Are Risk Society Risks Exceptional?

Transcription

1 Are Risk Society Risks Exceptional? Merryn Ekberg Centre for Risk and Community Safety, RMIT University Abstract: At the frontier of contemporary social and political theory is the concept of the risk society. Initially developed by German sociologist Ulrich Beck, the risk society is a theoretical framework for understanding and explaining the emergence of a society stressed, depressed and self-obsessed with risk objects, risk events and risk issues. According to Beck, we are living in a society of omnipresent risk, but without the institutional capabilities to effectively manage risk. Our existing policies are ineffective for governing risk society risks because the risks of the risk society are exceptional and unprecedented. This paper offers an outline of ten features that legitimate the claim that the risks of the risk society are exceptional. Introduction This paper is oriented towards answering the question: are risk society risks exceptional? This is an important question because exploring the answer will offer new insights about the social origins and impact of risk. Ultimately, the answer may be useful for the design of more efficient, effective and equitable risk management policies. In answering this question, I will argue that there are ten exceptional features of risk society risks. Briefly, these features include: the omnipresence of risk and increased awareness of living in a risk environment; the scientization of risk; the shift from invisible to visible and virtual risks; the shift in emphasis from natural to technological risks; the denial or diffusion of responsibility for governing risk; the emergence of borderless risks; the shift in emphasis from actual risk to perceived risk; the politicisation of risk; the commercialisation of risk and finally, the importance of balancing our right to protection against risk with our right to take risks.

2 2 The Ten Exceptional Features of Risk Society Risks The omnipresence of risk and increased awareness of living in a risk environment is the first exceptional feature of risk society risks. Risk has been a constant feature in all societies through all ages, yet risk society risks are exceptional because we have become more aware of risk, more sensitised to risk, less tolerant of risk and more afraid of risk. As a consequence, we invest more resources into locating, identifying, calculating, classifying, predicting, avoiding, managing and governing risk objects, risk activities, risk behaviours and risk events. Risk theorists do not claim that the volume of actual risk has increased, indeed there are many instances where our exposure to risk has decreased. Most of us living in affluent western societies live longer lives and we live without the risk of starvation or chronic infectious disease. However, because we define more actions, objects and events as a risk, we feel more vulnerable to risk. It is this increased perception of risk, increased consciousness of risk and a feeling that every action, object and event is associated with risk, that gives rise to the notion of living in a society of ubiquitous risk. The second exceptional feature of risk society risks is the scientization of risk. The scientization of risk means that we employ the advanced theories and calibrated methods of science to isolate, locate, measure, calculate, predict and monitor risk. Indeed, the routine techniques and precision instruments of science make previously invisible risks visible, thus contributing to our increased awareness, and collective consciousness of risk. The concept of the risk society, as a society determined by, and dependent on science and technology is thus inseparable from the concept of a

3 3 knowledge society (Stehr 1994), an information society (Castells 1996) or technological age (Ellul 1980). The shift from invisible to visible and virtual risks, made possible by the scientization of risk, is the third exceptional feature of risk society risks. Previous societies were unaware of many risks because the microscopic or subatomic risks were invisible to the unaided human senses. Risk society risks are exceptional because the advanced instruments of science and technology have made invisible risks visible. Infectious agents for example, are made visible by the magnification powers of microscopes and the radiation emitted from radioisotopes is detectable by the Geiger counter. On a more spectacular level, three dimensional computer simulations and the global electronic media transform invisible risks into virtual risks, and ultimately, the hyperreality of virtual risks becomes more real than the real risk. As Van Loon notes, the risks of the risk society become virtual risks in an age of cybernetic reproduction (Van Loon 2000). As a consequence of this media amplification of risk, there is an additional risk that the public confuse reality and hyper-reality and develop exaggerated fears over hypothetical risk scenarios. The fourth exceptional feature of risk society risks is the shift in emphasis from natural to technological risks. Risks society risks are exceptional not only because they are made visible by science and technology but also because they are produced by science and technology. Previous societies were vulnerable to natural hazards including floods, fires, cyclones and epidemics and these natural hazards continue to threaten our safety in the risk society. However, the risk society is also vulnerable to

