IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA TF TF-56974) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR14.18 MILLION (US$20 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

Transcription

1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Document of The World Bank IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA TF TF-56974) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR14.18 MILLION (US$20 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA FOR A PROVINCIAL AND RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT June 22, 2012 Report No: ICR2229 Infrastructure Unit Sustainable Development Department East Asia and Pacific Region

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2011) Currency Unit = Riel (KHR) KHR 1 = US$ US$1 = KHR 4,030 FISCAL YEAR January 1 December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ADB Asian Development Bank NPRS National Poverty Reduction Strategy AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome NPV Net Present Value CAS Country Assistance Strategy NR National Road DCA Development Credit Agreement PAD Project Appraisal Document EMP Environmental Management Plan PDO Project Development Objective ERR Economic Rate of Return PDPWT Provincial Department of Public Works and Transport FM Financial Management PDRD Provincial Department of Rural Development GGF Good Governance Framework PHRD Policy and Human Resource Development, Japan HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus PIU Project Implementation Unit IDA International Development Association PPF Project Preparation Facility IFAPER Integrated Fiduciary Assessment and Public Expenditure Review (Bank) PR Provincial Road ILO International Labor Organization PRIP Provincial and Rural Infrastructure Project INT Department of Institutional Integrity, World Bank RAMP Road Asset Management Project (Cr. 4442) IPA Independent Procurement Agent RGC Royal Government of Cambodia KPI Key Performance Indicator RMDS Road Management Decision Support System LBAT Labor-Based Appropriate Technology RMMS Road Maintenance and Management System LCRS Location Referencing and Condition Survey ROMAPS Road Management and Planning System M&E Monitoring and Evaluation RRP Road Rehabilitation Project (Cr. 3181) MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance SBST Single Bituminous Surface Treatment MPWT Ministry of Public Works and Transport TOR Terms of Reference MRD Ministry of Rural Development UXO Unexploded Ordnance NGO Non-Governmental Organization VOC Vehicle Operating Cost Vice President: Country Director: Sector Managers: Project Team Leader: ICR Team Leader: Pamela Cox, EAP Annette Dixon, EACTF N. Vijay Jagannathan, EASIN and Julia Fraser (Acting), EASTS Siele Silue, EASIN Siele Silue, EASIN

3 KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA Provincial and Rural Infrastructure Project CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information i B. Key Dates. i C. Ratings Summary.i D. Sector and Theme Codes ii E. Bank Staff...ii F. Results Framework Analysis..ii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs vi H. Restructuring. vi I. Disbursement Graph...vi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes Assessment of Outcomes Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance Lessons Learned Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing Annex 2. Outputs by Component Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and Comments on Draft ICR Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Annex 10. Transcript of Connecting the Ethnic People Annex 11. Pictures of Roads Before and After Improvement IBRD Map No

4

5 A. Basic Information Country: Cambodia Project Name: Provincial and Rural Infrastructure Project Project ID: P L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-38220,TF ,TF ICR Date: 06/20/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: Original Total Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 12.72M Environmental Category: A Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Public Works and Transportation Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA XDR 14.18M Disbursed Amount: XDR 11.60M B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 06/20/2001 Effectiveness: 03/16/ /16/2004 Appraisal: 06/02/2003 Restructuring(s): 12/27/2010 Approval: 09/11/2003 Mid-term Review: 07/03/ /03/2006 Closing: 09/30/ /31/2011 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Risk to Development Outcome: Bank Performance: Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory High Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Moderately Moderately Quality at Entry: Government: Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory Overall Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory i

6 C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments (if Indicators Performance any) Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Yes Problem Project at any time Yes (Yes/No): DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: Unsatisfactory Quality at Entry (QEA): Quality of Supervision (QSA): None None Rating D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 9 9 Roads and highways Sub-national government administration 8 8 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction HIV/AIDS Injuries and non-communicable diseases Other accountability/anti-corruption Rural services and infrastructure E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Pamela Cox Jemal-ud-din Kassum Country Director: Annette Dixon Ian C. Porter Sector Manager: Narasimham Vijay Jagannathan Jitendra N. Bajpai Project Team Leader: Siele Silue Sally L. Burningham ICR Team Leader: ICR Primary Author: Siele Silue Imogene B. Jensen F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The development objective is to assist the Kingdom of Cambodia to enhance the livelihood of the peoples residing in the provinces of Kampong Thom, Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear and Siem Reap by providing sustainable access to markets and essential services through (i) a program of road rehabilitation and maintenance; (ii) a program of capacity building and training; and (iii) development of improved public policies and strategies. ii

7 Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) (a) PDO Indicator(s) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Indicator 1 : RMMS established within MRD Value quantitative or Qualitative) No RMMS established RMMS is operational Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years RMMS partially established but not yet operational Date achieved 09/11/ /30/ /31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) No computerized system is currently being used by MRD to prepare prioritized road maintenance plans. ROMAPS was installed in two PRIP provinces but MRD lacks funds to pay servicing fees & is developing its own system using Microsoft Access. Indicator 2 : Direct project beneficiaries Value quantitative or 708 1, Qualitative) Date achieved 09/11/ /30/ /31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 3 : Value quantitative or Qualitative) Out of 132 villages in the project area, 1059 (55%) had sustainable access to good allweather roads at project close. Female beneficiaries 247,406 Date achieved 12/31/2011 Comments No baseline value is specified because this core indicator was added when mandated (incl. % during implementation. The value reported is the estimated number of women in the achievement) villages served by the project roads. Indicator 4 : RMMS established within the MPWT. Value quantitative or Qualitative) No RMMS established RMMS is operational RMMS is partially established Date achieved 09/11/ /30/ /31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) An inventory of all road assets was done & MPWT staff were trained, but problems with data interpretation precludes the system's use to develop prioritized road maintenance plans. iii

