Penalties Guidance March 2015

Transcription

1 March 2015

2 1. Intrductin 1.1 Under sectin 73(1) Financial Services (Banking Refrm) Act 2013 (FSBRA), we may require a participant in a regulated payment system t pay a penalty in respect f a cmpliance failure A cmpliance failure means a failure by a participant in a regulated payment system t cmply with: a directin given by us under sectin 54 FSBRA; r a requirement impsed by us under sectin 55 r 56 FSBRA. 1.3 This dcument cntains ur statement f the principles which we will apply in determining (a) whether t impse a penalty; and (b) the amunt f that penalty. We are required t prepare this statement f principles under sectin 73(3) FSBRA. Details f the prcedures that we will generally apply in relatin t ur regulatry functins under FSBRA, including rights f appeal, are set ut in ur Pwers and Prcedures Guide. 1.4 We will have regard t this statement f principles: in respect f any cmpliance failure which ccurred, r is cntinuing, n r after 1 April 2015 in deciding whether t impse a penalty in determining the amunt f any penalty. 1.5 We will apply this statement f principles in respect f all participants. This des nt imply that the same cmpliance failure wuld necessarily result in the same financial penalty acrss and within different categries f participant. 1.6 We may, frm time t time, revise this statement f principles. In s ding we will liaise with ther relevant regulatrs t ensure that this statement reflects current best practice as apprpriate t ur regulatry functins and the payments industry. Any revised statement will be issued fr cnsultatin and published. 2 1 In this dcument references t a participant shall have the same meaning as defined in sectin 42 FSBRA. 2 Except insfar as the cntext requires, wrds r expressins will have the meaning assigned t them in the PSR s relevant directins and requirements, and therwise any wrd r expressin will have the same meaning as it has in FSBRA. 2 March 2015 Payment Systems Regulatr

3 2. Deciding whether t impse a penalty 2.1 We will cnsider the full circumstances f each individual case when determining whether r nt t impse a financial penalty. 2.2 Set ut belw is a list f factrs that may be relevant fr this purpse. The list is nt exhaustive, and nt all f these factrs may be applicable in a particular case. There may als be ther factrs, nt listed here, that are relevant in an individual case. The factrs we may cnsider include: The nature, seriusness, duratin, frequency and impact f the cmpliance failure. The behaviur f the participant after the cmpliance failure has been identified. The previus disciplinary recrd and cmpliance histry f the participant. Our guidance and ther published materials: we will nt generally take actin against a participant fr behaviur that we cnsider t be in line with guidance, ur regulatry principles r ther materials published by us pursuant t ur statutry functins and duties, and which were current at the time f the behaviur in questin. Actin taken by us r a relevant regulatr (i.e., anther relevant dmestic r internatinal regulatry r cmpetitin authrity) in previus similar cases. Actin taken by a relevant regulatr: where a relevant regulatr prpses t take actin in respect f the cmpliance failure which is under cnsideratin by us, r ne similar t it, we will cnsider whether the ther regulatr s actin wuld be adequate t address ur cncerns, r whether it wuld be apprpriate fr us t take ur wn actin. The extent t which the cmpliance failure in questin may relate t a nvel issue which has nt been the subject f previus guidance r statements by the PSR r anther relevant regulatr. 2.3 Where we impse a financial penalty, ur nrmal practice will be t als publish details f the cmpliance failure In deciding whether it is apprpriate t publish details f a cmpliance failure (instead f impsing a financial penalty), we will cnsider all the relevant circumstances f the case. The key factr is the nature and seriusness f the cmpliance failure, but ther cnsideratins include the fllwing nn-exhaustive factrs: whether r nt deterrence may be effectively achieved by publishing details f the cmpliance failure if the participant has derived an ecnmic benefit (including made a prfit r avided a lss) as a result f the cmpliance failure, this may be a factr in favur f a financial penalty, n the basis that a participant shuld nt be permitted t retain any benefit frm its cmpliance failure 3 Under sectin 72(1) FSBRA we may publish details f a cmpliance failure by a participant in a regulated payment system. 3 March 2015 Payment Systems Regulatr

