Member of
|
|
- Willa Knight
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Making Europe Safer Prof. Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh Member of New York University Stern School of Business National Bank of Belgium, December 22, 2011
2 Agenda Diagnosis of design issues in the Eurozone Destabilizing capital flows Diabolical loop between sovereign and banking crises Proposal: European Safe Bonds and European Junior Bonds How they help long-run How they help short run Financial sector reform
3 Eurozone: 10yr sovereign debt yield Par Yield Par Yield Spain 5 Germany 0 Jan 94 Jan 97 Jan 00 Jan 03 Jan 06 Jan 09 Source: Eurostat
4 Eurozone: 10yr sovereign debt yield Par Yield 25 Par Yield Italy Greece Spain 5 France Germany 0 Jan 94 Jan 97 Jan 00 Jan 03 Jan 06 Jan 09 Source: Eurostat
5 Eurozone: Persistent Inflation Divergence Par Yield Mo. Moving Average HCPI for Eurozone (1999=100) Par Yield 160 Spain 140 Germany Jan 96 Jan 00 Jan 04 Jan 08 Source: IMF
6 Eurozone: Persistent Inflation Divergence Par Yield Mo. Moving Average HCPI for Eurozone (1999=100) Par Yield 160 Greece Spain 140 Italy France Germany Jan 96 Jan 00 Jan 04 Jan 08 Source: IMF
7 Real interest rate gap Average rates Germany Spain Greece Nominal interest rate 3.8% 3.9% 4.4% Inflation rate 1.8% 3.3% 3.5% Real interest rate 2.0% 0.6% 0.9% Rate for German savers > Rate for Spanish/Greek borrowers (Government) Consequence: Source: Bloomberg 5 year government note indices larger savings in Germany + capital outflows boost to Spanish economy & inflation 7
8 Eurozone Accumulated Net Capital Inflows Billion Q Q Q Q Q1 2006Q Source: Eurostat Billion 800 Spain Germany
9 Eurozone Accumulated Net Capital Inflows Billion Q Q1 1997Q1 2000Q1 2003Q1 2006Q Source: Eurostat Billion 800 Spain 600 Greece 400 Italy 200 France Germany
10 Eurozone: Accumulated GDP Growth Percent Percent Eurozone Spain Germany Jan 95Jan 97Jan 99Jan 01Jan 03Jan 05Jan 07Jan 09Jan 11 Source: OECD
11 Eurozone: Accumulated GDP Growth Percent 100 Percent Ireland Spain 60 Greece 40 Belgium 40 Portugal France 20 Eurozone Germany 20 Italy Jan 95Jan 97Jan 99Jan 01Jan 03Jan 05Jan 07Jan 09Jan 11 Source: OECD 11
12 Crisis diagnosis 1: Flight to safety coordinate on which safe asset to flock to in times of crisis - appreciates in times of crisis Today: asymmetric shifts across borders Value of German debt increases Value of Italian/Spanish/Greek sovereign debt declines 12
13 Crisis diagnosis 2: Diabolic Loop Sovereign debt is treated as safe asset Basel: Zero risk-weight (for own sovereign) ECB: Low haircut e.g. 10 year Greek bond has 10% haircut Concentration of sovereign risk in banks In today s environment, European banks have no safe assets (with exception of German Bund)
14 Crisis diagnosis 2: Diabolic Loop Contagion due to diabolic loop twin crisis Trigger Bank insolvency (Ireland, Spain) Public debt/slow growth (Greece, Portugal, Italy) Banks need safe asset for transactions (collateral, Basel II and III prudential regulation) 14
15 Polling Question No: 1 What was the biggest cause of the divergence in performance between periphery and core in last decade? A) Lack of fiscal discipline of governments in periphery B) Cheap money encouraged too much private sector borrowing in periphery C) Productivity differences D) Financial system fragility in periphery
16 European Safe Bonds (ESBies) proposal 1. Creates safe asset Banks have safe alternative to own-country sovereign bond With flight to quality correlation structure 2. Breaks diabolic loop between banking and sovereign credit risks ECB grants ESBies preferential treatment + haircuts for sovereign debt Appropriate Basel risk weights + higher weights for sovereign debt 16
17 Our Proposal A EDA L sovereign bond portfolio of 17 EZ countries Weight of each country in portfolio equal to its relative size Total scheme capped at 60% of GDP ( 5.5tn) Pass-through: Issues 2 securities sold to private market No control rights for EJB holders European Safe Bonds (ESBies) European Junior Bonds (EJBs) X% 17
18 Flight to safety: in times of crisis A L sovereign bonds ESBies EJBs Today: asymmetric shifts across borders With ESBies: Negative co-movement across European bonds Value of ESBies expands due to flight to quality Value of EJBs shrinks due to increased risk Asset side is more stable 18
19 Incentives for reform ESBies do not distort incentives for sovereigns to undertake structural reform Sovereign bonds will still need to be placed in secondary markets for countries with debt-gdp above 60% (nearly all countries) Interest rate signal as corrective (market) force should remain intact In fact, by moving to a new stable equilibrium, governments may be able to credibly commit not to bail out, making interest rates more informative 19
