Monetary Economics. Chapter 8: Money and credit. Prof. Aleksander Berentsen. University of Basel

Transcription

1 Monetary Economics Chapter 8: Money and credit Prof. Aleksander Berentsen University of Basel Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 1 / 125

2 Structure of this chapter 1 Introduction 2 Dichotomy between money and credit 3 Costly record-keeping 4 Strategic complementaries and payments 5 Short-term and long-term partnerships 6 Money, Credit and Banking 7 Conclusion Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 2 / 125

3 Introduction Many modes of payments coexist in actual economies: credit arrangements, where trades are intertemporal by nature and involve a future payment; monetary exchanges, where trades are quid pro quo and do not involve future obligations. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 3 / 125

4 Introduction One way to explain the coexistence of monetary exchange and credit arrangements is to introduce some heterogeneity among agents and/or trading matches. In some markets agents are anonymous, and can therefore only trade with money, while in others their identities can be veri ed, and intertemporal contracts can be enforced, and thus agents can resort to credit arrangements. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 4 / 125

5 Introduction We rst consider an environment where there is a technology that enforces debt contracts in some markets but not in others. We then assume that the gains from trade vary across matches in the decentralized market, and that the use of credit involves a costly record-keeping technology. In the next section, we capture the notion of commitment through the reputation that buyers acquire by trading repeatedly with some sellers. We show that the availability of credit depends on the value of money and monetary policy, and the extent of the trading frictions. Finally, we will see a model which analyzes the role that banks have as intermediaries, and the gain in utility they can provide. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 5 / 125

6 Structure of this chapter 1 Introduction 2 Dichotomy between money and credit 3 Costly record-keeping 4 Strategic complementaries and payments 5 Short-term and long-term partnerships 6 Money, Credit and Banking 7 Conclusion Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 6 / 125

7 Dichotomy between money and credit In this section, we divid the day market into two subperiods: a morning (DM1) and an afternoon (DM2). The morning and afternoon subperiods are similar in terms of agents preferences and specialization: buyers can consume in both subperiods but cannot produce, sellers can produce but cannot consume and in terms of the trading process buyers and sellers trade in bilateral matches. The discount factor across periods is β. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 7 / 125

8 Dichotomy between money and credit The buyer s instantaneous utility function is U b (q 1, q 2, x, h) = υ(q 1 ) + u(q 2 ) + x h, where q 1 is the consumption in the rst subperiod, q 2 is the consumption in the second subperiod, x is the consumption of the general good in the third subperiod, and h is the utility cost of producing h units of the general good. The utility functions υ(q) and u(q) are strictly increasing and concave, with υ(0) = u(0) = 0, υ 0 (0) = u 0 (0) = +, υ 0 (+ ) = u 0 (+ ) = 0. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 8 / 125

9 Dichotomy between money and credit The utility function of a seller is U s (q 1, q 2, x, h) = ψ(q 1 ) c(q 2 ) + x h, where functions ψ(q) and c(q) are strictly increasing and convex, with ψ(0) = c (0) = 0, ψ 0 (0) = c 0 (0) = 0, ψ 0 (+ ) = c 0 (+ ) = 0. We denote q1 the solution to υ0 (q) = ψ 0 (q) and q2 the solution to u 0 (q) = c 0 (q). These are the quantities that maximize the match surpluses in the rst two subperiods. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 9 / 125

10 Dichotomy between money and credit MORNING (DM 1) AFTERNOON (DM 2) NIGHT (CM) Utility of consumption: υ ( q ) Disutility of production: ψ ( q ) c( q ) 1 1 u ( q 2 ) 2 h Record keeping Enforcement Anonymity Record keeping Enforcement Figure 8.1: Timing of a representative period Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 10 / 125

11 Dichotomy between money and credit Both the DM1 and the DM2 are characterized by search frictions. A buyer meets a seller in the DM1 with probability σ 1 2 [0, 1], and in the DM2 with probability σ 2 2 [0, 1], where σ 1 and σ 2 are independent events. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 11 / 125

12 Dichotomy between money and credit In the DM1 all agents identities are known to all other agents. We assume that any contract written in the DM1 can be (and will be) enforced at night. As a result, buyers can get output in the DM1 by using credit or, equivalently, by issuing an IOU to be repaid at night. We will assume that all the IOUs are one period in nature in that they are repaid in the subsequent competitive night market, CM. Moreover, the authenticity of the IOUs issued in DM1 cannot be veri ed in DM2, and hence they cannot be used as medium of exchange in the afternoon. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 12 / 125

13 Dichotomy between money and credit In the DM2 all agents are anonymous. Since buyers are anonymous in the DM2, bilateral trades cannot be publicly recorded or enforced. As a result, sellers do not accept IOUs for output produced in the DM2 since buyers would renege on these at night. Because of the anonymity of agents in the DM2, money has an essential role in this environment. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 13 / 125

14 Dichotomy between money and credit We assume that the stock of money grows at a constant rate γ M t+1 /M t, and that this is accomplished by a lump-sum transfers to buyers in the CM. We focus on stationary equilibria where real balances and the quantities traded in the di erent subperiods are constant over time: = M t M t+1 = γ 1. φ t+1 φ t Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 14 / 125