8 (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) iv Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Indicator 1 : Roads rehabilitated, non-rural Value (quantitative 0 km 300 km 250 km km or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/11/ /30/ /31/ /31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) The original target of 300 km was reduced to 250 km during the December 2010 project restructuring. Achievement of the original target was 88% and of the revised target 105%. Indicator 2 : Road rehabilitated, rural Value (quantitative 0 km 300 km 80 km 84 km or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/11/ /30/ /31/ /31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 3 : Value (quantitative or Qualitative) The original target of 300 km was reduced to 80 km during the December 2010 project restructuring. Achievement of the original target was 29% and of the revised target 105%. Number of km of secondary and provincial roads maintained 0 km 300 km 738 km Date achieved 09/11/ /30/ /31/2011 Comments Achieved. By project close, MPWT was routinely maintaining 738 km of roads (incl. % annually, exceeding the target by nearly 150%. achievement) Indicator 4 : Number of km of tertiary roads maintained Value (quantitative km 602 km or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/11/ /30/ /31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved. By project close, MRD was routinely maintaining 738 km of roads annually, exceeding the target by about 100%. Number of MRD staff trained at central and regional levels in policy design, strategy Indicator 5 : development, public involvement methods, decentralized program management, contract management, monitoring, social and environment. Value (quantitative 0 No target 215 or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/11/ /30/ /31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) No original target was established. Training was conducted in accordance with a training plan that covered the prescribed areas.

9 Indicator 6 : Integrated planning and budgeting of roads adopted in MPWT at national level. Value Planning and Poor planning and (quantitative budgeting system budgeting system or Qualitative) operational Partially completed Date achieved 09/11/ /30/ /31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Partially achieved, as a 3-year rolling program for public investment has been developed, but is not yet fully operational. MPWT now submits annual budget requests to MEF and receives allocations for specific categories of road works. Indicator 7 : Institutional reform adopted. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Road Law endorsed by Council of Ministers Date achieved 12/31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) The Road Law is being developed in parallel to PRIP and thus is not a direct output of PRIP. The Law is important to clarify roles & responsibilities for the sector, including at the provincial level, and thus was tracked along with other PRIP outputs. Number of MPWT staff trained in policy design, strategy development, public Indicator 8 : involvement methods, decentralized program management, and contract management and monitoring. Value (quantitative 0 No target 460 or Qualitative) Date achieved 08/13/ /30/ /31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 9 : Value (quantitative or Qualitative) No original target was established. Training was conducted in accordance with a training plan and in a range of venues. Number of people educated on preventive measures (HIV/AIDS, Road Safety, UXO) 0 No target 15,000 Date achieved 08/13/ /30/ /31/2011 Comments No original target was set, but with 15,000 people participating in community (incl. % awareness activities, coverage was fully adequate. achievement) v

10 G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Actual Disbursements DO IP Archived (USD millions) 1 11/07/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory /14/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory /23/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory /14/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory /23/2006 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory /28/2007 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory /21/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /19/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /06/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory /26/2010 Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory /18/2011 Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory /11/2012 Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory H. Restructuring (if any) Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring DO 12/27/2010 U MU I. Disbursement Profile IP Amount Disbursed at Reason for Restructuring & Key Restructuring Changes Made in USD millions Extension of closing date; alignment of KPI vi

11 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. At appraisal in mid-2003, Cambodia was experiencing its fifth year of relative peace following nearly 30 years of civil strife and economic isolation. The population was extremely poor, with 36 percent of the population living below the poverty line and a per capita income of US$276 per annum. Cambodia s road network comprised about 38,250 km, with an average density of about 0.3 km/person. However, as was true of much of Cambodia s economic infrastructure, about 60 percent of the road network was in poor or bad condition and often impassible during the rainy season. The presence of mines/unexploded ordnances (UXOs) further limited mobility, especially in the northern region of the country. 2. The transport sector was deemed of high priority because, as with much of Cambodia s economic infrastructure, the country s roads and carrying capacity had been severely damaged by the war. Since the mid-1990s, a concerted effort by Government, with the support of the donor community, had been made to reestablish the country s main national road infrastructure. About 1,500 km of national roads and 11,000 km of rural roads were rehabilitated or reconstructed during this period. Government and donor support was also being directed towards the most basic needs at the village level through community driven development projects, and one project had reconstructed tertiary roads in six provinces located in the southeastern part of the country. 3. The Provincial and Rural Infrastructure Project (PRIP) complemented these other activities as it focused on the road network s missing middle, that is, the part of the network between the national network and village access roads/tracks. This part of the network was critical for the reintegration of severely war affected people and areas into the national economy, and for the creation of opportunities for employment in rural areas and sustained livelihoods. The needs were especially dire in the far north of the country, as this area was the last area within Cambodia to experience peace. 4. At appraisal there was increasing concern that post-war reconstruction gains could not be sustained. With respect to roads, both the Government s National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) and the Integrated Fiduciary Assessment and Public Expenditure Review (IFAPER, World Bank, 2003) highlighted the need to shift from the post-war focus on emergency repair and reconstruction to improved planning and management of roads. Key elements of such a shift were predictable funding for roads, timely road maintenance, prioritization of interventions in accordance with economic principles, and transparency and accountability in the use of funds. All were important if the gains from repair and reconstruction of approximately five percent of the total network were to last. 5. The Bank s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS, 2005) sought, among other things, to provide greater access for the poor to basic social services and economic opportunities. Since about 85 percent of the population and 90 percent of the poor resided in rural areas, a main focus of the CAS was on the provision of rural infrastructure services and other means to promote rural development. The four provinces selected for PRIP were in the far north of the country and the 1

