separation. This figure is both revealing and should be a source of deep concern to those who advocate federalism or partition. Like the previous figures, it shows that Iraq is not dividing along the kinds of sectarian and ethnic lines that offer any hope of near term security or stability even in governorates dominated by given sects and ethnic groups, The polling data reflects the high degree of displacement or cleansing in most areas, but also indicates that many Iraqis may be in a state of denial about what is happening. The data for Basra, for example, clearly understate the level of forcible displacement. The polling often indicates that Iraqis who live in mixed areas do not describe the area as mixed if their neighborhood is not mixed, and many Iraqis cite displacements as voluntary in areas that were subject to high levels of intimidation and violence. What is particularly striking, however, are the low percentages for mixed neighborhoods that have not yet been caught up in separation. This is a warning of just how dangerous forced separation or a broad-based civil conflict might be in the future. These figures are particularly striking for Basra, Kirkuk, and other cities, but are high for Baghdad. They affect eight of Iraq s provinces, including most Shi ite ones. The only exceptions are the two Kurdish governorates of Suleymaniyah and Irbil, and the Kurds seem to be ignoring Turcoman and Christian minorities. Figure Fifteen highlights the areas where separation and cleansing are already serious problems. They include Baghdad city and the Basra, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninevah governorates. The data, however, cover only a limited number of governorates, and largely areas where the main source of tension is Arab Sunni versus Arab Shi ite. They do, however, reflect the fact that the primary pressure for relocation has Arab Shi ite pressure on Arab Sunnis, particularly in Baghdad and Basra Figure Sixteen shows one of the most tragic aspects of the civil conflicts in Iraq. The vast majority of Iraqis in all major cities and r governorates feel separation is bad, generally by margins of well over 90%. This is true regardless of whether the population is Arab Sunni, Arab Shi ite, or Kurdish. It is also important to note that all of these charts illustrate the extraordinary complexity of violence in Iraq. A focus concentrating on the insurgency, militias, fears of civil war, or sectarian and ethnic differences does not reflect the realities Iraqis perceive or the problems the US, its allies, and the Iraqi government face in dealing with local threats and perceptions.

32 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 32 Figure Fourteen: Has the Separating of People Been Happening In Your Mahallah or Not? Has this been mainly forcible or mainly peaceful? ABC Poll (August 2007)* 100% Cities Governorates 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Total National Baghdad Basra Kirku. -Anbar Sunni -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah Suleyman iyah-kurd Irbil-Kurd Yes, has happened 17% 43% 45% 23% 39% 22% 20% 44% 16% 2% Mainly forcible-- 11% 27% 39% 15% 34% 15% 12% 28% 10% 1% Mainly voluntary- 5% 16% 6% 6% 5% 7% 6% 16% 6% 0% No, remains mixed 29% 24% 52% 52% 43% 40% 76% 43% 25% 61% 10% 1% 0% No, never has been mixed 54% 33% 3% 25% 100% 19% 60% 2% 37% 31% 23% 88% 99% 100% Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007.

33 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 33 Figure Fifteen: Percentage of Iraqis reporting separation and forcible separation in Their Neighborhood ABC Poll (August 2007)* Cities Governorates 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Total National Baghdad Basra Kirku. -Anbar Sunni -Basrah -Dhi Qar Yes, has happened 17% 43% 45% 23% 39% 22% 20% 44% 16% 2% Mainly forcible-- 11% 27% 39% 15% 34% 15% 12% 28% 10% 1% -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah Suleyma -niyah Kurd -Irbil Kurd Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007.

34 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by and Region 10/19/07 Page 34 Figure Sixteen: Do you think the separation of people on sectarian lines is a good thing or a bad thing? ABC Poll (August 2007)* Cities Governorates 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Total National Baghdad Basra Kirku Good thing 2% 15% 4% 10% 1% 3% 5% 1% 12% Bad thing 98% 100% 85% 96% 100% 90% 98% 100% 97% 100% 100% 95% 99% 88% Don't Know 0% 0% 1% 0%. -Anbar Sunni -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah Suleymani yah-kurd Irbil-Kurd Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007.