Lecture 8: Heterogeneous Firms and the Decision to Export

Transcription

1 Lecture 8: Heterogeneous Firms and the Decision to Export Gregory Corcos Isabelle Méjean International Trade Université Paris-Saclay Master in Economics, 2nd year. 7 December 2016 G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 1 / 35

2 Introduction Krugman model : empirically successful at an aggregate level : gravity equation, intra-industry trade but fails to explain zeros in bilateral trade matrices and difference between exporters and non-exporters Mélitz (2003) extends Krugman with heterogeneous firms and fixed exportation costs generates an aggregate gravity equation, but explains why some firms don t export additional gains from trade through the reallocation of resources towards the most productive firms G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 2 / 35

3 The Mélitz model See analytical details in MelitzAnalytics.pdf G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 3 / 35

4 Main features of the Mélitz (2003) model Dynamic industry model of trade with heterogeneous firms and imperfect competition Bilateral trade follows a gravity pattern, depending on technology, revenues and geographic barriers The fixed exportation cost implies that only firms above a minimum productivity level can export. Allows to study the response of trade to shocks at two margins : extensive margin (change in the number of firms) and intensive margin (change in the average exported quantity). that export) G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 4 / 35

5 Assumptions 2 symmetric countries ; symmetry insures wage equality. CES utility function : [ U = ω Ω ] σ q(ω) σ 1 σ 1 σ dω with σ > 1 and Ω the (endogenous) mass of available goods Dixit-Stiglitz demand functions : ( ) p(ω) σ R q(ω) = P P where R is the country s nominal revenue and P the ideal price index : [ ] 1 P = p(ω) 1 σ 1 σ dω ω Ω G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 5 / 35

6 Assumptions (ii) Continuum of firms and varieties indexed by ω (with increasing returns, no incentive to replicate an existing variety) One factor of production, labor, in inelastic supply L = L. Increasing returns to scale : l(ω) = f + q(ω) ϕ(ω) where ϕ(ω) > 0 is the firm-specific productivity level and f > 0 Optimal price : p(ω) = σ w σ 1 ϕ(ω) where w is the wage rate (normalized to one) Firm profit : π(ω) = p(ω)q(ω) f = R ( ) σ 1 σ 1 σ σ σ Pϕ(ω) f G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 6 / 35

7 Assumptions (iii) A large unbounded pool of prospective entrants into the industry An entry cost f e, sunk at the time of producing A common distribution of productivities g(ϕ) with positive support (0, ) and continuous cumulative distribution G(ϕ) Individual productivity assumed constant over time Allows to focus on steady state equilibria A constant death probability δ in every period (independent across firms) Zero time discounting G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 7 / 35

8 Timing Prospective entrants pay the sunk cost f e if the present value of future profits is large enough Free Entry condition : v e = p in v f e = 0 ((FE)) p in is the ex-ante probability of successful entry and v = t=0 (1 δ)t π = 1 δ π is the average profit flow, conditional on entry Conditional on having paid f e, firms draw their productivity level ϕ : If π(ϕ) < 0, the firm immediately exits If π(ϕ) 0, the firm produces until being hit by the death shock G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 8 / 35

9 Timing (2) Zero Cutoff Profit Condition (ZCP) : ϕ = inf {ϕ : v(ϕ) > 0} π(ϕ ) = 0 (ZCP) and p in 1 G(ϕ ) Ex-post distribution of productivities : µ(ϕ) = Aggregate productivity level : { g(ϕ) 1 G(ϕ ) [ ϕ(ϕ 1 ) = 1 G(ϕ ) if ϕ ϕ 0 otherwise ϕ ] 1 ϕ σ 1 σ 1 g(ϕ)dϕ G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 9 / 35

10 Equilibrium in a closed economy (FE) and (ZCP) jointly determine π and ϕ : [ ( ϕ(ϕ ) ) σ 1 (ZCP) π = f 1] (FE) π = ϕ δf e 1 G(ϕ ) 1704 MARC J. MELITZ (Zero Cutoff Profit) (Free Entry) FIGURE 1.-Determination of the equilibrium cutoff (p* and average profit I-T. uniqueness of the equilibrium qp* and 7, which is graphically represented in Figure 1.15 Equilibrium exists and is unique In a stationary equilibrium, the aggregate variables must also remain constant over time. This requires a mass Me of new entrants in every period, such G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) that the mass of successful entrants, Lecture pinme, 8 exactly replaces the mass 8M of 10 / 35

