Stochastic Dominance Notes AGEC 662

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Stochastic Dominance Notes AGEC 662"

Transcription

1 McCarl July 1996 Stochastic Dominance Notes AGEC 66 A undamental concern, when looking at risky situations is choosing among risky alternatives. Stochastic dominance has been developed to identiy conditions under which one risky outcome would be preerable to another. The basic approach o stochastic dominance is to resolve risky choices while making the weakest possible assumptions. Generally, stochastic dominance assumes an individual is an expected utility maximizer and then adds urther assumptions relative to preerence or wealth and risk aversion. We will discuss stochastic dominance in two parts. First, we will review the basic theory then we will cover a number o the extensions that had been done. 1.1 Background - Assumptions 1.0 Background to Stochastic Dominance There are a number o important assumptions in traditional stochastic dominance. Assumption #1 - individuals are expected utility maximizers. Assumption # - two alternatives are to be compared and these are mutually exclusive, i.e., one or the other must be chosen not a convex combination o both. Assumption #3 - the stochastic dominance analysis is developed based on population probability distributions. 1. Background - The Expected Utility Basis o Stochastic Dominance 1

2 Stochastic dominance assumes expected utility o wealth maximization. Assume x is the level o wealth while (x) and g(x) gives the probability o each level o wealth or alternatives and g. We may then write the dierence in the expected utility between the prospects as ollows. u(x) (x) dx u(x) g(x) dx and this equation can be rewritten as: u(x) ( (x) g(x) ) dx (1) I is preerred to g then the sign o the above equation would be positive. Conversely, i g is preerred to, the sign o the above equation be negative. 1.3 Background - Integration by Parts One o the classical calculus techniques or integration is called integration by parts. The basic integration by parts ormula is: a db ab b da where a and b are unctions o x..0 Basic Stochastic Dominance.1 First Degree Stochastic Dominance Following the developments in Quirk and Soposnik or Fishburn as reviewed in Anderson, we may apply the integration by parts ormula to the last version o the expected utility equation (1). Let us do this by deining an a and b terms which it the integration by parts structure. Namely, let us choose a to be u(x) and b as the dierence between the cumulative density unctions as ollows:

3 where F(x) G(x) a = u(x) b = (F(x) - G(x)) x (x)dx x g(x)dx in turn the dierential terms are: da u (x) dx db ((x) g(x)) dx Notice that under this substitution that adb encompasses the terms in the expected utility equation. Given this substitution the integration o u(x) ( (x) g(x) ) dx equals u(x) ( F(x) G(x) ) u (x) ( F(x) G(x) ) dx We can observe a couple o things about this result. First, let us look at the let hand part. Notice that when the F(x) and G(x) terms are evaluated at x levels o minus ininity they are both zero because we are at the ar let hand tail o the probability distribution where the cumulative probabilities equal zero. Thus, the evaluation at minus ininity is zero. Similarly, when x equals plus ininity since these are cumulative probability distributions both will equal one so we have the utility o plus ininity times a term which equals one minus one which is zero. Thus, the let part 3

4 o the expression is zero. Now let us look at the right part which is: u (x) ( F(x) G(x) ) dx Suppose we try to characterize something about the sign o this term. Remember, i the overall sign is positive then dominates g. We will restrict the sign by adding assumptions. First, suppose that we assume nonsatiation i.e., that more is preerred to less or u'(x) > 0 or all x. Thus, the u'(x) term does not have anything to do with the overall sign o this term as it will always be a positive multiplier. This means this term takes it s sign rom the F(x) - G(x) term. That term gives the dierence between the two cumulative probability distributions. One can then make a second assumption which is that the dierence between F(x) and G(x) is negative or zero or all x. This means that the cumulative probability o distribution o must always lie on or to the right o the cumulative probability distribution o g (Figure 1). Notice in Figure 1 that or a value o x equal to 7 that there is no meaningul area under the (x) distribution but there is under the g(x) distribution. Note, or the point x that there is an area under both distributions but that the area underneath the g distribution (i.e., the area between the line and the horizontal axis integrated rom the beginning o the probability distribution up to the point x) is greater or the g distribution than it is or the distribution. Note, when this is true or all x points and thereore we can conclude that dominates g. What this then does is leads us to the irst degree stochastic dominance rule which is as ollows: Given two probability distributions and g, distribution dominates distribution g by irst degree stochastic dominance when the decision maker has positive marginal utility o wealth or all x 4

5 (u (x)>0) and or all x the cumulative probability under the distribution is less than or equal to the cumulative probability under the g distribution with strict inequality or some x. This requires that or all x the cumulative probability distribution or is always to the right o the cumulative probability distribution or g or that or every x the cumulative probability o getting that level o wealth or higher is greater under than under g. Note, the strict inequality requirement means the distribution cannot be the same. This is not a revolutionary requirement. Some properties are that the mean o is greater than the mean o g and that or every level o probability you make at least as much money under as you do under g. This is clearly a very weak requirement, but allows one to characterize the choices between two risky distributions or every utility maximizer that preers more wealth to less. This is about as weak an assumption as one can make and still resolve some sort o a choice.. Second Degree Stochastic Dominance The above stochastic dominance development while theoretically elegant is not terribly useul. What this means is when one is comparing two crop varieties. What one has to observe is that one crop variety always has to consistently perorm the other. This may not be the case. The next development in stochastic dominance due to Fishburn; Hanoch and Levy; Hadar and Russell; and Hammond involves making an assumption about risk aversion. We do this by again applying integration by parts and setting the ollowing: a u (x) db (F(x) G(x) ) dx so that: 5

6 da u (x) dx b = (F (x) - G (x)) where the terms F and G are the second integral o F and G with respect to x, i.e.: F (x) x x (x)dx x F (x)dx Under these circumstances i we plug in our integration by parts ormula we get the equation. u (x) ( F (x) G (x) ) u (x) ( F (x) G (x) ) dx The ormula above has two parts. Let us address the right hand part o it irst. This contains the second derivative o the utility unction multiplied times the dierence in the integrals o the cumulative probability distributions with a positive sign in ront o it. In order or us to guarantee that dominates g the sign o this whole term must be positive. Second degree stochastic dominance makes two assumptions that render this term positive. First, assume that the second derivative o the utility unction with respect to x is negative everywhere (u (x) < 0). Also, assume that F (x) is less than or equal to G (x) or all x with strict inequality or some x. Under these circumstances we have a negative times a negative leading to a positive. We must also sign the let hand part o the above term. First, add the assumption on nonsatiation u (x) >0. This term then multiplies by F(x) - G (x) which we know is at plus ininity non-positive since we have already assumed F(x) is smaller than G (x) while it is zero at x equals minus ininity since there is no area at that stage. This coupled with the leading minus sign 6

7 means the whole term will be positive. The second degree stochastic dominance rule can now be stated. Under the assumptions that an individual has 1) positive marginal utility; (u (x) >0) ) diminishing marginal utility o income (u (x) >0) and 3) that or all x F (x) is less than or equal to G (x) with strict inequality or some x then we can say that dominates g by a second degree stochastic dominance. One aspect o the above assumptions worth mentioning is that when u (x) is less than zero and u (x) is greater than zero, this implies the Pratt risk aversion coeicient is positive. Also, the area assumption that the integral under the cumulative probability distribution o must be smaller than the integral under g allows the cumulative distributions to cross as long as the dierence in the areas beore they cross is greater than the dierence in their areas ater they cross. Figure shows the case where second degree stochastic dominance would exist. Notice the area between g and beore x equals 11 exceeds that ater x equals 11. Figure 3 shows a case where stochastic dominance cannot be concluded because o the crossing below x equals 9..3 The Extension to the Third Degree Stochastic Dominance Whitmore and Hammond made up a third degree stochastic dominance rule by extending this approach once more. They again apply integration by parts. There they ind i one assumes that the irst derivative is positive, the second derivative negative and the third derivative positive and that the third integral o the probability unction o is always smaller than that o g then dominates g. The logical intuition is that we have a risk averter with diminishing absolute risk aversion. This test has not been used a great deal in the literature. 7

