Partially Ordered Preferences in Decision Trees: Computing Strategies with Imprecision in Probabilities

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Partially Ordered Preferences in Decision Trees: Computing Strategies with Imprecision in Probabilities"

Transcription

1 Partially Ordered Preferences in Decision Trees: Comuting trategies with Imrecision in Probabilities Daniel Kikuti scola Politécnica University of ão Paulo Fabio G. Cozman scola Politécnica University of ão Paulo Cassio P. de Camos Pontifícia Universidade Católica PUC-P Abstract Partially ordered references generally lead to choices that do not abide by standard exected utility guidelines; often such references are revealed by imrecision in robability values. We investigate five criteria for strategy selection in decision trees with imrecision in robabilities: extensive Γ-maximin and Γ-maximax, interval dominance, maximality and -admissibility. We resent algorithms that generate strategies for all these criteria; our main contribution is an algorithm for - admissibility that runs over admissible strategies rather than over sets of robability distributions. Introduction A rational agent is often exected to comly with strict guidelines concerning decisions: acts are encoded as functions from states to consequences, consequences are measured by utilities, and utilities are weighted by robabilities. The rational agent is then assumed to have a comlete order that ranks all acts: any two decisions can be comared, and either one is better than the other, or the two are equivalent. Preferences are then revealed by the agent s consistent attern of choice among acts [amuelson, 948]. In this aer we wish to exlore situations where references are artially ordered: given two acts, the agent may refer one to the other, or find them to be equivalent, or find them to be incomarable. In this aer we want to restrict attention to models that assume a unique utility function (u to a linear transformation) but that contemlate nonunique robability values as a source of artially ordered references [Jaffray, 999; Machina, 989; eidenfeld, 24; Walley, 99]. Imrecise beliefs may arise from an incomlete understanding of a decision situation, from lack of rior knowledge or emirical data, from disagreements between exerts, or from lack of resources for a comlete elicitation rocedure [Walley, 99]. A gradual assessment of references may in fact create intermediate models that are incomlete but that are still useful for decisions [Wang and Boutilier, 23]. Whatever may be its origin, imrecise beliefs reresented by a set of robability measures lead to artially ordered references because each robability measure in the set may create a different comlete ordering among acts: the intersection of these comlete ordering is the agent s artial ordering. Thus our agents exress their artially ordered references by recise utilities and imrecise beliefs. Consider first the static scenario where the agent must select a single act. The agent may select an act that maximizes the minimum exected utility. This solution is called a Γ-maximin one [Berger, 985; Gilboa and chmeidler, 989]. An alternative solution is to find a set of acts such that any act in the set is an otimal act with resect to at least a robability measure in the set of ossible robability measures. uch acts are called -admissible [Levi, 98]. Other solutions, such as maximality and interval dominance, can be found in the literature, and there is considerable debate on which solution should be adoted in ractice [eidenfeld, 24; Troffaes, 24]. In this aer we focus on the more comlex dynamic situation, where a decision tree reresents a sequential decision roblem with imrecise robabilities. We resent algorithms for comuting strategies under extensive Γ-maximin and Γ-maximax, interval dominance, maximality and - admissibility we develo these algorithms within a multilinear rogramming framework. Our main contribution is an algorithm for -admissibility whose comlexity deends essentially on the number of admissible strategies thus avoiding a direct deendency on the otentially high comlexity of the underlying set of robabilities. ection 2 briefly reviews the basics of decision trees and sets of robabilities. ection 3 resents several algorithms that handle decision trees from different ersectives. ection 4 resents examles that illustrate our methods, and ection 5 concludes the aer. 2 Decision trees and credal sets A decision tree reresents a sequential decision roblem using nodes (choice, chance and value nodes) and arcs between nodes [Raiffa, 968]. Arcs indicate ossible decisions (when coming out of choice nodes) or ossible states (when coming out of chance nodes). A chance node is associated with robability values, and value nodes are associated with utility values. An obvious solution method for solving a standard decision tree is by comlete enumeration of all strategies (equivalent to the reresentation of games in normal form [Luce

2 D 2.a 2.b 3 C C C q q q q q q D 2 D a 3.2b a 3.2b Figure : Decision tree for xamle. and Raiffa, 957]). xlicit enumeration clearly becomes infeasible for large roblems. A better aroach is to take the rincile of dynamic feasibility : to assess sub-strategy s at a choice node n, one has to anticiate how one will choose at (otential) future choice nodes n, and declare infeasible all future alternatives under s which are inadmissible at n [eidenfeld, 988]. xamle Figure deicts a sequential decision roblem, adated from [eidenfeld, 24]. The chance node C is the toss of a fair coin with robability of.5 for heads or tails (q = q =.5). uose that is a recise robability value, say.25. At the initial choice node, there are four otions. We must ay.4 utiles to take, 2a or 2b, and we ay.35 utiles to take decision 3. At D we have twelve strategies to evaluate. Using dynamic feasibility, we only have to evaluate four strategies (, 2a, 2b,(3, 3.b, 3.a)). In this aer we only consider methods that emloy dynamic feasibility. ome solutions, such as Γ-maximin, roduce strategies under dynamic feasibility that are not identical to strategies roduced in the normal form (that is, when all strategies are enumerated) [eidenfeld, 24]. We focus on dynamic feasibility solutions for comutational reasons: it is imractical to enumerate all strategies as decision trees grow larger. That is, we always work with the extensive form of decision trees. This rincile is also known as backward induction or is simly taken as the basis for dynamic rogramming In this aer we wish to study situations where a chance node is not associated with a single robability measure, but rather with intervals or sets of measures. uch reresentations encode artially-ordered references [Walley, 99; eidenfeld, 995]; here we briefly review essential concets concerning sets of robabilities. A credal set K(X) is a set of robability distributions (or measures) for random variable X [Levi, 98]. A credal set catures imrecision in robability values; given a credal set and a function f(x), one may comute lower exectations [f(x)] = inf [f(x)] and uer exectations [f(x)] = su [f(x)], where [f(x)] denotes standard exectation. Lower and uer robabilities are defined similarly [Giron and Rios, 98; Walley, 99]. A conditional credal set is obtained by alying Bayes rule to every distribution in a credal set. We adot the following definition of indeendence, usually referred to as strong indeendence: two variables X and Y are strongly indeendent when the credal set K(X, Y ) has all vertices satisfying stochastic indeendence of X and Y (that is, all vertices factorize as P (X) P (Y )) [Couso et al., 2; Cozman, 2]. In this aer we assume that all variables are categorical. We also assume that credal sets are closed and convex with finitely many vertices. Finally, we assume that any conditioning event has lower robability strictly larger than zero. 3 Algorithms for decision trees associated with credal sets In this section we resent algorithms that roduce one or several strategies for a given decision tree associated with imrecise robabilities that is, chance nodes are associated with credal sets. We start with the relatively simle extensive Γ-maximin and Γ-maximax solutions (here extensive indicates that solutions are not necessarily valid for the normal form, but they are valid in an extensive form emloying dynamic feasibility). We then consider interval dominance, maximality and -admissibility solutions all of which tyically roduce sets of strategies [Troffaes, 24]. Given our reliance on dynamic feasibility, all solutions follow a iterative lan: start with the leaves of the tree, and gradually build the artial strategies that are admissible from a certain oint on. The skeleton of the rocedure is as follows: DCIIONTR(decisiontree) for each decision node D from deth N to do 2 Aux null; 3 for each branch i of D do 4 if i links D to a choice node then 5 Aux Aux TRATGI(i); 6 else if i links D to a chance node then 7 Aux Aux COMBINATION(i); 8 else //value node 9 Aux Aux i; endif endfor 2 X.Adm CRITRION X(Aux); 3 endfor 4 return TRATGI(root of the decision tree); The function TRATGI receives a decision node and returns a list of admissible strategies. The function COM-

