Promotion, Turnover and Compensation in the Executive Market
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1 Promotion, Turnover and Compensation in the Executive Market George-Levi Gayle, Limor Golan, Robert A. Miller Carnegie Mellon University June 25 at Cowles Conference ayle, Golan, Miller (Carnegie Mellon University)Promotion, Turnover and Compensation June 25 at Cowles Conference 1 /
2 Introduction What are executives paid for? CEOs are paid more than executives in lower ranks. Average tenure of a CEO is ve years. They are mainly promoted internally. Is promotion to CEO a reward for excellent service at lower ranks? The income volatility of CEOs is also much higher. Rent from human capital or risk premium? Are there non pecuniary bene ts? June 25 at Cowles Conference 2 /
3 Introduction What we do: develop and estimate structural model Formulate a dynamic model where there is: 1 Moral hazard and incentive concerns 2 Human capital, rm speci c and general 3 Job turnover stimulated by demand from rms for a mix of executive talent and idiosyncratic (private) shocks to executives. Identify non pecuniary bene ts of jobs, human capital, risk premium, span of control. Estimate model and compute importance of factors above. June 25 at Cowles Conference 3 /
4 Introduction Background literature There is a growing literature on estimating structural models of contracting. See Ferral and Shearer (99), Margiotta and Miller (00), Dubois and Vukina (05), Bajari and Khwaja (06), D Haultfoeviller and Fevrier (07), Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (07), Nekipelov (07), Gayle and Miller (08a,b,c). In related work Gibbons and Murphy (92) test implications of optimal contract with career concerns, and Frydman (05) presents evidence on turnover and general human capital. There is little empirical work relating career hierarchies to human capital, promotion and job turnover. See Baker Gibbs and Holmstrom (94) for a case study of one rm. June 25 at Cowles Conference 4 /
5 Introduction Outline of this talk Brie y describe the data. Develop a structural model. Discuss identi cation and estimation. Present preliminary results from structural model. June 25 at Cowles Conference 5 /
6 Data Sources S&P ExecuComp database. Compensation and title on top 5 paid executives ( ). 30,614 executives with at least one year of data rms S&P 500, midcap, smallcap. Matched sample with background data from "Who s Who". Matched 16,300 executives in 2100 rms. Compensation data: Direct compensation (cost to shareholders): salary, bonus, value of restricted stocks and options granted, retirement and long-term compensation schemes Total compensation (relevant for manager): also include wealth changes from holding rm options and stocks June 25 at Cowles Conference 6 /
7 Data Ranks and transitions We constructed a life-cycle based hierarchy of 7 ranks: Rank 1 includes Chairman Rank 2 includes CEO Rank 4 includes COO Rank 5 includes Senior VP See Gayle, Golan and Miller (2008) for details. Most executives do not move in any given period. Internal promotion by one rank is the most common job transition. 99% of Rank 2 executives are not demoted.they occur more frequently at lower levels, 5% in Rank 3, 7% in Rank 4. There is more exit than entry in lower ranks. There is more entry than exit at higher ranks. A small percentage of transition involves turnover. Movers are more likely to change ranks than stayers, with promotion more likely than not below Rank 2. June 25 at Cowles Conference 7 /
8 Data Job mobility within the rm Table 2a: Internal Transitions RANK 1 RANK 2 RANK 3 RANK 4 RANK 5 RANK 6 RANK 7 Size exit %exit RANK RANK RANK RANK RANK RANK RANK entries %entries ayle, Golan, Miller (Carnegie Mellon University)Promotion, Turnover and Compensation June 25 at Cowles Conference 8 /