8 .4 Geometric Interpretation Suppose we interpret the irst and second degree tests geometrically. First degree stochastic dominance requires that the cumulative probability distribution o always lies to the right or just touching the probability distribution o g. What then happens is the cumulative probability at each income level under g is greater than or equal to the cumulative probability o reaching that income level or less under the distribution. Conversely one minus that cumulative probability (which is the probability o that income exceeds that level) has to be greater under the distribution than the g distribution. When the distributions cross irst degree dominance is not possible. Thus, at some income levels there is greater probability o exceeding that income level with the g distribution than the. What second degree does is assume risk aversion and allows the marginal utility o income at the lower levels o wealth exceed to overcome the utility o the additional income increments at the higher levels. What we care about then is the cumulative area between and g remain positive everywhere or that when alls below g that it has an advantage and retains that advantage starting rom low x values..5 Empirical Implementations Again, as is the argument in the notes on ormation o probability distributions, one does not usually have ull continuous probability distributions. Generally, these distribution come about in a discrete ashion. The above presentation is entirely in terms o integrals. Let us now develop the ways o computing the areas in terms o discrete steps. The ollowing procedure develops the probability distributions and the related integrals. Step 1 - take the wealth or x outcomes or all the probability distributions and array them rom high to low as is inherent in tables

9 Step - write the relative requencies o observations against each o the x levels or each probability distribution. Note, some o these requencies will usually be zero i or example when an x level is observed under distribution g but not observed under distribution. Step 3 - divide the requencies through by the number o observations under each o the items and i there are 10 observations or each probability would be the relative requency times 1/10th. Step 4 - orm the cumulative probability distribution starting at the irst x value by taking zero plus the probability o that x or each distribution. For the second and all later x values take the cumulative probability or the prior x plus the relative requency and accumulate this and at the end both o the cumulative probability distributions should be a one. The algebraic ormulae or the area is: F o = G o = 0 F = F + i i-1 i G = G + g i i-1 i Where the F and G are the cumulative probability at step i and g and the are the event i i i i probabilities. Step 5 - orm the second integral o the probability using the ormulae; F = 0,1 G = 0,1 F = F + F * ( x - x ) i > 1,i,i-1 i i i-1 G = G + G * ( x - x ) i > 1,i,i-1 i i i-1 Where F i and G i are second integrals at Step i. 9

10 An example o this is given in Table 1. Suppose that or distribution we have one observation at one and three at two, our at our, our at ive, two at six, three at seven, two at nine, and one at ten or a total o 0. For g we have two at one, ive at two, one at three, ive at our, and seven at seven. We then orm the distributions as in the Table. Notice or the distribution we have zero probability o observations at three and eight, whereas or distribution g we have zero probabilities at six through ten. We then orm the cumulative probability distribution unction as in the cd columns and put the integral o the cumulatives as in the last two columns in the Table. In this comparison dominates g by irst degree stochastic dominance since every single observation in the cd column or F is less than or equal to that or G with some strict equalities. Example presents a case where second degree stochastic dominance holds. First degree ails since or the case o x = 5 the cd or is greater than the cd or g. But when we integrate the cumulatives then F is always less than or equal that or G with several strict inequalities. Example 3 shows a case where dominance does not hold. Note here that the integrated cumulative probability distribution or is both larger and smaller than that or g. I one looks at this case careully one can also see that one o the problems with stochastic dominance and that is that the whole reason or the ailure o the dominance tests is the low level crossing at x = Moment Based Stochastic Dominance Analysis One way that stochastic dominance analysis can be done is under distributional assumption. There are a number o derivations o second degree (SSD) results in such cases as reviewed in Pope and Ziemer; Ali; Bawa and Bury. Namely, i one assumes normality then the SSD rule is 10

11 u u g g with at least one strict in inequality where u, u, and are the mean and variance parameters g g o the and g data that is assumed to be normally distributed. Similarly, under log normal distributions we get the rule u u g g g and under Gamma distributions we get the rule 1 max (1, / 1 ) Each o these rules is discussed in Pope and Ziemer 3.0 Problems With Stochastic Dominance While stochastic dominance as presented above seems to have nice properties; it has problems inherent in its assumptions and it is not a very discriminating instrument. Let us shed some light on the diiculties and on approaches and procedures that have been advanced to get around them. 3.1 Non-Discrimination - Low Crossings The irst problem is the lack o ability to discriminate among cases with low crossings. Stochastic dominance requires the dominant distribution to always have a greater minimum than the dominated distribution. I the distribution shows a vast improvement under all the observations but the lowest one as in Figure 3 or Table 3, then stochastic dominance will not hold in any orm. The real question is how risk adverse will individuals be? Stochastic dominance 11

12 assumes that the individuals all in the class o all risk averters which includes ininitely risk adverse individuals. It assumes someone can possess a risk aversion parameter that is so large that the utility o the small dierence at the lowest observation is extraordinary important. The extension to get around this is involves placing bounds on the risk aversion parameter and saying it has to all in particular numerical ranges. 3. Portolio Eects A second assumption o stochastic dominance is the assumption that the alternatives are mutually exclusive. When one does stochastic dominance one ignores the possibility that the alternatives could be diversiied. This is perectly reasonable when one is talking about dealing with two mutually exclusive alternatives. On the other hand, i one is looking at acreages o crops to grow an obvious possibility is to not have a monoculture area but rather have a diversiied area where one can grow some combination o both. One can use stochastic dominance to look at such questions but one has to orm a larger set o mutually exclusive alternatives. For example, 100% corn, 95% corn - 5% cotton, 90% corn - 10% cotton, etc. 3.3 Sample Size A third problem with stochastic dominance is sampling distributions. Namely, when one goes out and inds data, one does not ind population data and one usually inds a sample. For example, data rom 5 years o crop yield experiments whereas the true crop could be exposed to a million dierent years o weather. Stochastic dominance is subject to sampling error and one could or example draw a particular good or bad year or even have some contamination in sample collection. 1

13 4.0 Problem Resolution Each o these problems has had some degree o attention toward its relaxation. We will cover those now. 4.1 Crossings and Dominance Failures Low crossings is a problem in stochastic dominance so is the existence o crossings in general which cause second degree stochastic dominance rule ailure. There have been solutions proposed which make additional assumptions relative to the risk aversion parameters. Two techniques will be reviewed that all into this class Generalized Stochastic Dominance An extension o stochastic dominance that has been utilized is generalized stochastic dominance (GSD). Here one again starts rom the expected utility unction: u (x) ( F(x) G(x) ) dx Meyer investigated the magnitude o this expression under the conditions that the Pratt risk aversion coeicient all into an interval: r 1 (x) u (x) u (x) r (x) In this ramework what we do is look at the utility dierence between and g but we hold the risk aversion parameter in a particular interval. Meyer poses an optimal control ormat or this examination 13

14 Max u (x) ( F(x) G(x) ) dx (u (x)) r 1 (x) u (x) u (x) u (x) u (x) u (x) r (x) () In this problem Meyer chooses u(x) so as to maximize the utility dierence while requiring the risk aversion parameter to be in a particular interval. When this problem is solved i the solution has a negative objective unction value, then under any utility unction choice within the r(x) interval, the expected utility criteria will always be positive and thereore must dominate g. What this says is that when the decision makers utility unction has r(x) is in the interval between r(x) and r (x) that this dominance holds. 1 Meyer recognized that this is a simple optimal control problem since it is linear in the control variables. The problem has what it is called a Bang-Bang solution. Namely, the solution or r(x) is at either r (x) or r (x) depending on the criteria. The criteria developed is as ollows: 1 r(x ) r 1 (x ) i r (x ) i x x u (x) ( F(x) G(x) ) dx > 0 u (x) ( (F(x) G(x) ) dx 0 Which leads to an recursive calculation o the optimal objective unction. X n 1 Q n X n u (x) ( F(x) G(x) ) dx Q n 1 The generalized stochastic dominance rule can now be developed. Namely, dominates g 14