4 4 technological risks and in particular, to the risks associated with advances in nuclear, chemical and biomedical technologies. Ironically, these technological risks are not a side effect of the failure of science, engineering and technology, but rather, they are an unanticipated after effect of the spectacular success of science, engineering and technology. Originating in the powers of technology rather than the forces of nature, the risks of the risk society are exceptional because we are collectively responsible for their presence. Risk society risks are a product of the agents and institutions of society, and especially of the practices and practitioners of science and technology. This is why sociologists are interested in the origins and impact of risk and describe risk society risks as socially constructed risks. Yet, herein lies another irony, that although we are collectively responsible for creating the scientized risks of late modern society, there is an avoidance of responsibility for managing or governing the risks. Thus producing the fifth exceptional feature of risk society risks. Organised irresponsibility means that although risk society risks are produced by many individuals and organizations separated in time and space, responsibility for monitoring risk levels, avoiding risk events, developing risk-avoidance policies and compensating victims of risk events is often denied, delayed, deferred or avoided. According to Beck: organized irresponsibility explains how and why the institutions of modern society must unavoidably acknowledge the reality of catastrophe while simultaneously denying its existence, covering its origins and precluding compensation or control (Beck 1998: 18). In particular, when risks cross national borders and become global risks, it becomes unclear which authority or organization

5 5 is responsible for governing the globalised risk. Examples of global risks that evade national responsibility include acid rain, atmospheric pollution and the ozone hole. Adams has contested Beck s notion of organized irresponsibility. Adams suggests that we have entered an era burdened by the risk of over-regulation and excessive legislation. Threatened by the increasing risk of litigation, government, business and science must now invest in stringent regulatory protocols and follow precise safety standards in order to avoid both the risks to public health and safety and the risks to professional integrity and reputation (Adams 1995). The profession of gynaecology for example, is at risk of collapse because of excessive indemnity fees. Furthermore, Luhmann suggests that the overuse of safety technologies, regulations and warnings can create a risk of complacency as people develop a sense of false security, dependency on technology and an avoidance of personal responsibility in risky environments (Luhmann 1993: 94). The sixth exceptional feature of risk society risks is their incessant ability to cross borders. Risk society risks cross the boundary between expert calculations of risk and lay perceptions of risk. They cross the boundary between the invisible and visible and between reality, hyper-reality and virtual reality. The inescapable risks of the world risk society cross class, gender and race boundaries emerging as egalitarian or democratic risks. The random and unpredictable risks of scientific research cross the boundary between the impossible, possible and probable, thus increasing the probability of what Perrow has described as normal accidents. In Perrow s account, what has been scientifically ruled out as impossible or improbable, predictably occurs (Perrow 1984). Similarly, they cross the boundary between what Weinberg has

6 6 described as science and trans-science. According to Weinberg, trans-science refers to the condition where questions can be asked of science but cannot be answered by science (Weinberg 1972). In other words, the risks of the risk society are not only problems of technology, they are also problems for technology. Risk society risks erase the boundary between the laboratory space of controlled experiments and the social space of lived experience and they challenge the logic of scientific discovery, which presumes testing before application. As Beck suggests: the world has become the test site for risky technologies (Beck 1995: 101). A similar concern has been expressed by Unger who explains that since the hazards of mega-technologies involve multiple complex interactions, they cannot be adequately tested in the laboratory. Thus, rather than discovering the harmful effects through rigorous laboratory evaluation, the unanticipated consequences can only be discovered after they have been implemented (Unger 2001). The technological risks of the risk society cross geospatial and geopolitical boundaries emerging as global risks of a cosmopolitan society that evade the boundaries of national sovereignty and national security (Beck 2000). Risk society risks cross spatial and temporal boundaries meaning the point of origin may not correspond with the point of impact. They exemplify what Giddens terms time-space distanciation (Giddens 1994) or what Harvey has termed time-space compression (Harvey 1989). Finally, the modernization risks of the risk society cross generational boundaries, which means the latent and unknown effects of ionizing radiation, carcinogenic

7 7 chemicals and germ line gene therapy may be inherited by individuals yet unborn (Beck 1992: 22). The seventh exceptional feature of risk society risks is the shift in emphasis from actual risk to perceived risk. In developing risk avoidance policies and in developing strategies to change peoples risky behaviour, policy-makers are guided more by how people perceive risk, than by statistical or numerical calculations of actual risk. The actual risk of a terrorist attack for example is relatively low, yet anti-terrorist policies are designed in response to a perceived risk that is extremely high. Furthermore, antiterrorist policies are an example of the politicisation of risk; the eighth exceptional feature of risk society risks. Risk society risks are a product of political decisions, which means they are a product of power relations. The definition of a risk is a political decision, deciding where to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable risks is a political decision and the decision to allocate funds to risk research or to invest resources into risk avoidance or risk minimization policies is a political decision. Risk society risks are also political because they present a new threat to our fundamental political vales of liberty, equality, justice, rights and democracy. Democracy is at risk when citizens are unable to participate in decisions that determine the quality of their lives (Irwin 2001). For example, when citizens are unable to participate in decisions about the content of science or the conduct of scientists, then the democratic process of decision-making is at risk of being overshadowed by a technocratic decision-making process. Similarly, when citizens

