Programme Final Evaluation Report: Post Typhoon Ketsana Cash Transfers in Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces.

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1 Programme Final Evaluation Report: Post Typhoon Ketsana Cash Transfers in Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai March 2010 Prepared By: Richard Rastall theidlgroup Ltd Vietnam Country Office 1, Lane 5, An Duong F361 Yen Phu, Tay Ho, Hanoi, Vietnam Tel: Fax: Web: 1

2 Contents List of Acronyms Acknowledgements 1. Executive Summary 1 2. Background 3 3. Evaluation Approach & Methodology Evaluation Objective and Purpose Approach, Methodology and Work Schedule 6 4. Evaluation Findings Programme Appropriateness & Relevance Programme Efficiency Programme Impact Conclusions & Lessons Learned Programme Strengths Programme Constraints/Weaknesses A Few Key Lessons Recommendations 30 Annex 1: Guidelines for Unconditional Cash Recovery Operations Annex 2: Workplan Annex 3: Post distribution Survey Questionnaire Annex 4: Post distribution Survey Training Agenda Annex 5: Lists of Participants 2

3 List of Acronyms ARC CBDRM CCFSC EMMA FSCB IFRC OFDA PNS SOE USAID USD VND VNRC American Red Cross Community Based Disaster Risk Management Central Committee for Storm and Flood Control Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis Flood and Storm Control Board International Federation of the Red Cross Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Partner National Societies State Owned Enterprise United States Agency for International Development United States Dollar Vietnam Dong Vietnam Red Cross

4 Acknowledgements The project evaluation consultant would like to acknowledge the following individuals and organizations for their assistance in making this evaluation both possible and productive. Firstly the efforts of Mr Le Gia Tien and Ms Tran Thi Thanh Huyen from Vietnam Red Cross for their contributions to the household survey questionnaire and for their assistance in terms of organizing the logistics for and participation in two field missions to Central Vietnam. Secondly for the insights of Mr Doan Van Thai and Mr Le The Thin, Director and General Secretary respectively of the Social Works Department at Vietnam Red Cross. The support of each of the 4 Provincial Red Cross Chapters for their sincere effort and active participation in meetings is deeply appreciated and has contributed towards the findings in this evaluation. The consultant is aware that the cash transfer programme has already usurped a considerable amount of their time and that these chapters are engaged in a number of other projects and relief efforts. In particular the efforts of the Provincial Chapters with regard to the smooth planning and implementation of household post distribution surveys in the week prior to Tet are appreciated. Special thanks go to Mr Phuong from Quang Ngai Red Cross who also took on the considerable task of collating and disaggregating the data from this province. A total of 40 Red Cross volunteers were also crucial in gathering this important household data, without their enthusiastic participation the data collection would not have been possible. Thanks are also due to Ms Nguyen Thi Thu Quynh at ARC headquarters in Vietnam who assisted with the disaggregation of the household data from Gia Lai Province. Thanks to Ms Dang Thi Hien for organizing flights, budgets and logistics. The consultant is also grateful for the assistance of ARC International staff Ms Rebecca Scheurer and Michael Zeleke for their advice regarding the approach and methodology. Finally special and particular thanks go to Hoang Gia Yen for his patience and professionalism in assisting the consultant throughout all aspects of the assignment. 1

5 1. Executive Summary The following report constitutes an independent evaluation of a United States Agency for International Development, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance funded unconditional cash transfer programme, providing humanitarian assistance to victims of Typhoon Ketsana. The programme was effectively implemented by the Vietnam Red Cross, although the funding was channeled through the American Red Cross who also assisted with implementation through provision of technical guidance as well as overall monitoring, project management support and supervision. Typhoon Ketsana struck Central Vietnam in late September 2009 causing widespread destruction and impacted an estimated 3 million people who faced multiple hazards including flooding, flash flooding, soil erosion, landslides and high speed winds. As one of the worst storms to afflict the region in decades, there was a substantive humanitarian response from the government, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) movement as well as various other sources. As part of the IFRC response, the cash transfer programme intended to complement other Partner National Society and IFRC programmes, many of which focused on the provision of food and non-food items. There is a growing body of evidence from around the world regarding the significant advantages of cash transfer programming in the emergency/disaster response context. However, this was the first time that the VNRC had implemented a post-disaster cash transfer programme and as such it would provide a unique opportunity to learn about the potential benefits and challenges of such a humanitarian response approach in Vietnam (as well as contributing further to the international body of evidence). The cash transfers were intended to help beneficiaries meet their immediate basic needs, begin to stabilize or rebuild their livelihoods and to re-stimulate local economies. The distributions ultimately reached over 8,500 households (a significantly greater number than originally proposed) in 4 of the worst affected provinces; Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai. This report is based on an evaluation mission conducted between February and March 2010, approximately 4-6 weeks after the cash distributions and largely finds the programme to be a considerable success, demonstrating the appropriateness of unconditional cash transfers as a viable and appropriate humanitarian response in the post-disaster context. Results from post-distribution household surveys illustrate that whilst the majority of cash transfers have been used for buying food, there has been significant expenditure on other basic needs such as house repair, medicines and clothes. There was also significant investment in productive assets such as agricultural tools, seeds, fertilizers and/or small livestock (eg. pigs and poultry). This has proved that the cash grants have been used appropriately and in accordance with the intended objectives of the programme. The cash transfers have had an impact by essentially assisting some of the most poor and vulnerable households in the country with getting back on their feet after Ketsana. For many the cash grants have ensured that their families will have enough to eat until the next harvest or for others the cash grants have gone towards either improving the next harvest or covering expenses so that more of the next harvest can be sold by the beneficiary. One of the most important things to note with the utilization of cash transfer data collected during this evaluation is the different ways cash has been used by different groups of people in different geographical areas i.e. the beneficiaries have been empowered to use the cash according to their needs and that those needs may differ according to a wide range of cultural, socio-economic, geographic and other contextual permutations, not at least how they specifically were impacted by the typhoon. 2

6 The programme itself has gone a long way towards defining a very clear set of formats, guidelines and procedures for implementing programmes of type in the future. A considerable amount of time and thought went into the front-end of the project in making sure that the programme was well-designed and in accordance with international best-practice. This did mean that the distributions were slightly later than originally intended (but still within the 3 month emergency response period). Given that a longer amount of time had to be utilized in designing the programme, providing training and developing formats for various monitoring forms, it is a testament to the organizational capacity of the VNRC that such a programme involving distributions to over 8,500 households, in 63 communes, 15 districts and four provinces was effectively implemented in around 6 weeks. This included conducting orientation workshops and village meetings where a community-based and participatory beneficiary selection process was endorsed. The clarity of the beneficiary selection criteria and guidelines, together with simple yet thorough monitoring processes allowed for what were believed to be very safe, secure and transparent distributions. There were inevitably certain constraints and weaknesses which are essentially teething problems and these have been addressed in this report towards fine-tuning the guidelines and creating a standard operating procedure for unconditional cash grants in the post-disaster context in Vietnam based on lessons learned from this programme. Overall though this programme has undoubtedly been successful and has demonstrated the massive potential for up-scaling unconditional cash transfers as a humanitarian tool in the emergency/post-disaster response context. Although this programme did help to build the capacity and confidence of the VNRC and provincial RC chapters, there is still a set of institutional capacity issues which need to be addressed as part of further roll out of the approach. One of the other key lessons learned was the importance of the role of volunteers (in monitoring and supervision) for these kinds of distributions and that there is an urgent need for VNRC not only to build the knowledge/skills capacity of its staff but its physical human resource capacity also needs to be strengthened. One of the major challenges ahead will be how VNRC can expand its volunteer network. Finally, the evaluation consultant would like to note that although the programme is generally believed to be an overwhelming success in terms of what it set out to achieve, special mention needs to be made of the fact that many of the most vulnerable and worst affected households have been set back considerably by Typhoon Ketsana and it will take them many, many years to recover, if indeed they do. Many beneficiaries interviewed during the evaluation mission had their houses completely destroyed, others had their red book agricultural land literally washed away and others still had their upland forestry plantations completely washed away. These kind of impacts of Ketsana will take a long time to recover from and thus certain recommendations are included stating the appropriateness of further ongoing support to livelihoods rehabilitation in some of the target provinces. 3

7 2. Background On 29 September 2009, Typhoon Ketsana struck central Vietnam with wind gusts of up to 160 km/hour. The typhoon swept through 12 provinces including Binh Dinh, Da Nang, Dak Lak, Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Lam Dong, Phu Yen, Quang Binh, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Quang Tri and Thua Thien Hue. It caused widespread destruction, with the provinces of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai the hardest struck, resulting in the evacuation of 103,123 households (some 356,790 people). One of the key features of Typhoon Ketsana was the multiple hazards experienced by different communities in different environments and across a wide area. An estimated total of three million people were impacted by floods (the worst in Central Vietnam for 45 years), flash floods, landslides, and high winds. Fig 1 provides an illustration of some of the most severe impacts of Typhoon Ketsana as well as the ARC response (red arrows identify the worst affected provinces). Fig 1: Map Showing Ketsana Affected Areas & ARC Response The International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) launched an appeal for international aid, seeking USD 5.47 million to support the affected population. This support was targeted towards the 60,000 worst affected and most vulnerable households (approximately 270,000 people) and comprised the 4