4 if the cmpliance failure is mre serius in nature r degree, this may be a factr in favur f a financial penalty, n the basis that the sanctin shuld reflect the seriusness f the cmpliance failure; ther things being equal, the mre serius the failure, the mre likely we are t impse a financial penalty if the participant has brught the cmpliance failure t ur attentin, this may be a factr in favur f nly publishing details f the cmpliance failure if the participant has admitted the cmpliance failure and prvided full and immediate cperatin t us, and has taken steps t put in place effective remedial actin, this may be a factr in favur f nly publishing details f the cmpliance failure, rather than als impsing a financial penalty if the participant has a pr disciplinary recrd r cmpliance histry this may be a factr in favur f a financial penalty, n the basis that it may be particularly imprtant t deter future cases the apprach f the PSR r ther relevant regulatr in similar previus cases (where apprpriate, we will seek t achieve a cnsistent apprach t ur decisins n whether t impse a financial penalty r t publish details f a cmpliance failure) and the impact n the participant cncerned, althugh it wuld nly be in an exceptinal case that we wuld be prepared t agree t nly publish details f the cmpliance failure, and nt impse a financial penalty, if a penalty wuld therwise be the apprpriate sanctin. 2.5 Where we impse a financial penalty, ur nrmal practice will be t als publish details f that financial penalty as set ut under sectin 72(2) FSBRA. We will nly refrain frm publishing details f a financial penalty in exceptinal circumstances. 4 March 2015 Payment Systems Regulatr

5 3. Determining the apprpriate level f the financial penalty 3.1 Our penalty-setting regime is based n the fllwing general principles: disgrgement a participant shuld nt benefit frm any cmpliance failure discipline a participant shuld be penalised fr wrngding; and deterrence any penalty impsed shuld deter the participant wh cmmitted the cmpliance failure, and thers, frm cmmitting further r similar cmpliance failures. 3.2 The ttal amunt payable by a participant subject t enfrcement actin may be made up f tw elements: (i) disgrgement f the benefit received as a result f the cmpliance failure; and (ii) a financial penalty reflecting the seriusness f the cmpliance failure. These elements are incrprated in the fllwing framewrk. First element: the disgrgement f any ecnmic benefits derived directly frm the cmpliance failure (see paragraphs ). Secnd element: the financial penalty, calculated as fllws: Step 1: in additin t any disgrgement (see first element), the determinatin f a figure which reflects the seriusness f the cmpliance failure and the size and financial psitin f the participant (see paragraphs ) Step 2: where apprpriate, an adjustment made t the Step 1 figure t take accunt f any aggravating r mitigating circumstances (see paragraphs ) Step 3: where apprpriate, an upwards adjustment made t the amunt arrived at after Steps 1 and 2, t ensure that the penalty has an apprpriate and effective deterrent effect (see paragraph 3.13); and Step 4: if applicable, ne r bth f the fllwing factrs may be applied t the figure determined fllwing Steps 1, 2 and 3:! a settlement discunt (see paragraphs 3.14 and )! an adjustment based n any serius financial hardship which the PSR cnsiders payment f the penalty wuld cause the participant, r if the penalty culd adversely impact the stability f r cnfidence in the UK financial system (see paragraphs 3.15 and ). 3.3 Fr the avidance f dubt, any settlement discunt des nt apply t disgrgement f any financial benefit derived directly frm the cmpliance failure (under the first element f paragraph 3.2). 5 March 2015 Payment Systems Regulatr