15 whenever the solution o the maxim and in () is positive as calculated by the recursive relationship explained above. This is a numerical test based on the data and means that when one goes through numerical evaluation equation or given and g probability distributions with upper and lower bounds on the risk aversion parameter, that stochastic dominance holds whenever the numerical value o the objective unctions comes out positive. Meyer originally wrote a computer program to do this and McCarl has a related program called MEYEROOT on the class web page. This has been a airly heavily used technique in risk analysis and virtually everyone that has used it has used constants or r (x) and r (x) saying that the risk aversion parameter lies 1 somewhere between two absolute numbers. Note this does not imply that the risk aversion parameter is constant but rather that it could be increasing, decreasing or o any other orm as long as it remains in between the two bounds. The biggest problem in using that technique has always been to ind the r, r values. There is a computer program available on McCarl s web 1 page which does do the Meyer calculations. It can use ixed r, r or will search or the largest 1 interval given a value or r or r. Namely, when given r it searches or the largest r that permits 1 1 dominance or when given r inds the smallest r that still permits dominance. However, there are 1 diiculties in how big r and r should be. There is an alternative approach which can be used as 1 discussed next.. Finally, note GSD is a generalization o the other stochastic dominance orms when r = 0 1 and r = we get test equivalent to second degree while r = - and r = is the same as irst 1 degree. 4. Finding the Discriminating Risk Aversion Parameter - Low Crossings 15

16 Yet another approach has been used to deal with crossings. Hammond showed that given two alternatives which cross once that under constant absolute risk aversion there is a break-even risk aversion coeicient (BRAC) that dierentiates between those two alternatives. Further, anyone with a risk aversion coeicient (RAC) larger than that particular BRAC will preer one alternative while any one with a RAC smaller than the BRAC would preer the other alternative. Hammond s approach has been implemented in two dierent ways. First and undamentally, Hammond noted the expected utility problem given an RAC (r) e rx (x) dx is a orm o the mathematical statistics moment generating unction, i.e., see Hogg and Craig. Moment generating unctions have been derived and are tabled or alternative distributional orms. Perhaps this should be illustrated with an example. Suppose we assume normality and use the moment generating unction or the normal distribution. In this case, the moment generating unction given the risk aversion parameter r or distribution is as ollows: m(r) e (r u r ) I we go to solve this or the break-even risk aversion parameter, irst thing we would do is set the expected utilities equal: e (r u r ) e (r u g g r ). In turn i we take the logs o both sides 16

17 r u r r u g g r this can be manipulated to r ( which yields two roots r = 0 r = g ) (u u g )r o (u u g ) 0 g Notice then or any two normally distributed prospects we can ind a break-even risk aversion parameter using this ormula just using data on the means and variances. Thereore, what one can do is take the moment generating unction or the and g distributions then solve or the BRAC which leads to the expected utility being equal. Subsequently, one would investigate the value o the utility dierence unction above and below that BRAC to come up with a conclusion about which distribution is preerred above and below it. The important dierence in this technique relative to Meyers generalized stochastic dominance is rather than having to speciy a risk aversion parameter bound one, can solve or the BRAC then proceed to investigate whether it is reasonable or individuals to have risk aversion coeicients which are larger or smaller than that particular value. However, this introduces the problem o knowing the unctional orm o the assumed probability distribution. McCarl wrote a program to implement Hammond s approach with an empirical discrete 17

18 distribution o unknown orm. This program is called RISKROOT and is available on the web page. RISKROOT takes data or two alternatives and searches or the break-even risk aversion parameters between those two alternatives. This is done by solving the ollowing equation or all applicable values o r. i e rx i ((x i ) g(x i )) 0 There are several characteristics that are recognized in RISKROOT. First, Hammond shows the number o roots that can be ound is determined by the number o distribution crossings. I there are no distribution crossings then either irst degree stochastic dominance must exist and no BRAC can be ound. I they cross, then one or more BRAC s may be ound. Second, the number o roots depend upon the number o crossings and i there are 5 crossings it is conceivable there will be 5 BRAC s. Intuitively, a case with multiple BRAC s occurs with distributions with a lower minimum and higher maximum than another but where the other distribution has a higher mean. Note, at extremely high risk aversion, the distribution with a higher minimum will be preerred, while at extremely high risk taking the distribution with the higher maximum will be preerred. However, at moderate levels o risk aversion (somewhere around zero) the distribution with the higher mean will be preerred. One would start preerring the distribution with the higher minimum then switch to the distribution with the higher mean then switch back to the distribution with the higher maximum. Thus, there would be two crossings and one would expect to ind two roots. Third, the maximum size o the BRAC examined by RISKROOT is dependent upon a 18

19 ormula derived rom McCarl and Bessler. It is possible that due to very low or high crossings, a risk aversion parameter cannot be ound to be the low or high enough in order to dierentiate among the prospects. Fourth, the BRAC arises rom the solution o i e rx i ((x i ) g(x i )) 0 Note that when the risk aversion parameter equals zero the above unction becomes zero (since the ormula reduces to the sum o the minus g probabilities equaling one minus one) while when -rx r equals ininity the above unction is zero. Thus, (since e goes to zero) there is always a root or risk aversion parameter equal zero and positive ininity. Fith, when one uses RISKROOT to ind BRAC s one inds results which are limiting results on the Meyer GSD. One cannot span a BRAC within Meyer s ramework. Namely, i one ound a BRAC o.1 where distribution is preerred to g above it whereas below it g is preerred to then i one spans.1 unanimous dominance cannot be ound Technique Choice Both the Meyer and GSD technique and the McCarl RISKROOT techniquecan be used to resolve stochastic dominance choices. We recommend that the McCarl RISKROOT technique be used because it identiies the BRAC points at which preerence switches. Let us briely present an argument rom McCarl (1990). At any point or any RAC value one can always ind a Meyer interval which will give the same results as the BRAC preerences. Namely, i a BRAC is ound at 0.1 above which is preerred to g and below which the converse is true. Now suppose one wants to investigate what happens at 0.09 is preerred to then one can ind an interval 19

20 surrounding 0.09 (it may need to be a small one) where according to the Meyer GSD g is preerred to. There is no way with GSD r below 0.1 and 0. anywhere above.1 that one can 1 ever ind GSD results where is preerred to g. Thus, the BRACs deine the places where the preerence shits. The RISKROOT BRAC gives much stronger results than GSD telling exactly where the preerence shits rather than having to make one hunt or appropriate levels o risk aversion bounds to put into the GSD program. 5.0 Sampling Pope and Ziemer investigated sampling error. Not a lot can be said beyond the ollowing 1) when distribution means and variances get close together that the probability o improper dominance conclusions can become quite high. ) using the moment based stochastic dominance rules is inerior to using the empirical distribution based stochastic dominance rules. 3) the smaller the sample size the more likely one is to have errors. 6.0 Portolios A problem in stochastic dominance involves potential presence o a portolios. Namely, one may be looking at two stochastic prospects which are not mutually exclusive but which may be correlated, i.e., i one was looking at two crops one might ind that wheat and corn perorm dierently in dierent weather conditions because they utilize dierent growing seasons. Here we investigate the question o what happens with the correlation. The undamental basis or these notes is in the paper by McCarl, et al. where the portolio problem is investigated. In that paper several results occur which will not be reviewed here where previous authors have shown conditions under which diversiication between two alternatives is optimal. The question that we 0

21 deal with involves the conditions under which when one inds that dominates g that the prospect will also dominate all combinations o the and g. The procedure or investigation that is used in that paper is based on two moment based stochastic dominance rules. This portolio based investigation requires us to take on some additional assumptions so that we may generate analytical results. We will rely on the moment based normality GSD rule which states that normally distributed prospect dominates normally distributed prospect g whenever the ollowing two conditions are discovered. u u g g Now we wish to see when prospect dominates prospect g via the above stochastic dominance rules that we will also ind that prospect will dominate prospect h which is a convex combination o and g. A convex combination is written according to the ollowing ormula: h = + (1 - )g where varies between 0 and 1. We also know rom mathematical statistics that when we orm prospect h that its mean and variance are given by the u h u (1 ) u g h (1 ) g p (1 ) g we also know since dominates g that the ollowing two equations are satisied. u u g g 1

22 Now what we need to do is investigate the more general dominance conditions between and h and try and ind conditions under which those conditions will hold given some arbitrary and g. The irst rule that we will investigate is the relationship between the means. Notice that the deinition o the mean as expressed above allows us to write the ollowing: u h u (1 ) u g u (1 )u u or u h u This arises since u is less than or equal to u. Thus, uniormly u is always less than or equal to u g h so the irst o the two dominance rules is always satisied. Examining the second dominance rule is more complicated. Here we need to investigate the relationship between the variance o and the variance o h. We can get the variance o h rom h (1 ) g ( ) (1 ) g Suppose we make a substitution namely since the variance o is smaller than the variance o g, we can write. which renders our equation into the orm K = g K 1 h (1 ) K ( ) (1 ) K Factoring out the we get the ollowing or now suppose we get = n or

23 ( ( (1 ) K K (1 )) (1 ) K (1 ) K 1 I we collect the square terms in this and use the classical quadratic ormula, we ind the roots are = 1 and (K 1) (K K 1) I we wish to preclude convex combinations we wish the equality o the variances to hold somewhere outside the realm o easible convex combinations. So what we wish to do is that be strictly greater than or equal to one 1. This implies K 1 K K 1 which can be simpliied to and inally to K 1/K = / 1 where is the correlation coeicient. Thus, we have the restriction that the correlation coeicient must be greater than or equal to the ratio o the variances. The signiicance o this result is that we now have a condition under which we are certain that i dominates g via a second degree stochastic dominance then will dominate all potential convex combinations o and g. This equation has several other implications. Namely, i the items are perectly correlated 3

24 then we are always sae because we know that is always less than or equal to. Thus, i 1 = 1 it is always going to be greater than the ratio o the standard errors. Similarly, i is zero or negative then there is no way that one can ever guarantee that all the convex combinations are dominated. McCarl, et al. do rather extensive evaluation on this rule in mind that it works in a very high proportion i the cases or normal and non-normal cases. They also develop a second criteria or dominance. This starts rom a rule the dierences in mean. This values use o the certain equivalent or the normal distribution stating dominates g whenever u r r u h h under this rule ollowing the same approach as talked through above, they ind the ollowing condition will dominate all combinations o and g whenever g (u u g ) r g This can be transormed using the rule that r is twice the value as explained in McCarl and Bessler as ollows: r Z to become g (u u g ) Z g 4

25 what this rule shows is that the maximum acceptable correlation coeicient becomes smaller as the means become more disparable. What these rules can be used or is to examine when one has two potentially diversed alternatives whether can successully do dominance analysis between the two without considering diversiications. Namely, i the rules are satisied one is sae i the rule is not satisied then one needs to potentially consider diversiications. One can also use the ormula or as expressed above giving a particular ratio o the standard errors and a correlation coeicient to ind the largest possible diversiication that should be considered. For example, i one plugs in the ratio o Z = or where g is twice as big as, with a correlation o.5 then one can use the ormula to ind that the diversiication that should be considered is something between 100% o and 43% o and one then can lay a grid out where one might consider 100, 90, 80, 70, 60, 50 and 43% o and corresponding values o g and then do stochastic dominance over all those alternatives. 5

26 Reerences Anderson, J.R Risk eiciency in the interpretation o agricultural production research. Rev. Mktg. Agric. Econ. 4(3): Fishburn, P.C Decision and Value Theory. New York: Wiley. Hadar, J., and W.R. Russell Rules or ordering uncertain prospects. Am. Econ. Rev. 59(1):5-34. Hanoch, G., and H. Levy The eiciency analysis o choice involving risk. Rev. Econ. Stud. 36(3): Meyer, Jack. Choice Among Distributions. Journal o Economic Theory. 14(1977): McCarl, B.A. Generalized Stochastic Dominance: An Empirical Examination. Southern Journal o Agricultural Economics.,(December 1990): McCarl, B.A. Preerence Among Risky Prospects Under Constant Risk Aversion. Southern Journal o Agricultural Economics. 0,(December 1988):5-33. McCarl, B.A., Thomas O. Knight, James R. Wilson, and James B. Hastie. Stochastic Dominance Over Potential Portolios: Caution Regarding Covariance. American Journal o Agricultural Economics. 69,4(November 1987): Pope, Rulon D. and Rod F. Ziemer. Stochastic Eiciency, Normality, and Sampling Errors in Agricultural Risk Analysis. American Journal o Agricultural Economics. 66,1(February 1984): Quirk, J.P., and R. Saposnik Admissibility and measurable utility unctions. Rev. Econ. Stud. 9(): Whitmore, G.A Third-degree stochastic dominance. Am. Econ. Rev. 60(3):

27 Table 1. First Degree Stochastic Dominance Example x Freq Freq g Pd Pd g CDF CDF g Intcd Intcd g () i (g) i (F) i (G) i (F i) (G i) Mean Std Err

28 Table. Second Degree Stochastic Dominance Example x Freq Freq g Pd Pd g CDF CDF g Intcd Intcd g () (g) (F) (G) (F ) (G ) i i i i i i Mean Std Err.4.9 8

29 Table 3. No Stochastic Dominance x Freq Freq g Pd Pd g CDF CDF g Intcd Intcd g () (g) (F) (G) (F ) (G ) i i i i i i % 0% 5% 0% % 35% 0% 35% % 5% 0% 40% % 10% 40% 50% % 35% 60% 85% % 0% 70% 85% % 15% 85% 100% % 0% 85% 100% % 0% 95% 100% % 0% 100% 100% Mean Std Err

30 Table 4. Example OUTPUT FROM RISKROOT - CONSTANT RISK AVERSION ROOT FINDER Example 1 DISTRIBUTION 1 NAME IS CASE 1 DISTRIBUTION NAME IS CASE THE DISTRIBUTIONS DO NOT CROSS -- 1 IS DOMINANT Example THE DISTRIBUTION CDFS CROSS TIMES 1 HAS BEEN FOUND DOMINANT BETWEEN HAS BEEN FOUND DOMINANT BETWEEN Example 3 SUMMARY STATISTICS ON THE DATA DISTRIBUTION MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX CASE CASE RAC IS LIMITED TO BE BETWEEN +/ E+01 BASED ON MCCARL AND BESSLER THE DISTRIBUTION CDFS CROSS 3 TIMES 1 HAS BEEN FOUND DOMINANT BETWEEN TROUBLE -- FOUND 1 DOMINANT AT HIGHEST RAC -- SHOULD FIND RAC LARGE ENOUGH THAT DOMINATED 1 HAS BEEN FOUND DOMINANT BETWEEN

31 31

32 Figure 1. First Degree 1. Cumulative Probability Distribution Distribution g Wealth 3

33 1 Figure. Second Degree 1. Cumulative Probability Distribution Distribution g Wealth 33

1. Expected utility, risk aversion and stochastic dominance

1. Expected utility, risk aversion and stochastic dominance . Epected utility, risk aversion and stochastic dominance. Epected utility.. Description o risky alternatives.. Preerences over lotteries..3 The epected utility theorem. Monetary lotteries and risk aversion..

More information

The fundamentals of the derivation of the CAPM can be outlined as follows:

The fundamentals of the derivation of the CAPM can be outlined as follows: Summary & Review o the Capital Asset Pricing Model The undamentals o the derivation o the CAPM can be outlined as ollows: (1) Risky investment opportunities create a Bullet o portolio alternatives. That

More information

Characterization of the Optimum

Characterization of the Optimum ECO 317 Economics of Uncertainty Fall Term 2009 Notes for lectures 5. Portfolio Allocation with One Riskless, One Risky Asset Characterization of the Optimum Consider a risk-averse, expected-utility-maximizing

More information

Notes on the Cost of Capital

Notes on the Cost of Capital Notes on the Cost o Capital. Introduction We have seen that evaluating an investment project by using either the Net Present Value (NPV) method or the Internal Rate o Return (IRR) method requires a determination

More information

An Asset Allocation Puzzle: Comment

An Asset Allocation Puzzle: Comment An Asset Allocation Puzzle: Comment By HAIM SHALIT AND SHLOMO YITZHAKI* The purpose of this note is to look at the rationale behind popular advice on portfolio allocation among cash, bonds, and stocks.