15 Dichotomy between money and credit Beginning of the CM Consider a buyer at the beginning of the CM who holds z = φ t m units of real balances and has issued b units of IOUs in the previous DM1, where each unit is normalized to be worth one unit of general good. The value function for this buyer, W b (z, b), is given by n o W b (z, b) = max x h + βv b (z 0 ) x,h,z 0 (8.1) x + b + γz 0 = z + h + T, (8.2) where V b is the value of a buyer at the beginning of the day market. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 15 / 125

16 Dichotomy between money and credit Beginning of the CM Substituting x h from (8.2) into (8.1), we get n o W b (z, b) = z b + T + max z 0 0 γz 0 + βv b (z 0 ). (8.3) As before, the value function is linear in the buyer s current portfolio, and the buyer s choice of real balances is independent of his current portfolio. (Also, recall that sellers do not receive transfers in the CM.) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 16 / 125

17 Dichotomy between money and credit Beginning of the CM The value function of a seller holding z units of real balances and b IOUs at the beginning of the CM is given by W s (z, b) = z + b + βv s, (8.4) where V s is the value function of a seller at the beginning of the next period. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 17 / 125

18 Dichotomy between money and credit Bilateral match in the DM2 Consider now a bilateral match in the DM2 between a buyer holding z units of real balances and a seller. The buyer is anonymous and cannot use credit. Hence, he can transfer at most z units of real balances to the seller in exchange for afternoon output. We assume that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o er. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 18 / 125

19 Dichotomy between money and credit Bilateral match in the DM2 The buyer s o er to the seller is given by the solution to the following simple problem, max q 2,d 2 [u(q 2 ) d 2 ] s.t. c(q 2 ) + d 2 0 and d 2 z, where the rst inequality represents the seller s participation constraint and the second is a feasibility constraint. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 19 / 125

20 Dichotomy between money and credit Bilateral match in the DM2 The solution to this maximization problem is c(q 2 ) = min [c(q 2 ), z], (8.5) d 2 = c(q 2 ), (8.6)! The buyer purchases the e cient level of output if he has su cient real balances; otherwise he spends all of his balances on output. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 20 / 125

21 Dichotomy between money and credit Bilateral match in the DM1 Since buyers identities are known and there is a technology that enforces contracts at night, they can purchase output with IOUs. If the buyer defaults on his IOU, he can be subject to an arbitrarily large ne in the CM. The buyer can also use his money holdings as means of payment in the morning. For a given level of real balances, spending money balances in the DM1 is a (weakly) dominated strategy since the buyer might need money to trade in the DM2. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 21 / 125

22 Dichotomy between money and credit Bilateral match in the DM1 Suppose then that buyers only use credit to purchase output in the DM1. The buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o er (q 1, b) to the seller so as to maximize his surplus υ(q 1 ) b, subject to the seller s participation constraint ψ(q 1 ) + b 0. Thanks to the enforcement technology in the CM, there is no feasibility constraint imposed on the transfer of IOUs since the buyer can issue as much debt as he wishes. The solution to the buyer s problem in the DM1 is q 1 = q 1 (8.7) b = ψ(q 1 ). (8.8) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 22 / 125

23 Dichotomy between money and credit Given the terms of trade established in the DM1 and DM2, the value function of a buyer holding z units of real balances at the beginning of a period is V b (z) = o σ 1 σ 2 nυ(q 1 ) + u[q 2 (z)] + W b [ b, z d 2 (z)] n o +σ 1 (1 σ 2 ) υ(q1 ) + W b ( b, z) o +(1 σ 1 )σ 2 nu[q 2 (z)] + W b [0, z d 2 (z)] +(1 σ 1 )(1 σ 2 )W b (0, z). (8.9) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 23 / 125

24 Dichotomy between money and credit Using the linearity of W b, the beginning-of-period value function can be simpli ed to V b (z) = σ 1 fυ(q 1 ) ψ(q 1 )g + σ 2 fu[q 2 (z)] c [q 2 (z)]g +z + W b (0, 0). (8.10) If we substitute V b (z) from (8.10) into (8.3), then the buyer s portfolio problem in the CM can be represented by where i γ in the DM2. β β max f iz + σ 2 fu[q 2 (z)] c [q 2 (z)]gg, (8.11) z0. Note that the buyer s real balances only a ects his surplus Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 24 / 125

25 Dichotomy between money and credit The rst-order condition for problem (8.11) is u 0 (q 2 ) c 0 (q 2 ) = 1 + i σ 2. (8.12) This expression for the output traded in the DM2 is identical to the one we derived for the pure monetary economy. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 25 / 125

26 Dichotomy between money and credit The allocation is dichotomic in the sense that the output traded in the DM1, q 1, is independent of both the quantity traded in the DM2, q 2, and the value of money, φ t. As well, when in ation increases, q 1 is una ected and remains at the e cient level, while q 2 decreases, see equation (8.12). So there are no interactions between the DM1 and the DM2. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 26 / 125

27 Dichotomy between money and credit In the DM1 a fraction σ 1 of the buyers issue debt, while at the same time holding positive amounts of money. Credit is a preferred means of payment because it involves no opportunity cost. However, credit can only be used in transactions when agents identities are known and debt contracts can be enforced. Buyers will hold money, even though it is more costly than credit, because it allows them to consume in the DM2 when they are anonymous. Finally, as the cost of holding money, i, approaches zero, the quantity traded in the DM2 approaches its e cient level, q2. When the cost of holding money is exactly equal to zero, there is no cost associated with holding real balances, and buyers will be indi erent between trading with money and credit in the DM1. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 27 / 125

28 Structure of this chapter 1 Introduction 2 Dichotomy between money and credit 3 Costly record-keeping 4 Strategic complementaries and payments 5 Short-term and long-term partnerships 6 Money, Credit and Banking 7 Conclusion Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 28 / 125

29 Costly record-keeping We now consider an environment where money and credit coexist, and monetary policy a ects the composition of monetary and credit transactions. The model is similar as in Chapter 5, "Divisibility of money", but we add a costly record-keeping technology. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 29 / 125

30 Costly record-keeping The instantaneous utility function of a buyer is given by U b = εu(q) + x h, where ε 2 R + is a match-speci c preference shock. The preference shock, ε, is drawn from a cumulative distribution, F (ε), with support [0, ε max ]. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 30 / 125

31 Costly record-keeping Matched agents in the DM have the option to record a credit transaction at a real cost of ζ > 0. If a credit transaction is recorded in the DM, we assume that its repayment is enforced at night. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 31 / 125

32 Costly record-keeping The value functions for buyers and sellers at the beginning of the CM, W b (z, b) and W s (z, b), are given by equations (8.3) and (8.4): n o W b (z, b) = z b + T + max z 0 0 γz 0 + βv b (z 0 ). (8.3) W s (z, b) = z + b + βv s, (8.4) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 32 / 125

33 Costly record-keeping Consider a match in the DM between a buyer with match speci c preference shock ε holding z units of real balances, and a seller. The buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o er to the seller. The terms of trade, (q, b, d), are given by the solution to max εu(q) d b ζifb>0g s.t. c(q) + d + b 0 and d z, q,d,b where I fb>0g = 1 if b > 0 and I fb>0g = 0, otherwise. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 33 / 125

34 Costly record-keeping If the buyer chooses to use credit as a means of payment, he must incur the xed cost ζ due to record-keeping. If the buyer incurs the xed cost, then the solution is q = q ε with d + b = c(q ε ), where q ε solves εu 0 (q ε ) = c 0 (q ε ). Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 34 / 125

35 Costly record-keeping If the buyer does not incur the xed cost to use credit, then and q = q ε (z) = c 1 [min (c(q ε ), z)] d = c(q) If he has enough real balances, the buyer purchases the e cient level of output for his particular preference shock; otherwise he spends all of his real balances. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 35 / 125

36 Costly record-keeping The buyer s surplus from a trade match in the DM is S b (z, ε) = max fεu(q ε ) c(q ε ) ζ, εu [q ε (z)] c [q ε (z)]g. (8.13) Note that S b (z, ε) is increasing in ε, i.e., both terms in the maximization problem increase with ε. We represent each of these terms as a function of ε in Figure 8.2. The slope of the rst term is u(q ε ), and the slope of the second is u [q ε (z)]. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 36 / 125

37 Costly record-keeping Let ε denote the value of ε such that c(q ε ) = z, i.e., ε is a threshold below which the buyer has enough real balances to purchase the e cient level of DM output. For all ε < ε, u [q ε (z)] = u(q ε ), which implies that the slopes of the two terms in the maximization problem (8.13) are equal. For all ε > ε, u [q ε (z)] < u(q ε ), and the slope of the second term in the maximization problem (8.13) is independent of ε and lower than the slope of the rst term. When ε = 0, the rst term is equal to zero. ζ, while the second is equal to Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 37 / 125

38 Costly record-keeping For ε > ε su ciently large, fεu(q ε ) c(q ε ) ζg fεu [q ε (z)] c [q ε (z)]g > 0. Consequently, there exists a threshold ε c > ε above which the buyer uses credit as means of payment and below which he uses money. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 38 / 125

39 Costly record-keeping This threshold is given by, ε c u(q ε c ) c(q ε c ) ζ = ε c u c 1 (z) z. (8.14) Graphically, the rst term in the maximization problem (8.13) intersects the second term from below at ε = ε c, see Figure 8.2. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 39 / 125

40 Costly record-keeping Buyer s surplus * * εu( q ) c( q ) ζ ε ε εu q ( z) c q ( z) ε ε ε c Trades with money Trades with credit Figure 8.2: Credit vs monetary trades Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 40 / 125

41 Costly record-keeping It should be emphasized that the value of the threshold, ε c, is for a given level of real balances, z. Hence, from (8.14), ε c increases with z, i.e., dε c dz = ε c u 0 (c 1 (z)) 1 c 0 (c 1 (z)) u qε c u (c 1 (z)) > 0, since q ε c > c 1 (z) for ε c > ε. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 41 / 125

42 Costly record-keeping Graphically, as z increases ε increases and for all ε > ε the second term of the maximization problem (8.13) moves upward. Buyers increase their surplus by holding more real balances in all trades where they don t trade the e cient quantity. Consequently, as buyers hold more real balances the fraction of trades conducted with credit decreases: money and credit are complements. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 42 / 125

43 Costly record-keeping Using the linearity of W b, the value of being a buyer at the beginning of the period, V b (z), is Z εmax V b (z) = σ S b (z, ε)df (ε) + W b (z). (8.15) 0 Substituting V b (z) from (8.15) into (8.3), and simplifying, we get Z εmax max iz + σ S b (z, ε)df (ε). (8.16) z0 0 Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 43 / 125

44 Costly record-keeping The objective function in (8.16) is continuous and the solution to (8.16) must lie in the interval [0, c(q ε max )] for all i > 0. An equilibrium corresponds to a pair (ε c, z) that solves (8.14) and (8.16) and can be determined recursively: A value for z is determined independently by (8.16), and given this value for z, (8.14) determines a unique ε c. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 44 / 125

45 Costly record-keeping E ects of monetary policy We now investigate the e ects that monetary policy has on the use of at money and credit as means of payment. The rst-order (necessary but not su cient) condition associated with (8.16) is Z εc (z) i = σ ε(z) ( εu 0 c 1 (z) c 0 [c 1 (z)] 1 ) df (ε). (8.17) From (8.17), real balances have a liquidity return when the realization of the preference shock is not too low so that the buyer s budget constraint in the match is binding and when the preference shock is not too high so that it is not pro table for buyers to use credit i.e., when ε (z) < ε < ε c (z). Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 45 / 125

46 Costly record-keeping E ects of monetary policy Suppose that in ation and, hence, the cost of holding money, i, increases: the right side of (8.17) must also increase, it reduces buyers real balances and increases the use of costly credit, As the cost of holding real balances approaches zero, from (8.16): real balances approach c(q ε max ), buyers nd it pro table to trade with money only. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 46 / 125

47 Structure of this chapter 1 Introduction 2 Dichotomy between money and credit 3 Costly record-keeping 4 Strategic complementaries and payments 5 Short-term and long-term partnerships 6 Money, Credit and Banking 7 Conclusion Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 47 / 125

48 Strategic complementarities and payments In order to be able to accept credit, sellers must invest ex-ante i.e., before trades take place in a record-keeping technology that allows the transactions to be recorded and enforced. Buyers will form rational expectations about sellers investment decisions and choose which means of payment(s) to carry into meetings. These decisions made by buyers and sellers create strategic complementarities for payment choices and network-like externalities. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 48 / 125

49 Strategic complementarities and payments The model with network externalities is similar to that of the previous section, but modi ed in the following ways: All matches are identical, i.e., ε = 1. It is the seller who invests in the record-keeping technology and this investment is undertaken at the beginning of the DM before matches are formed. The cost to invest in this technology is ζ > 0. The pricing mechanism must be changed from the previous section to one that permits sellers to extract a fraction of the match surplus; otherwise sellers could not recover their ex ante investment costs and would have no incentive to invest in the record-keeping technology. Again, the buyer receives a constant share θ 2 [0, 1) of the match surplus, while the seller gets the remaining 1 θ > 0 share. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 49 / 125

50 Strategic complementarities and payments Seller invest in the technology Consider rst a match between a buyer holding z units of real balances and a seller who has invested in the technology. The terms of trade are given by the solution to the following problem: max [u(q) q,d,b d b] (8.18) s.t. c(q) + d + b 1 θ [u(q) θ d b] (8.19) d z (8.20) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 50 / 125

51 Strategic complementarities and payments Seller invest in the technology Since b is unconstrained buyers can borrow as much as they want in the DM the constraint d z never constrains the purchase of q. Because of this, the output produced in the DM will be at the e cient level, q = q, and d + b = (1 θ) u(q ) + θc(q ), i.e., the seller gets the fraction 1 θ of match surplus. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 51 / 125

52 Strategic complementarities and payments Seller does not invest in the technology Consider next the case where the seller has not invested in the record-keeping technology. The terms of trade are still determined by the problem (8.18)-(8.20), but with the added constraint that b = 0. If z (1 θ) u(q ) + θc(q ), then the buyer will have su cient money balances to purchase the e cient level of output and q = q ; otherwise, the level of DM output, q(z), will satisfy where q (z) < q. z = z(q) (1 θ) u(q) + θc(q), (8.21) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 52 / 125

53 Strategic complementarities and payments Seller s decision Considering that all buyers hold the same real balances, z, it is optimal for a seller to invest in the technology if σ(1 θ) [u(q(z)) c(q(z))] σ(1 θ) [u(q ) c(q )] ζ. (8.22) From (8.22), the ow cost to invest in the record-keeping technology must be less than the increase in the seller s expected surplus associated with accepting credit instead of money. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 53 / 125

54 Strategic complementarities and payments Seller s decision The left side of (8.22) is increasing in z: it equals 0 if z = 0 it equals σ(1 θ) [u(q ) c(q )] if z (1 θ) u(q ) + θc(q ). Consequently, if ζ < σ(1 θ) [u(q ) c(q )], then there exists a threshold z c > 0 for the buyer s real balances, below which sellers invest in the record-keeping technology. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 54 / 125

55 Strategic complementarities and payments Seller s decision This threshold is given by the solution to u [q(z c )] c [q(z c )] = u(q ) c(q ) ζ σ(1 θ). (8.23) Let Λ be the measure of sellers who invest in the record-keeping technology. Then, 8 8 < 1 < < Λ = 2 [0, 1] if z = z : : c. (8.24) 0 > The seller s reaction function is depicted in Figure 8.3. As buyers hold more money, sellers have less incentives to invest in the costly record-keeping technology. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 55 / 125