11 Equilibrium in a closed economy (ii) In a stationary equilibrium, aggregate variables are constant : p in M }{{} e Successful entrants = }{{} δm Incumbents exiting L e M e f e = δm f e = Π p in R = L p + L e = L M = R r = L σ( π + f ) This completes the characterization of the unique stationary equilibrium in the closed economy For given ϕ and π, the model behaves as in an economy with representative firms (Krugman model) : P = M 1 1 σ p( ϕ) R = Mr( ϕ) Π = Mπ( ϕ) G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 11 / 35

12 Open-economy Equilibrium Without trade costs : trade increases L same individual output and prices, more firms and gain from variety (same as Krugman) With trade costs : iceberg trade cost τ > 1 and fixed per-period export cost f ex Pricing decision : Revenues : p d (ϕ) = σ w σ 1 ϕ and p x(ϕ) = σ σ 1 τ w ϕ = τp d(ϕ) ( ) σ 1 σ p d (ϕ)q d (ϕ) = R σ 1 Pϕ p x (ϕ)q x (ϕ) = τ 1 σ R ( σ σ 1 P ϕ ) σ 1 G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 12 / 35

13 International trade (ii) When ϕ is revealed the firm chooses whether to produce and whether to export (paying f ex ) The firm exports if : π x (ϕ) = p x(ϕ)q x (ϕ) σ New productivity cutoff for exports : f ex 0 ϕ x = inf {ϕ : ϕ ϕ and π x (ϕ) 0} New productivity cutoff for successful entry : where and ϕ = inf {ϕ : v(ϕ) 0} { v(ϕ) = max 0; π(ϕ) } δ π(ϕ) = π d (ϕ) + max{0; π x (ϕ)} G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 13 / 35

14 Selection in each market Assume τ σ 1 f x > f Then ϕ x > ϕ and firms self-select into export markets : Below ϕ, exit Between ϕ and ϕ x, produce for d Above ϕ x, produce for d and x The cutoff levels thus satisfy : π d (ϕ ) = 0 and π x (ϕ x) = 0 G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 14 / 35

15 Equilibrium in open economy Average productivity level : { [ ( 1 ϕ T = M ϕ σ 1 ϕx + M x M T τ [ with ϕ(ϕ 1 ) = 1 G(ϕ ) ϕ [ and ϕ x (ϕ 1 x) = 1 G(ϕ x) ϕ x ) σ 1 ]} 1 σ 1 ] 1 ϕ σ 1 σ 1 g(ϕ)dϕ ϕ σ 1 g(ϕ)dϕ ] 1 σ 1 G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 15 / 35

16 Equilibrium in open economy (ii) (ZCP) and (FE) jointly determine π and ϕ : (ZCP) π = π d ( ϕ) + p x π x ( ϕ x ) [ ( ϕ(ϕ with π d (ϕ ) ) σ 1 ) = 0 π d ( ϕ) = f 1] ϕ and π x (ϕ x) = 0 π x ( ϕ x ) = f x [ ( ϕx (ϕ x) ϕ x and π d (ϕ ) = 0 and π x (ϕ x) = 0 ϕ x = ϕ τ and p x = 1 G(ϕ x) 1 G(ϕ ) σf e (FE) π = 1 G(ϕ ) Equilibrium exists and is unique ) σ 1 1] ( ) 1 fx σ 1 f G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 16 / 35

17 Impact of trade Figure Impact of trade on sales and profits IMPACT OF TRADE 1715 r((p) (Trade) (Autarky) j i. ~ ~~~~~~~~~, ~ (x (Trade) (Autarky) G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 17 / 35

18 Impact of trade (ii) At the extensive margin : - entry of the most productive firms in foreign markets - exit of the least productive domestic firms exit At the intensive margin : - low-productivity survivors lose sales and profit : - new exporters increase their sales : p d (ϕ)q d (ϕ) < p a (ϕ)q a (ϕ) p d (ϕ)q d (ϕ) + p x (ϕ)q x (ϕ) > p a (ϕ)q a (ϕ) - only the most productive of new exporters increase their profits, the gain in sales must cover the additional fixed cost : f ex G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 18 / 35

19 Impact of trade (iii) Aggregate productivity increases as the most productive firms gain market share extra labor demand by exporting firms and increased entry (since the value of entry increases) the least productive firms cannot survive the increases in the real wage No pro-competitive gains from trade in this model : output, prices and markups are constant (but see Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 19 / 35

20 Aggregate trade X = ϕ X p X (ϕ)q X (ϕ)mg(ϕ)dϕ = (1 G(ϕ X }{{ )) M p } X ( ϕ X (ϕ X ))q X ( ϕ X (ϕ X }{{ )) } Mass of exporters Mean exports per exporter Assume a Pareto distribution of productivity G(ϕ) = 1 ϕ γ and an exogenous mass of firms : ϕ X (ϕ X )σ 1 = γ γ (σ 1) ϕ X σ 1 ϕ X = ( ) 1 fx σ 1 τ λ R P X = λ R γ σ 1 P γ τ (1 σ)+(σ 1 γ) f [ γ σ 1 1] X Both variable and fixed costs of exporting affect trade flows. In the Pareto case the elasticity of trade w.r.t. τ only depends on γ and σ. G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 20 / 35

21 Empirical evidence G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 21 / 35

22 The 10+ Mélitz 0.28 model premia defined as Empirical the ratios of evidence exporters (FDI-makers ) Conclusions to non-exporters (non FDI-makers ) values. Total FIM. Heterogeneous behavior in export Table 4 markets o only one market while 10% of firms export n ten products to more than ten markets. ttom panel reports the shares of aggregate ue to firms exporting given numbers of prods) to given numbers of markets (columns). lar pattern is not there: firms exporting more products to more than ten markets account than 75% of total exports. aring the two panels then yields: Top exporters export many products to ocations. Firms exporting more than ten s to more than ten markets account for an 75 % of total exports. marise, aggregate exports are determined top exporters that are relatively big and supal foreign markets with several differentiated. This points to the existence of a process which only firms that are large enough and h enough portfolio of products can withstand nal competition. We shall explore below the ristics that make exporters, and a fortiori top, different from other firms. We shall refer to rences as exporters premia. arket coverage, most naturally the larger the f markets a firm serves, the larger their avernce from the firm s country of origin. Table 3 Country of origin Exporters and FDI-makers Exhibit Superior Performance Employment premia Exporters premia: Germany 2.99 (4.39) France 2.24 (0.47) United Kingdom Italy 1.01 (0.92) 2.42 (2.06) Hungary 5.31 (2.95) Belgium 9.16 (13.42) Norway 6.11 (5.59) FDI- makers premia: Germany (2.86) France (7.14) Belgium (6.82) Norway 8.28 (4.48) Value added premia 2.68 (0.84) 1.29 (1.53) 2.14 (1.78) (23.75) (21.12) 7.95 (7.48) (6.10) (11.14) (5.41) Wage premia 1.02 (0.06) 1.09 (1.12) 1.15 (1.39) 1.07 (1.06) 1.44 (1.63) 1.26 (1.15) 1.08 (0.68) 1.13 (0.90) 1.53 (1.20) 1.34 (0.76) Capital intensity premia 1.49 (5.60) 1.01 (0.45) 0.79 (0.35) 1.04 (3.09) 1.01 (0.23) 1.52 (0.72) 1.03 (0.82) 0.87 (0.13) Skill intensity premia 1.25 (1.04) Note: The table shows premia of the considered variable as the ratio of exporters over non-exporters (standard deviation ratio in brackets). France, Germany, Hungary, Italy and the United Kingdom have large firms only; Belgian and Norwegian data are exhaustive. Source: EFIM. Source : Mayer & Ottaviano (2008) from EFIM omics, May/June G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 22 / 35

23 Heterogeneous behavior in export markets (ii) Eaton, Kortum & Kramarz (2004) using French firm-level data In the manufacturing sector, 17.4% of firms do export. 22% of producers sales is realized in foreign markets 34.5% of exporters serve only one market (Belgium most of the time). This represents 0.7% of total exports 1.5% of exporting firms serve more than 50 markets. This represents 52% of aggregate exports Huge granularity in exports G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 23 / 35

24 Heterogeneous behavior in export markets (iii) number of French firms number of markets per firm Figure 1A: Entry of French Firms Source : Eaton, Kortum & Kramarz (2004) Granularity in the distribution of firms entering foreign markets G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 24 / 35

25 SIE CEN AUTTAI BUL SPA NZE SWENET NOR FIN ARG YUG ISR SOU DEN CZEROM MEX BELKOR HOK IND MAY IRE VIE GRE VEN SINHUNSAU CHI CUB POR COL TUR IRN ALG EGY INO ECU ZIM SUD COT PHI PER CAM SYR URU PAN MOR PAK ALB TRI COS THA KUW TAN JOR DOM SRI TUN ELS BUK BOL GUA ETH SENPAR HON OMA IRQ PAP ZAI JAM BAN NIA ANG SOM TOG MAS LIY CHA KEN MAL BEN MAD NEP UGA NIC RWA NIG MOZ BUR GHA ZAM MAU MAW AFG LIB AUL SWI CAN UNK CHN BRA GEE ITA FRA GER USR JAP USA Heterogeneous behavior in export markets (iv) number of French entrants / French share 1.0e e market size, $ billions Figure 2A: Entry and Market Size Source : Eaton, Kortum & Kramarz (2004) Extensive margin and the size of the destination country : ln #Firms n = ln F.MSh n ln Size n (.069) (.030) (.021) A higher French market share in a destination reflects 88% more firms selling there and 12% more sales by firm G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 25 / 35

26 Structural Estimation : Crozet & Koenig (2010) Three-step method : i) Probability that a firm exports P(ϕ > ϕ h ij ) determines δh γ h ii) Gravity equation on individual exports xij h(ϕ) determines δh (σ h 1) iii) Pareto distribution (relationship between ϕ and xij h (ϕ)) determines [γ h (σ h 1)] Main results : Distance (proxy for τij ) has a significant effect on export probability for all industries and on export volume for all but 6 industries. Results consistent with theory : ˆσ h > 1 and ˆγ h > ˆσ h 1 On average, the extensive margin accounts for 62% of the overall effect of distance or trade barriers on trade Estimated on firms with more than 20 employees Right tail of the distribution on which Pareto is more likely to hold (Axtell, 2001) G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 26 / 35

27 Structural Estimation : Eaton, Kortum & Kramarz (2011) Heterogeneous productivity in the Melitz model captures half of the variation across firms in market entry. But the model fails in several respects : Firms do not enter markets according to an exact hierarchy. The distribution of sales across markets deviates from the model. Firms that export sell too much in France. In the typical destination, too many firms sell small amounts. Augment the model with market and firm-specific heterogeneity in entry costs and demand. G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 27 / 35

28 A structural estimation of Melitz (ii) Assumptions : i) Melitz-Chaney, i.e. Melitz + exogenous mass of entrants + Pareto distribution of productivities with parameter θ ii) Fixed export cost ( Cost to acquire consumers, Arkolakis, 2010) has a firm destination random coefficient : f ij (ϕ) = ε j (ϕ)e ij M(f ) ε j (ϕ)e ij 1 (1 f ) 1 1/λ 1 1/λ where f is the share of the market s consumers reached, and λ > 0 reflects the increasing cost of reaching a larger fraction of consumers G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 28 / 35

29 A structural estimation of Melitz (iii) iii) CES demand function that depends on the share f of consumers reached and a market destination-specific demand shock : ( ) pj (ϕ) 1 σ X j (ϕ) = α j (ϕ)fx j P j Assume ln α j (ϕ) and ln η j (ϕ) ln α j (ϕ) ln ε j (ϕ) are normally distributed with zero means, variance σ 2 α and σ 2 η and correlation ρ Model reduces to 5 parameters (θ, λ, σα, 2 ση, 2 ρ) Data : Sales of French manufacturing firms in 113 countries+france Restricted to firms selling in France and at least one market G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 29 / 35