More information

Multiplicative Risk Prudence *

Multiplicative Risk Prudence * Multiplicative Risk Prudence * Xin Chang a ; Bruce Grundy a ; George Wong b,# a Department o Finance, Faculty o Economics and Commerce, University o Melbourne, Australia. b Department o Accounting and

More information

An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Risk Aversion. in Executive Compensation Contracts. Frank Moers. and. Erik Peek

An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Risk Aversion. in Executive Compensation Contracts. Frank Moers. and. Erik Peek An Empirical Analysis o the Role o Risk Aversion in Executive Compensation Contracts Frank Moers and Erik Peek Maastricht University Faculty o Economics and Business Administration MARC / Department o

More information

The Relationship Between Franking Credits and the Market Risk Premium

The Relationship Between Franking Credits and the Market Risk Premium The Relationship Between Franking Credits and the Market Risk Premium Stephen Gray * Jason Hall UQ Business School University o Queensland ABSTRACT In a dividend imputation tax system, equity investors

More information

Week 2 Quantitative Analysis of Financial Markets Hypothesis Testing and Confidence Intervals

Week 2 Quantitative Analysis of Financial Markets Hypothesis Testing and Confidence Intervals Week 2 Quantitative Analysis of Financial Markets Hypothesis Testing and Confidence Intervals Christopher Ting http://www.mysmu.edu/faculty/christophert/ Christopher Ting : christopherting@smu.edu.sg :

More information

[D7] PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF OUTSTANDING LIABILITY FROM INDIVIDUAL PAYMENTS DATA Contributed by T S Wright

[D7] PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF OUTSTANDING LIABILITY FROM INDIVIDUAL PAYMENTS DATA Contributed by T S Wright Faculty and Institute of Actuaries Claims Reserving Manual v.2 (09/1997) Section D7 [D7] PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF OUTSTANDING LIABILITY FROM INDIVIDUAL PAYMENTS DATA Contributed by T S Wright 1. Introduction

More information

Evaluating Risk Management Strategies Using Stochastic Dominance with a Risk Free Asset

Evaluating Risk Management Strategies Using Stochastic Dominance with a Risk Free Asset Evaluating Risk Management Strategies Using Stochastic Dominance with a Risk Free Asset ABSTRACT: The stochastic dominance with a risk free asset (SDRA) criteria are evaluated. Results show that the inclusion

More information

LAPLACE TRANSFORMS AND THE AMERICAN STRADDLE

LAPLACE TRANSFORMS AND THE AMERICAN STRADDLE LAPLACE TRANFORM AND THE AMERICAN TRADDLE G. ALOBAIDI AND R. MALLIER Received 2 October 2001 and in revised orm 12 March 2002 We address the pricing o American straddle options. We use partial Laplace

More information

Representing Risk Preferences in Expected Utility Based Decision Models

Representing Risk Preferences in Expected Utility Based Decision Models Representing Risk Preferences in Expected Utility Based Decision Models Jack Meyer Department of Economics Michigan State University East Lansing, MI 48824 jmeyer@msu.edu SCC-76: Economics and Management

More information

Preference relations in ranking multivalued alternatives using stochastic dominance: case of the Warsaw Stock Exchange

Preference relations in ranking multivalued alternatives using stochastic dominance: case of the Warsaw Stock Exchange Preference relations in ranking multivalued alternatives using stochastic dominance: case of the Warsaw Stock Exchange by *UD \QD 7U]SRW Department of Statistics Academy of Economics,Katowice ul. 1- Maja

More information

ECON Micro Foundations

ECON Micro Foundations ECON 302 - Micro Foundations Michael Bar September 13, 2016 Contents 1 Consumer s Choice 2 1.1 Preferences.................................... 2 1.2 Budget Constraint................................ 3

More information

Summary of the Chief Features of Alternative Asset Pricing Theories

Summary of the Chief Features of Alternative Asset Pricing Theories Summary o the Chie Features o Alternative Asset Pricing Theories CAP and its extensions The undamental equation o CAP ertains to the exected rate o return time eriod into the uture o any security r r β

More information

Intro to Economic analysis

Intro to Economic analysis Intro to Economic analysis Alberto Bisin - NYU 1 The Consumer Problem Consider an agent choosing her consumption of goods 1 and 2 for a given budget. This is the workhorse of microeconomic theory. (Notice

More information

Reinsuring Group Revenue Insurance with. Exchange-Provided Revenue Contracts. Bruce A. Babcock, Dermot J. Hayes, and Steven Griffin

Reinsuring Group Revenue Insurance with. Exchange-Provided Revenue Contracts. Bruce A. Babcock, Dermot J. Hayes, and Steven Griffin Reinsuring Group Revenue Insurance with Exchange-Provided Revenue Contracts Bruce A. Babcock, Dermot J. Hayes, and Steven Griffin CARD Working Paper 99-WP 212 Center for Agricultural and Rural Development

More information

Synthetic options. Synthetic options consists in trading a varying position in underlying asset (or

Synthetic options. Synthetic options consists in trading a varying position in underlying asset (or Synthetic options Synthetic options consists in trading a varying position in underlying asset (or utures on the underlying asset 1 ) to replicate the payo proile o a desired option. In practice, traders

More information

Maximizing Winnings on Final Jeopardy!

Maximizing Winnings on Final Jeopardy! Maximizing Winnings on Final Jeopardy! Jessica Abramson, Natalie Collina, and William Gasarch August 2017 1 Introduction Consider a final round of Jeopardy! with players Alice and Betty 1. We assume that

More information

Risk Aversion, Prudence, and the Three-Moment Decision Model for Hedging

Risk Aversion, Prudence, and the Three-Moment Decision Model for Hedging Risk Aversion, Prudence, and the Three-Moment Decision Model or Hedging Xiaomei Chen Graduate Research Assistant School o Economic Sciences Washington State University P.O. Box 64610 Pullman, WA 99164-610

More information

Stochastic Efficiency Analysis With Risk Aversion Bounds: A Simplified Approach. J. Brian Hardaker and Gudbrand Lien. No.

Stochastic Efficiency Analysis With Risk Aversion Bounds: A Simplified Approach. J. Brian Hardaker and Gudbrand Lien. No. University of New England Graduate School of Agricultural and Resource Economics & School of Economics Stochastic Efficiency Analysis With Risk Aversion Bounds: A Simplified Approach by J. Brian Hardaker

More information

Portfolio Selection with Quadratic Utility Revisited

Portfolio Selection with Quadratic Utility Revisited The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 29: 137 144, 2004 c 2004 The Geneva Association Portfolio Selection with Quadratic Utility Revisited TIMOTHY MATHEWS tmathews@csun.edu Department of Economics,

More information

Best Reply Behavior. Michael Peters. December 27, 2013

Best Reply Behavior. Michael Peters. December 27, 2013 Best Reply Behavior Michael Peters December 27, 2013 1 Introduction So far, we have concentrated on individual optimization. This unified way of thinking about individual behavior makes it possible to

More information

Expected Utility and Risk Aversion

Expected Utility and Risk Aversion Expected Utility and Risk Aversion Expected utility and risk aversion 1/ 58 Introduction Expected utility is the standard framework for modeling investor choices. The following topics will be covered:

More information

If U is linear, then U[E(Ỹ )] = E[U(Ỹ )], and one is indifferent between lottery and its expectation. One is called risk neutral.

If U is linear, then U[E(Ỹ )] = E[U(Ỹ )], and one is indifferent between lottery and its expectation. One is called risk neutral. Risk aversion For those preference orderings which (i.e., for those individuals who) satisfy the seven axioms, define risk aversion. Compare a lottery Ỹ = L(a, b, π) (where a, b are fixed monetary outcomes)

More information

Chapter 1 Microeconomics of Consumer Theory

Chapter 1 Microeconomics of Consumer Theory Chapter Microeconomics of Consumer Theory The two broad categories of decision-makers in an economy are consumers and firms. Each individual in each of these groups makes its decisions in order to achieve

More information

Basics of Derivative Pricing

Basics of Derivative Pricing Basics o Derivative Pricing 1/ 25 Introduction Derivative securities have cash ows that derive rom another underlying variable, such as an asset price, interest rate, or exchange rate. The absence o arbitrage

More information

Theory of Consumer Behavior First, we need to define the agents' goals and limitations (if any) in their ability to achieve those goals.