12 poorest and most isolated provinces in all of Cambodia. The Project directly supported those CAS objectives that were directed towards: a) improving governance through capacity building and road sector reforms aimed at strengthening provincial management of secondary and tertiary roads, local participation in road selection, and transparency in contract management; b) rehabilitating physical infrastructure at the subnational level to improve access to markets and essential services; and c) creating opportunities for local contractors and consultants, along with technical assistance and training to enhance their capacity to carry out works and provide services. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 6. The development objective was to assist the Kingdom of Cambodia to enhance the livelihood of the peoples residing in the provinces of Kampong Thom, Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear and Siem Reap by providing sustainable access to markets and essential services through (i) a program of road rehabilitation and maintenance; (ii) a program of capacity building and training; and (iii) development of improved public policies and strategies. 7. The key performance indicators given in the PAD were: Increase in traffic levels including volume of goods and passenger traffic; Reduction in travel time along the project roads between major provincial centers in the four provinces and increase in number of villages linked to higher level roads in good condition; Reduction in transport costs; and Increase in kilometers of roads under the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT) and the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) receiving regular routine maintenance. 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 8. The PDO was not revised, but some indicators were modified in the 2010 restructuring. Details are in Section Main Beneficiaries 9. At appraisal the project s primary target population was defined as all those living, working and/or settling along the project area roads in the four provinces of Kampong Thom, Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear and Siem Reap (rural home to 1.5 million people out of a total population at the time of 12.6 million people). The beneficiary population included road users such as subsistence and surplus farmers, employees in the non-farm sector, health attendants and civil servants, traders and business people, transport providers, as well as consumers in the small and provincial towns, local contractors and consultants, and those directly employed in the rehabilitation and maintenance of the roads. The latter included unskilled laborers from the 2

13 project provinces, an estimated 40 percent of whom were women. Secondary beneficiaries included MPWT and MRD staff at national and provincial levels who would be trained in priority road maintenance and management, planning, financial management, quality control, road design, etc. 1.5 Original Components Component 1. Maintenance Management (US$1.0 million): The project was to support (a) installation and operation of road maintenance management systems at the national level in MPWT and MRD and in their respective Provincial Departments located in Kampong Thom, Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear and Siem Reap, and (b) annual programs of routine maintenance on all roads in good and fair condition in the four project provinces. Routine maintenance was to be funded from the government s annual budget allocations. Component 2. Rehabilitation and Periodic Maintenance of Secondary-national, Provincial and Tertiary Roads (US$18.65 million): The component included a program of rehabilitation and periodic maintenance in the four project provinces covering: (a) approximately 300 km of strategic secondary-national and provincial roads under MPWT; and (b) approximately 300 km of tertiary roads under MRD. The works were to be contracted out and a program to develop qualified private contractors was to be run concurrently to increase private sector involvement in the road sector. To the extent practicable, these works were to be carried out using labor-based appropriate technology (LBAT) to maximize local employment. Component 3. Capacity Building Program (US$2.6 million): The project included a program of institutional capacity strengthening for MPWT and MRD at the national level and their four Provincial Departments. Component 4. Policy and Strategy Development (US$0.20 million): The component was to support a program to improve MPWT and MRD policy and strategy development in the areas of (a) integrated planning and budgeting of roads; (b) least cost life-cycle standards; (c) use of appropriate technology; (d) mainstreaming of road maintenance; and (e) institutional reform. The component also was to support on-going policy development in the transport sector. Component 5. Community Awareness Programs (US$0.55 million): The component was to support community awareness programs aimed at increasing awareness of road safety risks, HIV/AIDS, road planning and access to public information, mine and UXO risks and mine clearance programs. 1.6 Revised Components n.a. 1.7 Other significant changes 10. Project Restructuring. The project underwent two Level II restructurings. The first was in response to a Bank Department of Institutional Integrity (INT) investigation that uncovered evidence of corruption, collusion and fraud in four ongoing Bank-assisted projects in Cambodia. 3

14 In the case of PRIP, the investigation uncovered evidence of fraud and corruption in the procurement and/or administration of six contracts (two in MPWT and four in MRD). 11. PRIP disbursements were suspended from June 5, 2006 to February 1, 2007, except for contracts associated with preparation of the financial audit and the construction of two essential bridges on a district road. A total of SDR million (US$2.29 million equivalent) was cancelled (and refunded by Government), thereby reducing the Credit amount to SDR million. Schedule 4 of the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) was amended to require the borrower to: a) select an independent procurement agent (IPA) to undertake all remaining procurement activities under PRIP; b) reassign project management responsibilities from the project implementation units in MPWT and MRD to regular functional units within each ministry, respectively; c) acquire full-time engineering supervision services with responsibility for oversight, approval and control of contracts; d) engage an external technical auditor; and e) adopt a joint MPWT/MRD anti-corruption action plan for PRIP. All conditions were met and the suspension was lifted on February 1, The second restructuring, countersigned by the Borrower on December 31, 2010, made changes to the performance indicators to bring the project outcomes and indicators into better alignment: (a) Indicators measuring results that could not be directly attributed to the project were removed, such as increased use of health services, increased use of education services, volume and revenue of tourism, increased flow of information in rural areas, increased number of non-farm employment opportunities, and increased number of NGOs active in the area; and (b) output targets were revised downwards to reflect what could realistically be accomplished within the time and funding available (see Section 2.2). 13. Project Schedule. The closing date was extended three times. The first extension, from September 30, 2007 to September 30, 2009, was to make up for time lost due to the suspension and slow start-up of the IPA. The second, from September 30, 2009 to December 31, 2010, was to enable completion of the second annual work program and capacity building activities funded under the PHRD grant (TF56974). The third extension, from December 31, 2010 to December 31, 2011, was to complete a final six civil works packages that would provide basic all-weather access and connectivity to higher order roads for a number of poor rural communities. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 14. Strategic relevance and approach. The project s objectives were aligned with the Bank s and Government s priorities as reflected in both the CAS and the NPRS. The design of the project was appropriate and timely given its focus on the sub-national network; this portion of the network had received almost no attention during the post-war period and many of the roads 4

15 were impassible. The northern area addressed in the project had been hard-hit by the war, but similar conditions could be found throughout Cambodia. The idea was to use PRIP to address the road access needs within and among the four poorest and most isolated provinces, and subsequently, with the help of other development partners, to extend coverage to other provinces. 15. Project preparation. Project preparation benefitted from analytical work carried out under the Road Rehabilitation Project (RRP, Cr KH, FY99) and a PHRD grant (TF26422). The former provided initial thinking on transport sector policy and strategy, including proposals for legislative and institutional reform. The latter enabled a broader and more intensive analysis of rural access needs and solutions at the provincial and district levels. The focus of the PHRD grant in particular was on rural infrastructure needs (not just transport), which accounts for the name of the project Provincial Rural Infrastructure Project. However, in recognition of the limitations of the IDA allocation for Cambodia overall, the Grant Agreement was amended after six months to focus solely on rural roads and transport. 16. Safeguards. The project was rated Category A and triggered Environmental Assessment, Natural Habitats, Cultural Property, Indigenous Peoples and Involuntary Resettlement. Three important protected areas were located within the four provinces: Beng Per Wildlife Sanctuary, Phnom Kulen National Park, and Kulen Promtep Wildlife Sanctuary. Safeguard preparation was thorough, commensurate with the project s rating. This was important as the investments would occur in areas that were largely unfamiliar with Bank/international requirements and best practice. The likely incidence of problems was reduced to the extent that the roads were being reconstructed on existing rights-of-way and the alignments were adjusted to avoid resettlement wherever possible. In addition to consultations around environmental and social impacts, the project enlisted the support of NGOs to design and implement public awareness campaigns for road safety, HIV/AIDS, mine and unexploded ordnance security, and for monitoring of civil works on the ground. 17. Project scope. The main focus of PRIP was on provision of road access, and in so doing, the development of capacity at both the national and provincial levels and of the local contractor base. PRIP also adopted an inclusive participatory planning approach that was new to Cambodia, and which subsequently was mainstreamed in the planning for roads. The project did not explicitly follow up on the broader concepts of transport sector policy and strategy development, but rather focused on a few specific areas, such as integrated planning and budgeting, that would lead to improved management of the sector. This was deemed reasonable at the time, as ADB (through mutual agreement among the development partners and government) was taking the lead in this area. The Bank s contribution to policy and strategy development was being handled under the RRP, which overlapped with PRIP and closed in September Lessons incorporated into the project design. The PRIP was the second post-war IDAfinanced engagement in the transport sector. Although the RRP was still underway while PRIP was being prepared, the following lessons had emerged. The first was that the project design needs to be simple and manageable in line with the limited institutional and human resource capacity of the country. This lesson was not fully taken on board, as noted in Quality at Entry shortcomings below. The second was that client engagement and ownership are important. The 5

16 project was designed to build on existing structures and, departing from the norm, to be implemented in large part by the provincial offices of MPWT and MRD. The participatory planning and decision-making approach highlighted above helped to build ownership within the various levels of government, as well as among commune representatives and residents. A related lesson was that civil society involvement builds ownership and requires outreach. This lesson was addressed by the provincial level capacity-building activities, communityoutreach/informational sessions lead by staff from MPWT and MRD, and NGO engagement noted above. 19. Quality at entry shortcomings. The excellent targeting of the project to address the mobility needs at the provincial level in Cambodia s four poorest provinces and build capacity at both national and provincial level was important but compromised by five less satisfactory elements as follows: a) Poorly defined results framework. This is discussed in more detail in Section 2.3, but the main point is that the PDO was overly broad. Data on many of the outcome indicators were hard to collect and not directly attributable to the project; b) Underestimation of the high governance risk in the project design. The risk framework accorded the project an overall rating of S (substantial risk). However the only risk rated H (high) was that a road maintenance policy and maintenance financing mechanism would not be established within the three-year time frame of the project. The risk associated with security and rule of law was rated M (modest), while the risk associated with transparent competitive tendering processes of public road works was rated S. In retrospect both of these risks should have been rated H; c) Failure to account for the severe capacity constraints of the implementing agencies in the project design. MRD, for example, was a relatively new ministry and inexperienced in road planning and management, while MPWT was more experienced but underresourced and staffed. The decision to create what were essentially two separate implementing units complicated implementation and capacity building arrangements and contributed to many of the problems that emerged as the project unfolded. The four year project implementation period was too short given the capacity constraints, especially in the remote northern provinces; d) Overly complex project design relative to the needs of the four project provinces. The four provinces were selected because of their extreme poverty and urgent basic reconstruction needs. At appraisal this area of Cambodia remained in post-conflict, as characterized by sporadic violence, large numbers of displaced persons and limited mobility due to the lack of passable roads and presence of UXOs. While broader policy and institutional development objectives were important for the sector overall, the needs and difficulty of working in these provinces called for a simple project design focused on improvements in basic access and hence livelihoods, as per the PDO; and e) Lack of due diligence in vetting technical designs and cost estimates. This was most apparent in the incomplete designs and unrealistically low cost estimates prepared by ILO for MRD s low volume roads. The target of 300 rehabilitated km of MRD s tertiary road network was unrealistic relative to the funding available. 6

17 20. The project quality at entry was moderately unsatisfactory. The rating reflects both positive aspects, such as the focus on accessibility needs in the four poorest provinces, the consultative process adopted and well conceived awareness activities, and less positive aspects, such as the poorly defined results framework and underestimation of risk, the overly complex design and implementation arrangements, and lack of due diligence in vetting technical designs and costs. 2.2 Implementation 21. The project was designed with an implementation period of about four years, but with one suspension and three extensions, ended up lasting nearly eight years. As noted in Section 1.7, the project was restructured twice, with each restructuring initiating a separate phase of project implementation as follows: a) The first phase was from project effectiveness in 2004 to the suspension of the project on June 6, The suspension was accompanied by cancellation of SDR million (US$2.29 million equivalent), for the six contracts that had been misprocured. This phase focused on implementation of the first year works plan, which covered km (244.5 km MPWT; km MRD) of laterite, single bituminous surface treatment (SBST) and double bituminous surface treatment (DBST) works, six wooden bridges (route 210), a bailey bridge, routine maintenance of km ( km MPWT; 457 km MRD), and construction of two provincial offices in Oddar Meanchey Province (one for the Provincial Department of Public Works and Transport (PDPWT) and one for the Provincial Department of Rural Development (PDRD)). b) The second phase was from the suspension in June 2006 to the second restructuring in September The suspension covered all activities under the project except for financial auditing services and two bridges deemed essential for access from Salavisai Commune to the Stoung District road. On September 1, 2006, the DCA was amended to include the conditions to lift the suspension and carry out the project through completion (details in Section 1.7). All conditions were met and the suspension was lifted on February 1, 2007, enabling work to begin on the second year works plan seven months before the original closing date. c) The third phase was from the second restructuring in September 2010 through the end of the project on December 31, The second restructuring, approved December 31, 2010, acknowledged that the initial rehabilitation targets could not be achieved within the remaining time and budget. Thus the number of km of secondary-national and provincial roads to be rehabilitated was reduced from 300 to 250 km, and of tertiary roads reduced from 300 to 80 km. Outcome indicators not directly attributable to the project were also removed, leaving those that measured transport costs, road access, capacity building within the transport sector and road management. 22. The first phase began well, and as of February 2005, half of the Credit amount had been committed in signed contracts. However by this time complaints of procurement irregularities had already been received, and an investigation by the Bank s Department of 7

18 Institutional Integrity (INT) was underway. By mid-2005, more shortcomings were apparent. Sub-standard designs were resulting in multiple variation orders and cost overruns, roads supervision at the provincial level was inadequate, routine maintenance was not being carried out (especially by MPWT, as MRD was implementing community-based routine maintenance contracts), and baseline data were still uncollected. 23. The suspension lasted eight months, but the project did not get back on track for the better part of three years. The only civil works completed during this second phase were the two exempted bridges (completed on January 6, 2007). The Project Implementation Units (PIUs) were dismantled by mid-2007 and their staff reintegrated into units within the ministries. Overdue audit reports were submitted, and baseline data for the year 2007 were supplied in the first quarter of The IPA was selected in December 2006, but mobilization was slow and the IPA s inception report was only issued in January The IPA s performance did not improve, and the first IPA failed to complete procurement of a single contract. The unsatisfactory performance of the IPA delayed the selection of the Engineer and Technical Auditor (see 1.7(c)+(d)), both newly imposed requirements. Although the implementing staff tried to restart the project, at most levels staff commitment and enthusiasm had been lost. Unlike the original consultants whose role was to work alongside and advise their counterparts, the new positions were to carry out their functions on behalf of their counterparts, thus compromising the capacity building feature of the project. 25. In spite of these difficulties, the civil works in the third phase proceeded well, due in large part to the implementing agencies renewed energy and follow-through during this final phase, complemented by intensive supervision by the Bank. The first IPA had been replaced, and while there continued to be procurement delays, the contracts were awarded and the works and supervision proceeded accordingly. By this time much less could be accomplished, as the cost of labor and materials had increased as a result of the delays and inflation arising from the 2008 economic downturn and aftermath. The second restructuring brought the project into alignment with the remaining resources and time to completion. Routine maintenance funding, which had been slow to materialize, improved and ultimately exceeded project targets. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 26. Design. As noted in Section 2.1, the key performance indicators and means of data collection were poorly designed. The key part of the PDO to enhance the livelihood of the peoples residing in the provinces. was set at too high a level, as the project was targeting mobility, one step removed from livelihoods. Indicators were specified that could not be uniquely attributed to the roads, such as increased use of health services, increased use of education services, increased volume and revenue of tourism, increased flow of information in rural areas, increased number of non-farm employment opportunities, and increased number of NGOs active in the project area. The improved roads could ensure access but not the availability of the services to be accessed. Many of the indicators were not readily quantifiable, such as increased flow of information, and it was not clear how the indicators were intended to be measured as the Data Collection Strategy column of the Project Design Summary was left 8

19 blank. A social survey was conducted during project preparation (Annex 5), but the findings were not reflected in the monitoring plan, and there was no beneficiary reassessment at the project close. 27. Implementation. Baseline data were not collected during project preparation or at the project start. The initial data were for the year 2007, after the first restructuring and three years after the project became effective. Thereafter the Key Performance Indicator (KPI) table was updated annually, although some of the data were unreliable or unavailable. As noted in Section 2.2, the outcome indicators were only brought into alignment during the second restructuring in December Utilization. There is no evidence to suggest that the data collected to populate the M&E framework was or will in the future be used for decision-making purposes. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 29. Procurement. The project experienced major fiduciary issues with misprocurement declared on six contracts as stated in Section 1.7. A further procurement problem arose in mid- 2009, with evidence of collusion among bidders for construction of drainage structures on MRD and MPWT roads. This required rebidding of two packages of civil works, but as there was no evidence of government staff involvement, the Bank s approach in this case was to support MPWT and MRD in their handling of deceptive contractor practices. The experience highlights that while strength of the project was the packaging of works to encourage participation of the local contracting industry, it was also a weakness. As the number of local firms with capacity to take on even the smaller works contracts was limited, it was relatively easy for collusion and other corrupt practices to take place. 30. Financial management. Although serious problems were encountered in financial management (FM) in the early years of project implementation, remedial actions were taken by the PIUs, and FM received satisfactory or moderately satisfactory ratings throughout most of the project. A Financial Management Standard was prepared and rolled out under the project (2009). Both MPWT and MRD encountered difficulties in finding and retaining qualified FM staff, and the Financial Management Advisor position in each ministry remained vacant throughout much of the first two phases of project implementation (and again for MRD before project close). Audit compliance was especially poor in the early years, as the first three audit reports were seriously overdue and FM was downgraded to unsatisfactory during Audit compliance improved, however, from disclaimer of opinion (no opinion provided) for 2004 due to misprocurement, to unqualified (clean) audit opinions thereafter. The unqualified audit opinions of later years indicated that funds were used for the intended purposes from a fiduciary perspective. 31. Environment and Social. PRIP was designed with a number of good environmental and social features, and these were carried out as planned. These included: (i) a participatory road selection process for planning and preparation of the project s annual work; (ii) establishment of Coordination Committees on Social and Environmental Impacts and Work Quality in the project communes of MPWT work (MRD used existing Road Maintenance Committees in the 9

20 communes) to connect directly with the project; (iii) posting of information on signboards along the project roads, including project cost and time frame, applicable safeguard frameworks and grievance redress mechanisms (with contact information and comment/complaint boxes, and also posted on MPWT and MRD websites); (iv) ensuring that a Grievance Redress Committee was available in every project commune where local people could log their complaints/grievances; (v) hiring of local people by the contractors; and (vi) conducting road safety and HIV/AIDS awareness activities for the project stakeholders. 32. Environmental and Social Safeguard compliance was satisfactory or moderately satisfactory throughout most of project implementation. Environmental management plans (EMPs) were included in works bidding documents, social and environmental training of provincial offices was carried out. Some problems occurred in areas affected by the routine maintenance activities and in the environmental management of road works on NR 64 (which traversed part of the Boeng Per Wildlife Sanctuary). In the latter case, a review mission in mid found that the contractor had failed to comply with environmental protection measures within the Wildlife Sanctuary. This triggered a review of natural habitats in the four PRIP provinces, with special focus on the road segments proposed in the upcoming work plans and recommendations for improved management and mitigation in protected areas. In July 2007, the Social and Environmental Unit of MPWT began to take an active role in overseeing environmental and social issues under the project, starting with NR 64 and carrying on throughout the second works program. Two publications Final Standard Guidelines for Environmental Safeguards and Final Standard Guidelines for Implementation of Social Safeguards were finalized in and made publicly available in Khmer and English. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 33. PRIP is the middle project of a three-project sequence that started with RRP and will conclude with the Road Asset Management Project (RAMP, Cr. 4442), which is scheduled to close on September 30, Institutional reform elements, such as the approval of a new Roads Law, began under RRP and are expected to come to fruition during the next calendar year. Regular budget submissions are now being prepared by the two ministries and the RGC provides regular allocations for road maintenance of the maintainable network that exceed the PRIPmandated levels. The ongoing development of the Road Maintenance Management System (RMMS) has been formally transferred to RAMP, but only for MPWT. As MRD s Road Management and Planning System (ROMAPS) depend on proprietary software, MRD is now developing its own spreadsheet-based system using Microsoft ACCESS. Other gains, such as the participatory approach to planning, have been internalized into MPWT s planning system for roads. More problematic is the retention of trained staff, as civil service reforms related to conditions of service and remuneration have been rescinded but not replaced. Also uncertain are future arrangements for sustainable financing of periodic maintenance and reconstruction of subnational roads. 34. For reasons unrelated to this project, no new transport sector project is presently included in the Bank s pipeline. If in the future, follow up engagements are contemplated, they could include: (a) a follow-up project that focuses on the subnational network and extends the coverage of PRIP to other provinces; and/or (b) a sector-wide approach that engages at a higher 10

21 level to address the larger institutional and financial issues in collaboration with government and the other development partners. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 35. The project objective remains highly relevant to Cambodia s development priorities of inclusive growth, improved rural livelihoods and strengthened institutions. The Rural Roads Policy recently endorsed by the Cabinet of Ministers articulates the goal of year-around access for all, although how this will be managed is not elaborated. The project objective is consistent with the third growth rectangle in the current World Bank CAS ( ), as it focuses on rehabilitation of physical infrastructure (in particular transport infrastructure) to support improved productivity and diversification and access to essential services. The Bank s updated IFAPER (Report No KH, November 30, 2011) identifies agriculture as both a mainstay of Cambodia s economy and important source of growth, but cites lack of investment in rural infrastructure, particularly roads, as a serious constraint to development of competitive agriculture. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 36. The overarching PDO - to enhance the livelihood of the peoples residing in the four target provinces by providing sustainable access to markets and essential services - was set high (at the level of impact rather than outcome), especially when taken in conjunction with the original outcome indicators (in effect for seven out of eight implementation years) of increased use of health and education services, volume of tourism, non-farm employment and increased flow of information. The causal relationship exists to the extent that good quality all-weather, mine-free roads and bridges are essential but not sufficient to achieve these outcomes. 37. The link between rural roads and improved livelihoods was, however, well documented. Studies published around the time of appraisal, such as Design and Appraisal of Rural Transport Infrastructure; Ensuring Basic Access for Rural Communities (April 2001), advocated provision of least-cost basic access in rural areas to ensure reliable, all-season passability for the locally prevailing means of transport. This World Bank technical paper cited evidence of enrollment of girls in Bhutan that was three times higher in connected villages as compared to unconnected ones; and in Andhra Pradesh, India, a female literacy rate that was 60 percent higher in villages with all-season roads compared to those without. Negative impacts of improved roads, such as HIV/AIDs transmission and increased numbers and fatality of accidents, were also documented. The community awareness elements of PRIP were designed to mitigate some of these risks. The project design and results framework adopted for PRIP thus reflected established principles at the time. 11