6 3.4 We recgnise that the verall penalty arrived at pursuant t ur framewrk apprach must be apprpriate and prprtinate t the relevant cmpliance failure. We may decrease the level f the penalty which wuld therwise be determined fllwing Steps 1 and 2 if we cnsider that it is disprprtinately high having regard t the seriusness, scale and effect f the cmpliance failure. In determining any deterrence uplift at Step 3, we will als ensure that the verall penalty is nt disprprtinate. 3.5 The factrs and circumstances relevant t determining the apprpriate level f penalties set ut belw are nt exhaustive. Nt all f the factrs r circumstances listed will necessarily be relevant in a particular case and there may be ther factrs r circumstances nt listed which are relevant. Our framewrk fr determining the level f penalties First element disgrgement 3.6 We will seek t deprive a participant f the ecnmic benefit derived directly frm, r attributable t, the cmpliance failure (which may include any prfit made r lss avided) where it is practicable t quantify this. We may als charge interest n the disgrgement. 3.7 Where the success f a participant s business mdel is dependent n failing t cmply with regulatry bligatins related t payment systems and services prvided by payment systems, and the cmpliance failure is at the cre f the participant s activities related t payment systems and services prvided by payment systems, we will seek t deprive the participant f all the financial benefit derived frm such activities. 3.8 Where a participant agrees t carry ut a remedial prgramme (which may include redress t cmpensate thse wh have suffered a lss r nt realised a prfit as a result f the cmpliance failure), r where we decide t impse a redress prgramme, the PSR will take this int cnsideratin. In such cases the final penalty might nt include a disgrgement element, r the disgrgement element might be reduced. Secnd element the penalty Step 1 the seriusness f the cmpliance failure 3.9 As nted in paragraphs , the penalty is calculated separately frm, and in additin t, any disgrgement. We will determine a figure fr the penalty that reflects the seriusness f the cmpliance failure. In many cases, the amunt f revenue generated by a participant frm a particular business activity is indicative f the harm r ptential harm that its cmpliance failure may cause. In such cases the PSR will determine a figure which will be based n a percentage f the annual grss revenues derived by the participant frm the business activity in the United Kingdm t which the cmpliance failure relates. 4 Where apprpriate the PSR may have regard t a participant s billings (i.e. the revenues inviced t third parties) in respect f the relevant business activity, fr example where revenues infrmatin is nt available r differs frm billings. 4 Annual revenues realised in the year prir t the PSR s final decisin ntice r terminatin f the relevant cmpliance failure, whichever is earlier. 6 March 2015 Payment Systems Regulatr

7 3.10 The fllwing factrs may be relevant t determining the apprpriate level f financial penalty: Deterrence: when determining the apprpriate level f penalty, we will have regard t the principal purpse fr which we impse sanctins, namely t prmte high standards f regulatry behaviur by deterring participants wh have cmmitted cmpliance failures frm cmmitting further cmpliance failures and helping t deter ther participants frm cmmitting similar cmpliance failures. The nature f the cmpliance failure: the fllwing cnsideratins may in particular be relevant: the nature f the requirement impsed n, r the directin given t, the participant which was nt cmplied with the duratin and/r frequency and/r repetitin f the cmpliance failure the extent t which the participant s senir management were aware f the cmpliance failure, the nature and extent f their invlvement in it, and the timing and adequacy f any steps taken t address it. The impact r ptential impact f the cmpliance failure n the fllwing may in particular be relevant: cmpetitiveness f and cmpetitin in the market fr payment systems r the markets fr services prvided by payment systems innvatin in the market fr payment systems r the markets fr services prvided by payment systems r the markets fr infrastructure t be used fr the purpses f perating payment systems the interests f thse wh use, r wh are likely t use, services prvided by regulated payment systems. The extent t which the cmpliance failure was deliberate r reckless. Step 2 mitigating and aggravating factrs 3.11 We may increase r decrease the amunt f the financial penalty arrived at after Step 1 (but nt including any amunt t be disgrged as set ut in paragraphs ) t take int accunt factrs which aggravate r mitigate the cmpliance failure The fllwing list f factrs may have the effect f aggravating r mitigating the cmpliance failure: the behaviur f the participant in bringing (r failing t bring) quickly, effectively and cmprehensively the cmpliance failure t ur attentin (r the attentin f ther relevant regulatrs, where apprpriate) the degree f cperatin the participant shwed during the investigatin f the cmpliance failure by us, r any ther relevant regulatr wrking with us, and the impact f this n ur ability t cnclude ur investigatin int the cmpliance failure prmptly and efficiently 7 March 2015 Payment Systems Regulatr