8 distribution of food/rice, emergency kits and uniquely in the case of the American Red Cross (ARC) supported programme, unconditional cash transfers. As part of the emergency response operation the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provided resources to the ARC. The Vietnam Red Cross Society (VNRC), as the primary implementer of the programme, originally led efforts to reach over 6,000 families in four of the worst affected provinces: Gai Lai, Kon Tum, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai. The programme design entailed cash distributions as an emergency/early recovery intervention aimed at supporting the families that were most affected by Typhoon Ketsana, many of whom were from poorer farming communities whose reserves had been depleted by multiple recent disasters and were considered to be among the most vulnerable communities in Vietnam. The programme was coordinated with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Emergency Appeal, and was tailored to complement the livelihoods objective in the Emergency Appeal. ARC channeled this support from the US Government directly through the VNRC. In total the unconditional cash transfer programme directly assisted more than 8,500 households in 63 communes, 15 districts and 4 provinces. The table below provides statistics on the programme s coverage. Table 1: Consolidated Data for Cash Programme Province Districts Communes Villages Budget (million VND) 1- member HH 2- member HH 3>member HH Total HHs Total beneficiaries Quang Nam , ,637 2, Quang Ngai ,000 1, ,118 3, Kon Tum , ,930 2, Gia Lai ,900 1,536 1,501 5,545 8,582 29,381 The ARC cash transfer programme in the aftermath of Typhoon Ketsana is particularly significant as it is the first time that the VNRC has implemented a cash transfer programme in the emergency context. The conceptualization of the programme was however based on the increasingly positive recognition of the role of cash transfers in the emergency context globally as well as VNRC s eagerness to pilot this approach to disaster response based on their own experiences with cash transfers in the livelihood support context. The programme was also justified on the basis that it complemented the relief efforts of other Partner National Societies (PNS), who distributed food and non-food items immediately after the typhoon struck, through the provision of cash to the most vulnerable and worst affected poor households in order that beneficiaries would be able to allocate financial resources according to their personal and varied needs. Thus unconditional cash transfers were believed to be an appropriate, costefficient and effective means of addressing the programme s 3 key objectives: a) To provide beneficiaries financial means to address basic needs such as food and productive asset replenishment b) To promote economic recovery in support of local markets c) To strengthen the VNRC capacities to engage in early recovery activities by encouraging leadership and participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of the project. 5

9 3. Evaluation Approach & Methodology 3.1 Evaluation Objective and Purpose The objective and purpose of the evaluation mission was essentially two-fold. Firstly, to assess the impact of the cash transfers on the beneficiaries what were the cash transfers used for by beneficiaries? Was the usage in accordance with intended programme goals and objectives? The second aspect of the mission was to review the programme s implementation strategy as a project, was it successful? Was it appropriate, relevant, efficient, effective, and what lessons can be learned in terms of implementing programmes of type in the future? The specific objectives as presented in the TOR are listed below: 1. To assess the effectiveness and impact of the unconditional cash operation in the Vietnam context 2. To review the implementation strategy of the programme and identify areas of learning opportunity, in particular in relation to the unconditional cash distribution guidance 3. To analyze and review existing unconditional cash programmes conducted by VNRC and others in Vietnam To provide recommendations for guidelines towards the development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for unconditional emergency cash distributions that can lead to early recovery. In order to address these TORs the consultant had a number of key guiding questions for the evaluation: Did the programme addressed typical constraints, risks and weaknesses in design, implementation and monitoring (eg. different cash transfer options, the value of the cash transfer, timing, availability of markets, targeting/beneficiary selection, corruption, transparency, security, monitoring)? What needs to be changed so that such concerns are addressed, where appropriate? The consultant referred closely to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Guidelines for Cash Transfer Programming (ICRC, 2007) and Oxfam GB s Cash Transfer Programming in Emergencies (Oxfam GB, 2006) as best-practice manuals throughout in determining the success of this ARC intervention had best-practice been applied? 3.2 Approach, Methodology and Work Schedule A work schedule summarizing the above approach and methodology is presented as Annex 2 at the back of this report. The first priority of the evaluation mission was to conduct a survey with programme beneficiaries to assess what in fact the cash transfers were used for. The reason for this was that the evaluation consultant was not hired until the first week of February, between 4-6 weeks after the cash distributions. Thus it was necessary to carry out this part of the assignment first before people forgot what they had used the money for and crucially before the Tet holiday which would then delay implementation for another 2-3 weeks. 1 It should be noted that this report will not deal with point 3 above. The reason for this is that there are no existing analyses or reports documenting and evaluating previous VNRC cash transfer initiatives. The VNRC have implemented and/or currently implement several cash transfer projects or programmes including Tet for the Poor and other cow/pig bank projects. VNRC have also facilitated the distribution of cash following other disasters but there is no documentation and analysis of this. In order to fulfill these TORs, the consultant would have had to have spent considerably more time in the field in order to collect further primary data so as to analyse other VNRC cash transfer interventions. 6

