Strategic Default and Equity Risk Across Countries

Transcription

1 Strategic Default and Equity Risk Across Countries Giovanni Favara 1 Enrique Schroth 2 Philip Valta 3 1 Board of Governors of the FED, 2 Cass Business School, 3 HEC Paris Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 1 / 20

2 Research question Is strategic default an important determinant of corporate decisions and outcomes? Theoretically, yes (e.g., Berglöf and von Thadden, JPE 94; Hart and Moore, QJE 98; Bolton and Scharfstein JPE 96; Anderson and Sundaresan, RFS 96; Fan and Sundaresan, RFS 2000) Empirically, still an open question This paper: does strategic default matter for the rm s equity risk? Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 2 / 20

3 Why focus on equity risk? Theoretically: The systematic risk of equity depends on the uncertainty of equity holders payo in default. Empirically: equity risk is observable/measurable important for rms nancing & investment decisions Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 3 / 20

4 Is strategic default relevant? Mixed evidence for the US: does strategic default a ect stock returns? Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (RFS 2006) say yes. debt pricing? Davydenko and Strebulaev (JF 2007) say yes, but the economic signi cance is very small. Caveat: in these studies the expected value of equity in default depends only on rm characteristics not on bankruptcy laws (e.g., suppose APR violations are infrequent, as in Bharat et al., 2008). Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 4 / 20

5 This paper We use an international cross-section of stocks (8,700 rms, 38 countries, 93 to 2006) We exploit cross-country variation in bankruptcy laws We test whether strategic default matters for equity risk. Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 5 / 20

6 How we do it? 1 We use a contingent claim model to derive hypotheses relating rm and institutional characteristics to equity risk. 2 We estimate market betas using market model. 3 We use Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (JPE 2008) dataset on international debt enforcement procedures. 4 We run cross-country- rm regressions of equity betas on rm characteristics and characteristics of the debt enforcement procedure. Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 6 / 20

7 The mechanism Failure Liquidation Decision to default Renegotiation Success Cash flow to shareholders Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 7 / 20

8 Model: based on Davydenko and Strebulaev (JF 2007) Renegotiation failure, q, liquidation cost α, and shareholders bargaining power η. The Beta of equity is where β = E X X E = 1 + (1 τ) c r E X B r µ = c r λ 1 1 λ 1 (1 q)ηα. (1 τ) c r X λ, E X {z B } default option e ect Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 8 / 20

9 Equity Beta Equity beta, renegotiation failure and liquidation costs Equity Swap Model Renegotiation failure Liquidation costs Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 9 / 20

10 Model s predictions 1 Firms in a legal regime with stricter enforcement of debt contracts have a higher equity beta. 2 Firms with higher liquidation costs or where shareholders have a higher bargaining power in case of debt renegotiations have a lower equity beta. 3 The di erence in equity beta between rms facing di erent liquidation costs or shareholders bargaining power is smaller in countries with stricter enforcement of creditors rights. Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 10 / 20

11 Data and empirical design Firm and country speci c data: Liquidation costs, bargaining power, controls (leverage, book-to-market, size, momentum) Source: Worldscope, Datastream, World Bank Institutional data: Renegotiation failure Source: Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (JPE 2008) Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 11 / 20

12 Renegotiation failure Renegotiation failure 2 [0, 1] May creditors seize collateral outof-court? Is a reorganization not mandatory? No judgement for enforcement of Must operations stop upon start of security? insolvency procedure? Floating charge? Will management lose control upon start of insolvency procedure? May creditors enforce security at the start of insolvency procedure? May an insolvency ruling not be appealed? Is the procedure not suspended while appeal is resolved? Can creditors appoint insolvency administrator? Can creditors dismiss insolvency administrator? Can creditors vote on reorganization plan? Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 12 / 20

13 Renegotiation failure index Country Renegotiation Creditors failure recovery Chile China Italy France Russia Germany USA Korea Japan New Zealand Australia Hong Kong UK Singapore Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 13 / 20

14 Data and empirical design (II) Basic empirical framework: β it = xit 0 γ + δ {z} q Renegotiation failure C + δ α Liquidation Costs it controls +δ qα Renegotiation failure C Liquidation Costs it +ε it. First stage: compute the orthogonal projection of leverage from Leverage it = γ 0 + γ 1 Leverage i0 + γ 0 z z it + γ 0 x x C + υ it. Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 14 / 20

15 Results: Renegotiation failure (Table V) Domestic beta Overall beta N = 351, 099 N = 347, 211 (1) (2) (3) (4) Renegotiation failure (0.052) (0.1) (0.12) (0.203) Insiders share (0.063) (0.125) Insiders share Renegotiation failure (0.096) (0.195) Intangibles (0.137) (0.256) Intangibles Renegotiation failure (0.201) (0.382) Average adjusted R E(r H 0 : i r jrenegotiation failure=1) Intangibility or Insiders share = (0.036) (0.075) (0.036) (0.072) H 0 : E (r i r jreneg. failure = 1) E (r i r jreneg. failure = 0) = (0.057) (0.072) (0.058) (0.068) Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 15 / 20

16 Results: Leverage interactions (Table VI) The di erence in equity beta between rms in di erent countries is larger the more levered they are. Domestic beta (1) (2) LL HL LL HL β Renegotiation failure (0.099) (0.101) (0.219) (0.205) Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 16 / 20

17 Creditors recovery rate We can show that the creditors expected recovery rate, R is re (C ) c (1 q)(1 ηα)x B + q(1 α)x B c r = λ 1 λ 1 αq 1 (1 q)ηα so that R q > 0. Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 17 / 20

18 Results: Creditors s recovery (Table VII) Domestic beta N = 351, 099 (1) (2) (3) (4) Priority (0.023) (0.042) Recovery (0.090) (0.115) Insiders share (0.132) (0.082) Intangibles (0.351) (0.195) Insiders share Priority Intangibles Priority Insiders share Creditors recovery Intangibles Creditors recovery (0.035) (0.091) (0.103) (0.237) Average adjusted R Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 18 / 20

19 Results: Returns volatility (Table VIII) N = 351, 082 Total volatility Systematic volatility Idiosyncratic volatility (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Renegotiation failure (0.013) (0.026) (0.012) (0.022) (0.011) (0.021) Insiders share (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) Insiders share Renegotiation failure (0.024) (0.02) (0.02) Intangibles (0.033) (0.029) (0.027) Intangibles Renegotiation failure (0.049) (0.042) (0.04) Volatility(q=1) - Volatility(q=0) 2.50% 3.82% 5.42% 3.34% 6.38% 6.70% Average adjusted R Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 19 / 20

20 Conclusions Using an international cross-section of stocks, we nd: 1 Stricter debt enforcement procedures increase equity risk 2 Higher liquidation costs or equity holders bargaining power decrease equity risk; but less so 1 the lower the leverage and, 2 the stricter the country s debt enforcement. Favara et al. (FED, Cass & HEC) Strategic default and equity risk 20 / 20