8 any remedial steps the participant has taken r has cmmitted t take since the cmpliance failure was identified, hw prmptly they were r will be taken, and their effectiveness whether the participant has arranged its resurces in such a way as t enable r avid disgrgement and/r payment f a financial penalty whether the participant had previusly been infrmed abut ur cncerns in relatin t the issue r behaviur in questin whether the participant had previusly undertaken t us r anther relevant regulatr nt t perfrm a particular act r nt t engage in particular behaviur which relates t the cmpliance failure, r has undertaken t perfrm a particular act r t engage in particular behaviur which relates t the cmpliance failure the extent t which the participant cncerned has cmplied with ur requests r requirements r thse f anther relevant regulatr relating t the issue the previus disciplinary recrd and general cmpliance histry f the participant in relatin t us r anther relevant regulatr actin taken against the participant by anther relevant regulatr that is relevant t the cmpliance failure in questin whether ur guidance r ther published materials had already raised relevant cncerns, and the nature and accessibility f such materials whether adequate steps have been taken by the participant t achieve a clear and unambiguus cmmitment t cmpliance with ur regulatry requirements thrughut the rganisatin (frm the tp dwn) tgether with apprpriate steps relating t regulatry risk identificatin, risk assessment, risk mitigatin and review activities 5 whether the failure is due (in whle r in part) t the actins f a third party and whether the participant was r ught t have been aware f it, and tk r ught t have taken reasnable steps t avid the cmpliance failure. the size, financial resurces and ther circumstances f the participant n whm the penalty is t be impsed. Step 3 adjustment fr deterrence 3.13 If we cnsider that the figure arrived at after Step 2 is insufficient t deter the participant wh cmmitted the cmpliance failure, r thers, frm cmmitting further r similar cmpliance failures, then we may increase the penalty. Circumstances where we may d this include (but are nt limited t): 5 The mere existence f cmpliance activities will nt be treated as a mitigating factr. The participant will need t demnstrate that the steps taken were apprpriate t the size f the business cncerned and its verall level f regulatry risk. It will als need t present evidence n the steps it tk t review its cmpliance activities, and change them as apprpriate, in light f the events that led t the investigatin at hand. We will nt, subject t sme exceptins, rdinarily regard the existence f a cmpliance prgramme as a factr t warrant an increase in the amunt f the penalty t be impsed against that participant fr the cmpliance failure. The exceptins include situatins where the purprted cmpliance prgramme had been used t facilitate the cmpliance failure, t mislead us r anther relevant regulatr as t the existence r nature f the cmpliance failure, r had been used in an attempt t cnceal the cmpliance failure. 8 March 2015 Payment Systems Regulatr

9 where we cnsider that the value f the penalty is t small in relatin t the cmpliance failure t meet ur bjective f credible and effective deterrence where previus actin by us r anther relevant regulatr in respect f the same r similar issues has failed t imprve the relevant behaviural standards f the participant which is the subject f ur actin and/r relevant industry behaviural standards; and where we cnsider that there is a risk that similar cmpliance failures will be cmmitted by the participant r by ther participants in the future in the absence f such an increase t the penalty. Step 4 discunts 3.14 The PSR and the participant n whm a penalty is t be impsed may seek t agree the amunt f any financial penalty and ther terms. In recgnitin f the benefits f such agreements, the amunt f the financial penalty which might therwise have been payable will be reduced t reflect the stage at which the PSR and the participant cncerned reached an agreement. The settlement discunt des nt apply t the disgrgement f any benefit calculated under the first element, pursuant t paragraphs Details f the PSR s plicy n settlement discunts are prvided at paragraphs Details f ur plicy n serius financial hardship are prvided at paragraphs March 2015 Payment Systems Regulatr

10 4. Serius financial hardship 4.1 Our starting pint is that we cnsider that it is nly in exceptinal cases that we wuld grant a discunt t a penalty based n a claim f serius financial hardship fr the reasns set ut in paragraphs We nte that many Payment Service Prviders (PSPs) authrised by the Financial Cnduct Authrity (FCA) r the Prudential Regulatin Authrity (PRA) are subject t their wn prudential requirements. 4.3 In the cntext f penalties impsed n a participant fr a cmpliance failure, we expect in particular that Operatrs 6 r Central Infrastructure Prviders 7 rganised as nt-fr-prfit entities shuld have in place effective arrangements with their wners, sharehlders, guarantrs r direct participants (as the case may be) t call upn such persns t cntribute sufficient funds frm time t time in rder t enable the Operatr r Central Infrastructure Prvider t meet its current and future debts and liabilities as they fall due. This wuld cver a debt wed t us as a penalty fr a cmpliance failure. 4.4 With respect t any claim that a decisin t impse a penalty n a participant culd adversely impact the stability f, r cnfidence in, the UK financial system, r where we cnsider that such a risk exists, we will liaise with the Bank f England befre taking such a decisin. 4.5 Subject t paragraphs , ur apprach t determining penalties is intended t ensure that financial penalties are prprtinate t the cmpliance failure. We recgnise that penalties may affect participants differently, and that we shuld cnsider whether a reductin in the prpsed penalty is apprpriate if the penalty wuld cause the subject f enfrcement actin serius financial hardship, and/r if this culd adversely impact the stability f, r cnfidence in, the UK financial system. Where a participant claims that payment f the penalty prpsed by us will cause it serius financial hardship, we will cnsider whether t reduce the prpsed penalty (resulting frm Steps 1, 2 and 3) nly if: the participant prvides verifiable evidence that payment f the penalty will cause them serius financial hardship and/r culd adversely impact the stability f r cnfidence in the UK financial system; and the participant prvides full, frank and timely disclsure f the verifiable evidence, and cperates fully in answering any questins asked by us abut its financial psitin. 4.6 The nus is n the participant t satisfy us that payment f the penalty will cause it serius financial hardship and/r that this culd adversely impact the stability f, r cnfidence in, the UK financial system. 6 As defined under s.42(3) FSBRA, in relatin t a payment system, Operatr means any persn with respnsibility under the system fr managing r perating it; and any reference t the peratin f a payment system includes a reference t its management. 7 An Infrastructure Prvider wh prvides Central Infrastructure t an Operatr under a cntract. Central Infrastructure means a package f systems and services prvided under cntract t an Operatr fr the purpse f perating the relevant payment system, and specifically the prcessing f payment transactins and funds transfers. The package must include at a minimum the prvisin f hardware and sftware (including related ancillary supprt services). It may include additinal services such as secure telecmmunicatins netwrks, facilities, physical security r supprt staff. Central Infrastructure may be prvided t the Operatr by an external prvider, r internally. 10 March 2015 Payment Systems Regulatr

11 4.7 There may be cases where, even thugh the participant has satisfied us that payment f the financial penalty wuld cause serius financial hardship, we cnsider the cmpliance failure t be s serius that it is nt apprpriate t reduce the penalty. We will cnsider all the circumstances f the case in determining whether this curse f actin is apprpriate, including whether (as applicable): an individual wh has the ability t exercise cntrl r material influence ver the management r peratin f the participant (Individual Cntrller): directly derived a financial benefit frm the cmpliance failure and, if s, the extent f that financial benefit that individual acted fraudulently r dishnestly with a view t persnal gain previus actin by us in respect f similar cmpliance failures has failed t imprve industry standards a participant r Individual Cntrller has spent mney r dissipated assets r therwise used financial structures in anticipatin f enfrcement actin by us r anther relevant regulatr with a view t frustrating r limiting the impact f actin taken by us r ther regulatrs. 11 March 2015 Payment Systems Regulatr

12 5. Settlement discunt 5.1 As set ut in paragraph 3.3 and fr the avidance f dubt, any settlement discunt des nt apply t disgrgement f any financial benefit derived directly frm the cmpliance failure (under the first element f paragraph 3.2). 5.2 Participants subject t enfrcement actin may be prepared t agree the amunt f any financial penalty and ther cnditins which we seek t impse by way f such actin. We recgnise the benefits f such agreements, in that they ffer the ptential fr securing earlier prtectin fr service-users and the saving f csts t the participant cncerned in cntesting the financial penalty and t the PSR itself. The penalty that might therwise be payable in respect f a cmpliance failure by the participant cncerned will therefre be reduced t reflect the timing f any settlement agreement. 5.3 In apprpriate cases ur apprach will be t discuss with the participant cncerned t agree in principle the amunt f a financial penalty having regard t ur statement f principles as set ut here. This starting figure (resulting frm Steps 1, 2 and 3) will take n accunt f the existence f the settlement discunt. Such amunt (A) will then be reduced by a percentage f A accrding t the stage in the prcess at which agreement is reached. The maximum percentage reductin shall be n mre than 30% f A. The resulting figure (B) will be the amunt actually payable by the participant cncerned in respect f the cmpliance failure. Hwever, where part f a prpsed penalty specifically equates t the disgrgement f any prfit accrued, r lss avided, then the percentage reductin will nt apply t that part f the penalty. 5.4 In certain circumstances, the participant cncerned may cnsider that it wuld have been pssible t reach a settlement at an earlier stage, and argue that it shuld be entitled t a greater percentage reductin in penalty. It may be, fr example, that we n lnger wish t pursue enfrcement actin in respect f all f the acts r missins previusly alleged t give rise t the cmpliance failure. In such cases, the participant cncerned might argue that it wuld have been prepared t agree an apprpriate penalty at an earlier stage and shuld therefre benefit frm a greater discunt. Equally, we may cnsider that greater penness frm the participant cncerned culd have resulted in an earlier settlement. 5.5 Arguments f this nature risk cmprmising the gals f greater clarity and transparency in respect f the benefits f early settlement, and invite dispute in each case as t when an agreement might have been pssible. It will nt usually be apprpriate therefre t argue fr a greater reductin in the amunt f penalty n the basis that settlement culd have been achieved earlier. 5.6 Hwever, in exceptinal cases we may accept that there has been a substantial change in the nature r seriusness f the actin being taken against the participant cncerned, and that an agreement wuld have been pssible at an earlier stage if the actin had cmmenced n a different fting. In such cases the PSR and the participant cncerned may agree that the amunt f the reductin in penalty shuld reflect the stage at which a settlement might therwise have been pssible. 5.7 In cases where we apply a discunt in the penalty fr settlement, the fact f settlement and the level f the discunt t the financial penalty that wuld therwise have been impsed by us will be set ut in the final decisin ntice. 12 March 2015 Payment Systems Regulatr