Theory of Consumer Behavior First, we need to define the agents' goals and limitations (if any) in their ability to achieve those goals. Theory of Consumer Behavior First, we need to define the agents' goals and limitations (if any) in their ability to achieve those goals. We will deal with a particular set of assumptions, but we can modify

More information

In terms of covariance the Markowitz portfolio optimisation problem is:

In terms of covariance the Markowitz portfolio optimisation problem is: Markowitz portfolio optimisation Solver To use Solver to solve the quadratic program associated with tracing out the efficient frontier (unconstrained efficient frontier UEF) in Markowitz portfolio optimisation

More information

Micro Theory I Assignment #5 - Answer key

Micro Theory I Assignment #5 - Answer key Micro Theory I Assignment #5 - Answer key 1. Exercises from MWG (Chapter 6): (a) Exercise 6.B.1 from MWG: Show that if the preferences % over L satisfy the independence axiom, then for all 2 (0; 1) and

More information

Microeconomic Theory May 2013 Applied Economics. Ph.D. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION MICROECONOMIC THEORY. Applied Economics Graduate Program.

Microeconomic Theory May 2013 Applied Economics. Ph.D. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION MICROECONOMIC THEORY. Applied Economics Graduate Program. Ph.D. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION MICROECONOMIC THEORY Applied Economics Graduate Program May 2013 *********************************************** COVER SHEET ***********************************************

More information

MODELLING OPTIMAL HEDGE RATIO IN THE PRESENCE OF FUNDING RISK

MODELLING OPTIMAL HEDGE RATIO IN THE PRESENCE OF FUNDING RISK MODELLING OPTIMAL HEDGE RATIO IN THE PRESENCE O UNDING RISK Barbara Dömötör Department of inance Corvinus University of Budapest 193, Budapest, Hungary E-mail: barbara.domotor@uni-corvinus.hu KEYWORDS

More information

Optimal Safety Stocks and Preventive Maintenance Periods in Unreliable Manufacturing Systems.

Optimal Safety Stocks and Preventive Maintenance Periods in Unreliable Manufacturing Systems. Int. J. Production Economics 07 (007) 4 434 doi:0.06/j.ijpe.006.09.08 Optimal Saety Stocks and Preventive Maintenance Periods in Unreliable Manuacturing Systems. A. Gharbi*, J.-P. Kenné** and M. Beit**

More information

Horizontal Coordinating Contracts in the Semiconductor Industry

Horizontal Coordinating Contracts in the Semiconductor Industry Horizontal Coordinating Contracts in the Semiconductor Industry Xiaole Wu* School o Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 2433, China wuxiaole@udaneducn Panos Kouvelis Olin Business School, Washington

More information

Leverage Aversion, Efficient Frontiers, and the Efficient Region*

Leverage Aversion, Efficient Frontiers, and the Efficient Region* Posted SSRN 08/31/01 Last Revised 10/15/01 Leverage Aversion, Efficient Frontiers, and the Efficient Region* Bruce I. Jacobs and Kenneth N. Levy * Previously entitled Leverage Aversion and Portfolio Optimality:

More information

Environmental Regulation through Voluntary Agreements

Environmental Regulation through Voluntary Agreements MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Environmental Regulation through Voluntary Agreements Lars Gårn Hansen 1997 Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47537/ MPRA Paper No. 47537, posted 11. June 2013

More information

ECON 459 Game Theory. Lecture Notes Auctions. Luca Anderlini Spring 2017

ECON 459 Game Theory. Lecture Notes Auctions. Luca Anderlini Spring 2017 ECON 459 Game Theory Lecture Notes Auctions Luca Anderlini Spring 2017 These notes have been used and commented on before. If you can still spot any errors or have any suggestions for improvement, please

More information

These notes essentially correspond to chapter 13 of the text.

These notes essentially correspond to chapter 13 of the text. These notes essentially correspond to chapter 13 of the text. 1 Oligopoly The key feature of the oligopoly (and to some extent, the monopolistically competitive market) market structure is that one rm

More information

Maximizing Winnings on Final Jeopardy!

Maximizing Winnings on Final Jeopardy! Maximizing Winnings on Final Jeopardy! Jessica Abramson, Natalie Collina, and William Gasarch August 2017 1 Abstract Alice and Betty are going into the final round of Jeopardy. Alice knows how much money

More information

The Morningstar Category Average Methodology

The Morningstar Category Average Methodology ? The Morningstar Category Average Methodology Morningstar Research 31 August 2017 Contents 1 Introduction 1 Construction Methodology Calculation Methodology 2 Monthly, Quarterly, and Annual 4 Daily Return

More information

A Simple Model of Bank Employee Compensation

A Simple Model of Bank Employee Compensation Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department A Simple Model of Bank Employee Compensation Christopher Phelan Working Paper 676 December 2009 Phelan: University of Minnesota and Federal Reserve

More information

EconS Micro Theory I Recitation #8b - Uncertainty II

EconS Micro Theory I Recitation #8b - Uncertainty II EconS 50 - Micro Theory I Recitation #8b - Uncertainty II. Exercise 6.E.: The purpose of this exercise is to show that preferences may not be transitive in the presence of regret. Let there be S states

More information

This homework assignment uses the material on pages ( A moving average ).

This homework assignment uses the material on pages ( A moving average ). Module 2: Time series concepts HW Homework assignment: equally weighted moving average This homework assignment uses the material on pages 14-15 ( A moving average ). 2 Let Y t = 1/5 ( t + t-1 + t-2 +

More information

Utility and Choice Under Uncertainty

Utility and Choice Under Uncertainty Introduction to Microeconomics Utility and Choice Under Uncertainty The Five Axioms of Choice Under Uncertainty We can use the axioms of preference to show how preferences can be mapped into measurable

More information

Chapter 19: Compensating and Equivalent Variations

Chapter 19: Compensating and Equivalent Variations Chapter 19: Compensating and Equivalent Variations 19.1: Introduction This chapter is interesting and important. It also helps to answer a question you may well have been asking ever since we studied quasi-linear

More information

Mathematics of Finance Final Preparation December 19. To be thoroughly prepared for the final exam, you should

Mathematics of Finance Final Preparation December 19. To be thoroughly prepared for the final exam, you should Mathematics of Finance Final Preparation December 19 To be thoroughly prepared for the final exam, you should 1. know how to do the homework problems. 2. be able to provide (correct and complete!) definitions

More information

16 MAKING SIMPLE DECISIONS

16 MAKING SIMPLE DECISIONS 247 16 MAKING SIMPLE DECISIONS Let us associate each state S with a numeric utility U(S), which expresses the desirability of the state A nondeterministic action A will have possible outcome states Result

More information

2c Tax Incidence : General Equilibrium

2c Tax Incidence : General Equilibrium 2c Tax Incidence : General Equilibrium Partial equilibrium tax incidence misses out on a lot of important aspects of economic activity. Among those aspects : markets are interrelated, so that prices of

More information

CHAPTER 13. Investor Behavior and Capital Market Efficiency. Chapter Synopsis

CHAPTER 13. Investor Behavior and Capital Market Efficiency. Chapter Synopsis CHAPTER 13 Investor Behavior and Capital Market Eiciency Chapter Synopsis 13.1 Competition and Capital Markets When the market portolio is eicient, all stocks are on the security market line and have an

More information

Symmetric Game. In animal behaviour a typical realization involves two parents balancing their individual investment in the common

Symmetric Game. In animal behaviour a typical realization involves two parents balancing their individual investment in the common Symmetric Game Consider the following -person game. Each player has a strategy which is a number x (0 x 1), thought of as the player s contribution to the common good. The net payoff to a player playing

More information

Notes on a Basic Business Problem MATH 104 and MATH 184 Mark Mac Lean (with assistance from Patrick Chan) 2011W

Notes on a Basic Business Problem MATH 104 and MATH 184 Mark Mac Lean (with assistance from Patrick Chan) 2011W Notes on a Basic Business Problem MATH 104 and MATH 184 Mark Mac Lean (with assistance from Patrick Chan) 2011W This simple problem will introduce you to the basic ideas of revenue, cost, profit, and demand.

More information

1 Asset Pricing: Bonds vs Stocks

1 Asset Pricing: Bonds vs Stocks Asset Pricing: Bonds vs Stocks The historical data on financial asset returns show that one dollar invested in the Dow- Jones yields 6 times more than one dollar invested in U.S. Treasury bonds. The return

More information

Understanding the Binomial Distribution. Introduction

Understanding the Binomial Distribution. Introduction Understanding the Binomial Distribution Introduction The purpose of this note is to give you insight into the Binomial Distribution: context, analysis, and calculations. What I think is difficult when

More information

Corporate Finance, Module 21: Option Valuation. Practice Problems. (The attached PDF file has better formatting.) Updated: July 7, 2005

Corporate Finance, Module 21: Option Valuation. Practice Problems. (The attached PDF file has better formatting.) Updated: July 7, 2005 Corporate Finance, Module 21: Option Valuation Practice Problems (The attached PDF file has better formatting.) Updated: July 7, 2005 {This posting has more information than is needed for the corporate

More information

Eco504 Spring 2010 C. Sims FINAL EXAM. β t 1 2 φτ2 t subject to (1)

Eco504 Spring 2010 C. Sims FINAL EXAM. β t 1 2 φτ2 t subject to (1) Eco54 Spring 21 C. Sims FINAL EXAM There are three questions that will be equally weighted in grading. Since you may find some questions take longer to answer than others, and partial credit will be given

More information

Random Variables and Probability Distributions

Random Variables and Probability Distributions Chapter 3 Random Variables and Probability Distributions Chapter Three Random Variables and Probability Distributions 3. Introduction An event is defined as the possible outcome of an experiment. In engineering

More information

Macro Consumption Problems 33-43

Macro Consumption Problems 33-43 Macro Consumption Problems 33-43 3rd October 6 Problem 33 This is a very simple example of questions involving what is referred to as "non-convex budget sets". In other words, there is some non-standard

More information

Lecture 2: Fundamentals of meanvariance

Lecture 2: Fundamentals of meanvariance Lecture 2: Fundamentals of meanvariance analysis Prof. Massimo Guidolin Portfolio Management Second Term 2018 Outline and objectives Mean-variance and efficient frontiers: logical meaning o Guidolin-Pedio,

More information

Hedging and Insuring. Hedging Financial Risk. General Principles of Hedging, Cont. General Principles of Hedging. Econ 422 Summer 2005

Hedging and Insuring. Hedging Financial Risk. General Principles of Hedging, Cont. General Principles of Hedging. Econ 422 Summer 2005 Hedging and Insuring Hedging inancial Risk Econ 422 Summer 2005 Both hedging and insuring are methods to manage or reduce inancial risk. Insuring involves the payment o a premium (a small certain loss)

More information

1 Economical Applications

1 Economical Applications WEEK 4 Reading [SB], 3.6, pp. 58-69 1 Economical Applications 1.1 Production Function A production function y f(q) assigns to amount q of input the corresponding output y. Usually f is - increasing, that

More information

Securitized Markets and International Capital Flows

Securitized Markets and International Capital Flows Securitized Markets and International Capital Flows Gregory Phelan Alexis Akira Toda This version: October 29, 215 Abstract We study the eect o collateralized lending and securitization on international

More information

Chapter 23: Choice under Risk

Chapter 23: Choice under Risk Chapter 23: Choice under Risk 23.1: Introduction We consider in this chapter optimal behaviour in conditions of risk. By this we mean that, when the individual takes a decision, he or she does not know

More information

MS-E2114 Investment Science Exercise 10/2016, Solutions

MS-E2114 Investment Science Exercise 10/2016, Solutions A simple and versatile model of asset dynamics is the binomial lattice. In this model, the asset price is multiplied by either factor u (up) or d (down) in each period, according to probabilities p and

More information

DATA SUMMARIZATION AND VISUALIZATION

DATA SUMMARIZATION AND VISUALIZATION APPENDIX DATA SUMMARIZATION AND VISUALIZATION PART 1 SUMMARIZATION 1: BUILDING BLOCKS OF DATA ANALYSIS 294 PART 2 PART 3 PART 4 VISUALIZATION: GRAPHS AND TABLES FOR SUMMARIZING AND ORGANIZING DATA 296

More information

Do investors dislike kurtosis? Abstract

Do investors dislike kurtosis? Abstract Do investors dislike kurtosis? Markus Haas University of Munich Abstract We show that decreasing absolute prudence implies kurtosis aversion. The ``proof'' of this relation is usually based on the identification

More information

1 Consumption and saving under uncertainty

1 Consumption and saving under uncertainty 1 Consumption and saving under uncertainty 1.1 Modelling uncertainty As in the deterministic case, we keep assuming that agents live for two periods. The novelty here is that their earnings in the second

More information

EconS Constrained Consumer Choice

EconS Constrained Consumer Choice EconS 305 - Constrained Consumer Choice Eric Dunaway Washington State University eric.dunaway@wsu.edu September 21, 2015 Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS 305 - Lecture 12 September 21, 2015 1 / 49 Introduction

More information

Probability and Stochastics for finance-ii Prof. Joydeep Dutta Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur

Probability and Stochastics for finance-ii Prof. Joydeep Dutta Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur Probability and Stochastics for finance-ii Prof. Joydeep Dutta Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur Lecture - 07 Mean-Variance Portfolio Optimization (Part-II)

More information

Problem Set 4 Answers

Problem Set 4 Answers Business 3594 John H. Cochrane Problem Set 4 Answers ) a) In the end, we re looking for ( ) ( ) + This suggests writing the portfolio as an investment in the riskless asset, then investing in the risky

More information

Models of Asset Pricing

Models of Asset Pricing appendix1 to chapter 5 Models of Asset Pricing In Chapter 4, we saw that the return on an asset (such as a bond) measures how much we gain from holding that asset. When we make a decision to buy an asset,

More information

x f(x) D.N.E

x f(x) D.N.E Limits Consider the function f(x) x2 x. This function is not defined for x, but if we examine the value of f for numbers close to, we can observe something interesting: x 0 0.5 0.9 0.999.00..5 2 f(x).5.9.999

More information

Entry Mode, Technology Transfer and Management Delegation of FDI. Ho-Chyuan Chen

Entry Mode, Technology Transfer and Management Delegation of FDI. Ho-Chyuan Chen ntry Mode, Technology Transer and Management Delegation o FDI Ho-Chyuan Chen Department o conomics, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan bstract This paper employs a our-stage game to analyze decisions

More information

Continuous-Time Pension-Fund Modelling

Continuous-Time Pension-Fund Modelling . Continuous-Time Pension-Fund Modelling Andrew J.G. Cairns Department of Actuarial Mathematics and Statistics, Heriot-Watt University, Riccarton, Edinburgh, EH4 4AS, United Kingdom Abstract This paper

More information

Web Extension: Continuous Distributions and Estimating Beta with a Calculator

Web Extension: Continuous Distributions and Estimating Beta with a Calculator 19878_02W_p001-008.qxd 3/10/06 9:51 AM Page 1 C H A P T E R 2 Web Extension: Continuous Distributions and Estimating Beta with a Calculator This extension explains continuous probability distributions

More information

5 Probability densities

5 Probability densities ENGG450 robability and Statistics or Engineers Introduction 3 robability 4 robability distributions 5 robability Densities Organization and description o data 6 Sampling distributions 7 Inerences concerning

More information

Advanced Macroeconomics 5. Rational Expectations and Asset Prices

Advanced Macroeconomics 5. Rational Expectations and Asset Prices Advanced Macroeconomics 5. Rational Expectations and Asset Prices Karl Whelan School of Economics, UCD Spring 2015 Karl Whelan (UCD) Asset Prices Spring 2015 1 / 43 A New Topic We are now going to switch