9 Data Job mobility between rms Table 2b: Turnover RANK 1 RANK 2 RANK 3 RANK 4 RANK 5 RANK 6 RANK 7 Size Size Trans Moves Rank Rate RANK % RANK % RANK % RANK % RANK % RANK % RANK % Total % ayle, Golan, Miller (Carnegie Mellon University)Promotion, Turnover and Compensation June 25 at Cowles Conference 9 /
10 Data Demographics on executives Table 4: Executives Characteristics Age, Gender, Education and Experience Variable Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 Rank4 Rank5 Rank6 Rank7 Age 59.6 (9.8) 55.7 (7.6) 52.4 (8.0) 52.0 (8.8) 52.8 (10) 52.4 (10.3) 52.2 (11.2) Female No Degree MBA MS/MA Ph.D Prof. Certi cation Executive Experience 22.3 (13.0) 19.8 (10.5) 16.1 (10.7) 15.9 (11.0) 16.6 (12) 16.5 (11.7) 16.9 (11.7) Tenure (13.5) (11.7) (11.4) (11.2) 14.1 (12) 13.7 (11.0) 14.2 (10.8) June 25 at Cowles Conference 10 /
11 Data Executive movement and compensation Table 4: Executives Characteristics (continued) Compensation and Salary are Measured in Thousands of 2006 US$ Variable Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 Rank4 Rank5 Rank6 Rank7 # of past moves 1.9 (2.0) 1.9 (1.9) 1.7 (1.9) 1.9 (1.9) 2.2 (2.0) 2.3 (2.1) 2.3 (2.1 # of Executive Moves (1.4) (1.38) (1.3) (0.13) (1.32) (1.3) (1.4 Salary 640 (375) 767 (398) 591 (320) 438 (197) 408 (190) 323 (141) 340 (217 Total Compensation (18229) (20198) (14892) (85) (7319) (5539) (663 June 25 at Cowles Conference 11 /
12 Model Overview Labor Demand: Firms have demand for e ort level and skills for jobs in each rank. Jobs yield match speci c non-pecuniary bene ts and experience. Firms o er contracts to achieve target hiring levels. Labor Supply: Managers are heterogenous with respect to tastes, productivity and endogenously determined experience. Risk averse managers choose their job, rm, and e ort level. Equilibrium Markets clear in rank transitions and rm turnover to balance supply with demand in probability. This determines rm speci c and general skills investment, plus career trajectory and lifecycle compensation. At the aggregate level, equilibrium induces a distribution of rm size and rank composition, plus distribution of management experience Gayle, Golan, and Miller skills. (Carnegie Mellon University)Promotion, Turnover and Compensation June 25 at Cowles Conference 12 /
13 Model Job choice and human capital Manager chooses job k in rm j be setting indicator variable d jkt = 1, and chooses an e ort level l t 2 f0, 1g. Retirement is also possible, by setting d 0kt = 1. J j=0 K k=1 d jkt = 1 Human Capital: EITHER Private information on rm speci c human capital: h jt = K k =1 t s=1 d j,k,t s l t s OR Public information on rm speci c human capital: General human capital: h jt = K k =1 t s=1 d j,k,t s h 0t = J j=1 h jt June 25 at Cowles Conference 13 /
14 Model Preferences and Budget Constraint Managers get utility from current consumption c t. Managers have absolute risk aversion parameter ρ. Utility also depends on age, education, gender, stock of human capital, all captured in z t. Jobs, rms, and e ort level give nonpecuniary utility though the functions α 0jmkt (shirking) and α 1jmkt (working): α 0jmkt α 0jk (z t ) < α 1jk (z t ) α 1jmkt An i.i.d. rm-job privately observed taste shock ε jkt also a ects utility. Lifetime utility is parameterized as: t=1 β t d jkt [α 0jkt (1 l t ) + α 1jkt l t ] exp ( ρc t ε jkt ) k,j Managers face life-time budget constraint for goods and services. June 25 at Cowles Conference 14 /
15 Model Firms and Output Excess return x jt of j th rm attributed to all its executive management: This residual is not priced by (purged of) its aggregate factors It is the relevant measure for compensation and incentives p.d.f. of excess return depends on each executive s e ort and human capital: f j (xjz jt ) high e ort by all managers f jk (xjz jt ) only executive in rank k shirks g jk (x, z) f jk (xjz jt )/f j (xjz jt ) likelihood ratio Firms maximize expected value, by minimizing expected cost of achieving HR goals. June 25 at Cowles Conference 15 /
16 Model Timing, Information, and Overview Executives know their z and privately observe realizations of ε jkt. Demand for positions P jkt (z) and e ort level L jkt revealed to rms. Firms o er contracts, w jkt+1. Executives choose contracts, d jkt. Executives choose e ort, l t. Hence the positions are lled with probability p jkt (z). Expectations by rms and managers are rational, meaning (p jkt (z), l t ) = (P jkt (z), L jkt ). June 25 at Cowles Conference 16 /
17 Optimization by executives Other assets held in smoothing over uncertain income sequences Executives smooth their consumption over the winnings from playing a sequence of lotteries. Let e t denote the value of assets in t. Let b t denote the bond price in t. Let a t denote the price of a security which pays a dividend of (λ s ln λ s s ln β) each period where λ s is the price of a consumption unit in period s. Those two assets are su cient to achieve the optimal portfolio when markets are complete. See Rubinstein (1981) on aggregation. June 25 at Cowles Conference 17 /
18 Optimization by executives Value function for executives De ne the "indirect utility from compensation" by: υ jk,t+1 (z, x) exp [ ρw jk,t+1 (z, x) /b t+1 ] Set A 0 (z t ) 1 and recursively de ne A s (z t ) as: p jkl (z t ) α 1/b t jklt E [e (j,k,l) ε jkt bt jz t ] ha s 1 z (j,k,l) t+1 i 1 1 b t E [υ jk,t+1 jz t, l t ] The value function, indirect utility at the beginning of period t, is: at + ρe t V (z t ) = A s (z t ) b t exp b t A s (z t ) is a normalized value function for the consumption smoothing problem re ecting wealth from future lotteries. June 25 at Cowles Conference 18 /
19 Optimization by executives Job, rm and e ort choice The conditional value function is: V jklt 8 z t, εjkt < = : α 1/b t jklt ha s 1 z (j,k,l t ) t+1 exp i 1 1 b t E [υ jk,t+1 jz t, l t ] ε jkt b t b t exp at +ρe t b t If ε jkt is standard Type 1 extreme value, the choice probability is: p jklt (z t ) = h i α jklt A s 1 z (j,k,l t ) (b t 1) t+1 fe [υjk,t+1 jz t,l t ]g (b t 1) 1+ j 0,k 0 α j 0 k 0 l 0 t A s 1 z (j0,k 0,l 0 (b t 1) ) t+1 fe [υj 0k 0,t+1 jz t,l 0 ]g (b t 1) 9 = ; June 25 at Cowles Conference 19 /
20 Cost Minimizing Contract Incentive compatible contracts to correct moral hazard If human capital is private information then the incentive compatibility constraint is: E [υ jk,t+1 (x) g jk (x, z t ) jz t ] 1 (j,k,1) α1jkt bt 1 A s 1,t+1 α 0jk0t A (j,k,0) s 1,t+1 E [υ jk,t+1 (x) jz t ] If human capital is public information, then the incentive compatibility reduces to the standard moral hazard formulation: E [υ jk,t+1 (x) g (x, z t ) jz t ] α1jkt α 0jk0t 1 bt 1 E [υjk,t+1 (x) jz t ] In the private information case, career concerns (may) help to o set current bene ts from shirking because human capital accumulation depends on e ort, not just on participation. June 25 at Cowles Conference 20 /
21 Cost Minimizing Contract Demand for Executives and participation constraint Firm j is required to recruit at rate P jk (z t ) for an executive with characteristics z to ll position k. Let U jk (z) denote log odds ratio of the demand for the job multiplied by the continuation value for an outside option: 8 9 Pjkt (z) 1 P jkt (z) >< 1 + >: J j 0 =1 j 0 6=j K k 0 =1, k 0 6=k α j 0 k 0 l 0 t h A (j 0,k 0,l 0 ) s 1,t+1 E [υ j 0 k 0,t+1jz t, l 0 ] i (bt 1) Exponential utility is negative. Thus to meet its recruiting objectives rm j picks a compensation contract υ j,k,t+1 satisfying >= >; n o U jk (z) α jklt A (j,k,l t ) s 1,t+1 E bt 1 [υ jk,t+1jz t, l t ] June 25 at Cowles Conference 21 /