13 6. Apprtinment 6.1 In a case where we are prpsing t impse a financial penalty n a participant fr tw r mre separate and distinct cmpliance failures, we will cnsider whether it is apprpriate t identify in the warning ntice and final decisin ntice hw the penalty is apprtined between thse separate and distinct areas. Apprtinment will nt, hwever, generally be apprpriate in ther cases. 13 March 2015 Payment Systems Regulatr

14 7. Payment f financial penalties 7.1 Financial penalties will be paid t the Treasury after deducting ur enfrcement csts as prvided fr in Schedule 4 FSBRA, paragraph 10(1). 7.2 Financial penalties must be paid within the perid (usually 14 calendar days) that is stated n the final decisin ntice. Our plicy in relatin t reducing a penalty because its payment may cause a participant serius financial hardship is set ut in paragraphs We will cnsider agreeing t defer the due date fr payment f a penalty r accepting payment by instalments where, fr example, the participant requires a reasnable time t raise funds t enable the ttality f the penalty t be paid within a sensible perid. Each case will be treated n its facts and extra time will nt be given where the participant culd r shuld have rganised its business affairs in rder t allw it t pay within the specified time. 7.4 We will remain vigilant t any attempt by participants t seek t avid r pass n the financial cnsequences f any penalty t third parties in circumstances where it wuld be unlawful r inapprpriate t d s. 8 In this cntext, it shuld be nted that pursuant t sectin 42(8) FSBRA, the Bank f England is nt a participant within the meaning f sectin 42 FSBRA, and accrdingly participants n whm a penalty has been impsed shuld nt seek t pass n any liability fr penalties t the Bank f England, whether directly r indirectly as a cst recverable frm the Bank. 7.5 We have a mechanism which enables us t require participants t justify their fees and charges. Sectin 57 FSBRA enables us t vary any f the terms r fees r charges payable under relevant agreements, including (but nt limited t) agreements between a PSP with direct access t a regulated payment system and anther persn fr the purpses f enabling that ther persn t btain indirect access t the payment system. It wuld therefre be pen t an Indirect PSP t apply t us under sectin 57, shuld there be grunds fr cncern that the fees charged under their agreement with a Direct PSP t btain indirect access t a payment system, represent an attempt t indemnify the Direct PSP frm the financial cnsequences f penalties, r t therwise pass n the effects f such penalties t Indirect PSPs. 7.6 In meeting their bligatin t pay a penalty, participants must satisfy themselves that their arrangements are cnsistent with public plicy. Fr example, thse participants wh are als subject t Chapter 6 f the General Prvisins mdule f the FCA Handbk (GEN) 9 will be reminded that it cntains rules prhibiting a firm r member frm entering int, arranging, claiming n r making a payment under a cntract f insurance that is intended t have, r has, the effect f indemnifying a relevant party against a financial penalty. We expect participants in a regulated payment system wh are subject t GEN t cmply with thse prvisins as relevant fr the purpses f financial penalties impsed under FSBRA. We wuld typically expect participants in a regulated payment system wh are nt subject t GEN t cmply with these general principles. 8 Including, ptentially, any attempt by a participant t withdraw frm participatin in a payment system as a Direct PSP after a penalty is impsed r when a penalty appears t be reasnably likely in rder t avid meeting liability fr penalties impsed r likely t be impsed by us. 9 See 14 March 2015 Payment Systems Regulatr