20 Summary: advantages Brings stability to banking sector by breaking diabolic loop Eliminates capital flow imbalances due to search for safe haven ESBies liquidity premium ( 40bn per year in normal times and more in crises) shared across all euro-members No fiscal transfers/joint liability, unlike eurobonds! No need for (unpopular) political unification No need for Treaty changes to implement 20
21 Design: How to % of EJBs? Design principle: maximize safety, not profits! We propose X=30% based on conservative assumptions on Sovereign default probabilities Their correlation across countries Different macro scenarios Overlay contingencies, if Italy goes, Spain goes with very high likelihood, etc. Loss given default given the credit rating ESBies would sustain losses in only 0.8% of 5-yr simulations (once every 600 years)
22 Design: credit enhancement for ESBies Concern: Standardization across various issues A EDA L sovereign bonds ESBies EJBs credit enhancement A Assets according to ECB key EFSF L Guarantees granted Credit enhancement cannot be provided privately EFSF could provide this guarantee Would be a useful way to leverage its monies 22
23 Design: Governance of EDA Mechanical: portfolio weights according to strict, stable, credible, and transparent rules In crisis, temptation to lift 60% limit Strict governance is important Open yourself up to private law suits from Former/current ESBies holders Former/current EJB holders Needed to provide truly safe security 23
24 How ESBies can help short run Give credible path out of current panic Increases sovereign debt prices by preventing multiple equilibrium, market freeze, fire sale prices Initially, focus on newly issued sovereign debt Primary market purchases in proportion to GDP Ex. Could buy 940bn in Italian debt, next 3 years At least 3 years for all countries to make necessary structural adjustment and ride out business cycle Program countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal) would not participate in ESBies until later 24
25 Who buys the junior bond? High risk, high return: 10yr EJBs currently 10% p.a. Hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds Can t they take on levered sovereign risk already? Yes, a hedge fund can buy the portfolio of sovereigns on margins and lever it up, but margin calls may force deleveraging at the worst possible time EJBs provide fixed embedded leverage Retailize junior bond Design ETFs for retail investors with EJB as underlying Recall: State bonds in the US are mostly held by households, as are many European sovereign bonds 25
26 EFSF as market maker for EJB A German bund Low/negative correlation Italian Bonds EDA ESBies EJB L EFSF Collateralized Credit line ECB Automatic recapitalization larger capital share Increased influence Hedge funds, SWF Households (via ETFs) Member States 26
27 Q&A: Didn t CDOs bring us in this mess? Yes, fight fire with fire. ESBies Are simple and very transparent Asset side contains liquid sovereign bonds with a traded price Objective is not to largest ESBies tranche, but maximum safety We use extremely high correlation assumption 27
28 Q&A: Don t you force banks to realize losses? Not relevant for initial phase (EDA only does primary market purchases) Later, swap of sovereign bonds for ESBies could trigger banking book losses and may necessitate bank recapitalization, but The introduction of ESBies will stabilize the market (if communicated well as part of a long-run package) Market prices will increase and allow a restructuring Redistribution of liquidity premium (which is very high right now) towards peripheral countries 28
29 Q&A: Maturity transformation Should the European Debt Agency (EDA) be active in maturity transformation? No. Otherwise who should be the LOLR? How to ensure this? EDA can only buy according to weights per maturity E.g. one year paper up to 5% of GDP, two year paper up to Demand pressure will make it attractive for each sovereign to adjust their maturity structure to EDA s demand What maturity of ESBIES should the EDA issue? whole yield curve 29
30 Q&A: Don t ESBies also create externalities? Isn t it the case that if a country s probability of default increases, it will increase the yield of EJBs, increasing funding costs for all? And that the country does not internalize this effect on others? Not with perfect market liquidity. Without ESBies, misbehaviour of country X hurts its existing creditors, but the country would bear the full cost on all new debt. With ESBies, it s the same. Price of new debt drops. Indeed, the country would have to sell some of its debt in the market and some to the EDA, but at market price. Note, ESBies/junior bond is just repacking With imperfect market liquidity 30 Some externalities might arise, but small in scale.
31 Q&A: Will EDA break even? Concern: situation where the EDA Buys individual sovereign bonds at high ask price Sells ESBies and EJBs at low bid price 3 options of purchase 1. Only secondary market 2. Primary market as regular bidder 3. Primary market with fixed quantity (like submitting market order) Recommendation: Option 2, since temporary price pressure from option 1 may be non-trivial 31
32 Q&A: Remaining sovereign debt illiquid? Illiquid bonds would have low prices, little price discovery But ESBies and EJBs will be more liquid and if the EDA makes profit off this extra liquidity, it can be redistributed back to the national Treasuries If sovereign debt < 60% of GDP Country gets average (best of) AAA rated country Provides incentive to lower debt/gdp ratio 32
33 Conclusion ESBies Smooth flight-to-safety fluctuations Break diabolic loop (in the long-run) Share liquidity premium (at expense of Bund, US Treasury) One element to overcome the crisis! In parallel, need to promote medium-term growth prospects through structural reform, financial stability, new governance systems to create prudent fiscal policies in future 33
34 Other elements of the euro-nomics plan Two layered banking landscape European banks Regional banks European bank resolution and FDIC Making sovereign default more credible Work in progress stayed tuned to 34
Overcoming the crisis
Princeton, Oct 24 th, 2011 Overcoming the crisis backwards induction approach: 1. Diagnosis how did we get there? Run-up phase Crisis phase 2. Give long-run perspective Banking landscape (ESBies, European
More informationESBies: Safety in the. Markus Brunnermeier, Sam Langfield, Stijn van Nieuwerburgh, Marco Pagano, Ricardo Reis and Dimitri Vayanos
ESBies: Safety in the Tranches Markus Brunnermeier, Sam Langfield, Stijn van Nieuwerburgh, Marco Pagano, Ricardo Reis and Dimitri Vayanos European Commission Brussels, 13 th of October 2016 Outline Definitions
More informationEurope s Response to the Sovereign Debt Crisis. Christophe Frankel, CFO of EFSF ICMA Conference, Milan 24 May 2012
Europe s Response to the Sovereign Debt Crisis Christophe Frankel, CFO of EFSF ICMA Conference, Milan 24 May 2012 The reasons for sovereign debt crisis 1 Member States did not fully accept the political
More informationESBies: Rationale, Simulations and Theory
ESBies: Rationale, Simulations and Theory Marco Pagano University of Naples Federico II, CSEF & EIEF (joint with Markus Brunnermeier, Sam Langfield, Stijn van Nieuwerburgh, Ricardo Reis and Dimitri Vayanos)
More informationCan the Euro Survive?
Can the Euro Survive? AED/IS 4540 International Commerce and the World Economy Professor Sheldon sheldon.1@osu.edu Sovereign Debt Crisis Market participants tend to focus on yield spread between country
More informationManaging the Fragility of the Eurozone. Paul De Grauwe London School of Economics
Managing the Fragility of the Eurozone Paul De Grauwe London School of Economics The causes of the crisis in the Eurozone Fragility of the system Asymmetric shocks that have led to imbalances Interaction
More informationBanks and sovereign debt in Europe
Banks and sovereign debt in Europe University of Lisbon Lars Nyberg, 19 January 2012 Sovereign debt and banking problems in Europe. Sweden s experiences in the 1990 s anything to learn? CDS premiums for
More informationIs the Euro Crisis Over?
Is the Euro Crisis Over? Klaus Regling, Managing Director, ESM International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies, Geneva 25 March 2014 Eight reasons for the sovereign debt crisis 1. Member States did
More informationWhy ESBies won t solve the euro area s problems
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/04/25/2187829/guest-post-why-esbies-wont-solve-the-euro-areas-problems/ Why ESBies won t solve the euro area s problems APRIL 25, 2017 By: Marcello Minenna The following
More informationEurope s Response to the Sovereign Debt Crisis. Klaus Regling, CEO of EFSF 40 th Economics Conference OeNB Vienna, 10 May 2012
Europe s Response to the Sovereign Debt Crisis Klaus Regling, CEO of EFSF 40 th Economics Conference OeNB Vienna, 10 May 2012 Eight reasons for sovereign debt crisis Member States did not fully accept
More informationEuropean Safe Bonds (ESBies) i
European Safe Bonds (ESBies) i The euro nomics group * Markus K. Brunnermeier, Luis Garicano, Philip R. Lane, Marco Pagano, Ricardo Reis, Tano Santos, David Thesmar, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh and Dimitri
More informationTOWARDS A MORE INTEGRATED AND STABLE EUROPE? National Bank of Poland
TOWARDS A MORE INTEGRATED AND STABLE EUROPE? National Bank of Poland by Daniel Gros Warsaw; October 2011 Key points 1. Background: global credit boom and excess leverage. 2. EMU system not designed to
More informationFalling Short of Expectations? Stress-Testing the European Banking System
Falling Short of Expectations? Stress-Testing the European Banking System Viral V. Acharya (NYU Stern, CEPR and NBER) and Sascha Steffen (ESMT) January 2014 1 Falling Short of Expectations? Stress-Testing
More informationECB LTRO Dec Greece program
International Monetary Fund June 9, 212 Euro Area Crisis: Still in the Danger Zone */ Emil Stavrev Research Department ( */ Views expressed in this presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily
More informationEuropean Sovereign Crisis, what s the Outcome? Gonzalo Rengifo June 2012 Mexico
European Sovereign Crisis, what s the Outcome? Gonzalo Rengifo June 2012 Mexico 1 Current situation Eurozone (im)balances: a Small World Rising imbalances since the creation of the euro Eurozone current