8 8 are unable to participate in decisions that determine the location of hazardous industries, then democracy is at risk (Hiskes 1998). Furthermore, our liberty is at risk in a high risk environment. Without safety and security, there can be no freedom. Indeed, one of the legitimate roles of the government in a liberal democracy, is to protect our liberty by safeguarding our security. Acknowledging this role for government, safeguarding Australia is one of the government s national research priority areas. Finally risk society risks are exceptional and political because advocacy and protest action groups are mobilised around risk issues. Political activist groups such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth are oriented towards raising the public awareness of risk, increasing public hostility towards the producers of risk and reducing the negative effects of risk on society. In reality, these groups often succeed as advertisements for risk avoidance products, thus promoting the very commercialisation of risk they oppose. The commercialisation of risk is the ninth exceptional feature of risk society risks. Hence, risk society risks are not only technological and political, they are also commercial risks in a consumer society. This commercialisation of risk has been noted by Adams who describes the risk industry as the world s largest industry (Adams 1995) and by Bauman suggests that the elimination of risk would precipitate a financial disaster (Bauman 1993).

9 9 Arguably, the oldest and most vivid example of the commercialisation of risk is the insurance industry. Billions of dollars are invested annually in insurance companies, whose business is to offer protection against risk and to spread the effects of risk. Add to this the billions of taxpayer dollars allocated to the military and national security as defences against military risk. Finally, risk society risks are exceptional because we acknowledge that there is a positive dimension to risk. Indeed one of the limitations of Beck s theory is his emphasis on risk-avoidance, which obscures the possibility of an acceptable risk. Acceptable risk implies that some residual level of risk can be tolerated, even desirable. In Beck s overly pessimistic account, risk is synonymous with danger, disaster and crisis and at times moves towards the extreme of catastrophe, holocaust or apocalypse. Risk is associated with the potential for loss, injury, harm, fatality or destruction, which negates the possibility of a positive risk, defined as a risk worth taking because of the potential for a beneficial outcome. Without taking risks, including entrepreneurial risks, we risk stagnation and we risk losing new opportunities for prosperity and progress. This is especially true in the case of biotechnology, where despite the social, political and ethical risks, there are many opportunities for benefit. Ideally, we should aim to design risk management policies that optimise the balance between the right to take risks and the right to protection against risk. Conclusion

10 10 The risk society theorists may not have all the answers, but they do raise important questions. Their approach offers a trenchant and provocative analysis of a scientized society oriented around identifying, measuring and managing risk. The theory succeeds in describing the emergence of a risk ethos and collective risk identity. It draws attention to how the essentialist nature of risk has been transformed and how the origins of risk have been relocated. It points to a reconfiguration in the way risk is identified, evaluated, communicated and governed. The risk society, or society of ubiquitous risk, expands the traditional concept of risk understood as the sum of the probability of an adverse event and the magnitude of the consequences, to include the subjective perception and experience of risk. Finally, the theorists of the risk society succeed in iterating that it is not just health and the environment that are at risk, but in addition, the fundamental socio-political values of liberty, equality, justice, rights and democracy. References Adams, J. (1995) Risk, London: University College London Press. Bauman, Z. (1993) Postmodern Ethics, Oxford: Polity Press. Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society : Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage. Beck, U. (1995) Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk, Cambridge: Polity Press. Beck, U. (1998) 'Politics of Risk Society', in J. Franklin (ed) The Politics of Risk Society, Cambridge: Polity Press. Beck, U. (2000) 'The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity', British Journal of Sociology 51(1): Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of the Network Society, Cambridge: Blackwell. Ellul, L. (1980) The Technological System, New York: Continuum.

11 11 Giddens, A. (1994) Beyond Left and Right : the Future of Radical Politics, Cambridge: Polity Press. Harvey, D. (1989) The Conditions of Postmodernity, Oxford: Blackwell. Hiskes, R. (1998) Democracy, Risk, and Community. Technological Hazards and the Evolution of Liberalism., Oxford: Oxford University Press. Irwin, A.(2001) 'Constructing the Scientific Citizen: Science and Democracy in the Biosciences', Public Understanding of Science 10: Luhmann, N. (1993) Risk: A Sociological Theory, New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Perrow, C. (1984) Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies, New York: Basic Books. Stehr, N. (1994) Knowledge Societies, London: Thousand Oaks. Unger, S. (2001) 'Moral Panic versus the Risk Society: The Implications of the Changing Sites of Social Anxiety', British Journal of Sociology 52(2): Van Loon, J. (2000) 'Virtual Risks in an Age of Cybernetic Reproduction', in B. Adam, U. Beck and J. van Loon (eds) The Risk Society and Beyond. Critical Issues for Social Theory, London: Sage. Weinberg, A. (1972) 'Science and Trans-Science', Minerva 10: