Location, Productivity, and Trade
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1 May 10, 2010
2 Motivation Outline Motivation - Trade and Location Major issue in trade: How does trade liberalization affect competition? Competition has more than one dimension price competition similarity in product space Location models allow us to examine both.
3 Motivation Outline Motivation - Trade, Location, and Heterogeneity Problem: Location models with significant heterogeneity become intractable Trade models require differences in firm costs importers face extra costs reallocation gains from high-cost firm exit. Contribution: New location model allows arbitrary heterogeneity tractable under a wide variety of preferences Analyze effect of a trade liberalization
4 Sequential Entry Motivation Outline I develop a location model with sequential entry Firms may enter after other firms. Critical feature: firms consider subsequent entry high cost firms do not operate low cost firms act to prevent further entry Simple summarized by cutoff firm marginal cost ā firm prices solve simple maximization problem
5 Motivation Outline Develop 2-country symmetric GE trade model Derive implications for competition after a trade liberalization productivity gains through exit margin reduction in markups increase in distance between firms Discuss improvements on a Dixit-Stiglitz Model with CES preferences (Fixed ): small exporters measured productivity gains from trade reform
6 Outline Motivation Outline Describe partial equilibrium location model present standard location environment introduce important difference in timing characterize the equilibrium Provide simple trade application GE model with flexibly parameterized demand derive implications for trade reform
7 Players The Game: Consumers uniformly distributed around the circumference of a circle demand goods which vary by location of producer Firms located on the circle sell to consumers around location
8 Strategies - Timing Overview Timing is the critical feature of this model. Firms: Choose to enter in any stage s {1, 2, 3..., } Firms entering in stage s pick (x j, p j ) simultaneously Produce and earn profits after each stage Discount profits at rate δ
9 Strategies An action for a firm is a triple: (s j, x j, p j ) A strategy is a mapping from histories up to stage s to actions. I am looking for a standard subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game
10 Payoffs - Consumers Consumer i chooses max j,c j u(c j, x ij ) λ(p j c j ) c j - quantity of good x ij - distance between consumer i and firm j p j - price charged by firm j λ - opportunity cost of expenditure literature usually focuses on a special case
11 A Special Case Consumer i inelastically demands one unit, chooses: max j u η x ij p j u - utility from consuming good, assumed large. η - linear distance cost Consumer chooses lowest effective price p j + η x ij
12 Classic Illustration Effective Price p 1 η Demand Location
13 Convex Costs -Indirect Utility: -V(p,x) -V(p,0) Demand Location
14 Concave Costs -Indirect Utility: -V(p,x) -V(p,0) Demand Location
15 Payoffs - Firms There are N firms indexed by j. In each stage firms produce to satisfy demand earning π j = p j y j a j y j f y j = l j /a j p j - price a j - unit labor requirement f - fixed cost of operating
16 Undercutting A firm incurs a cost γ at s j if it undercuts another firm. Effective Price p 0 p 1 Location
17 Payoffs - Firms Total profits for the firm are p j - price π j = (1 δ) s=s j δ s a j - unit labor requirement f - fixed cost of operating ( ) (p j a j ) D f + δ s j γ γ - penalty for undercutting another firm
18 Effective Price Location
19 Effective Price Location
20 An equilibrium I consider a class of equilibria characterized by a cutoff marginal cost ā and effective price p. all firms with a j < ā enter in stage 1 firms act to prevent the entry of firm ā maximum effective price faced by any consumer p deviations from equilibrium induce entry in stage 2
21 Prices Effective Price p Location
22 Firms in Most firms pick prices to solve max p j (p j a j ) D(p j, p) The cutoff ā is selected to be as low as possible consistent with firm rationality: j:a j <ā D(p j, p(ā)) 1
23 Effective Price p p Location
24 Effective Price p p a π Location
25 Effective Price p p a π Location
26 Statement The equilibrium is characterized by a cutoff firm J and a marginal firm K such that The boundary effective price between any two firms is p = a J + 2 ηf Firm prices and demands, (p j, d j ) are given by ( p + a j )/2, ( p a j )/η, a j < a K ; intermediate (p, d), firm K; (2 p + a j )/3η, 2( p a j )/3η, a K < a j < a J ; no entry, a J a j.
27 Importance of Large Number of Firms It is critical that there are many firms just above ā Mechanism: if a firm tries to grab more demand, marginal firms subsequently enter. To capture this idea, define ε = max j a j+1 a j
28 Results Existence For any A = {a 1,..., a N }, (f, δ, ε), there exists an γ such that this equilibrium exists. Limiting For any γ > 0 there exists there exists an (f, 1 δ, ε) small enough to support this equilibrium. As ε 0 we have a K a J.
29 Price Commitment - Comparison with Vogel 08 Price Demand SE ( p + a j )/2 ( p a j )/η V (2 p + a j )/3η 2( p a j )/3η
30 Price Commitment - Comparison with Vogel 08 Limited Heterogeneity Specific Demand Unlimited Heterogeneity Unrestricted Demand Fixed Prices SE SE Flexible Prices V?
31 Role of γ Effective Price p Location
32 Role of γ Effective Price Eq. Demand p Location
33 Role of γ Effective Price Eq. Demand p Extra Demand Location
34 Role of γ Effective Price p Eq. Demand Subsequent Entrants Location
35 Extension to Trade Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion Develop 2-country symmetric GE trade model Derive implications for competition after a trade liberalization productivity gains through exit margin reduction in markups increase in distance between firms Discuss improvements on a Dixit-Stiglitz Model with CES preferences: small exporters measured productivity gains from trade reform
36 Limiting Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion For this application, consider the limiting equilibrium as f, 1 δ, ε, γ 0 appropriate for a large number of firms p ā a K ā
37 Consumers Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion There are a continuum of industries indexed by ω [0, 1]. Consumer i chooses max j(ω),c i (ω) s.t ( ci (ω) ρ 1 ηx ij (ω) )dω σ ρ p j(ω) c i (ω)dω 1 + Π + T
38 Demand Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion There are two margins to demand intensive margin - individual demand c(p, ā) extensive margin - consumers purchasing from the firm d(p, ā) Firms set prices as if they always capture consumers with V (p, x) V (ā, 0)
39 Firms Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion Domestic Firms choose max p (p a) c(p, ā) d(p, ā) Foreign Firms choose max p = max p (p(1 τ) a) c(p, ā) d(p, ā) (1 τ)(p a ) c(p, ā) d(p, ā) 1 τ
40 Firm Distribution Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion Large number of firms N in each country CDF approximated by H(a), with density h(a) Pareto w/curvature κ Symmetric two-country model with tariff τ identical to closed economy where Ñ = N(1 + (1 τ) κ )
41 Prices Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion Firms prices are an implicit function of the first order condition ( p a a/ρ p = σ 1 ρ > 0 a < p < a/ρ ( ) ρ ) p 1 ρ ā lim σ p = a/ρ - the Dixit-Stiglitz pricing rule lim σ 0 p = a - the perfect competition pricing rule
42 Prices Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion Firms prices are an implicit function of the first order condition ( p a a/ρ p = σ 1 The firm s pricing policies are ( ) ρ ) p 1 ρ ā (ā ) p(a, ā) = a M a Where M is a markup function with M(1) = 1 M > 0
43 Effects of a Trade Reform Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion Productivity ā τ > 0 A reduction in tariffs reduces cutoff marginal costs, hence average costs.
44 Effects of a Trade Reform Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion Markups (ā ) p(a, ā) = a M a So that markups decline as ā declines. The simple average of markups, however, are constant 1 H(ā) ā 0 M(ā/a)da
45 Effects of a Trade Reform Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion Product Similarity For ρ > 0 we have Ñ H(ā) > 0 τ A reduction in tariffs reduces domestically available varieties new varieties are imported more domestic varieties exit Average distance between firms increases!
46 Effects of a Trade Reform Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion Product Similarity and Welfare Is competitive effect of a liberalization overstated? Greater product separations is welfare improving location models feature excess variety greater distance means low cost firms serve more of the market
47 Small Exporters Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion Arkolakis (2008) discusses the failure of fixed-cost CES - Dixit-Stiglitz models to account for small exporters in French export data. Fixed costs imply a minimum scale for operating firms. Variable markups limit the set of operating firms without a minimum scale lim d(p, ā) = 0 p ā
48 Productivity Gains Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion With a CES / Dixit-Stiglitz specification prices are constant p t (a) = p t 1 (a) = a/ρ GDP at current prices is fixed by the budget constraint t N p t (a)y t (a)da = K A Real GDP is equal to GDP at current prices. N p t 1 (a)y t 1 (a)da = N p t (a)y t (a)da = N A A A p t 1 (a)y t (a)da
49 Productivity Gains Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion The budget constraint also fixes GDP in current period prices in the location model t N p t (a)y t (a)da = K A But prices depend positively on the cutoff level p so that τ t 1 > τ t ā t 1 > ā t am(ā t 1 /a) > am(ā t /a) So that N p t 1 (a)y t 1 (a)da = N A A p t (a)y t (a)da < N A p t 1 (a)y t (a)da
50 Conclusion Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion Sequential entry location model handle arbitrary differences in firm costs tractable under a flexibly parameterized utility function 2-country symmetric trade model declining average costs, markups, varieties improves on benchmark trade model in several dimensions
51 Extensions Symmetric Two-Country Model Comparison Conclusion Model fixed locations under trade reform variable consumer density - home bias fixed locations across countries quantitative version of the model asymmetric countries cost draws
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