More informationLiability hedging in a world without risk-free assets
Liability hedging in a world without risk-free assets Anthony MacGuinness & John Thornton Nov 2012 Agenda Liability Driven Investment (LDI) Background & Regulation Environment Liability Hedging: Practitioner's
More informationEuropean Public Debt: A Solution to Fragility
Workshop Discussion Material European Public Debt: A Solution to Fragility 1. Moral Hazard within EUM The establishment of an economic and monetary union generates benefits in terms of microeconomic efficiencies,
More informationDebt Resolution in EMU
Debt Resolution in EMU Charles Wyplosz Graduate Institute, Geneva, and CEPR Public Finance Conference ECB, 11-12 December 2014 The situation Eurozone public debts 9400 bn. (96% GDP) Situation worse now
More informationWhat could debt restructuring imply for the Eurozone? Adrian Cooper
What could debt restructuring imply for the Eurozone? Adrian Cooper acooper@oxfordeconomics.com June 2011 What could debt restructuring imply for the Eurozone? New stage in Eurozone debt crisis: first
More informationCapital Flows in the Euro Area: Some lessons from the last boom-bust cycle. Angel Gavilan, Martin Hillebrand December 2017
Capital Flows in the Euro Area: Some lessons from the last boom-bust cycle Angel Gavilan, Martin Hillebrand December 217 The last boom in capital flows was largely a global phenomenon Sum of current account
More informationGlobal Debt and The New Neutral
Global Debt and The New Neutral May 1, 2018 by Nicola Mai of PIMCO Back in 2014, PIMCO developed the concept of The New Neutral as a secular framework for interest rates. After the financial crisis, the
More informationThe Financial Crisis of ? Gerald P. Dwyer Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta University of Carlos III, Madrid
The Financial Crisis of 2007-201? Gerald P. Dwyer Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta University of Carlos III, Madrid Disclaimer These views are mine and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank
More informationGlobal Economic Outlook John Hawksworth Chief Economist, PwC September 2012
www.pwc.co.uk/economics Global Economic Outlook John Hawksworth Chief Economist, September 2012 Agenda Global overview Short term prospects for Europe, US and BRICs Long term trends: demographics, growth
More informationEuro, sovereign debt, liquidity and other issues: questions and answers from BNP Paribas
Euro, sovereign debt, liquidity and other issues: questions and answers from BNP Paribas After being asked a number of questions about the bank and the Eurozone, we have decided to publish the answers
More informationEurozone Focus The Ongoing Saga Of Sovereign Debt
14 The Ongoing Saga Of Sovereign Debt Sovereign debt will continue to be the headline issue for the Eurozone. Whilst the discordant debate over Greece has certainly overshadowed concerns over Portugal,
More informationDivergence and Adjustment in the Euro Area
MINISTÉRIO DAS FINANÇAS Divergence and Adjustment in the Euro Area Vítor Gaspar Frankfurt June 15, 2012 MINISTÉRIO DAS FINANÇAS 1 Outline 1. Credit Boom 2. Eliminating excessive debt 3. Challenges ahead
More informationOpen Economy AS/AD: Applications
Open Economy AS/AD: Applications Econ 309 Martin Ellison UBC Agenda and References Trilemma Jones, chapter 20, section 7 Euro crisis Jones, chapter 20, section 8 Global imbalances Jones, chapter 29, section
More informationGlobal Financial Crisis. Econ 690 Spring 2019
Global Financial Crisis Econ 690 Spring 2019 1 Timeline of Global Financial Crisis 2002-2007 US real estate prices rise mid-2007 Mortgage loan defaults rise, some financial institutions have trouble, recession
More informationWhat next for the Eurozone?
www.economics.pwc.com What next for the Eurozone? Possible scenarios for 2012 December 2011 Economic views 1 Economic views Executive Summary Expect surprises next year. We are currently experiencing unprecedented
More informationEurope in crisis. George Gelauff. ECU 92 Lustrum Conference Utrecht. 23 February 2012
Europe in crisis George Gelauff ECU 92 Lustrum Conference Utrecht Menu Costs and benefits of Europe Banks and governments Monetary Union and debts Germany Conclusion 2 Europe in crisis Europe largest export
More informationWhat Governance for the Eurozone? Paul De Grauwe London School of Economics
What Governance for the Eurozone? Paul De Grauwe London School of Economics Outline of presentation Diagnosis od the Eurocrisis Design failures of Eurozone Redesigning the Eurozone: o Role of central bank
More information: Monetary Economics and the European Union. Lecture 8. Instructor: Prof Robert Hill. The Costs and Benefits of Monetary Union II
320.326: Monetary Economics and the European Union Lecture 8 Instructor: Prof Robert Hill The Costs and Benefits of Monetary Union II De Grauwe Chapters 3, 4, 5 1 1. Countries in Trouble in the Eurozone
More informationLESSONS OF THE EUROPEAN CRISIS FOR REGIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN EAST ASIA
LESSONS OF THE EUROPEAN CRISIS FOR REGIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN EAST ASIA Ulrich Volz, German Development Institute 8 August 2012, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia
More informationThe euro crisis and the new impossible trinity
The euro crisis and the new impossible trinity Moneda y Crédito Symposium, Madrid, 3 November 2011 Jean Pisani-Ferry (Bruegel)* (*) With thanks to Silvia Merler for excellent research assistance Outline
More informationHow Europe is Overcoming the Euro Crisis?
How Europe is Overcoming the Euro Crisis? Klaus Regling, Managing Director, ESM University of Latvia, Riga 3 March 2014 Eight reasons for the sovereign debt crisis 1. Member States did not fully accept
More informationGains for all: A proposal for a common euro bond Paul De Grauwe Wim Moesen. University of Leuven
Gains for all: A proposal for a common euro bond Paul De Grauwe Wim Moesen University of Leuven Until the eruption of the credit crisis in August 2007 financial markets were gripped by a flight to risk.
More informationThe EU is running out of choices to tame the crisis
PABLO DE OLAVIDE UNIVERSITY, Sevilla, SPAIN Conference: «Addressing the Sovereign Debt Crisis in Euro Area» Wednesday, 18 May 2011 The EU is running out of choices to tame the crisis Panayotis GLAVINIS
More informationCONDITIONAL EUROBONDS AND EUROZONE REFORM
CONDITIONAL EUROBONDS AND EUROZONE REFORM John Muellbauer, INET at Oxford OENB workshop Towards a genuine economic and monetary union, Vienna, 10-11 September, 2015 OBJECTIVES Reduce the Euro-area policy
More informationA Fiscal Union in Europe: why is it possible/impossible?
Warsaw 18 th October 2013 A Fiscal Union in Europe: why is it possible/impossible? Daniele Franco Chiara Goretti Italian Ministry of the Economy and Finance This talk FROM non-controversial aspects General
More informationThe European Economic Crisis
The European Economic Crisis Patrick Leblond Teaching about the EU in the Classroom Centre for European Studies Carleton University, 25 November 2013 Outline Before the crisis European economic integration
More informationFor the Eurozone, much hinges on self-discipline and self-interest
For the Eurozone, much hinges on self-discipline and self-interest Author: Jonathan Lemco, Ph.D. Will the Eurozone survive its severe financial challenges? Vanguard believes it is in the interests of both
More informationA safe sovereign asset for the Eurozone?
Ad van Riet * A safe sovereign asset for the Eurozone? * Senior Adviser, European Central Bank (ECB) Disclaimer: the views expressed are those of the presenter and should therefore not be viewed or reported
More informationA Two-Handed Economist s Presentation on The Treaty. Professor Karl Whelan University College Dublin Presentation for Labour Party April 28, 2012
A Two-Handed Economist s Presentation on The Treaty Professor Karl Whelan University College Dublin Presentation for Labour Party April 28, 2012 The Fiscal Compact Treaty: Two Angles, Four Questions A
More informationDesign Failures in the Eurozone. Can they be fixed? Paul De Grauwe London School of Economics
Design Failures in the Eurozone. Can they be fixed? Paul De Grauwe London School of Economics Eurozone s design failures: in a nutshell 1. Endogenous dynamics of booms and busts endemic in capitalism continued
More informationMacro Focus. From austerity to growth? 30 May Group Economics Macro Research
Macro Focus From austerity to growth? Group Economics Macro Research Nick Kounis Tel: +31 20 343 5616 Aline Schuiling Tel: +31 20 343 5606 30 May 2013 Europe has changed its approach. The European Commission
More informationEurozone. Outlook for. Ernst & Young Eurozone Forecast. Summer edition 2012
Eurozone Ernst & Young Eurozone Forecast Summer edition 2012 Outlook for Published in collaboration with Andy Baldwin Head of Financial Services Europe, Middle East, India and Africa With key national
More informationA Strategy for Growth in the EU How to Boost the Economic Recovery?
A Strategy for Growth in the EU How to Boost the Economic Recovery? EU Commission and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Berlin, November 19, 01 Lorenzo Codogno Director General, Italian Ministry of Economy and
More informationEconomic state of the union, EuroMemo Engelbert Stockhammer Kingston University
Economic state of the union, EuroMemo 2013 Engelbert Stockhammer Kingston University structure Economic developments Background: export-led growth and debt-led growth Growth, trade imbalances, ages and
More informationIs the Euro Crisis Over?
Is the Euro Crisis Over? Klaus Regling, Managing Director, ESM Institute of International and European Affairs, Dublin 17 January 2014 Europe reacts to the euro crisis at national and EU level A comprehensive
More informationBanking Union in Europe Glass Half Full or Glass Half Empty. Thorsten Beck
Banking Union in Europe Glass Half Full or Glass Half Empty Thorsten Beck ` Bank resolution a critical part of the regulatory reform agenda Many regulatory reforms over past five years: Basel 3: capital
More informationECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION IKV BRIEF 2010 THE DEBT CRISIS IN GREECE AND THE EURO ZONE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION IKV BRIEF 2010 April 2010 Prepared by: Sema Gençay ÇAPANOĞLU (scapanoglu@ikv.org.tr) THE DEBT CRISIS IN GREECE AND THE EURO ZONE Greece is struggling with the most serious
More informationGlobal Financial Stability Report: Grappling with Crisis Legacies
Global Financial Stability Report: Grappling with Crisis Legacies Seminar for Senior Bank Supervisors from Emerging Economies Laura E. Kodres /International Monetary Fund October 17, 2011 Chapter 1 Overcoming
More informationThe Euro Zone Sovereign Debt Crisis: Testing the Limits of Solidarity. Presentation to the IA BE
IA BE The Euro Zone Sovereign Debt Crisis: Testing the Limits of Solidarity Presentation to the IA BE Jean Deboutte 14 June 2011 Table of Contents Section 1 Introduction Section 2 Diagnosis Section 3 Remedies
More informationThe role of ECB in relation to the modified EFSF and the future ESM. Prof. Dr. iur. Dr. rer. pol. Peter Sester
The role of ECB in relation to the modified EFSF and the future ESM Prof. Dr. iur. Dr. rer. pol. Peter Sester A monetary union with a stable euro can only survive if central bank independence is fully
More informationDiscussion of Marcel Fratzscher s book Die Deutschland-Illusion
Discussion of Marcel Fratzscher s book Die Deutschland-Illusion Klaus Regling, ESM Managing Director Brussels, 30 September 2014 (Please check this statement against delivery) The euro area suffers from
More informationIS A DEBT TARGET FOR THE EMU FEASIBLE?
IS A DEBT TARGET FOR THE EMU FEASIBLE? Paolo Canofari, Piero Esposito SEP Policy Brief No. 12 26 February 2014 Introduction The newly elected government led by Alexis Tsipras is challenging the European
More informationEUROZONE BANKS AND CAPITAL FLOW REVERSAL
EUROZONE BANKS AND CAPITAL FLOW REVERSAL Ashoka Mody Research Department International Monetary Fund European Crisis: Historical Parallels and Economic Lessons Julis-Rabinowitz Center for Public Policy
More informationExternal debt statistics of the euro area
External debt statistics of the euro area Jorge Diz Dias 1 1. Introduction Based on newly compiled data recently released by the European Central Bank (ECB), this paper reviews the latest developments
More informationCan the Eurozone Reform?
Can the Eurozone Reform? by Economist Conference on: Governance and regional arteries for Growth: Europe s momentum Greece s impetus, Wyndham Loutraki Poseidon Resort, Greece, May 10-11, 2018 The Greek
More informationCross-border banking regulating according to risk. Thorsten Beck
Cross-border banking regulating according to risk Thorsten Beck Following 2008: Lots of regulatory reforms Basel 3: Higher quantity and quality of capital and liquid assets Additional capital buffers for
More informationIs harmonization sufficient?
DEPOSIT INSURANCE (DI) AS AN UNCOORDINATED INTERACTION Is harmonization sufficient? Theo Kiriazidis * Head of Research Department Hellenic Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund (TEKE) * The usual disclaimer
More informationPanel Discussion: Europe at the Crossroads
Panel Discussion: Europe at the Crossroads Markus Brunnermeier Paul Krugman Hyun Song Shin Christopher Sims October 24th, 2011 Department of Economics and Griswold Center for Economic Policy Studies 1
More informationA Decade-Long Economic Crisis: Cyprus vs. Greece
A Decade-Long Economic Crisis: Cyprus vs. Greece Gikas Hardouvelis Professor of Finance & Economics University of Piraeus LSE SU Hellenic and Cypriot Societies Forum London, March 18, 17 TABLE OF CONTENTS
More informationFiscal Federalism - some thoughts
Fiscal Federalism - some thoughts John Hassler Swedish Fiscal Policy Council and IIES Why federal fiscal policy? 1. Financing union-wide public goods 2. Means to foster integration 3. Insurance against
More informationECONOMIC AND MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS
Box 2 RECENT WIDENING IN EURO AREA SOVEREIGN BOND YIELD SPREADS This box looks at recent in euro area countries sovereign bond yield spreads and the potential roles played by credit and liquidity risk.