10 Questionnaire Design: The first task was to design a questionnaire. A simple and fairly structured questionnaire was designed in order to collect the desired information pertaining both to household use of the cash transfer as well as to collect some qualitative information on beneficiary perceptions of the cash transfer experience Did people understand the selection criteria? Was it well organized? Clear? Transparent? The household questionnaire is presented in this report as Annex 3. Sample Size and Confidence: The survey was to be conducted at household level and in all target provinces. The next step was to determine an appropriate sample size for the household survey of programme beneficiaries. An online sample size calculator 2 was used to determine sample size. Given that the total number of beneficiaries was known to be 8,500, a sample size of 368 was determined to be appropriate with a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of 5. The sample size was rounded up to 400 in order to facilitate data entry and disaggregation i.e. 100 households per province. This figure also made things easier logistically in the field as it was known that at least 10 volunteers from each province would assist with carrying out the surveys, meaning that each volunteer would conduct 10 interviews in 1 day towards the provincial target of 100 questionnaires. The households would be randomly selected but the communes were chosen in order to try and achieve a reasonably representative cross-section of typhoon affected communities. As mentioned above, one of the key features of the typhoon was that it affected different people in different environments in different ways across a very wide area. There could be a huge range of factors which determine how different people respond to the disaster but it was decided to try and get a spread of lowland and upland communities, remote and less remote communes and those that were worst affected and those that were averagely affected. These factors were seen to be the most crucial in terms of affecting how people may utilize their cash transfer. Table 2 below provides a summary of households interviewed. Table 2: Household Survey Plan Province District Commune No. of HH Dates Responsible Note Quang Nam Nong Son Que Ninh Feb Volunteers & RC staff Remote Que Loc Feb Volunteers & RC staff Badly affected Phu Ninh Tam Phuoc Feb Volunteers & RC staff Tam Vinh Feb Volunteers & RC staff Badly affected Total Minh Long Long Hiep Feb Volunteers & RC staff Remote Long Son Feb Volunteers & RC staff Remote Quang Ngai Mo Duc Duc Hiep Feb Volunteers & RC staff Badly affected Nghia Hanh Hanh Tin Dong Feb Volunteers & RC staff Badly affected Hanh Thien Feb Volunteers & RC staff Badly affected Total Chu Pah Dak To Ve Feb Volunteers & RC staff Chu Prong Iato Feb Volunteers & RC staff Gia Lai Adok Feb Volunteers & RC staff Dak Doa Gla Feb Volunteers & RC staff Badly affected Total Dak Ruong Feb Volunteers Badly affected Kon Tum Kon Ray Dak To Lung Feb Volunteers Badly affected Dak Coi Feb Volunteers Remote Total Grand total

11 The disaggregation of data by ethnicity, sex, size of household/amount received, as well as particular vulnerable groups i.e. female headed households (FHH), households with children under the age of 5 and households with disabled/elderly would also serve to further determine what different types of people spent their money on. Household Survey Training: Once the above approach had been determined two 1-day training workshops were held for a total of 49 RC staff and volunteers from all 4 target provinces. Participants were trained in basic PRA and interview techniques as well as how to fill in the questionnaire (half-day) and a half-day field practice. Field Officers in each province were also shown how to enter the data collected by their colleagues and volunteers and how to disaggregate the data. Provincial RC leaders then developed the survey plan for their province (as summarized above in Table 2). An outline of the training course presented in Quang Nam and Gia Lai is presented as Annex 4. Following the training, RC staff and volunteers conducted the interviews in the field and data has been entered and subsequently disaggregated as mentioned above. Programme Evaluation through Consultation: A second field mission was conducted by the consultant between 1-5 March in order to meet with programme partners and stakeholders at commune, district and provincial levels. Meetings with People s Committees, Red Cross and relevant government departments (eg. the Central Committee for Storm and Flood Control and Flood and Storm Control Boards) were held in order to try and gather perspectives on the programme s Strengths, Weaknesses and Lessons Learned. Thus these consultation meetings served to address the second part of the evaluation purpose i.e. reviewing the implementation strategy and project appropriateness, relevance, efficiency and impact. Focus group discussions were also conducted with small groups of vulnerable beneficiaries (one different group in each province female headed households, disabled/elderly, households with young children and an ethnic minority group). The purpose of these consultations was to follow up on indicative trends in the survey data where possible and to collect further qualitative information on beneficiaries experiences with the processes of beneficiary selection, household responses to the shock of the disaster, and local level comments on the actual distributions themselves. 8