22 Cost Minimizing Contract Optimal contract Let η denote the Lagrange multiplier for the incentive compatitibility constraint, which is satis ed with equality. The optimal contract for w j,k,t+1 (x, z) is: b t+1 ρ 8 < : (b t 1) 1 [log U jk (z) log (α jk1t )] + log 1 ηg jk (x, z t ) + η A(j,k,1) s 1,t+1 A (j,k,0) s 1,t+1 1 α1jkt bt 1 α 0jkt If rm speci c human capital is public, it only a ects the U jk (z) term (the level of compensation), not the second expression, and not η (the dependence of compesation on excess returns). 9 = ; June 25 at Cowles Conference 22 /
23 Rational Expectations and Competitive Selection Matching supply with demand A competitive selection exists if there are contracts satisfying: A competitive selection exists. P jkt (z) = p jkt (z) In this de nition executives and shareholders have rational expectations. We also assume that shareholders do not believe executives deviate from the equilibrium path when human capital is private, and consequently act as if their employees behave optimally. If human capital is observed from employment records, the contract is optimal. If human capital is private information, the contract is sequentially optimal. In this case the (long term) optimal contract requires commitment. June 25 at Cowles Conference 23 /
24 Identi cation and Estimation Data requirements Our analysis applies to longitudinal panels of executives. Each executive is sampled at least two consecutive periods. The asymptotics we derive apply as the product of the number of time periods and the number of rms increases. Each observation contains his employer rm j, his rank k, the rm s abnormal return x, his compensation w, plus all the background variables relevant to the contract, namely z. Included in z are rm characteristics such as size and sector. Also included in z are the manager s characteristics, such as educational attainment and employment history. We do not, however, assume that e ort level l is observed. June 25 at Cowles Conference 24 /
25 Identi cation and Estimation Overview Estimation proceeds sequentially in six steps. Estimate: 1 f j (xjz) nonparametrically from data on abnormal returns 2 wjk o (x, z) nonparametrically from data on compensation and abnormal returns 3 P jk (z) from data on executive choices 4 ρ and α 1jk (z) from market participation equation 5 α 0jk (z) from incentive compatibility condition 6 g jk (xjz) from compensation equation See Gayle and Miller (08): "Identifying and Testing... ". June 25 at Cowles Conference 25 /
26 Identi cation and Estimation Fourth step Substitute estimates of P jk (z) into U jk (z) and wjk o (x, z) into υ j,k,t+1 (x, z). Then estimate α 1jk and ρ from: " (j,k,0) A s 1,t+1 E t A (j,k,1) s 1,t+1 (U jk (z)/α 1jk (z)) 1/(b t 1) υ j,k,t+1 (x, z)jz # = 0 This equation holds at each age to retirement and each type (j, k, z). We can identify recursively working back from a common retirement age, say 70. To identify α 1jk (z) and ρ we require one restriction on an otherwise full set of interactions with (j, k, z). June 25 at Cowles Conference 26 /
27 Identi cation and Estimation Fifth step We impose the regularity condition that there exists some x < such that if x x then g jk (x, ) = 0 From the incentive compatibility condition we now obtain α 0jk (z) from our estimates of α 1jk (z), wjk o (x, z) and ρ (and hence A) using: ( " (1,j,k) α 0jk (z) A α 1jk (z) = s 1 υ 1 k,j,t+1 (x, z) E [υ j,k,t+1(x, z) jl = 1] A (0,j,k) υ 1 s 1 j,k,t+1 (x, z) E t[υk,j,t+1 1 (x, z)jz] 1 #) 1 bt June 25 at Cowles Conference 27 /
28 Identi cation and Estimation Sixth step Since g jk (x, z) is a likelihood ratio: E [g jk (x, z)jz] = 1 Then g jk (xjz) is identi ed o the relative slope of compensation schedule using this equation and the regularity condition given in the last slide. Using ρ and and nonparametric estimates of w1jk o (x, z) we estimate g jk (xjz) from: g jk (xjz) = υk,j,t+1 1 (x, z) 1 υk,j,t+1 (x, z) υk,j,t+1 1 E t[υ 1 k,j,t+1 (x, z)jz] June 25 at Cowles Conference 28 /
29 Preliminary Empirical Results Estimated compensation schedule The most important explanatory factor is the rm s excess return. Compensation at higher ranks is more sensitive to excess returns. Compensation is quadratic in age. There is a sign-on bonus, with penalties for increased tenure. Larger rms pay more, but compensation is more closely calibrated to excess returns. June 25 at Cowles Conference 29 /
30 Preliminary Empirical Results Span of control One measure of how important a position is to the rm is how much the rm s value would fall if its occupant shirked. The expected gross loss from executive k with characteristics z in rm j shirking is: τ 1jk (z) E fx [1 g jk (x, z))]g = E [x jdiligent] E [x jshirk] = E [xg jk (x, z)] June 25 at Cowles Conference 30 /
31 Preliminary Empirical Results Estimated span of control and dispersion across rms τ 1 is measured in percentage per year Measure Rank Estimates Standard Deviation. ρ 0.45 τ The estimate of the risk aversion parameter implies a manager would pay up to $217,780 to insure himself against a fair bet of losing versus winning one million dollars. Span of control is highest at rank 2, 11 percent per year. June 25 at Cowles Conference 31 /
32 Preliminary Empirical Results Compensating di erential for diligent work versus shirking From the optimal contract, manager s reservation wage to shirk: w0jk 0 (z) = b t+1 ρ log(a s 1(z j,k,0 t+1 )) + b t+1 ρ(b t 1) log(α 0jk /U jk (z)) Manager s reservation certainty equivalent wage for diligent work: w1jk 0 (z) = b t+1 ρ log(a s 1(z j,k,1 t+1 )) + b t+1 ρ(b t Di erential between shirking and working diligently: τ 2jk (z) w1jk 0 (z) w0jk 0 (z) " = b t+1 ρ log As 1 (z j,k,1 A s t+1 ) 1 (z j,k,0 t+1 # 1) log(α 1jk /U jk (z)) + b t+1 ρ(b t 1) log α1jk α 0jk June 25 at Cowles Conference 32 /
33 Preliminary Empirical Results How career concerns alleviate moral hazard In a static moral hazard model the compensating di erential is τ PM 2jk b t+1 ρ(b t 1) log (α 1jk /α 0jk ) De ning τ H 2jk (z) as the amount which career concerns abate the moral hazard problem τ H 2jk (z) τ 2jk (z) τ PM 2jk 2 = b t+1 ρ log 4 A s 1 A s z j,k,1 t+1 1 z j,k,0 t June 25 at Cowles Conference 33 /
34 Preliminary Empirical Results Estimates of the compensating di erential τ H 2 and τpm 2 is measured in $US100,000 Measure Rank Estimates Standard Deviation τ H τ PM June 25 at Cowles Conference 34 /
35 Preliminary Empirical Results The welfare cost of moral hazard Firms pay the di erence between expected compensation and its certainty equivalent to resolve moral hazard: τ 3jk = E [w jk (x) jz] w 0 1jk (z) = E [w jk (x) jz] ρ(b t b t+1 b t+1 ρ log(a s 1(z j,k,1 t+1 )) 1) log [α 1jk /U jk (z)] If there were no career concerns, the additional cost of moral hazard to the rm would be τ 4jk (z) b t+1 ρ log(a s 1(z j,k,1 t+1 )) June 25 at Cowles Conference 35 /
36 Human Capital versus Moral Hazard Estimating the welfare cost τ 3 and τ 4 are measured in US100,000 of dollars Measure Rank Estimates Standard Deviation τ τ ayle, Golan, Miller (Carnegie Mellon University)Promotion, Turnover and Compensation June 25 at Cowles Conference /
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