22 38. Field visits, interviews and other anecdotal evidence collected after the PRIP roads were improved confirm that the presence of good roads and bridges has improved the standard of living, incomes and opportunities available to residents along the roads and adjacent communities. This evidence indicates that school attendance and visits to health clinics increased in response to improved road surfaces and de-mining activities carried out under the project. More girls now attend school beyond second grade. Residents of three communes reported transport cost reductions of 50 percent or more, and travel times shortened from days to hours. Trips that required an overnight stay can now be completed within one day. Bus services traverse the improved roads and middlemen come to the villages to purchase agricultural products. Some crop diversification has occurred, as getting produce to market is faster and smoother. These experiences are recounted by residents in a short film entitled Connecting the Ethnic People, a transcript of which is included as Annex The main PRIP intervention supporting access to essential services and thus improved livelihoods was the rehabilitation and periodic maintenance of sub-national roads in the four provinces. In total, the MPWT rehabilitated km of secondary national and provincial roads and six bridges, and MRD rehabilitated about 84 km of rural roads and two bridges (selected before and after pictures are shown in Annex 11). As these roads had been selected in a participatory planning exercise, they were the roads residents deemed most essential for access to markets and services, for connecting to the national road network, and/or for linking provincial centers together. The efficacy of this approach was confirmed by the anecdotal evidence noted above. The resilience of the structures built under the project, plus the effectiveness of regular maintenance activities, was tested during recent extensive rains and severe flooding. Most of the project roads survived in good condition, despite the extraordinary weather conditions of 2009 and During the project period the Government also carried out complementary programs of national and provincial road rehabilitation in the four provinces for about 1,200 km. Together, PRIP and the Government s own program made important strides in linking the villages in the project area to secondary and provincial roads, and in turn to the national network. Before the project only 708 out of 1932 villages (37%) in the project provinces were linked to secondary and provincial roads in good condition. After the project, 1059 out of 1932 villages (55%) had all weather access to the secondary and provincial road networks. While impressive, without the delays and problems that plagued the first two phases of the project, the level of connectivity achieved could have been much more. 41. The second intervention, maintenance management, was directed towards sustainable access. The combination of two sub-components, establishment of maintenance management systems and annual maintenance carried out on the roads, was intended to ensure that costeffective maintenance would be planned and carried out. The output of maintenance management systems established and operational in MPWT and MRD was not achieved. At project end maintenance management systems in the two ministries were still under development, but maintenance management plans for each year were being prepared regularly, albeit manually. The second output was achieved, as 738 km of MPWT roads and 602 km of MRD roads were receiving regular routine maintenance financed by annual budget allocations from Government. 12

23 These targets exceeded project targets by about 100% and 150%, for MPWT and MRD, respectively. 42. As with the health of Cambodia s entire road network, the sustainability of the gains achieved under PRIP and elsewhere depends on clear policies and strategies to shape and manage the network overall, predictable levels of adequate financing for routine and periodic maintenance and reconstruction where necessary, and a staff capable of carrying out effective planning and management of the portion of the network within their area of responsibility. While PRIP did not address overall policy and strategy, the policy and strategy component covered a subset of institutional processes and approaches designed to help the ministries to provide road services more efficiently and effectively. Of these, integrated planning and budgeting of roads was partially achieved, as now there is a three-year rolling plan and a budget, least cost life-cycle standards are embedded in planning methodologies, and road maintenance has been mainstreamed. The use of appropriate technology and institutional reform did not gain much traction under PRIP, although the latter has been taken up in other contexts. 43. The capacity building component was intended to help support the effective management into the medium term of roads under the responsibility of MPWT and MRD. In line with the decentralized approach adopted in PRIP, training was extended to national and provincial public works departments, and also to private contractors who were capable of carrying out civil works but lacked skills related to business processes. The training was successful in that about 450 staff from MPWT and 215 staff from MRD received training in project management, planning, road maintenance, road safety, etc. However the link between the training and the sustainability of improved road services has been seriously compromised by the Government s decision to terminate programs designed to adequately remunerate and thereby retain high caliber staff. Project implementation arrangements that provided for consultant advisors to work alongside staff of the two ministries to provide hands-on knowledge transfer were also undercut when conditions for lifting the suspension transferred procurement and supervision authority from ministry staff to the IPA and Supervision Engineer. 3.3 Efficiency Overall rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 44. One of the important features of the project design, commensurate with Cambodia s transition from emergency reconstruction to a medium-term planning horizon, was that all candidate roads for rehabilitation and periodic maintenance would be subject to economic analysis. Roads to be improved were selected in a participatory manner, taking into account costs and benefits, traffic volumes, and social and environmental impacts. The proposed road sections were then subjected to a cost-benefit analysis for the rehabilitation and improvement works, and cost-effectiveness analysis for the periodic maintenance of lower volume rural roads. 45. An ex-ante analysis was conducted for Phase 1 roads for which some data were available, and all remain economically viable. For MPWT, the six roads in the Phase 1 program yielded NPVs from US$0.025 million to US$8.8 million, and ERRs of between 15% and 21%. These rates fall within the same general range as the original estimates for the same roads. For MRD, 13

24 the unrealistically low original cost estimates due to inadequate designs resulted in somewhat inflated initial NPVs and ERRs. Nonetheless, the substantially higher costs were partially offset by higher traffic volumes and smoother road surfaces associated with higher road standards. The MRD Phase 1 roads thus remain economically viable, with ex-ante NPVs of 0.19 million to 1.95 million and ERRs of 19% to 50+%. 46. The amount of work that could be completed under the project was negatively affected by the cancellation of SDR million associated with contracts that were misprocured, the suspension and subsequent start-up delays, further deterioration of the roads during the suspension and aftermath and additional quantities required for their repair, and higher labor and material costs due to inflation during this period. The ex-ante calculations reflect the higher costs due to increases in the price of bitumen and other inputs, offset by higher traffic volumes and VOC savings. The roads remain economically viable, but the negative impact of delays on the number of km that could be improved, and hence on the individuals that would be served by these roads, was probably large. 47. As discussed in Section 3.2 (details in Annexes 3 and 10), focus discussions and anecdotal evidence from the field confirm that the project brought significant benefits to those served by the improved roads. Positive impacts cited included large reductions in transport costs, faster travel times, increased crop prices, some limited crop diversification, higher rates of school attendance (especially for girls whose school access had been restricted by safety concerns), better night security due to faster speeds and removal of land mines, improved maternal health and lower infant mortality rates. The principle negative impact involved traffic safety concerns associated with higher traffic volumes and speeds. 48. Employment generation benefits proved to be somewhat limited. Labor-based appropriate technology was applied on a couple of small contracts in the first year program, but the decision to build roads to a higher standard and/or time constraints precluded its application in subsequent years. Site workers were hired locally for road, bridge, and pipe and box culvert works, sodding and planting, but the duration of this employment was limited to the construction period, and the numbers were relatively small. For example, in the order of local residents were employed for construction of PR 213 (about 24 km). 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 49. Although relevance was high, achievement of the PDO and efficiency are moderately unsatisfactory and efficacy and efficiency are moderately unsatisfactory; therefore the overall outcome rating is moderately unsatisfactory. 14