12 4. Evaluation Findings This section of the report documents findings from the evaluation mission and is intentionally structured to assess programme appropriateness, relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact in logical sequence. Thus the section begins by looking at programme design and relevance, followed by the implementation strategy itself and practical issues, strengths, constraints and weaknesses during implementation before analysing how beneficiaries used their cash transfers and what this has meant in terms of disaster affected peoples being able to meet their immediate needs and rebuild their livelihoods. 4.1 Programme Appropriateness & Relevance Justifying Cash Transfers in the Emergency Context in Vietnam The consultant believes the ARC Post-Ketsana Cash Transfer Programme to be a highly appropriate and relevant intervention. The rationale for choosing cash transfers as a humanitarian response in the initial stages-early recovery/transition period was clearly justified given: i) The scale of the disaster: As highlighted above in Section 2, Typhoon Ketsana caused widespread destruction, communities and people suffered the severe consequences of multiple hazards in Central Vietnam and the need to provide humanitarian assistance to affected communities for people to meet their basic needs and to re-establish their livelihoods is unquestionable. ii) Substantive assistance provided in the form of food and non-food items by other projects: There was an enormous humanitarian response by the IFRC and PNS to the devastation caused by Ketsana. Table 3 below summarises the different responses by different IFRC member societies. As can be seen from the table, the ARC cash transfer initiative is unique and as such is highly complementary with the other relief efforts which have distributed food/rice and non-food items such as household emergency kits, water containers and included a water and sanitation project. Above and beyond IFRC and PNS support, communities in the disaster affected areas also received emergency assistance from the government of Vietnam as well as numerous local charities, churches/pagodas, civil society organizations and corporate businesses. The vast majority of this support comprised rice, noodles and other food packages. Table 3: IFRC and PNS Post-Ketsana Humanitarian Assistance No Organisation Assistance Provided Location No of Beneficiaries 1 IFRC Watsan handbook, purification sachet, water treatment unit, food/nutrition parcel, rice, household kits, water containers, shelter 2 German RC Aquatab, household kits, water container 3 French RC Rice, plastic sheeting, household kits Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Thua Thien Hue, Danang, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Kon Tum, Gia Lai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Dak Lak, Lam Dong Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Thua Thien Hue Binh Dinh, Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Quang Ngai Project Cost (USD) 283,223 5,246,154 76, , ,448 2,023,995 4 Spanish RC Rice, water container, seed Danang, Quang Nam 55, ,089 9

13 5 American RC Unconditional cash transfers Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai 6 German RC & Rice, unconditional cash Netherland RC transfer 7 Swiss RC Rice, household kits, house repair Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Thua Thien Hue Quang Tri, Thua Thien Hue, Kon Tum, Danang, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Phu Yen, Binh Dinh 29, ,750 41, ,132 13, ,936 In the light of all of these other forms of humanitarian assistance, the consultant believes it to be extremely appropriate to have also piloted unconditional cash transfers as a complementary measure to the worst affected areas. Statements from VNRC and provincial RC chapters during this evaluation indicated that they had witnessed significant post-distribution sale of emergency kits in particular (although also other relief items including rice) thus suggesting that in a number of cases the assistance being provided did not match beneficiary needs of course one of the main advantages of cash transfers is that beneficiaries have the power to decide what they need most, cash is more flexible, fungible and transferable. iii) The challenges and difficulties associated with quickly assessing detailed damages and needs: Associated with the point above, that sometimes the provision of food and non-food items may not be the most appropriate, Typhoon Ketsana impacted different people in different environments in different ways across an extremely wide area. With cash transfers there is less need to assess in detail what exactly each community and different groups of people need following the disaster because once the cash is distributed beneficiaries can decide on how best to use the funds. Particularly given the scale and scope of Ketsana s impacts, unconditional cash transfers were justified because it was virtually impossible to assess such multiple/varied needs accurately and within the required short timeframe of emergency response. iv) The institutional framework for emergency response, the capability of VNRC and Provincial RC Chapters and their experience of other cash transfer programmes: Vietnam has an extremely wellestablished institutional framework for emergency response with clearly defined relief committees which coordinate operations between state actors and mass organizations under the Fatherland Front (VFF) including the Red Cross, Youth Union, and Women s Union. This well-established Socialist institutional structure and the clear understanding of different bodies roles and responsibilities is certainly an important and advantageous factor for implementing this kind of a humanitarian response programme in Vietnam. The VNRC have implemented other cash transfer programmes in the past, albeit in a non-emergency livelihood support context and based on these experiences were keen to pilot cash transfers in the emergency context. v) Lower transaction costs: The consultant has observed that in addition to the fact that cash transfers offer beneficiaries empowerment through choice and therefore the ability to meet needs appropriately, the VNRC were particularly keen to pilot cash transfers due to the substantially lower transaction costs. Lower transaction costs (than distribution of food and non-food items) were realised by VNRC and Provincial RC chapters across the board with this programme. vi) The existence and durability of markets for a reasonable diversity of products in most parts of Vietnam: The rapid economic growth accompanied by massive infrastructural development of the country over the last 20 years has meant that Vietnam is approaching middle-income country status. As such the vast majority of the country is reasonably well-connected to local markets. Typhoon Ketsana induced the worst floods for 45 years in some areas and yet still communities were only temporarily restricted in access to district centres and therefore markets for a maximum of a few 10

14 weeks (in most cases only a few days). Cash transfers only work where beneficiaries have markets as well as a safe, stable local economy in which to use their money and for the most part Vietnam has those necessary pre-existing conditions for cash transfers to succeed Cash Transfer Modalities - Why unconditional cash transfers? The consultant, having evaluated whether cash transfers were an appropriate and relevant option then examined whether the modality of cash transfer was the correct one. There are several different options for cash transfer programming, including conditional or unconditional cash transfers, cash or commodity vouchers and cash for work programmes. In this case unconditional cash transfers were chosen but why? Cash or commodity vouchers are generally used in situations where a particular needed commodity is scarce, there is a high risk of inflation, and/or there are security concerns. None of these were deemed to be serious concerns in this case. Furthermore, this is not a traditional response in Vietnam. Choosing cash or commodity vouchers could also be appropriate if the programme was designed to achieve specific objectives such as improved agricultural production or nutrition. In this case unconditional cash support was correctly chosen due to the multi-faceted nature of the impacts of the disaster on rural livelihoods. Conditional cash transfers are appropriate where very specific needs have to be met for large sum costs eg. housing. This might have been an appropriate response for some communities in the affected area but even in those areas people had suffered damages to both houses and land and therefore within even a small community there would have been different priorities. On a larger scale across 4 provinces, these differences are even greater and very difficult to assess in a short timeframe. Thus the consultant is bound to conclude that unconditional transfers had to make more sense in this scenario. Perhaps in a scenario where a storm has a more localized and uniform impact, conditional cash transfers could be an appropriate option. Cash for work (CFW) programmes are often appropriate when public works are required. Given the destruction and devastation caused by Typhoon Ketsana this could also have been a potentially appropriate response, as there is usually the capacity amongst Vietnamese communities to undertake such work and there is scope for provision of equipment and supervision. However, by necessity this would have created different criteria in determining beneficiaries and may inherently marginalise the most vulnerable members of the community (eg. elderly, disabled) who cannot work. CFW programmes were also carried out in any case by provincial and district authorities in the aftermath of Ketsana. During focus group discussions with beneficiaries a number of them mentioned being employed temporarily in either public works schemes or privately clearing other people s land/repairing other people s houses as a short-term source of income/coping strategy. Therefore in this case the consultant concludes that selecting the default option, unconditional cash transfers, was the correct decision since especially by the time of the transfer people were generally able to buy items they needed, there was a low risk of inflation, and a low security threat. The fact that the programme objectives were necessarily broad as a result of the broad livelihood impacts from Ketsana, also meant that the right choice was made not to condition. The programme deliberately targeted poor and vulnerable groups and as such CFW becomes inappropriate on those grounds because the most poor and vulnerable groups include people who cannot work. This does not mean however that the other options should not be considered in other emergency situations in Vietnam, indeed the consultant would encourage the piloting of other types of cash 11

15 transfer options in Vietnam. This can only put the IFRC, VNRC and other relevant authorities in a better position to respond to disasters and emergencies. Conditional cash transfers may be an appropriate choice now for certain communities as they begin to enter a livelihood rehabilitation stage and with more time since the disaster it is possible to identify particular areas, needs and individuals that have been much worse affected. The British Red Cross for example distributed targeted conditional cash grants for small-scale businesses in Aceh, Indonesia beginning in mid-2005 approximately 6 months after the Tsunami Addressing Risks in Programme Design Cash transfer programming, although it presents numerous advantages as outlined above, is relatively untried in the emergency response context and there are a number of typical fears or risks associated with them. The following risks have been identified in ICRC (2007) and Oxfam GB (2006) guideline documents and the evaluation consultant is satisfied that such risks were considered in design of this cash transfer programme. 1. Inflationary Risks: With the distribution of large amounts of cash to communities it is theoretically possible that a large enough injection could have an inflationary impact. Prices, including food and petrol did increase between 5-10% in the project area but this was not linked to the distribution of cash itself but due to the scarcity and infrastructural problems caused by the disaster. Almost all beneficiaries, especially those in the worst affected provinces had also already received food aid. Based on findings from the Oxfam GB study (2006), even the largest cash transfer programmes still represent only a small fraction of the local economy and this one was no different with cash transfer amounts designed to assist beneficiaries with purchasing enough food for their household until the next harvest with a little left over to spare for investment in productive assets. Indeed as will be shown later on in section 4.3 this is more or less how most cash transfers were used by beneficiaries in this case. Thus, as such the cash transfer amounts of up to 1 million VND (or approximately 50 USD) distributed to only selected households on a one-off basis were never sufficient to seriously affect local market prices. 2. Targeting: Targeting or beneficiary selection is typically the most contentious issue in any cash transfer programme and as shall be discussed further below was also the case here. The programme however designed and then implemented a participatory and community-based household selection process with very clear beneficiary selection criteria and guidelines. Thus targeting was seriously considered during the design phase and thus ensured that communities selected and agreed on who should benefit from the programme. 3. Security: Any distribution of resources presents a security risk although so far there is no evidence to suggest that cash transfers are susceptible to any greater risk than food or non-food items. Once again though the community-based and participatory beneficiary selection approach served to minimize security concerns. Security was also addressed by the production of clear guidelines on how to carry out the cash distributions in an ordered manner and with a good security presence. 4. Intra-household tension: There is a concern that the provision of cash into the household economy may lead to disputes within the household over the use and control of the money. In most cases the fear is that men will control the money and misuse the funds or that women may be subjected to violence. In some societies it may be appropriate to specifically allocate cash transfers only to female recipients in order to also encourage female empowerment. However in Vietnam, in almost all cultures i.e. that of the majority ethnicity Kinh people and most of the other ethnic minority cultures, traditionally women have a strong position at least in terms of managing domestic finances 12

16 - indeed amongst some of the ethnic minority groups in the project area, the societies are matrilineal and thus households are female headed. An open selection of the household member leaving it up to the household themselves to decide who collected the cash is believed to be an appropriate and fair distribution method in this case. By stipulating that only women could receive the grant a) it may have created greater tension within the household (i.e. men trying to get their hands on the money), b) it would not have been fair to households who did not have any women eg. an elderly man living by himself and c) it could serve to further disempower male members of matrilineal households. This is likely to be an appropriate decision in most cases in Vietnam. 5. Inappropriate Use: There has been a somewhat irrational and misplaced fear amongst donors that large amounts of money will be misspent by beneficiaries on inappropriate items. Oxfam GB s M&E results from various cash transfer programmes worldwide indicate that in fact there is very little inappropriate use. The results from this study also do not indicate any misuse of cash transfers. 6. Corruption/Diversion: A major fear surrounding cash transfers is that local elites will not transfer the cash to beneficiaries but will instead divert cash. There is not logically any greater chance of this happening with cash than with any other form of aid distribution however there is a very real threat of this. The programme tackled this as we shall see through very close supervision and monitoring. 4.2 Programme Implementation Strategy and Efficiency Project Implementation Overview Fig 2 below presents a programme implementation timeline outlining the key steps taken between the receipt of OFDA funds for the programme and the distribution of the cash transfers. Fig 2: Programme Timeline 13

17 The programme actually started on 16 th October but the cash transfer programme plan of action was not developed until early November and key methodological approaches and documents (including the beneficiary selection criteria, guidelines, monitoring forms and coupons were not finalised until 12 th November. The programme was widely agreed by project partners and stakeholders to have been a little bit late overall with cash distributions finally taking place in the last two weeks of December (between months after Typhoon Ketsana). 45% of beneficiaries interviewed during the household surveys believed that the cash transfers were received slightly late but ok. The evaluation consultant believes that in future it should be possible to implement this programme around two weeks faster due to the fact that the above-mentioned documents and approaches have now been developed. Once the programme plan of action was developed in early November, the project was actually implemented extremely efficiently i.e. to distribute a total of 327,000 USD to 8,582 households in 63 communes, 15 districts and 4 provinces within 6-8 weeks is very impressive and testament to the institutional structure and organizational capacity of the Provincial RC chapters. It is doubtful that these phases involving orientation workshops at provincial/district and commune/village levels, the beneficiary selection processes through village meetings, the subsequent verification of beneficiaries, distribution of coupons and ultimately the cash itself could be carried out much faster without compromising the quality of the targeting Beneficiary Selection and Targeting Beneficiary selection and targeting is often the most contentious issue for any cash transfer programme and thus a considerable amount of attention was paid towards this throughout the evaluation. Targeting The primary level of beneficiary selection was carried out based on the reports submitted by both Provincial RC chapters as well as the official government reports coming in from the Central Committee for Storm and Flood Control (CCFSC) and their provincial departments and line agencies. These initial reports clearly indicated that the worst affected provinces were Quang Nam and Quang Ngai. Later on it became clear that Kon Tum was also severely affected. Thus based on this preliminary analysis the cash transfer programme was allocated these provinces as well as Gia Lai. Even though it was known that Gia Lai was not as badly affected as the other provinces, the province was included in the programme for what have been understood by the consultant to be three main reasons; i) Gia Lai is a highland province with a higher concentration of poor and vulnerable ethnic minority farmer groups, ii) Gia Lai had not received much other assistance and iii) it meant that another province could share in the learning experience of implementing cash transfers. Less money was also allocated to Gia Lai province and thus there were less beneficiaries as is indicated in table 1. A small sample of the field sites were visited during the evaluation mission and it did seem apparent that households in Kon Tum, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai were significantly worse affected than those in Gia Lai. This in turn also meant that many very badly affected farmers in the other three provinces could not receive the much-needed cash grant whilst those in a better position in Gia Lai could receive the grant. The evaluation consultant believes that there was less need for the cash transfers in Gia Lai province and that actually much of this reduced need stemmed from the livelihood options at local peoples disposal. Many of the Gia Lai households supported lived in areas of large coffee, rubber and tea plantations with large scale, often State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or reformed SOE producers. In addition to small areas of their own arable land, generally upland maize or cassava plots, most households worked on a seasonal, temporary or even permanent basis for these industrial plantations. Therefore as a livelihood response to the disaster, it seemed apparent that many of the cash transfer 14

18 beneficiaries were able to earn a reasonable income from working on the nearby estates they already had a source of cash income. This was not the case for many of the affected communities in the other provinces who were largely dependent on their rice harvest and their own agricultural land. The evaluation consultant does not want to draw too much from this as it is only supported by brief observation and anecdotal evidence, however perhaps it should serve to recognize that perhaps more deserving beneficiaries are already eliminated by political decisions or due to constraints regarding the accuracy, consistency, detail and speed of damage assessments. CCFSC reports contain statistics on number of deaths, injuries, damage to major infrastructure, housing, numbers of hectares of agricultural land destroyed/inundated etc but they do not contain information on livelihood needs and responses and there are inconsistencies between sectors and geographical areas. Such weaknesses in the GoV damage assessment reporting mechanisms were acknowledged by project partners and stakeholders and have been documented in other literature in Vietnam 3. This is not only applicable to cash transfers but more broadly with respect to disaster response, weaknesses in damage/need assessment reporting affect the distribution of emergency assistance. This programme did not set out to address this problem and thus it is only mentioned as a constraint and not as a criticism of the project per se but it is one that should be borne in mind for future potential scaling-up of cash transfer programmes. It is believed that a rapid assessment of damages/needs should have been carried out in all proposed target provinces prior to finalizing the project proposal by ARC/IFRC specialists. Rapid Needs Assessments were only carried out in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai. Such a needs assessment would not only assist in allocating scarce resources where they are most needed as well as ensure that cash transfers are the most appropriate option for all beneficiaries. Results from the household surveys indicate that beneficiaries overwhelmingly prefer cash grants to other forms of humanitarian assistance (83%). However, more detailed analysis of the data in Kon Tum province shows that 77% of Xe Dang ethnic minority interviewees actually prefer food and similarly there is a high percentage of So Ra minority people (44%) who also prefer food aid. During the follow-up evaluation mission visit, the consultant was not able to meet either of these minority groups and unfortunately is not able to definitively explain this result. It is possible that this result is indicative of cultural values amongst the groups but more likely it stems from the distance to markets. The evaluation consultant visited Dak To Lung commune, Kon Ray district in Kon Tum where although it is possible to buy some basic products in the commune centre, a 9 km walk to the district centre is required in order to purchase most items (including rice) at the nearest market. For those in outlying villages of course the walk may be significantly further. Especially for an elderly or disabled beneficiary, this may then explain the preference for food aid amongst some groups in Kon Tum. The initial rapid needs assessments also did not include a market mapping or analysis. Based on field interviews and observations, the evaluation consultant believes that in the vast majority of cases cash transfers were highly appropriate since by mid-december infrastructure had generally been sufficiently restored to allow relatively easy access to markets. However, the above results from remote areas in Kon Tum suggest that there are areas where cash transfers may not necessarily be the optimal intervention. In order to determine this, an initial rapid needs assessment should also include a basic market assessment, the importance of which is stressed by current best-practice guidelines (ICRC, 2007 & Oxfam GB, 2006 and others). 3 Country Disaster Risk Management Notes, Vietnam (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), World Bank, 2008) 15

19 Targeting Districts, Communes and Villages Once the target provinces had been established, target districts and communes were established according to levels of disaster impact as well as the levels of support already received. Once again there is potential here for misallocation. However, it would appear that in all provinces, the worst affected districts and communes were included in the cash transfer programme. Following provincial level orientation workshops with target districts, District RCs then (in some cases with the support of provincial RC chapters) held commune level orientation workshops with target communes explaining the project objectives, guidelines, principles, selection criteria etc. During this workshop, villages were prioritized and resources allocated for each village based on the numbers of households in the villages and the number of households affected. Plans of action were developed at the commune level. Targeting Households The programme endorsed a community-based beneficiary selection process at the village level where all villagers were invited to participate in a village meeting to vote for those who should receive the cash transfers in accordance with the guidelines and within the budget allocated to that village. Village meetings began with an explanation of the cash transfer programme, its objectives, principles and beneficiary selection guidelines. The guidelines had very clear criteria for the selection of households as below. Poor and nearly poor households who are seriously affected by typhoon Ketsana, specifically: - Having house collapsed, washed away or badly damaged; - Lost food stock, asset, and materials; - Lost main sources of income; - Has not received significant support from RC and other sources Of the above, priority should be given to the family that is living in difficulty and vulnerable conditions: - Having pregnant or breast feeding women; - Having women with children under 5; - Woman headed family; - Having people with disability, elderly - Having no labour force; In fact, in the majority of cases, village leaders with assistance from other key individuals in the community often made a first cut of who the beneficiaries should be since they know and have recorded what humanitarian assistance has been provided to who in the village. This step is not documented in the selection guidelines but makes a certain amount of sense in trying to facilitate the selection process. The proposed list is then presented during the village meeting and villagers had the opportunity to, and usually did, dispute and/or revise this list. Results from the household surveys indicate an overwhelming satisfaction with this community-based selection process with 87.5% of interviewees rating it as very transparent. Fig 3 below shows the predominant types of beneficiary selected. What also emerged from the results is that no one stated that they didn t know why they had been selected. 16