56 Strategic complementarities and payments Buyer s decision Given the seller s decision to invest in the record-keeping technology, (8.24), the buyer s decision problem is given by max f iz + σ(1 Λ)θ fu[q(z)] c [q(z)]g + σλθ z0 fu(q ) c(q )gg. (8.25) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 56 / 125

57 Strategic complementarities and payments Buyer s decision The rst-order condition for problem (8.25) is [σ(1 Λ)θ i (1 θ)] u 0 (q) [i + σ(1 Λ)] θc 0 (q) (1 θ) u 0 (q) + θc 0 (q) 0, (8.26) and holds with an equality if z > 0. If z > 0, and the numerator of (8.26) will equal to zero, and u 0 (q) c 0 (q) = [i + σ (1 Λ)] θ [i + σ(1 Λ)] θ i. (8.27) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 57 / 125

58 Strategic complementarities and payments Buyer s decision The right side of (8.27) is increasing with Λ, which implies that an increase in Λ will decrease q, and, hence, z. Therefore, the buyer s choice of real balances is decreasing in Λ. Intuitively, if it is more likely to nd a seller who accepts credit, then money is needed in a smaller fraction of matches, and since it is costly to hold money buyers will nd it optimal to hold fewer real balances. Moreover, there is a critical value for Λ above which buyers hold no real balances, and this happens when the denominator of equation (8.27) is σθ (1 θ)i equal to zero, or when Λ c = σθ, where Λ c > 0 if i < σθ 1 θ. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 58 / 125

59 Strategic complementarities and payments z 0 Sellers reaction function z c Buyers reaction function σθ ( 1 θ ) i Λc = σθ 1 Figure 8.3: Buyers and sellers reaction functions Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 59 / 125

60 Strategic complementarities and payments Symmetric equilibrium A stationary symmetric equilibrium is a pair (z, Λ) that solves (8.24) and (8.25). There exists a pure monetary equilibrium with Λ = 0 and z > 0; a pure credit equilibrium, with Λ = 1 and z = 0; and a mixed monetary equilibrium, where buyers use both credit and money, accumulating z c > 0 real balances, and a fraction 1 Λ 2 (0, 1) sellers accept only money, while other sellers, Λ 2 (0, 1) of them, are willing to accept both money and credit. The multiplicity of equilibria arises from the strategic complementarities between the buyers decisions to hold real balances and the sellers decisions to invest in the record-keeping technology. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 60 / 125

61 Strategic complementarities and payments Social welfare When there are multiple equilibria, which one is preferred from the society s viewpoint? Social welfare is given by W = σλ fu(q ) c(q )g + σ(1 Λ) fu [q(z)] c [q(z)]g Λζ. Consider a case where z 0 is greater but close to z c : There is a pure monetary equilibrium with z = z 0, Λ = 0, and social welfare is W 0 = σ fu [q(z 0 )] c [q(z 0 )]g ζ. There is also a pure credit equilibrium with Λ = 1 and social welfare is W 1 = σ fu(q ) c(q )g ζ. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 61 / 125

62 Strategic complementarities and payments Social welfare Given the de nition of z c in (8.23), ζ σ(1 θ) f[u(q ) c(q )] [u(q(z 0 )) c(q(z 0 ))]g < σ f[u(q ) c(q )] [u(q(z 0 )) c(q(z 0 ))]g, where we get the strict inequality because θ > 0. In this case, the di erence in the surpluses associated with credit and monetary transactions strictly exceeds the cost of investment in the record-keeping technology. Hence, W 1 > W 0, the pure monetary equilibrium is dominated, from a social welfare perspective, by the pure credit equilibrium. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 62 / 125

63 Strategic complementarities and payments Social welfare However, the socially ine cient monetary equilibrium can prevail because of a hold-up externality. If a seller decides to adopt the technology to accept credit, he incurs the full cost of the technology adoption, but he only receives a fraction 1 θ < 1 of the increase in the match surplus. Hence, sellers fail to internalize the e ect of the credit technology on buyers surpluses, which can lead to excess inertia* in the decision to adopt the record-keeping technology. *Excess inertia occurs when a particular compatibility switch would increase social welfare, but each player is not willing to initiate it, unsure if others will follow. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 63 / 125

64 Strategic complementarities and payments Social welfare, i close to zero When i is close to zero, z 0 will be close to θc(q ) + (1 θ)u(q ) and q(z 0 ) q. Hence, W 0 σ fu(q ) c(q )g. Provided that ζ > 0 the pure monetary equilibrium dominates the pure credit equilibrium from a social welfare perspective. The resources allocated to the record-keeping technology are wasted in the sense that a monetary equilibrium avoids costs associated with record-keeping and provides an allocation that is almost as good as the credit allocation. Still, if ζ < σ(1 θ) [u(q ) c(q )], agents can end up coordinating on the inferior (credit) equilibrium because of the strategic complementarities between the buyers and sellers choices. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 64 / 125

65 Structure of this chapter 1 Introduction 2 Dichotomy between money and credit 3 Costly record-keeping 4 Strategic complementaries and payments 5 Short-term and long-term partnerships 6 Money, Credit and Banking 7 Conclusion Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 65 / 125

66 Short-term and long-term partnerships In the next section, we capture the notion of commitment through the reputation that buyers acquire by trading repeatedly with some sellers. We show that the availability of credit depends on the value of money and monetary policy, and the extent of the trading frictions. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 66 / 125

67 Short-term and long-term partnerships We assume that there is no enforcement technology and buyers cannot commit to repay their debt. Debt contracts must be self-enforcing. If there can be repeated interactions with a seller, a buyer will want to generate a reputation for paying his debts, and the buyer s desire for this reputation results in contracts being self enforced. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 67 / 125

68 Short-term and long-term partnerships We allow for the possibility of both short-term and long-term partnerships. A short-term match corresponds to a situation where the buyer and the seller know they will not meet again in the future. In a long-term match the buyer and the seller have a chance to stay together for more than one period. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 68 / 125

69 Short-term and long-term partnerships At the beginning of a period, unmatched agents can enter into a long-term trade match with probability σ` or a short-term trade match with probability σ s, with 0 < σ` + σ s < 1. A short-term match is destroyed with probability one at the end of the day or DM, while a long-term match will be exogenously destroyed with probability λ < 1 at the beginning of the CM. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 69 / 125

70 Short-term and long-term partnerships In addition, either party to a long-term match that is not exogenously destroyed can always choose to terminate the relationship at the beginning of the DM. Since the measures of buyers and sellers are equal, there are also equal measures of unattached buyers and unattached sellers. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 70 / 125

71 Short-term and long-term partnerships DAY NIGHT A fraction σ l ( σ s ) Matched sellers of unmatched agents find a long term (short term) match. produce q l (q) s in long term (short term) matches. Matched buyers in long term matches produce y. l A fraction λ of long term matches are destroyed. Figure 8.4: Timing of a representative period. Agents can readjust their money holdings. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 71 / 125

72 Short-term and long-term partnerships The night period begins with buyers who are in a long-term partnership producing the general good for sellers if trade was mediated by credit in the previous DM. A fraction λ of buyers in the long-term partnership then realize a shock which dissolves the relationship they have with their currently matched seller. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 72 / 125

73 Short-term and long-term partnerships This is followed by the opening of the CM, where the general good and money are traded. In terms of pricing mechanisms, we assume that buyers make take-it-or-leave-it o ers to sellers in the DM, and that the night market is competitive, where one unit of money trades for φ t units of the general good. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 73 / 125

74 Short-term and long-term partnerships We will restrict our attention to a particular class of equilibria that exhibit two features. First, money is valued, but is only used in short-term trade matches. Second, the buyer s incentive-compatibility constraint in long-term matches that the buyer is willing to produce the general good for the seller to extinguish his debt obligation is not binding. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 74 / 125

75 Short-term and long-term partnerships This latter assumption implies that a buyer in a long-term partnership will be able to purchase the e cient quantity of the DM search good, q, with credit alone. So these equilibria will be such that money and credit coexist but are used in di erent types of meetings, as in the previous sections, but we do not need to impose enforcement or commitment. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 75 / 125

76 Short-term and long-term partnerships The value of being an unmatched buyer in the CM, W b u (z), is given by Wu b (z) = z + T + maxf γz 0 + βv z 0 u b (z 0 )g, (8.28) 0 where V b u (z 0 ) is the value of being an unmatched buyer holding z 0 units of real balances at the beginning of a period. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 76 / 125

77 Short-term and long-term partnerships The value function of an unmatched buyer in the DM who holds z units of real balances, V b u (z), is given by V b u (z) = σ`v b` (z) + σ sv b s (z) + (1 σ` σ s )W b u (z). (8.29) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 77 / 125

78 Short-term and long-term partnerships The expected lifetime utility of an unmatched seller in the CM is W s u (z) = z + βv s u, (8.30) where we take into account that sellers have no incentives to hold real balances in the DM. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 78 / 125

79 Short-term and long-term partnerships In the DM, the value of an unmatched seller is V s u = σ`v s` + σ sv s s + (1 σ` σ s )W s u (0), (8.31) where V s` (V s s ) is the value of a seller in a long-term (short-term) match in the DM. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 79 / 125

80 Short-term and long-term partnerships The buyer in a short-term trade match makes a take-it-or-leave-it o er, (q s, d s ), to the seller, where q s is the amount of the search good that the seller produces and d s is the amount of real balances transferred from the buyer to the seller. The value function of a buyer holding z units of real balances in a short-term trade match, V b s (z), is given by Vs b (z) = u [q s (z)] + Wu b [z d s (z)] = u [q s (z)] d s (z) + z + Wu b (0), (8.32) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 80 / 125

81 Short-term and long-term partnerships Similarly, the value function of a seller (with no real balances) in a short-term trade match is V s s = c [q s (z)] + d s (z) + W s u (0), (8.33) where z represents the buyer s real balances. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 81 / 125

82 Short-term and long-term partnerships The take-it-or-leave-it o er by the buyer maximizes the buyer s surplus u (q s ) d s subject to the seller s participation constraint and the feasibility constraint c (q s ) + d s 0 d s z. It is characterized by either q s (z) = q and d s (z) = c(q ) if z c(q ), or q s = c 1 (z) if z < c(q ). Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 82 / 125

83 Short-term and long-term partnerships Hence, (8.32) becomes V b s (z) = u [q s (z)] c [q s (z)] + z + W b u (0), (8.34) and, from (8.33), V s s = W s u (0). Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 83 / 125

84 Short-term and long-term partnerships The value function for a buyer in a long-term relationship holding z units of real balances at the beginning of the period is V b` (z) = u [q`(z)] + W b` [z d`(z), y`(z)], (8.35) where W b` (z d`, y`) is the value of the matched buyer at night holding z d` units of real balances, with a promise to produce y` units of the general good for his trade-match partner. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 84 / 125

85 Short-term and long-term partnerships Even though we allow the terms of trade (q`, d`, y`) to depend on the buyer s real balances, z, in the following we will consider equilibria where buyers don t use money in long-term partnerships, d` = 0 and (q`, y`) is independent of z. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 85 / 125

86 Short-term and long-term partnerships The value function of a buyer in a long-term partnership at the beginning of the night satis es W b` (z, y`) = z y` + T + λ max f γz 0 + βv z 0 u b (z 0 )g 0 n o +(1 λ) max γz 00 + βv b` (z 00 ). (8.36) z 00 0 Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 86 / 125

87 Short-term and long-term partnerships The value function for a seller in a long-term relationship at the beginning of the period is V s` = c [q`(z)] + W s` [d`(z), y`(z)]. (8.37) The value function of the seller at night is W s` (z, y`) = z + y` + (1 λ)βv s` + λβv s u. (8.38) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 87 / 125

88 Short-term and long-term partnerships We now turn to the formation of the terms of trade in long-term partnerships. We will assume that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-if o er, (q`, y`, d`). The o er must satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint according to which the buyer is willing to repay his debt at night. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 88 / 125

89 Short-term and long-term partnerships The buyer chooses (q`, y`, d`) in order to maximize V b` (z) subject to the seller s participation constraint c (q`) + W s` (d`, y`) W s` (0, 0), and the incentive compatibility constraint W b` (z d`, y`) W b u (z d`). The incentive-compatibility constraint states that the buyer is better-o paying his debt than walking away from his partnership. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 89 / 125

90 Short-term and long-term partnerships The buyer s problem can be expressed as max [u (q) y d] s.t. c (q) + y + d 0, d z, (8.39) q,y,d y W b` (0, 0) W b u (0). (8.40) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 90 / 125

91 Short-term and long-term partnerships We will focus on equilibria where the incentive-compatibility constraint (8.40) does not bind for all values of z. As a result, q` = q and y` + d` = c(q ). So the terms of trade in long-term partnerships are independent of the buyer s real balances. With no loss, we can assume that buyers pay with credit only, d` = 0. It is also immediate from (8.35) and (8.36) that a buyer in a long-term partnership at night will not accumulate real balances (in (8.36) z 00 = 0). Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 91 / 125

92 Short-term and long-term partnerships Let us consider the choice of real balances by unmatched buyers. From (8.28)-(8.36), the optimal choice of real balances at night, z, for a buyer who is not in a long-term relationship satis es max z0 f iz + σ s fu [q s (z)] c [q s (z)]gg. (8.41) This leads to the familiar rst-order condition, u 0 (q s ) c 0 (q s ) = 1 + i σ s. (8.42) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 92 / 125

93 Short-term and long-term partnerships The last thing we need to check is that the incentive-compatibility condition, (8.40), is not binding. Using that y` = c(q ), (8.40) becomes c(q ) W b` (0, 0) W b u (0). (8.43) With the help of equations (8.29)-(8.36), and after some rearranging, inequality (8.43) can be rewritten as c(q ) (1 λ)β f(1 σ`)u(q ) + ic(q s ) σ s [u(q s ) c(q s )]g, (8.44) where q s satis es (8.42). Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 93 / 125

94 Short-term and long-term partnerships If inequality (8.44) holds, then there exists an equilibrium where buyers and sellers in long-term relationships consume and produce q` = q units of the search good during the day and y` = c(q ) units of the general good at night, using credit arrangements to implement these trades. Buyers and sellers in short-term partnerships trade q s units of the search good for y s = c(q s ) units of real balances during the day. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 94 / 125

95 Short-term and long-term partnerships Perhaps not surprisingly, if σ s = 0, then from (8.42), q s = 0 and the incentive condition (8.44) is identical to the one obtained in a model where money was absent and trade in long-term relationships was supported by reputation. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 95 / 125

96 Short-term and long-term partnerships If the frequency of short-term matches, σ s, increases, then, from (8.42), agents will increase their real balance holdings; as a result the incentive-constraint (8.44) becomes more di cult to satisfy. Hence, the availability of monetary exchange in the presence of a long-term partnership increases the attractiveness of defaulting on promised performance. However, if in ation increases, then, from the envelope theorem, the term ic(q s ) + σ s [u(q s ) c(q s )] decreases, which relaxes the incentive-constraint (8.44). Hence, a higher in ation rate reduces the buyer s incentive to default on this long-term partnership obligations. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 96 / 125

97 Short-term and long-term partnerships Summary The use of credit is not incentive-feasible in short-lived matches, since the buyer will always default on repaying his obligation. In contrast, the buyer s behavior in a long-lived match is disciplined by reputation considerations that will trigger the dissolution of a valuable relationship following a default. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 97 / 125

98 Structure of this chapter 1 Introduction 2 Dichotomy between money and credit 3 Costly record-keeping 4 Strategic complementaries and payments 5 Short-term and long-term partnerships 6 Money, Credit and Banking 7 Conclusion Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 98 / 125

99 Money, Credit and Banking The following Section has been adapted from the paper: "Money, Credit and Banking" by Aleksander Berentsen, Gabriele Camera and Christopher Waller. CESifo Working Paper No. 1617, December Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter 8 99 / 125

100 Money, Credit and Banking The economy now has three markets: A banking market, a decentralized market, and a centralized market. Agents lend or borrow in the banking market, and receive interest or pay back loans in the centralized market: Figure 8.5: The BCW model Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter / 125

101 Money, Credit and Banking All markets are competitive. Agents are anonymous in the DM market. Record keeping of nancial transactions by banks only. The nominal price of goods in the DM is p. i is the nominal interest rate in the Bank market. φ is the price of money in the CM. The government makes lump-sum transfert T to agents in CM. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter / 125

102 Money, Credit and Banking At the beginning of the period, agents learn their type: buyer with probability 1 n, seller with probability n. In equilibrium, buyers borrow money and seller deposit money. We solve the model backwards. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter / 125

103 Money, Credit and Banking The value function at the beginning of the CM is l: loan (l 7 0) φ: 1 p V 3 (m, l) = max h,x,m 0 u(x) h + βv 1(m 0 ) (8.45) s.t. x + φm 0 = h + φm φl(1 + i) + T Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter / 125

104 Money, Credit and Banking The quantity l can either be positive (to take a loan), or negative (to give somebody a loan; i.e., a deposit in a bank). From the constraint: h = x + φm 0 φm + φl(1 + i) T = x + φ[m 0 m + l(1 + i)] T Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter / 125

105 Money, Credit and Banking We can therefore rewrite (8.45): FOC: V 3 (m, l) = max x,m 0 u(x) x φ[m 0 m + l(1 + i)] T + βv 1 (m 0 ) x : u 0 (x) = 1 m 0 : φ = βv 0 1(m 0 ) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter / 125

106 Money, Credit and Banking The envelope conditions are: m : V m 3 (m, l) = φ (8.46) l : V l 3(m, l) = φ(1 + i) (8.47) Equation (8.46) is the marginal value of money. The negative sign in (8.47) re ects the disutility that an agent faces when he repays his debt. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter / 125

107 Money, Credit and Banking The value functions at the beginning of the DM are V 2b (m, l) = max q b u(q b ) + V 3 (m pq b, l) s.t. pq b m (φλ q ) V 2s (m, l) = max q s c(q s ) + V 3 (m + pq s, l) where φλ q is the Lagrange multiplier for the buyer s constraint. A seller has no constraint, because he can produce as much as he wants to. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter / 125

108 Money, Credit and Banking The rst-order conditions are: For a buyer: u 0 (q b ) p V3 m φpλ q = u 0 (q b ) φp φpλ q = 0 (8.48) For a seller: c 0 (q s ) + p V3 m = c 0 (q s ) + φp = 0 (8.49) Combining (8.48) and (8.49) yields u 0 (q b ) c 0 (q s ) = 1 + λ q (8.50) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter / 125

109 Money, Credit and Banking The envelope conditions are: For a buyer: For a seller: m : V2b m = φ + φλ q l : V2b l = V 3 l = φ(1 + i) m : V2s m = V 3 m = φ l : V2s l = V 3 l = φ(1 + i) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter / 125

110 Money, Credit and Banking The value function at the beginning of the Banking market is: V 1 (m) = (1 n) max l b V 2b (m + l b, l b ) +n max l s V 2s (m + l s, l s ) s.t. l b l (φλ b ) s.t. m + l s 0 (φλ s ) where l is an exogenous borrowing constraint. Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter / 125

111 Money, Credit and Banking The rst-order conditions are: V2b m + V2b l φλ b = 0 () φλ q φi φλ b = 0 (8.51) V2s m + V2s l + φλ s = 0 () φλ s = φi (8.52) The envelope condition is: V1 m = (1 n)v2b m + n(v2s m + φλ s ) (8.53) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter / 125

112 Money, Credit and Banking As soon as they know what type of agent they are, the buyer will want more cash and will be ready to pay for it (interest rate). The banking market reallocates the cash of sellers (the surplus) to people who want more money (the buyers). Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter / 125

113 Money, Credit and Banking Rewriting (8.53) using the results obtained for V b 2, V s 2 and V 3 yields: V m 1 = (1 n)v m 2b + n(v m 2s + φλ s ) φ 1 β = (1 n) (φ + φλ q ) + n (φ + φλ q ) = (1 n) u0 (q b ) + n (φ + iφ) p = (1 n) u0 (q b ) c 0 φ + nφ (1 + i) (q s ) = (1 n) u0 (q b ) c 0 φ + nφ (1 + i) (q s ) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter / 125

114 Money, Credit and Banking In a stationary equilibrium, φm = φ 1 M 1, φ 1 φ = M M 1 = γ, and so: γ β = (1 (q b ) n)u0 c 0 + n(1 + i) (8.54) (q s ) Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau Money, Payments, and Liquidity - Chapter / 125