30 A structural estimation of Melitz (iv) The estimation procedure minimizes the distance between the observed and simulated 4 sets of moments : proportion of firms selling to each possible combination of the 7 most popular destinations q th percentile sales in each export market, q = 50, 75, 95 q th percentile sales in France, q = 50, 75, 95 q th percentile export/home sales ratio in each export market, q = 50, 75, 95 G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 30 / 35

31 A structural estimation of Melitz (v) ANATOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE Results The best fit is achieved at the parameter values (with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses) Table Results (EKK, 2011, p. 1479) θ λ σ α σ η ρ (0.10) (0.12) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) As a check on our procedure, Bootstrapped given standard our sample errors insize, parentheses we conduct a Monte Carlo analysis, which is described in Appendix C. A basic finding is that the standard errors above are good indicators of the ability of our procedure to recover parameters. We also analyze the sensitivity of our results, as described in Appendix D, to different moments. A basic finding is that the results are largely insensitive to the alternatives we explore. We turn to some implications of our parameter estimates. Our discussion in Section 3.6 foreshadowed our estimate of θ which lies between the values implied by the slopes in Figure 3C andfigure4. From equations (31), (29), and (30), the characteristic of a firm determining both entry and sales conditional on entry is v 1/ θ,wherev U[0 1]. Ourestimate of θ implies that the ratio of the 75th to the 25th percentile of this term is Another way to assess the magnitude of θ is by its implication for aggregate fixed costs of entry. Using expression (21), our estimate of 2.46 implies that fixed costs dissipate 59 percent of gross profit in any destination. θ = 2.46 implies that fixed costs equal 59% of gross destination profits! σ α = 1.69 implies enormous variation in a firm s sales across destinations ( Melitz) σ η =.34 means much less variation in the entry shock ρ < 0 reflects high variation of sales in a market λ close to 1 implies small entry costs for firms near the entry cutoff, explaining why many firms export small amounts ( Melitz) G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 31 / 35

32 A structural estimation of Melitz (vi) The model s fit is checked by comparing predictions of the model with data on moments not used in the estimation procedure : Total number of exporters Distribution of total sales in a market (mean and percentiles) Distribution of total sales in France, conditional on exporting Median export intensity in each market G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 32 / 35

33 A structural estimation of Melitz (vii) Table Model versus data (EKK, 2011, Figure 5) ANATOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1481 G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) FIGURE 5. Model versus data. Lecture 8 33 / 35

34 Conclusions Melitz (2003) introduces firm heterogeneity in the Krugman model. The model predicts self-selection of the most productive firms into exporting, trade adjustments at the intensive and extensive margin, and gains from within-industry reallocation. Strong simplifying assumptions : no dynamics, Pareto distribution of firms, same fixed entry cost across firms... EKK (2011) : an extension of the Melitz model with demand and trade cost shocks fits the data. G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 34 / 35

35 References - Arkolakis, K., Market Penetration Costs and the New Consumers Margin in International Trade, Journal of Political Economy, 118 : Axtell, R., Zipf Distribution of US firm sizes, Science, 293 : Chaney, T., Distorted Gravity : The Intensive and Extensive Margins of International Trade, American Economic Review, 98(4) : Crozet, M. & Koenig, P., Structural gravity equation with extensive and intensive margins. Canadian Journal of Economics, 43(1). - Eaton, J., Kortum, S. & Kramarz, F. (2004), Dissecting Trade : Firms, Industries, and Export Destinations, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 93 : Eaton, J., Kortum, S. & Kramarz, F. (2011), An Anatomy of International Trade : Evidence from French Firms, Econometrica, 79(5) : Helpman, E., Melitz, M. & Yeaple, S., Export Versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms, American Economic Review, 94(1) : Mayer, T. & Ottaviano, G., The happy few : the internationalisation of European firms Blueprints, Bruegel, number 12, 2. - Melitz, M., The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity, Econometrica, 71(6) : Mélitz, M. & Ottaviano, G., Market Size, Trade, and Productivity, Review of Economic Studies, 75(1) : G. Corcos & I. Méjean (Ecole polytechnique) Lecture 8 35 / 35