More informationModelling the sovereign debt crisis in Europe
Modelling the sovereign debt crisis in Europe National Institute Global Econometric Model Dawn Holland October 211 Project LINK Meeting on the World Economy National Institute of Economic and Social Research
More informationFinancial System Stabilized, but Exit, Reform, and Fiscal Challenges Lie Ahead
January 21 Financial System Stabilized, but Exit, Reform, and Fiscal Challenges Lie Ahead Systemic risks have continued to subside as economic fundamentals have improved and substantial public support
More informationPRESENTATION BY JACOB A. FRENKEL AT THE FORUM: INTELLIGENCE ON THE WORLD, EUROPE, AND ITALY. Villa d'este, Cernobbio - September 7, 8 and 9, 2012
PRESENTATION BY JACOB A. FRENKEL AT THE FORUM: INTELLIGENCE ON THE WORLD, EUROPE, AND ITALY Villa d'este, Cernobbio - September 7, 8 and 9, 1 Working paper, September 1. Kindly authorized by the Author.
More informationInternational financial crises
International Macroeconomics Master in International Economic Policy International financial crises Lectures 11-12 Nicolas Coeurdacier nicolas.coeurdacier@sciencespo.fr Lectures 11 and 12 International
More informationAssessing Capital Markets Union
6 Assessing Capital Markets Union Quarterly Assessment by Paul Richards Summary It is too early to make an assessment of Capital Markets Union, but not too early to give a market view of the tests by which
More informationEMU Architecture: Where do we stand? ETLA Conference, Helsinki, 16 /10/2012 Jean Pisani-Ferry
EMU Architecture: Where do we stand? ETLA Conference, Helsinki, 16 /10/2012 Jean Pisani-Ferry Building site.. And then? Outline 1. Known unknowns and unknown unknowns 2. Assessing the policy response 3.
More informationClient Seminar: End game in the Eurozone? slaughter and may. 18 September 2012
Client Seminar: End game in the Eurozone? slaughter and may 18 September 2012 Eurozone Crisis: End game in the Eurozone? Over the past four years, the EU has responded decisively to the economic and financial
More informationThe European Economy: Out of Crisis, Finally?
The European Economy: Out of Crisis, Finally? Nicolas Véron Senior Fellow, Bruegel (Brussels) Visiting Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics (Washington DC) ESRI International Conference
More informationEuro Summit Statement (26 October 2011)
Euro Summit Statement (26 October 2011) Caption: At their meeting on 26 October 2011 in Brussels, the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the euro zone manage, after tough negotiations,
More informationThe Greek crisis and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Abstract The financial crisis of is considered by many economists to be the
The Greek crisis and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Abstract The financial crisis of 2007 2008 is considered by many economists to be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the
More information1.1. Low yield environment
1. Key developments The overall macroeconomic environment remains very challenging for the European insurance and pension sector. The yields have been further compressed and are substantially below the
More informationLessons from the Crisis - Minimal Elements for a Fiscal Union in the Euro Area
Lessons from the Crisis - Minimal Elements for a Fiscal Union in the Euro Area Discussant Rolf Strauch, Member of the Management Board, Paris, 10 September 2013 Lessons from the crisis elements for a fiscal
More informationTeetering on the brink: is the world heading for another financial crisis?
Teetering on the brink: is the world heading for another financial crisis? Adrian Cooper CEO & Chief Economist acooper@oxfordeconomics.com Peter Suomi Director petersuomi@oxfordeconomics.com October 2011
More informationChallenges to the single monetary policy and the ECB s response. Benoît Cœuré Member of the Executive Board European Central Bank
Challenges to the single monetary policy and the ECB s response Benoît Cœuré Member of the Executive Board European Central Bank Institut d études politiques, Paris 2 September 212 1 Prime conduit of monetary
More informationFINANCIAL STABILITY SOVEREIGN DEBT ECONOMIC GROWTH
The European sovereign debt crisis and the future of the euro Peter Bekx European Commission i Tokyo, 30 November 2012 1 A Vicious circle FINANCIAL STABILITY SOVEREIGN DEBT ECONOMIC GROWTH 2 Breaking the
More informationThoughts and Concerns: 1) During the July to September quarter the financial turmoil surrounding Greece and Europe increased in its intensity.
Thoughts and Concerns: 1) During the July to September quarter the financial turmoil surrounding Greece and Europe increased in its intensity. In an effort to support the European banking system (and indirectly
More informationIntesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.
Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. IRMC 2012 The Unintended Consequences of Re-Regulation Rome, 19 June 2012 Mauro Maccarinelli Head of Market Risk and Financial Valuation Risk Management Group 1 Re-Regulation (1/2)
More informationThe I Theory of Money & Redistributive Monetary Policy
The I Theory of Money & Redistributive Monetary Policy Markus K. Brunnermeier & Yuliy Sannikov Princeton University Dutch Central Bank msterdam, Nov. 20 th, 2015 Redistributive Monetary Policy (New) Keynesian
More informationPORTUGAL E O CAMINHO PARA O FUTURO: A BANCA E O SEU PAPEL
XV CONFERÊNCIA A CRISE EUROPEIA E AS REFORMAS NECESSÁRIAS PORTUGAL E O CAMINHO PARA O FUTURO: A BANCA E O SEU PAPEL FERNANDO FARIA DE OLIVEIRA AGENDA European Context: From the Actual Crisis to Growth
More informationSOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: RULES VERSUS DISCRETION
Policy Brief July 19, 2018 SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: RULES VERSUS DISCRETION Angelo Baglioni and Massimo Bordignon (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart - Milan) Introduction and summary 1 We discuss
More informationFixing the Euro Zone. Daniel Stelter, Marc-Olivier Lücke, and Dirk Schilder. March 2012
Fixing the Euro Zone Daniel Stelter, Marc-Olivier Lücke, and Dirk Schilder March 2012 AT A GLANCE Although a step in the right direction, the recent haircut imposed on private holders of Greek debt really
More informationTowards a Stronger EMU: Recent Developments in Monetary Policy and EMU Governance Reform
Towards a Stronger EMU: Recent Developments in Monetary Policy and EMU Governance Reform Gilles Noblet Deputy Director General DG International and European Relations European Central Bank Presentation
More informationThe euro area in a globalized economy: An ESM perspective
The euro area in a globalized economy: An ESM perspective Rolf Strauch, Chief Economist, Member of the Management Board 3 rd Annual BBVA European Debt Conference New York, 4 October 217 The euro area:
More informationThe crisis response in the euro area. Peter Praet Pioneer Investment s Colloquia Series Beijing, 17 April 2013
The crisis response in the euro area Peter Praet Pioneer Investment s Colloquia Series Beijing, 17 April 213 Outline A. How the crisis developed B. Monetary policy response C. Structural adjustment underway
More informationThe outlook for the global economy in 2012
The Eurozone Crisis Still Threatens Global Growth Paolo Guerrieri Professor of Economics, University of Rome Sapienza; Professor, College of Europe, Bruges The outlook for the global economy in 2012 is
More informationDo Central Bank Interventions Limit the Market Discipline from Short-Term Debt?
Do Central Bank Interventions Limit the Market Discipline from Short-Term Debt? Viral Acharya NYU Stern School of Business Diane Pierret HEC Lausanne Sascha Steffen European School of Management and Technology
More informationA Selective Focus is Key to Navigating European Banking Sector Challenges
A Selective Focus is Key to Navigating European Banking Sector Challenges March 2016 PERSPECTIVES Key Insights Andrea Brasili Senior Economist Global Asset Allocation Research Diego Franzin Head of Equities
More informationDiabolic Loop. between Sovereign & Banking Risk. Markus K. Brunnermeier. Princeton University. Brunnermeier
Diabolic Loop between Sovereign & Banking Risk Markus K. Brunnermeier Princeton University G7 Conference, Bundesbank & BMF Frankfurt, March 27 th, 2015 How do these concepts hang together? Diabolic-Loop
More informationThe Greek. Hans-Werner Sinn
CESifo, a Munich-based, globe-spanning economic research and policy advice institution Forum june 215 Special Issue - Update The Greek Tragedy Hans-Werner Sinn This document contains updated graphs and
More informationSovereign Risks and Financial Spillovers
Sovereign Risks and Financial Spillovers International Monetary Fund October 21 Roadmap What is the Outlook for Global Financial Stability? Sovereign Risks and Financial Fragilities Sovereign and Banking
More informationThe European fiscal policy framework: too complicated
The European fiscal policy framework: too complicated a) The European semester Autumn package Commission's Annual Growth Survey (AGS) Alert Mechanism Report (AMR) Screening device, based on a scoreboard
More informationWho Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort? 1
Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort? 1 Itamar Drechsler, Thomas Drechsel, David Marques-Ibanez and Philipp Schnabl NYU Stern and NBER ECB NYU Stern, CEPR, and NBER November 2012 1 The views expressed
More informationGREECE S IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN DEBT CRISIS
1 GREECE S IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN DEBT CRISIS Summary The European leaders had initially planned to unveil a clear action plan to their counterparts at the G20 Summit on November 3-4th in Cannes, France
More informationPresentation at the 2011 Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum December 2, University of Maryland & NBER
Presentation at the 2011 Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum December 2, 2011 Enrique G. Mendoza Enrique G. Mendoza University of Maryland & NBER 1. Short: May/Dec. 2010 Greece, Ireland plans 2. Tall: July 2011
More informationThe ECB and its Watchers XIII. Klaus Regling CEO of EFSF Frankfurt, 10 June 2011
The ECB and its Watchers XIII Klaus Regling CEO of EFSF Frankfurt, 10 June 2011 Is the real economy disconnected from financial market developments? 3 Real GDP per capita growth (changes in percent) 2
More information