More information

On the Role of Authority in Just-In-Time Purchasing Agreements

On the Role of Authority in Just-In-Time Purchasing Agreements Discussion Paper No. A-55 On the Role o Authority in Just-In-Time Purchasing Agreements CHRISTIAN EWERHART and MICHAEL LORTH May 1997 On the Role o Authority in Just-In-Time Purchasing Agreements Christian

More information

Advanced Risk Management

Advanced Risk Management Winter 2014/2015 Advanced Risk Management Part I: Decision Theory and Risk Management Motives Lecture 1: Introduction and Expected Utility Your Instructors for Part I: Prof. Dr. Andreas Richter Email:

More information

16 MAKING SIMPLE DECISIONS

16 MAKING SIMPLE DECISIONS 253 16 MAKING SIMPLE DECISIONS Let us associate each state S with a numeric utility U(S), which expresses the desirability of the state A nondeterministic action a will have possible outcome states Result(a)

More information

u (x) < 0. and if you believe in diminishing return of the wealth, then you would require

u (x) < 0. and if you believe in diminishing return of the wealth, then you would require Chapter 8 Markowitz Portfolio Theory 8.7 Investor Utility Functions People are always asked the question: would more money make you happier? The answer is usually yes. The next question is how much more

More information

Markowitz portfolio theory

Markowitz portfolio theory Markowitz portfolio theory Farhad Amu, Marcus Millegård February 9, 2009 1 Introduction Optimizing a portfolio is a major area in nance. The objective is to maximize the yield and simultaneously minimize

More information

Edinburgh Research Explorer

Edinburgh Research Explorer Edinburgh Research Explorer Predictability o the simple technical trading rules Citation or published version: Fang, J, Jacobsen, B & Qin, Y 2014, 'Predictability o the simple technical trading rules:

More information

Partial Fractions. A rational function is a fraction in which both the numerator and denominator are polynomials. For example, f ( x) = 4, g( x) =

Partial Fractions. A rational function is a fraction in which both the numerator and denominator are polynomials. For example, f ( x) = 4, g( x) = Partial Fractions A rational function is a fraction in which both the numerator and denominator are polynomials. For example, f ( x) = 4, g( x) = 3 x 2 x + 5, and h( x) = x + 26 x 2 are rational functions.

More information

* CONTACT AUTHOR: (T) , (F) , -

* CONTACT AUTHOR: (T) , (F) ,  - Agricultural Bank Efficiency and the Role of Managerial Risk Preferences Bernard Armah * Timothy A. Park Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics 306 Conner Hall University of Georgia Athens, GA

More information

Probability. An intro for calculus students P= Figure 1: A normal integral

Probability. An intro for calculus students P= Figure 1: A normal integral Probability An intro for calculus students.8.6.4.2 P=.87 2 3 4 Figure : A normal integral Suppose we flip a coin 2 times; what is the probability that we get more than 2 heads? Suppose we roll a six-sided

More information

Game Theory and Economics Prof. Dr. Debarshi Das Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati

Game Theory and Economics Prof. Dr. Debarshi Das Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati Game Theory and Economics Prof. Dr. Debarshi Das Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati Module No. # 03 Illustrations of Nash Equilibrium Lecture No. # 02

More information

Real Options and Game Theory in Incomplete Markets

Real Options and Game Theory in Incomplete Markets Real Options and Game Theory in Incomplete Markets M. Grasselli Mathematics and Statistics McMaster University IMPA - June 28, 2006 Strategic Decision Making Suppose we want to assign monetary values to

More information

IS TAX SHARING OPTIMAL? AN ANALYSIS IN A PRINCIPAL-AGENT FRAMEWORK

IS TAX SHARING OPTIMAL? AN ANALYSIS IN A PRINCIPAL-AGENT FRAMEWORK IS TAX SHARING OPTIMAL? AN ANALYSIS IN A PRINCIPAL-AGENT FRAMEWORK BARNALI GUPTA AND CHRISTELLE VIAUROUX ABSTRACT. We study the effects of a statutory wage tax sharing rule in a principal - agent framework

More information

UK Evidence on the Profitability and the Risk-Return Characteristics of Merger Arbitrage

UK Evidence on the Profitability and the Risk-Return Characteristics of Merger Arbitrage UK Evidence on the Proitability and the isk-eturn Characteristics o Merger Arbitrage Sudi Sudarsanam* Proessor o Finance & Corporate Control Director, MSc in Finance & Management & Director (Finance),

More information

The mean-variance portfolio choice framework and its generalizations

The mean-variance portfolio choice framework and its generalizations The mean-variance portfolio choice framework and its generalizations Prof. Massimo Guidolin 20135 Theory of Finance, Part I (Sept. October) Fall 2014 Outline and objectives The backward, three-step solution

More information

Equation Chapter 1 Section 1 A Primer on Quantitative Risk Measures

Equation Chapter 1 Section 1 A Primer on Quantitative Risk Measures Equation Chapter 1 Section 1 A rimer on Quantitative Risk Measures aul D. Kaplan, h.d., CFA Quantitative Research Director Morningstar Europe, Ltd. London, UK 25 April 2011 Ever since Harry Markowitz s

More information

Expected Utility And Risk Aversion

Expected Utility And Risk Aversion Expected Utility And Risk Aversion Econ 2100 Fall 2017 Lecture 12, October 4 Outline 1 Risk Aversion 2 Certainty Equivalent 3 Risk Premium 4 Relative Risk Aversion 5 Stochastic Dominance Notation From

More information

Ph.D. Preliminary Examination MICROECONOMIC THEORY Applied Economics Graduate Program June 2017

Ph.D. Preliminary Examination MICROECONOMIC THEORY Applied Economics Graduate Program June 2017 Ph.D. Preliminary Examination MICROECONOMIC THEORY Applied Economics Graduate Program June 2017 The time limit for this exam is four hours. The exam has four sections. Each section includes two questions.

More information

A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions

A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions Omer Tamuz October 7, 213 Abstract We consider a monopoly seller who optimally auctions a single object to a single potential buyer, with

More information

Overview Definitions Mathematical Properties Properties of Economic Functions Exam Tips. Midterm 1 Review. ECON 100A - Fall Vincent Leah-Martin

Overview Definitions Mathematical Properties Properties of Economic Functions Exam Tips. Midterm 1 Review. ECON 100A - Fall Vincent Leah-Martin ECON 100A - Fall 2013 1 UCSD October 20, 2013 1 vleahmar@uscd.edu Preferences We started with a bundle of commodities: (x 1, x 2, x 3,...) (apples, bannanas, beer,...) Preferences We started with a bundle

More information

6.041SC Probabilistic Systems Analysis and Applied Probability, Fall 2013 Transcript Lecture 23

6.041SC Probabilistic Systems Analysis and Applied Probability, Fall 2013 Transcript Lecture 23 6.041SC Probabilistic Systems Analysis and Applied Probability, Fall 2013 Transcript Lecture 23 The following content is provided under a Creative Commons license. Your support will help MIT OpenCourseWare

More information

Lecture outline W.B. Powell 1

Lecture outline W.B. Powell 1 Lecture outline Applications of the newsvendor problem The newsvendor problem Estimating the distribution and censored demands The newsvendor problem and risk The newsvendor problem with an unknown distribution

More information

Lecture 2 Dynamic Equilibrium Models: Three and More (Finite) Periods

Lecture 2 Dynamic Equilibrium Models: Three and More (Finite) Periods Lecture 2 Dynamic Equilibrium Models: Three and More (Finite) Periods. Introduction In ECON 50, we discussed the structure of two-period dynamic general equilibrium models, some solution methods, and their

More information

4: SINGLE-PERIOD MARKET MODELS

4: SINGLE-PERIOD MARKET MODELS 4: SINGLE-PERIOD MARKET MODELS Marek Rutkowski School of Mathematics and Statistics University of Sydney Semester 2, 2016 M. Rutkowski (USydney) Slides 4: Single-Period Market Models 1 / 87 General Single-Period

More information