3 BINATION receives a chance node and makes recursively the combination of all admissible strategies available on decision nodes and value nodes. These functions simly build lists of admissible strategies as the algorithm roceeds. The function CRITRION X is a generic function that must be roerly imlemented to select all valid strategies in an array of strategies. This function is imlemented in several forms in the remainder of this section, relacing X by the aroriated criteria. Variable Aux is an array of strategies. ach strategy is defined by an array of choices; in xamle, we have strategies (3, 3.b, 3.b) and (3, 3.a, 3.b), among others. It is imortant to understand that a strategy defines a multilinear constraint as long as the robabilities that influence the strategy are imrecise. Consider for instance the strategy (3, 3.a, 3.b) in xamle. If robabilities q and are interval-valued, then the value of the strategy is the multilinear exression q + ( )( q). All algorithms resented in this aer require the comutation of uer and lower exectations for strategies or algebraic oerations on strategies; these uer and lower exectations are obtained by multilinear rogramming. To comute an uer exectation, it is necessary to maximize a multilinear function subject to whatever constraints are imosed on robability values. In some roblems it may be the case that the necessary robabilities are not directly secified and must be generated through Bayes rule. For examle, it may be necessary to maniulate P (X Y ) for variables X and Y, but the decision tree may be associated with robabilities P (Y X) and P (X) this is articularly common in influence diagrams. If P (Y X) and P (X) are recisely secified, direct alication of Bayes rule yields P (X Y ). If P (Y X) or P (X) are only secified u to constraints, then it is necessary to maniulate values of P (Y X) as unknowns and to introduce the multilinear constraints P (Y X) P (X) = P (X Y ) P (Y ). Note that this constraint corresonds to Bayes rule. To solve multilinear rograms, we have used herali and Tuncbilek s Reformulation-Linearization (RL) method [herali, 992] in our imlementation. The RL method substitutes each roduct of variables j J rt θ j by a new artificial variable ϑ Jrt for all terms t in the roblem, thus obtaining a linear rogram. The solution of each linear roblem gives an uer bound to the solution of the multilinear roblem. The method iterates over the variables by branching over their ranges whenever necessary, until each ϑ Jrt is close enough to j J rt θ j. We have used the same method for comutation of uer and lower conditional robabilities in multivariate models with remarkable success [Camos and Cozman, 24]. 3. Γ-Maximin and Γ-Maximax The Γ-maximin criterion selects the strategy with highest lower exected value a essimistic solution [Berger, 985; Gilboa and chmeidler, 989]. In a sequential setting, the extensive Γ-maximin solution is to take, at each choice node, the Γ-maximin solution at that oint (this may be different from the normal form) [Jaffray, 999; eidenfeld, 995]. The Γ-maximax criterion selects the strategy with highest uer exected value certainly a very otimistic solution [atia and Lave, 973]. This extensive form of Γ-maximin leads to a rocedure that selects a single strategy for any given set of strategies. Note that there may be several strategies with the same highest lower exected value, but these are all equivalent for this criterion. The resulting algorithm is comutationally simle and similar to solution of standard decision trees; the only difference is that the comutation of a lower exectation requires multilinear rogramming. CRITRION Γ-MAXIMIN(Aux) null; M ; 2 for each s in Aux do 3 if [s] > M then 4 s; M []; 5 endif 6 endfor 7 return M; The Γ-maximax solution has the same structure, but instead of comaring lower exectations in line 3, we must comare uer exectations. Both the Γ-maximin and the Γ- maximax lead to a single strategy, even though the underlying references are artially ordered. 3.2 Interval dominance Interval dominance classifies admissible choices according to a strict artial ordering. The ordering is generated by airwise comarison. Given two strategies r and s, if [r] > [s], then s is inadmissible. The set of admissible strategies consists of those strategies not classified as inadmissible [Troffaes, 24]. The algorithm is quite simle, again requiring multilinear rogramming. In this algorithm we associate an attribute admissible to each strategy. CRITRION INTRVAL DOMINANC (Aux) M CRITRION GAMMA-MAXIMIN(Aux); 2 for i running over every strategy in Aux do 3 if [M] > [Aux[i]] then 4 Aux[i].admissible false; 5 endif 6 endfor 7 return All alternatives not marked as false; This algorithm avoids unnecessary comutations of uer and lower exected values: instead of conducting exlicit airwise comarisons, it uses the Γ-maximin solution to yield a linear number of multilinear rograms (linear on the number of ossible strategies). To show that the algorithm is correct, note that the choice with maximum lower exectation is always admissible according to interval dominance criterion, and the comarison of all strategies with the Γ-maximin strategy is sufficient for determine the admissible ones. 3.3 Maximality The maximality criterion is also based on airwise comarisons between strategies. Consider that a credal set reresents the imrecise beliefs of a articular roblem. A strategy r is maximal rovided that there is no strategy s such that, for each robability measure P in the credal set, the exected value P [s] is larger than P [r]. The maximality criterion

4 rescribes that any maximal strategy can be selected by a rational agent; the comutational roblem is to generate the set of maximal strategies. CRITRION MAXIMALITY(Aux) N Number of strategies in Aux; 2 for i =... N- do 3 for j = i+... N do 4 if [Aux[i] Aux[j]] > then 5 Aux[j].admissible = false; 6 else if [Aux[i] Aux[j]] < then 7 Aux[i].admissible = false; 8 endif 9 endfor endfor return All alternatives not marked as false; The algorithm CRITRION MAXIMALITY comares any air of strategies only once. If we know the uer/lower value for [s i s j ], we also know whether one dominates the other and we do not need to evaluate [s j s i ]. The term (s i s j ) refers to a multilinear exression, obtained by subtracting the multilinear exression of s j from the multilinear exression of s i, and of course retaining all constraints on robability values in these exressions. To verify whether N alternatives are admissible, the algorithm runs through at most O(N 2 ) multilinear roblems Admissibility The criterion of -Admissibility restricts the decision maker s admissible choices to those that are Bayes for at least one robability measure P in the relevant credal sets. That is, given a choice set of feasible strategies and a credal set K reresenting imrecise beliefs, the strategy s is - admissible when, for at least one P K, s maximizes exected utility [chervish et al., 23]: = arg max([s]) K If neither otion s i or s j is -admissible, then their convex combination αs i ( α)s j is not -admissible. The following fact, similar to the usual decision tree construction, is also true. Let be the set of -admissible strategies and the set of -inadmissible alternatives in a subtree D of a decision tree D. A strategy s i in D cannot be a substrategy of an -admissible strategy in D; that is, if we detect that a substrategy is not -admissible in a subtree, we can discard any strategy that contains it. At first one may think that -admissibility is qualitatively different from the revious criteria, because it does not directly comare strategies. Rather, -admissibility looks at distributions on the underlying credal set, and comares strategies for all distributions. Thus one might think that - admissibility is much more difficult to handle than the revious criteria; in fact this seems to be the existing consensus on the issue [Troffaes, 24]. However we wish to demonstrate that -admissibility can also be exressed using airwise comarisons, when one works in our multilinear rogramming framework. For each strategy s, we are interested in finding a robability distribution for which s is otimal in the standard exected utility sense. If this robability distribution exists, then s is -admissible. That is, strategy s i is -admissible if there exists a P K such that for all s j, s j s i, we have [s i s j ]. These (multilinear) constraints must all be satisfied to show that s i is -admissible; if the constraints cannot be satisfied, then s i is not -admissible. We thus obtain the following algorithm, where LR is a list of constraints roduced by airs of strategies: CRITRION -ADMIIBILITY(Aux) N Number of strategies in Aux; 2 for i =... N do 3 LR null; 4 for j =... N do 5 if i j then 6 LR LR [Aux[i] Aux[j]] ; 7 endif 8 endfor 9 Q set of all constraints on robability values lus LR; P arg max [s i] s.t. constraints on Q; if P is non-null then 2 Aux[i].admissible = true; 3 else 4 Aux[i].admissible = false; 5 endif 6 endfor 7 return All alternatives not marked as false; Lines 3 to 8 generate all constraints that are required to satisfy -admissibility of a strategy s i, and line 9 collects constraints on robabilities. Line requires the solution of a multilinear rogram. We emhasize that the whole algorithm deends on N, the number of strategies, and not directly on the number distributions in the credal sets. ven though the roerties of the credal sets certainly affect the solution of the relevant multilinear rograms, there is no need to reresent the credal sets exlicitly, or to enumerate their vertices stes that are necessary in existing methods [Troffaes, 24]. In a sense, the comlexity of credal sets is hidden within the multilinear rograms. This raises the question of how efficient can be multilinear rogramming; we mention that revious work has indicated that state-of-the-art multilinear rogramming methods can handle roblems containing hundreds of variables [Camos and Cozman, 24]. 4 xamles In this section we aly the various decision criteria to two roblems where beliefs are reresented by credal sets. We start by analyzing the examle resented in ection 2, with a small change: instead of adoting recise robability values, we take q [.4,.5] and [.25,.75]. Algorithm DCIIONTR begins evaluation at D 3. The array Aux contains three strategies (3.), (3.2a) and (3.2b). Function COMBINATION is called twice, roducing exressions: (3.2a) = +( ) and (3.2b) = ( ) +. The choice node D 2 is analogous to D 3. At D, the function COMBINATION generates the following multilinear exressions for strategies 2.a and 2.b: [2.a] = q ( + ( ) ) + ( q) ( + ( ) ) and [2.b] = q ( +( ) ) +( q) ( +( ) ). Note that uer and lower exectations are obtained through

5 the maximization and minimization of these exressions subject to and.4 q.5. At sequential otion 3, the function COMBINATION combines all admissible strategies (those returned by CRITRION X in the revious stes). The function CRITRION X is called once more and finally, the function TRATGI returns the admissible strategies. The evaluation by Γ-Maximin in our examle yields strategy (2.a) or (2.b) or (3, (3.,3.)) with a ayoff of.5 units each. This examle shows that sometimes the Γ-Maximin criterion may dislay somewhat strange behavior: while choices (3.2a) and (3.2b) are inadmissible at D 2 and D 3, their combination is the same as (2a) and (2b) which are admissible at D [eidenfeld, 24]. Using Γ-Maximax at D 2 and D 3 we have two admissible alternatives: (3.2a) and (3.2b). Using interval dominance at decision nodes D 2 and D 3, we have that all strategies are admissible, thus, at decision node D we have nine ossible combinations for the fourth decision lus the three first strategies. At node D, we obtain that strategies () and (3,(3.,3.)) are dominated. From the remaining strategies, four of them have [s] [.4,.26] (combinations between the decision (3.) and the otions (3.2a) or (3.2b)), two have [s] = [.,.4] (same choice at D 2 and D 3 ) and the last two have [s] [.,.2]. According to the maximality criterion, we also have nine ossible combinations at D for the fourth decision. The dominated strategies are (), (2a), (2b) and (3, (3.,3.)). The other eight strategies are admissible. Finally, if we use -admissibility in the sequential otion 3, the first of these (3.) is -inadmissible. Thus, at the initial node we have the first three alternatives lus the four ossible combinations for the fourth otion. Alying -admissibility on these strategies we have the first three inadmissible. Two have [s] [.,.4] (same choice at D 2 and D 3 ) and the other two have [s] [.,.2]. Consider now a second examle, the classic oil wildcatter roblem, but with robability intervals. The roblem is as follows. An oil wildcatter must decide either to or not to. The cost of ing is $7,. If the decision is to, the hole may be, or with a return of $2,, $, and $27,, resectively. At the cost of $,, the oil wildcatter could decide to take seismic soundings of the geological structure at the site. The soundings will disclose whether the terrain has no structure (almost no hoe for oil), closed structure (indication for much oil) or an oen structure (indication for some oil). Table shows conditional robabilities (as interval-valued robabilities); take that rior robabilities of the test on no structure, oen structure and closed structure are interval-valued as [.8,.222], [.333,.363] and [.444,.454]. Table : Conditional robabilities for the oil wildcatter roblem. T no [.5,.666] [.222,.272] [.25,.8] oen [.222,.333] [.363,.444] [.25,.363] closed [.,.66] [.333,.363] [.454,.625] Figure 2 shows the decision tree for this roblem. no sounding D sounding $, D2 T $7, no oen D3 D4 closed D5 $7, $7, $7, $ $27, $2, $ $ $27, $2, $ $ $27, $2, $ $ $27, $2, Figure 2: Decision tree for the oil wildcatter roblem. We solve this roblem using a criterion that roduces a single strategy (Γ-maximin) and a criterion that roduces several strategies (-Admissibility). Using Γ-maximin we start by finding the uer and lower exectations at D 2, D 3, D 4, D 5, that is, max ( i i ) and min ( i i ) subject to i =, i. The admissible strategies in these nodes are resectively: (), (), () and (). At decision node D we have just two strategies (two multilinear rograms to solve): s = {ns, d} and s 2 = {s, (d, n, d, d)}. Choosing s we obtain the exectation [2,, 32, ] and, choosing s 2 the exectation is [25, 537.9, 42, ]. Thus, according to Γ-maximin, the best otion is take the strategy s 2. According to -admissibility, the admissible strategies at D 2, D 3, D 4, D 5 are: (), () or (), () and (). At D the strategies are s = {ns, d}, s 2 = {s, (d, n, d, d)} and s 3 = {s, (d, d, d, d)}. All three are admissible, that is, these strategies can roduce a maximal exectation for some robability. 5 Conclusion In this aer we have resented algorithms for strategy generation in decision trees associated with imrecise beliefs. As such decision trees reresent artially ordered references, there are several criteria that can be used to generate strategies. The aer contributes in two ways:. It resents a multilinear rogramming framework for strategy generation. We emhasize that existing techniques for multilinear rogramming can handle roblems with hundreds of variables [Camos and Cozman, 24], thus guaranteeing that our algorithms can be alied to large roblems. 2. It resents an algorithm for -admissibility that deends essentially on the number of strategies to be comared, and not so much on the underlying credal set. Given the diversity of criteria, one may wonder whether there is a best criterion in the field. The following comments may be relevant to this question. It seems that Γ-maximin is $

6 aealing concetually, and relatively simle from a comutational oint of view but extensive Γ-maximin solutions can be incoherent in a sequential manner [eidenfeld, 24]. The Γ-maximax criterion seems too otimistic, even though it may be aroriate in some situations [atia and Lave, 973]. The other three criteria, interval dominance, maximality and -admissibility, roduce sets of strategies with increasing selectivity that is, they are rogressively more faithful to the artial order of references. In articular, -admissibiliy does reveal the artial order of references in its sets of admissible strategies. Our results show that interval dominance is linear while maximality and -admissibility are quadratic (here linear and quadratic are used informally to refer to the number and size of multilinear rograms). This is a significantly simler icture than reviously believed [Troffaes, 24]. Altogether, -admissibility emerges as a concetually elegant and comutationally feasible criterion for decision trees with imrecise robabilities. Acknowledgments The first author has a scholarshi from FAPP, Brazil. The second author is artially suorted by CNPq, Brazil. This work has also received generous suort from HP Brazil R&D. References [Berger, 985] J. O. Berger. tatistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis. ringer-verlag, New York, 985. [Camos and Cozman, 24] C. P. de Camos and F. G. Cozman. Inference in credal networks using multilinear rogramming. Proc. of the 2nd tarting AI Researcher ym.,. 5 6, Valencia, 24. IO Press. [Couso et al., 2] I. Couso,. Moral, and P. Walley. A survey of concets of indeendence for imrecise robabilities. Risk, Decision and Policy, 5:65 8, 2. [Cozman, 2] F. G. Cozman. earation roerties of sets of robabilities. In Conf. on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, ages 7 5, an Francisco, 2. Morgan Kaufmann. [Gilboa and chmeidler, 989] I. Gilboa and D. chmeidler. Maxmin exected utility with non-unique rior. Journal of Mathematical conomics, 8(2):4 53, 989 [Giron and Rios, 98] F. J. Giron and. Rios. Quasi- Bayesian behaviour: A more realistic aroach to decision making? Bayesian tatistics, ages University Press, Valencia, ain, 98. [Jaffray, 999] J.-Y. Jaffray. Rational decision making with imrecise robabilities. In Proceedings of st Int. ym. on Imrecise Probabilities and Their Alications, Ghent, Belgium, 999. [Levi, 98] I. Levi. The nterrise of Knowledge. MIT Press, Massachusetts, 98. [Luce and Raiffa, 957] R. Duncan Luce and H. Raiffa. Games and Decisions. Wiley, New York, 957. [Machina, 989] M. J. Machina. Dynamic consistency and non-exected utility models of choice under uncertainty. Journal of conomic Literature, 27: , 989. [Raiffa, 968] H. Raiffa. Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices under Uncertainty. Addison-Welsey, Massachusetts, 968. [amuelson, 948] P. amuelson. Are counterfactual decisions relevant for dynamically consistent udating under nonexexted utility? conometrica, 5: , 948. [atia and Lave, 973] J. K. atia and R.. Lave, Jr. Markovian decision rocesses with uncertain transition robabilities. Oerations Research, 2(3):728 74, 973. [chervish et al., 23] M. J. chervish, T. eidenfeld, J. B. Kadane, and I. Levi. xtensions of exected utility theory and some limitations of airwise comarisons. In Proc. of 3rd Int. ym. on Imrecise Probabilities and Their Alications, ages 496 5, Lugano, witzerland, 23. [eidenfeld, 988] T. eidenfeld. Decision theory without indeendence or without ordering: What is the difference. conomics and Philosohy, 4:267 29, 988. [eidenfeld, 995] T. eidenfeld, M. J. chervish, and J. B. Kadane. A reresentation of artially ordered references. Annals of tatistics, 23(6): , 995. [eidenfeld, 24] T. eidenfeld. A contrast between two decision rules for use with (convex) sets of robabilities: Gamma-maximin versus -admissibility. ynthese, 4(3):69 88, June 24. [herali, 992] H. D. herali and C. H. Tuncbilek. A global otimization algorithm for olynomial rogramming roblems using a reformulation-linearization technique. J. of Global Otimization, 2: 2, 992. [Troffaes, 24] M. Troffaes. Decision making with imrecise robabilities: A short review. IPTA Newsletter, ages 4 7, ociety for Imrecise Probability Theory and Alications, Manno, witzerland, December 24. [Walley, 99] P. Walley. tatistical reasoning with imrecise robabilities. Chaman and Hall, Londom, 99. [Wang and Boutilier, 23] T. Wang and C. Boutilier. Incremental utility elicitation with the minimax regret decision criterion. Proc. of Int. Joint Conf. on Artificial Intelligence, ages 39 36, 23.

Supplemental Material: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing

Supplemental Material: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing Sulemental Material: Buyer-Otimal Learning and Monooly Pricing Anne-Katrin Roesler and Balázs Szentes February 3, 207 The goal of this note is to characterize buyer-otimal outcomes with minimal learning

More information

Matching Markets and Social Networks

Matching Markets and Social Networks Matching Markets and Social Networks Tilman Klum Emory University Mary Schroeder University of Iowa Setember 0 Abstract We consider a satial two-sided matching market with a network friction, where exchange

More information

Sampling Procedure for Performance-Based Road Maintenance Evaluations

Sampling Procedure for Performance-Based Road Maintenance Evaluations Samling Procedure for Performance-Based Road Maintenance Evaluations Jesus M. de la Garza, Juan C. Piñero, and Mehmet E. Ozbek Maintaining the road infrastructure at a high level of condition with generally

More information

Information and uncertainty in a queueing system

Information and uncertainty in a queueing system Information and uncertainty in a queueing system Refael Hassin December 7, 7 Abstract This aer deals with the effect of information and uncertainty on rofits in an unobservable single server queueing system.

More information

CS522 - Exotic and Path-Dependent Options

CS522 - Exotic and Path-Dependent Options CS522 - Exotic and Path-Deendent Otions Tibor Jánosi May 5, 2005 0. Other Otion Tyes We have studied extensively Euroean and American uts and calls. The class of otions is much larger, however. A digital

More information

Worst-case evaluation complexity for unconstrained nonlinear optimization using high-order regularized models

Worst-case evaluation complexity for unconstrained nonlinear optimization using high-order regularized models Worst-case evaluation comlexity for unconstrained nonlinear otimization using high-order regularized models E. G. Birgin, J. L. Gardenghi, J. M. Martínez, S. A. Santos and Ph. L. Toint 2 Aril 26 Abstract

More information

On the Power of Structural Violations in Priority Queues

On the Power of Structural Violations in Priority Queues On the Power of Structural Violations in Priority Queues Amr Elmasry 1, Claus Jensen 2, Jyrki Katajainen 2, 1 Comuter Science Deartment, Alexandria University Alexandria, Egyt 2 Deartment of Comuting,

More information

Asian Economic and Financial Review A MODEL FOR ESTIMATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF FUTURE POPULATION. Ben David Nissim.

Asian Economic and Financial Review A MODEL FOR ESTIMATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF FUTURE POPULATION. Ben David Nissim. Asian Economic and Financial Review journal homeage: htt://www.aessweb.com/journals/5 A MODEL FOR ESTIMATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF FUTURE POPULATION Ben David Nissim Deartment of Economics and Management,

More information

The Impact of Flexibility And Capacity Allocation On The Performance of Primary Care Practices

The Impact of Flexibility And Capacity Allocation On The Performance of Primary Care Practices University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014 2010 The Imact of Flexibility And Caacity Allocation On The Performance of Primary Care Practices Liang

More information

Confidence Intervals for a Proportion Using Inverse Sampling when the Data is Subject to False-positive Misclassification

Confidence Intervals for a Proportion Using Inverse Sampling when the Data is Subject to False-positive Misclassification Journal of Data Science 13(015), 63-636 Confidence Intervals for a Proortion Using Inverse Samling when the Data is Subject to False-ositive Misclassification Kent Riggs 1 1 Deartment of Mathematics and

More information

Management of Pricing Policies and Financial Risk as a Key Element for Short Term Scheduling Optimization

Management of Pricing Policies and Financial Risk as a Key Element for Short Term Scheduling Optimization Ind. Eng. Chem. Res. 2005, 44, 557-575 557 Management of Pricing Policies and Financial Risk as a Key Element for Short Term Scheduling Otimization Gonzalo Guillén, Miguel Bagajewicz, Sebastián Eloy Sequeira,

More information

INDEX NUMBERS. Introduction

INDEX NUMBERS. Introduction INDEX NUMBERS Introduction Index numbers are the indicators which reflect changes over a secified eriod of time in rices of different commodities industrial roduction (iii) sales (iv) imorts and exorts

More information

Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing

Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing Buyer-Otimal Learning and Monooly Pricing Anne-Katrin Roesler and Balázs Szentes January 2, 217 Abstract This aer analyzes a bilateral trade model where the buyer s valuation for the object is uncertain

More information

Non-Inferiority Tests for the Ratio of Two Correlated Proportions

Non-Inferiority Tests for the Ratio of Two Correlated Proportions Chater 161 Non-Inferiority Tests for the Ratio of Two Correlated Proortions Introduction This module comutes ower and samle size for non-inferiority tests of the ratio in which two dichotomous resonses

More information

SINGLE SAMPLING PLAN FOR VARIABLES UNDER MEASUREMENT ERROR FOR NON-NORMAL DISTRIBUTION

SINGLE SAMPLING PLAN FOR VARIABLES UNDER MEASUREMENT ERROR FOR NON-NORMAL DISTRIBUTION ISSN -58 (Paer) ISSN 5-5 (Online) Vol., No.9, SINGLE SAMPLING PLAN FOR VARIABLES UNDER MEASUREMENT ERROR FOR NON-NORMAL DISTRIBUTION Dr. ketki kulkarni Jayee University of Engineering and Technology Guna

More information

Application of Monte-Carlo Tree Search to Traveling-Salesman Problem

Application of Monte-Carlo Tree Search to Traveling-Salesman Problem R4-14 SASIMI 2016 Proceedings Alication of Monte-Carlo Tree Search to Traveling-Salesman Problem Masato Shimomura Yasuhiro Takashima Faculty of Environmental Engineering University of Kitakyushu Kitakyushu,

More information

Analysis on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Game Theory of Petroleum Group Corporation

Analysis on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Game Theory of Petroleum Group Corporation DOI: 10.14355/ijams.2014.0301.03 Analysis on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Game Theory of Petroleum Grou Cororation Minchang Xin 1, Yanbin Sun 2 1,2 Economic and Management Institute, Northeast Petroleum

More information

A GENERALISED PRICE-SCORING MODEL FOR TENDER EVALUATION

A GENERALISED PRICE-SCORING MODEL FOR TENDER EVALUATION 019-026 rice scoring 9/20/05 12:12 PM Page 19 A GENERALISED PRICE-SCORING MODEL FOR TENDER EVALUATION Thum Peng Chew BE (Hons), M Eng Sc, FIEM, P. Eng, MIEEE ABSTRACT This aer rooses a generalised rice-scoring

More information

Investment in Production Resource Flexibility:

Investment in Production Resource Flexibility: Investment in Production Resource Flexibility: An emirical investigation of methods for lanning under uncertainty Elena Katok MS&IS Deartment Penn State University University Park, PA 16802 ekatok@su.edu

More information

Capital Budgeting: The Valuation of Unusual, Irregular, or Extraordinary Cash Flows

Capital Budgeting: The Valuation of Unusual, Irregular, or Extraordinary Cash Flows Caital Budgeting: The Valuation of Unusual, Irregular, or Extraordinary Cash Flows ichael C. Ehrhardt Philli R. Daves Finance Deartment, SC 424 University of Tennessee Knoxville, TN 37996-0540 423-974-1717

More information

Lecture 5: Performance Analysis (part 1)

Lecture 5: Performance Analysis (part 1) Lecture 5: Performance Analysis (art 1) 1 Tyical Time Measurements Dark grey: time sent on comutation, decreasing with # of rocessors White: time sent on communication, increasing with # of rocessors Oerations

More information

Forward Vertical Integration: The Fixed-Proportion Case Revisited. Abstract

Forward Vertical Integration: The Fixed-Proportion Case Revisited. Abstract Forward Vertical Integration: The Fixed-roortion Case Revisited Olivier Bonroy GAEL, INRA-ierre Mendès France University Bruno Larue CRÉA, Laval University Abstract Assuming a fixed-roortion downstream

More information

Multiple-Project Financing with Informed Trading

Multiple-Project Financing with Informed Trading The ournal of Entrereneurial Finance Volume 6 ssue ring 0 rticle December 0 Multile-Project Financing with nformed Trading alvatore Cantale MD nternational Dmitry Lukin New Economic chool Follow this and

More information

Feasibilitystudyofconstruction investmentprojectsassessment withregardtoriskandprobability

Feasibilitystudyofconstruction investmentprojectsassessment withregardtoriskandprobability Feasibilitystudyofconstruction investmentrojectsassessment withregardtoriskandrobability ofnpvreaching Andrzej Minasowicz Warsaw University of Technology, Civil Engineering Faculty, Warsaw, PL a.minasowicz@il.w.edu.l

More information

Setting the regulatory WACC using Simulation and Loss Functions The case for standardising procedures

Setting the regulatory WACC using Simulation and Loss Functions The case for standardising procedures Setting the regulatory WACC using Simulation and Loss Functions The case for standardising rocedures by Ian M Dobbs Newcastle University Business School Draft: 7 Setember 2007 1 ABSTRACT The level set

More information

LECTURE NOTES ON MICROECONOMICS

LECTURE NOTES ON MICROECONOMICS LECTURE NOTES ON MCROECONOMCS ANALYZNG MARKETS WTH BASC CALCULUS William M. Boal Part : Consumers and demand Chater 5: Demand Section 5.: ndividual demand functions Determinants of choice. As noted in

More information

Maximize the Sharpe Ratio and Minimize a VaR 1

Maximize the Sharpe Ratio and Minimize a VaR 1 Maximize the Share Ratio and Minimize a VaR 1 Robert B. Durand 2 Hedieh Jafarour 3,4 Claudia Klüelberg 5 Ross Maller 6 Aril 28, 2008 Abstract In addition to its role as the otimal ex ante combination of

More information

On the Power of Structural Violations in Priority Queues

On the Power of Structural Violations in Priority Queues On the Power of Structural Violations in Priority Queues Amr Elmasry 1 Claus Jensen 2 Jyrki Katajainen 2 1 Deartment of Comuter Engineering and Systems, Alexandria University Alexandria, Egyt 2 Deartment

More information

Limitations of Value-at-Risk (VaR) for Budget Analysis

Limitations of Value-at-Risk (VaR) for Budget Analysis Agribusiness & Alied Economics March 2004 Miscellaneous Reort No. 194 Limitations of Value-at-Risk (VaR) for Budget Analysis Cole R. Gustafson Deartment of Agribusiness and Alied Economics Agricultural

More information

Management Accounting of Production Overheads by Groups of Equipment

Management Accounting of Production Overheads by Groups of Equipment Asian Social Science; Vol. 11, No. 11; 2015 ISSN 1911-2017 E-ISSN 1911-2025 Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education Management Accounting of Production verheads by Grous of Equiment Sokolov

More information

A Comparative Study of Various Loss Functions in the Economic Tolerance Design

A Comparative Study of Various Loss Functions in the Economic Tolerance Design A Comarative Study of Various Loss Functions in the Economic Tolerance Design Jeh-Nan Pan Deartment of Statistics National Chen-Kung University, Tainan, Taiwan 700, ROC Jianbiao Pan Deartment of Industrial

More information

Annex 4 - Poverty Predictors: Estimation and Algorithm for Computing Predicted Welfare Function

Annex 4 - Poverty Predictors: Estimation and Algorithm for Computing Predicted Welfare Function Annex 4 - Poverty Predictors: Estimation and Algorithm for Comuting Predicted Welfare Function The Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire (CWIQ) is an off-the-shelf survey ackage develoed by the World Bank

More information

Professor Huihua NIE, PhD School of Economics, Renmin University of China HOLD-UP, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND REPUTATION

Professor Huihua NIE, PhD School of Economics, Renmin University of China   HOLD-UP, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND REPUTATION Professor uihua NIE, PhD School of Economics, Renmin University of China E-mail: niehuihua@gmail.com OD-UP, PROPERTY RIGTS AND REPUTATION Abstract: By introducing asymmetric information of investors abilities

More information

Effects of Size and Allocation Method on Stock Portfolio Performance: A Simulation Study

Effects of Size and Allocation Method on Stock Portfolio Performance: A Simulation Study 2011 3rd International Conference on Information and Financial Engineering IPEDR vol.12 (2011) (2011) IACSIT Press, Singaore Effects of Size and Allocation Method on Stock Portfolio Performance: A Simulation

More information

Lecture 2. Main Topics: (Part II) Chapter 2 (2-7), Chapter 3. Bayes Theorem: Let A, B be two events, then. The probabilities P ( B), probability of B.

Lecture 2. Main Topics: (Part II) Chapter 2 (2-7), Chapter 3. Bayes Theorem: Let A, B be two events, then. The probabilities P ( B), probability of B. STT315, Section 701, Summer 006 Lecture (Part II) Main Toics: Chater (-7), Chater 3. Bayes Theorem: Let A, B be two events, then B A) = A B) B) A B) B) + A B) B) The robabilities P ( B), B) are called

More information

EVIDENCE OF ADVERSE SELECTION IN CROP INSURANCE MARKETS

EVIDENCE OF ADVERSE SELECTION IN CROP INSURANCE MARKETS The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2001, Vol. 68, No. 4, 685-708 EVIDENCE OF ADVERSE SELECTION IN CROP INSURANCE MARKETS Shiva S. Makki Agai Somwaru INTRODUCTION ABSTRACT This article analyzes farmers

More information

Asymmetric Information

Asymmetric Information Asymmetric Information Econ 235, Sring 2013 1 Wilson [1980] What haens when you have adverse selection? What is an equilibrium? What are we assuming when we define equilibrium in one of the ossible ways?

More information

5.1 Regional investment attractiveness in an unstable and risky environment

5.1 Regional investment attractiveness in an unstable and risky environment 5.1 Regional investment attractiveness in an unstable and risky environment Nikolova Liudmila Ekaterina Plotnikova Sub faculty Finances and monetary circulation Saint Petersburg state olytechnical university,

More information

Quality Regulation without Regulating Quality

Quality Regulation without Regulating Quality 1 Quality Regulation without Regulating Quality Claudia Kriehn, ifo Institute for Economic Research, Germany March 2004 Abstract Against the background that a combination of rice-ca and minimum uality

More information

A Multi-Objective Approach to Portfolio Optimization

A Multi-Objective Approach to Portfolio Optimization RoseHulman Undergraduate Mathematics Journal Volume 8 Issue Article 2 A MultiObjective Aroach to Portfolio Otimization Yaoyao Clare Duan Boston College, sweetclare@gmail.com Follow this and additional

More information

Objectives. 3.3 Toward statistical inference

Objectives. 3.3 Toward statistical inference Objectives 3.3 Toward statistical inference Poulation versus samle (CIS, Chater 6) Toward statistical inference Samling variability Further reading: htt://onlinestatbook.com/2/estimation/characteristics.html

More information

Publication Efficiency at DSI FEM CULS An Application of the Data Envelopment Analysis

Publication Efficiency at DSI FEM CULS An Application of the Data Envelopment Analysis Publication Efficiency at DSI FEM CULS An Alication of the Data Enveloment Analysis Martin Flégl, Helena Brožová 1 Abstract. The education and research efficiency at universities has always been very imortant

More information

Economic Performance, Wealth Distribution and Credit Restrictions under variable investment: The open economy

Economic Performance, Wealth Distribution and Credit Restrictions under variable investment: The open economy Economic Performance, Wealth Distribution and Credit Restrictions under variable investment: The oen economy Ronald Fischer U. de Chile Diego Huerta Banco Central de Chile August 21, 2015 Abstract Potential

More information

FORECASTING EARNINGS PER SHARE FOR COMPANIES IN IT SECTOR USING MARKOV PROCESS MODEL

FORECASTING EARNINGS PER SHARE FOR COMPANIES IN IT SECTOR USING MARKOV PROCESS MODEL FORECASTING EARNINGS PER SHARE FOR COMPANIES IN IT SECTOR USING MARKOV PROCESS MODEL 1 M.P. RAJAKUMAR, 2 V. SHANTHI 1 Research Scholar, Sathyabama University, Chennai-119, Tamil Nadu, India 2 Professor,

More information

Statistics and Probability Letters. Variance stabilizing transformations of Poisson, binomial and negative binomial distributions

Statistics and Probability Letters. Variance stabilizing transformations of Poisson, binomial and negative binomial distributions Statistics and Probability Letters 79 (9) 6 69 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Statistics and Probability Letters journal homeage: www.elsevier.com/locate/staro Variance stabilizing transformations

More information

Optimizing the Hurwicz criterion in decision trees with imprecise probabilities

Optimizing the Hurwicz criterion in decision trees with imprecise probabilities Optimizing the Hurwicz criterion in decision trees with imprecise probabilities Gildas Jeantet and Olivier Spanjaard LIP6 - UPMC 104 avenue du Président Kennedy 75016 Paris, France {gildas.jeantet,olivier.spanjaard}@lip6.fr

More information

A Stochastic Model of Optimal Debt Management and Bankruptcy

A Stochastic Model of Optimal Debt Management and Bankruptcy A Stochastic Model of Otimal Debt Management and Bankrutcy Alberto Bressan (, Antonio Marigonda (, Khai T. Nguyen (, and Michele Palladino ( (* Deartment of Mathematics, Penn State University University

More information

Oliver Hinz. Il-Horn Hann

Oliver Hinz. Il-Horn Hann REEARCH ARTICLE PRICE DICRIMINATION IN E-COMMERCE? AN EXAMINATION OF DYNAMIC PRICING IN NAME-YOUR-OWN PRICE MARKET Oliver Hinz Faculty of Economics and usiness Administration, Goethe-University of Frankfurt,

More information

No. 81 PETER TUCHYŇA AND MARTIN GREGOR. Centralization Trade-off with Non-Uniform Taxes

No. 81 PETER TUCHYŇA AND MARTIN GREGOR. Centralization Trade-off with Non-Uniform Taxes No. 81 PETER TUCHYŇA AND MARTIN GREGOR Centralization Trade-off with Non-Uniform Taxes 005 Disclaimer: The IES Working Paers is an online, eer-reviewed journal for work by the faculty and students of the

More information

Portfolio Selection Model with the Measures of Information Entropy- Incremental Entropy-Skewness

Portfolio Selection Model with the Measures of Information Entropy- Incremental Entropy-Skewness Portfolio Selection Model with the Measures of Information Entroy-Incremental Entroy-Skewness Portfolio Selection Model with the Measures of Information Entroy- Incremental Entroy-Skewness 1,2 Rongxi Zhou,

More information

2/20/2013. of Manchester. The University COMP Building a yes / no classifier

2/20/2013. of Manchester. The University COMP Building a yes / no classifier COMP4 Lecture 6 Building a yes / no classifier Buildinga feature-basedclassifier Whatis a classifier? What is an information feature? Building a classifier from one feature Probability densities and the

More information

Type-Guided Worst-Case Input Generation

Type-Guided Worst-Case Input Generation 1 Tye-Guided Worst-Case Inut Generation DI WANG, Carnegie Mellon University, USA JAN HOFFMANN, Carnegie Mellon University, USA This aer resents a novel techniue for tye-guided worst-case inut generation

More information

Causal Links between Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Egypt

Causal Links between Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Egypt J I B F Research Science Press Causal Links between Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Egyt TAREK GHALWASH* Abstract: The main objective of this aer is to study the causal relationshi between

More information

A Graphical Depiction of Hicksian Partial-Equilibrium Welfare Analysis

A Graphical Depiction of Hicksian Partial-Equilibrium Welfare Analysis A rahical eiction of Hicksian Partial-quilibrium Welfare Analysis Keir. Armstrong eartment of conomics Carleton University Ottawa, ON KS 5B6 karmstro@ccs.carleton.ca May 22, 23 Abstract An inescaable conclusion

More information

Midterm Exam: Tuesday 28 March in class Sample exam problems ( Homework 5 ) available tomorrow at the latest

Midterm Exam: Tuesday 28 March in class Sample exam problems ( Homework 5 ) available tomorrow at the latest Plan Martingales 1. Basic Definitions 2. Examles 3. Overview of Results Reading: G&S Section 12.1-12.4 Next Time: More Martingales Midterm Exam: Tuesday 28 March in class Samle exam roblems ( Homework

More information

Summary of the Chief Features of Alternative Asset Pricing Theories

Summary of the Chief Features of Alternative Asset Pricing Theories Summary o the Chie Features o Alternative Asset Pricing Theories CAP and its extensions The undamental equation o CAP ertains to the exected rate o return time eriod into the uture o any security r r β

More information

Volumetric Hedging in Electricity Procurement

Volumetric Hedging in Electricity Procurement Volumetric Hedging in Electricity Procurement Yumi Oum Deartment of Industrial Engineering and Oerations Research, University of California, Berkeley, CA, 9472-777 Email: yumioum@berkeley.edu Shmuel Oren

More information

Worst-case evaluation complexity of regularization methods for smooth unconstrained optimization using Hölder continuous gradients

Worst-case evaluation complexity of regularization methods for smooth unconstrained optimization using Hölder continuous gradients Worst-case evaluation comlexity of regularization methods for smooth unconstrained otimization using Hölder continuous gradients C Cartis N I M Gould and Ph L Toint 26 June 205 Abstract The worst-case

More information

ECON 1100 Global Economics (Fall 2013) Government Failure

ECON 1100 Global Economics (Fall 2013) Government Failure ECON 11 Global Economics (Fall 213) Government Failure Relevant Readings from the Required extbooks: Economics Chater 11, Government Failure Definitions and Concets: government failure a situation in which

More information

We connect the mix-flexibility and dual-sourcing literatures by studying unreliable supply chains that produce

We connect the mix-flexibility and dual-sourcing literatures by studying unreliable supply chains that produce MANUFACTURING & SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Vol. 7, No. 1, Winter 25,. 37 57 issn 1523-4614 eissn 1526-5498 5 71 37 informs doi 1.1287/msom.14.63 25 INFORMS On the Value of Mix Flexibility and Dual Sourcing

More information

Price Gap and Welfare

Price Gap and Welfare APPENDIX D Price Ga and Welfare Derivation of the Price-Ga Formula This aendix details the derivation of the rice-ga formula (see chaters 2 and 5) under two assumtions: (1) the simlest case, where there

More information

BA 351 CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE 7 UNCERTAINTY, THE CAPM AND CAPITAL BUDGETING. John R. Graham Adapted from S. Viswanathan

BA 351 CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE 7 UNCERTAINTY, THE CAPM AND CAPITAL BUDGETING. John R. Graham Adapted from S. Viswanathan BA 351 CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE 7 UNCERTAINTY, THE CAPM AND CAPITAL BUDGETING John R. Graham Adated from S. Viswanathan FUQUA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS DUKE UNIVERSITY 1 In this lecture, we examine roject valuation

More information

Does Hedging Reduce the Cost of Delegation?

Does Hedging Reduce the Cost of Delegation? Does Hedging Reduce the Cost of Delegation? Sanoti K. Eswar Job Market Paer July 2014 Abstract I incororate the choice of hedging instrument into a moral hazard model to study the imact of derivatives

More information

The Effect of Prior Gains and Losses on Current Risk-Taking Using Quantile Regression

The Effect of Prior Gains and Losses on Current Risk-Taking Using Quantile Regression The Effect of rior Gains and Losses on Current Risk-Taking Using Quantile Regression by Fabio Mattos and hili Garcia Suggested citation format: Mattos, F., and. Garcia. 2009. The Effect of rior Gains and

More information

FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMICS - Economics Of Uncertainty And Information - Giacomo Bonanno ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION

FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMICS - Economics Of Uncertainty And Information - Giacomo Bonanno ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION Giacomo Bonanno Deartment of Economics, University of California, Davis, CA 9566-8578, USA Keywords: adverse selection, asymmetric information, attitudes to risk,

More information

C (1,1) (1,2) (2,1) (2,2)

C (1,1) (1,2) (2,1) (2,2) TWO COIN MORRA This game is layed by two layers, R and C. Each layer hides either one or two silver dollars in his/her hand. Simultaneously, each layer guesses how many coins the other layer is holding.

More information

DP2003/10. Speculative behaviour, debt default and contagion: A stylised framework of the Latin American Crisis

DP2003/10. Speculative behaviour, debt default and contagion: A stylised framework of the Latin American Crisis DP2003/10 Seculative behaviour, debt default and contagion: A stylised framework of the Latin American Crisis 2001-2002 Louise Allso December 2003 JEL classification: E44, F34, F41 Discussion Paer Series

More information

Physical and Financial Virtual Power Plants

Physical and Financial Virtual Power Plants Physical and Financial Virtual Power Plants by Bert WILLEMS Public Economics Center for Economic Studies Discussions Paer Series (DPS) 05.1 htt://www.econ.kuleuven.be/ces/discussionaers/default.htm Aril

More information

Research Article A Method to Dynamic Stochastic Multicriteria Decision Making with Log-Normally Distributed Random Variables

Research Article A Method to Dynamic Stochastic Multicriteria Decision Making with Log-Normally Distributed Random Variables The Scientific World Journal Volume 03, Article ID 0085, 8 ages htt://dx.doi.org/0.55/03/0085 Research Article A Method to Dynamic Stochastic Multicriteria Decision Maing with Log-Normally Distributed

More information

Objectives. 5.2, 8.1 Inference for a single proportion. Categorical data from a simple random sample. Binomial distribution

Objectives. 5.2, 8.1 Inference for a single proportion. Categorical data from a simple random sample. Binomial distribution Objectives 5.2, 8.1 Inference for a single roortion Categorical data from a simle random samle Binomial distribution Samling distribution of the samle roortion Significance test for a single roortion Large-samle

More information

Games with more than 1 round

Games with more than 1 round Games with more than round Reeated risoner s dilemma Suose this game is to be layed 0 times. What should you do? Player High Price Low Price Player High Price 00, 00-0, 00 Low Price 00, -0 0,0 What if

More information

Gottfried Haberler s Principle of Comparative Advantage

Gottfried Haberler s Principle of Comparative Advantage Gottfried Haberler s rincile of Comarative dvantage Murray C. Kem a* and Masayuki Okawa b a Macquarie University b Ritsumeiken University bstract Like the Torrens-Ricardo rincile of Comarative dvantage,

More information

Brownian Motion, the Gaussian Lévy Process

Brownian Motion, the Gaussian Lévy Process Brownian Motion, the Gaussian Lévy Process Deconstructing Brownian Motion: My construction of Brownian motion is based on an idea of Lévy s; and in order to exlain Lévy s idea, I will begin with the following

More information

Quantitative Aggregate Effects of Asymmetric Information

Quantitative Aggregate Effects of Asymmetric Information Quantitative Aggregate Effects of Asymmetric Information Pablo Kurlat February 2012 In this note I roose a calibration of the model in Kurlat (forthcoming) to try to assess the otential magnitude of the

More information

TESTING THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL AFTER CURRENCY REFORM: THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE STOCK EXCHANGE

TESTING THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL AFTER CURRENCY REFORM: THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE STOCK EXCHANGE TESTING THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL AFTER CURRENCY REFORM: THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE STOCK EXCHANGE Batsirai Winmore Mazviona 1 ABSTRACT The Caital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) endeavors to exlain the relationshi

More information

How Large Are the Welfare Costs of Tax Competition?

How Large Are the Welfare Costs of Tax Competition? How Large Are the Welfare Costs of Tax Cometition? June 2001 Discussion Paer 01 28 Resources for the Future 1616 P Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20036 Telehone: 202 328 5000 Fax: 202 939 3460 Internet: htt://www.rff.org

More information

Interest Rates in Trade Credit Markets

Interest Rates in Trade Credit Markets Interest Rates in Trade Credit Markets Klenio Barbosa Humberto Moreira Walter Novaes December, 2009 Abstract Desite strong evidence that suliers of inuts are informed lenders, the cost of trade credit

More information

Twin Deficits and Inflation Dynamics in a Mundell-Fleming-Tobin Framework

Twin Deficits and Inflation Dynamics in a Mundell-Fleming-Tobin Framework Twin Deficits and Inflation Dynamics in a Mundell-Fleming-Tobin Framework Peter Flaschel, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany Gang Gong, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China Christian R. Proaño, IMK

More information

First the Basic Background Knowledge especially for SUS students. But going farther:

First the Basic Background Knowledge especially for SUS students. But going farther: asic ackground Knowledge: Review of Economics for Economics students. Consumers Economics of the Environment and Natural Resources/ Economics of Sustainability K Foster, CCNY, Sring 0 First the asic ackground

More information

School of Economic Sciences

School of Economic Sciences School of Economic Sciences Working Paer Series WP 015-10 Profit-Enhancing Environmental Policy: Uninformed Regulation in an Entry-Deterrence Model* Ana Esínola-Arredondo and Félix Muñoz-García June 18,

More information

BIS Working Papers. Liquidity risk in markets with trading frictions: What can swing pricing achieve? No 663. Monetary and Economic Department

BIS Working Papers. Liquidity risk in markets with trading frictions: What can swing pricing achieve? No 663. Monetary and Economic Department BIS Working Paers No 663 Liquidity risk in markets with trading frictions: What can swing ricing achieve? by Ulf Lewrick and Jochen Schanz Monetary and Economic Deartment October 207 JEL classification:

More information

Analysing indicators of performance, satisfaction, or safety using empirical logit transformation

Analysing indicators of performance, satisfaction, or safety using empirical logit transformation Analysing indicators of erformance, satisfaction, or safety using emirical logit transformation Sarah Stevens,, Jose M Valderas, Tim Doran, Rafael Perera,, Evangelos Kontoantelis,5 Nuffield Deartment of

More information

16 MAKING SIMPLE DECISIONS

16 MAKING SIMPLE DECISIONS 247 16 MAKING SIMPLE DECISIONS Let us associate each state S with a numeric utility U(S), which expresses the desirability of the state A nondeterministic action A will have possible outcome states Result

More information

Advertising Strategies for a Duopoly Model with Duo-markets and a budget constraint

Advertising Strategies for a Duopoly Model with Duo-markets and a budget constraint Advertising Strategies for a Duooly Model with Duo-markets and a budget constraint Ernie G.S. Teo Division of Economics, Nanyang Technological University Tianyin Chen School of Physical and Mathematical

More information

Subject : Computer Science. Paper: Machine Learning. Module: Decision Theory and Bayesian Decision Theory. Module No: CS/ML/10.

Subject : Computer Science. Paper: Machine Learning. Module: Decision Theory and Bayesian Decision Theory. Module No: CS/ML/10. e-pg Pathshala Subject : Computer Science Paper: Machine Learning Module: Decision Theory and Bayesian Decision Theory Module No: CS/ML/0 Quadrant I e-text Welcome to the e-pg Pathshala Lecture Series

More information

Monetary policy is a controversial

Monetary policy is a controversial Inflation Persistence: How Much Can We Exlain? PAU RABANAL AND JUAN F. RUBIO-RAMÍREZ Rabanal is an economist in the monetary and financial systems deartment at the International Monetary Fund in Washington,

More information

Pairs trading. ROBERT J. ELLIOTTy, JOHN VAN DER HOEK*z and WILLIAM P. MALCOLM

Pairs trading. ROBERT J. ELLIOTTy, JOHN VAN DER HOEK*z and WILLIAM P. MALCOLM Quantitative Finance, Vol. 5, No. 3, June 2005, 271 276 Pairs trading ROBERT J. ELLIOTTy, JOHN VAN DER HOEK*z and WILLIAM P. MALCOLM yhaskayne School of Business, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta,

More information

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES SELF-FULFILLING CURRENCY CRISES: THE ROLE OF INTEREST RATES. Christian Hellwig Arijit Mukherji Aleh Tsyvinski

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES SELF-FULFILLING CURRENCY CRISES: THE ROLE OF INTEREST RATES. Christian Hellwig Arijit Mukherji Aleh Tsyvinski NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES SELF-FULFILLING CURRENCY CRISES: THE ROLE OF INTEREST RATES Christian Hellwig Arijit Mukherji Aleh Tsyvinski Working Paer 11191 htt://www.nber.org/aers/w11191 NATIONAL BUREAU

More information

A NOTE ON SKEW-NORMAL DISTRIBUTION APPROXIMATION TO THE NEGATIVE BINOMAL DISTRIBUTION

A NOTE ON SKEW-NORMAL DISTRIBUTION APPROXIMATION TO THE NEGATIVE BINOMAL DISTRIBUTION A NOTE ON SKEW-NORMAL DISTRIBUTION APPROXIMATION TO THE NEGATIVE BINOMAL DISTRIBUTION JYH-JIUAN LIN 1, CHING-HUI CHANG * AND ROSEMARY JOU 1 Deartment of Statistics Tamkang University 151 Ying-Chuan Road,

More information

Lemons Markets and the Transmission of Aggregate Shocks

Lemons Markets and the Transmission of Aggregate Shocks Lemons Markets and the Transmission of Aggregate Shocks Pablo Kurlat Stanford University July 21, 2011 Abstract I study a dynamic economy featuring adverse selection in asset markets. Borrowingconstrained

More information

The Supply and Demand for Exports of Pakistan: The Polynomial Distributed Lag Model (PDL) Approach

The Supply and Demand for Exports of Pakistan: The Polynomial Distributed Lag Model (PDL) Approach The Pakistan Develoment Review 42 : 4 Part II (Winter 23). 96 972 The Suly and Demand for Exorts of Pakistan: The Polynomial Distributed Lag Model (PDL) Aroach ZESHAN ATIQUE and MOHSIN HASNAIN AHMAD. INTRODUCTION

More information

Sharpe Ratios and Alphas in Continuous Time

Sharpe Ratios and Alphas in Continuous Time JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS VOL. 39, NO. 1, MARCH 2004 COPYRIGHT 2004, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE, WA 98195 Share Ratios and Alhas in Continuous

More information

Institutional Constraints and The Inefficiency in Public Investments

Institutional Constraints and The Inefficiency in Public Investments Institutional Constraints and The Inefficiency in Public Investments Leyla D. Karakas March 14, 017 Abstract This aer studies limits on executive authority by identifying a dynamic channel through which

More information

Modifications of the Omega ratio for decision making under uncertainty

Modifications of the Omega ratio for decision making under uncertainty Croatian Oerational Research Review 8 CRORR 6(205), 8 94 Modifications of the Omega ratio for decision making under uncertainty Helena Gasars-Wieloch, Faculty of Informatics and Electronic Economy, Poznań

More information

( ) ( ) β. max. subject to. ( ) β. x S

( ) ( ) β. max. subject to. ( ) β. x S Intermediate Microeconomic Theory: ECON 5: Alication of Consumer Theory Constrained Maimization In the last set of notes, and based on our earlier discussion, we said that we can characterize individual

More information

Index Methodology Guidelines relating to the. EQM Global Cannabis Index

Index Methodology Guidelines relating to the. EQM Global Cannabis Index Index Methodology Guidelines relating to the EQM Global Cannabis Index Version 1.2 dated March 20, 2019 1 Contents Introduction 1 Index secifications 1.1 Short name 1.2 Initial value 1.3 Distribution 1.4

More information

Withdrawal History, Private Information, and Bank Runs

Withdrawal History, Private Information, and Bank Runs Withdrawal History, Private Information, and Bank Runs Carlos Garriga and Chao Gu This aer rovides a simle two-deositor, two-stage model to understand how a bank s withdrawal history affects an individual

More information

Analytical support in the setting of EU employment rate targets for Working Paper 1/2012 João Medeiros & Paul Minty

Analytical support in the setting of EU employment rate targets for Working Paper 1/2012 João Medeiros & Paul Minty Analytical suort in the setting of EU emloyment rate targets for 2020 Working Paer 1/2012 João Medeiros & Paul Minty DISCLAIMER Working Paers are written by the Staff of the Directorate-General for Emloyment,

More information

Statistical inferences and applications of the half exponential power distribution

Statistical inferences and applications of the half exponential power distribution Statistical inferences and alications of the half exonential ower distribution Wenhao Gui Deartment of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Minnesota Duluth, Duluth MN 558, USA Abstract In this aer,

More information

Modeling and Estimating a Higher Systematic Co-Moment Asset Pricing Model in the Brazilian Stock Market. Autoria: Andre Luiz Carvalhal da Silva

Modeling and Estimating a Higher Systematic Co-Moment Asset Pricing Model in the Brazilian Stock Market. Autoria: Andre Luiz Carvalhal da Silva Modeling and Estimating a Higher Systematic Co-Moment Asset Pricing Model in the Brazilian Stock Market Autoria: Andre Luiz Carvalhal da Silva Abstract Many asset ricing models assume that only the second-order

More information