25 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 50. The improvement of national-provincial, secondary and tertiary roads in Cambodia s four poorest provinces reduced isolation and improved access to markets, health clinics and schools. A social assessment survey was carried out in 2003 (Annex 5), but there was no follow-up study to document changes that occurred. Focus group discussions suggest that the impact was positive for the entire population, in particular for women and girls. (Section 3.3 and Annexes 3and 10). 51. Awareness activities both mitigated risk and promoted social development, as about 15,000 people participated in preventive activities (HIV/AIDS, road safety, UXO awareness). Complaint handling mechanisms were explained at the community level and signboards posted alongside the roads. Awareness campaigns were reinforced by Bank supervision of social safeguards in the form of training and other capacity building activities. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 52. Overall the effectiveness of the project s contribution to policy and strategy development was constrained by the piecemeal approach adopted by RGC and the development partners. The implementation period was to be four years, and as the condition of the roads was dire, priority was placed on restoration of basic services. As previously discussed, some important elements, e.g., a new Roads Law, were being addressed under RRP and elsewhere, and other aspects of institutional and organizational reform were being addressed in activities supported by other development partners. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) - n/a 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 53. See Annexes 3 and Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: High 54. The main risk to development outcome is lack of funding for roads, particularly for maintenance. Current allocations for routine maintenance are promising, but over time the roads will also require periodic maintenance and rehabilitation. The lack of an operational maintenance management system and of current data to support it affects the efficiency of expenditures made. Further, while allocations from Treasury for road maintenance have steadily improved, total funding for roads is inadequate and the risk of inadequate, unpredictable and/or untimely funding remains. 15

26 55. The second risk is the ability to retain technically qualified staff. Both MPWT and MRD are short of trained staff, and will continue to be until such staff can be adequately compensated. This is unlikely to occur until civil service reform rationalizes the complement of staff and offsets the compression of wage scales. The institutions and organizations with responsibility for roads are also in need of reform. Studies are underway, but the extent to which the recommendations will be acted upon depends on Government s commitment to reform. The decentralization process is an important development, but neither authority nor funding is currently aligned with this objective. 56. The third risk is the lack of a policy framework and strategy to guide the development of the roads and transport sector. Ratification of the proposed Roads Law is expected soon, which will clarify roles and responsibilities (roads will be classified by function rather than traffic volumes), but questions remain over such issues as sources of funding for roads, commercialization of road services and the role of the private sector. Other recent developments that may represent some modest maturation of the sector include the creation of the Cambodia Transport Association, the Cambodia Road Association and a new bureau in MPWT in charge of road concessions. 57. Fourth, while the adoption of a Good Governance Framework is a good start, the risk of fraud and corruption remains. Some progress has been made, as measures put in place by the two Ministries have contributed to more transparent processes and reporting, and the oversight role of civil society may develop over time. 58. Finally, the loss of maintenance funding and of the capacity and commitment to carrying out the works as needed, could result in the untimely deterioration of the roads. The likelihood that this could happen is judged to be substantial. The high potential impact and substantial likelihood result in a risk to development outcome rating of high. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 59. As noted in Section 2.1, the project was consistent with the CAS and well targeted, as rehabilitation of the subnational road network in the four poorest provinces addressed an important impediment to inclusive development. The introduction of participatory design and oversight processes and awareness campaigns was innovative in the Cambodian context and changed the way subnational roads are planned and managed in Cambodia. Although the project had originally been conceived as a multi-sector infrastructure project, the Bank rightly considered this too complex and early on limited the scope to sub-national roads in a prescribed geographical area. The PDO, however, remained overly broad, as it focused on livelihoods of residents in the geographical area, and it was measured by outcome indicators that built upon various mobility requirements that depended on factors exogenous to the project. 16

27 60. Project preparation was carried out by a team of specialists with the requisite skills and expertise to address a broad range of sectoral concerns. A PHRD grant provided support to RGC for preparation of the project, and Bank resources in terms of staff time and budget were adequate (details in Annex 4). The infrastructure and community awareness components were well conceived, the procurement and safeguard documents thoroughly prepared, and the implementation arrangements considered with some care. 61. Problems, however, stemmed from the Bank s failure to account adequately for the lack of capacity and, in MRD s case, lack of familiarity with Bank systems and procedures. Among other things, the decision to establish parallel implementing arrangements in each of the two ministries added complexity. On a technical level, the Bank failed to identify serious design flaws and cost underestimates. The poor quality of the designs, especially of MRD roads, not only affected the quality and quantity of civil works that could be carried out, but also contributed to governance problems by opening the door to variation orders and cost overruns. 62. The capacity building component was designed without benefit of an institutional development or organizational plan to identify job categories and skills required; broad categories were defined and the training was reportedly useful, but the link to desired outcomes could not explicitly be made. The policy and strategy development program lacked an integrative framework; the component simply comprised five practical areas intended to improve various aspects of decision-making and cost-effective implementation. 63. To an extent the shortcomings in the project design reflect the difficulty of assessing what is feasible in a country trying to rebuild after a war. In this context, the extent of uncertainty and lack of basic government systems and checks and balances could have been better reflected in the risk assessment. The risk associated with security and rule of law, rated Modest, was much too soft. Although the overall risk rating was Substantial, given the circumstances it realistically should have been High. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 64. As discussed in Section 2.2, the Bank s performance during implementation can usefully be divided into three phases, with the suspension marking the middle phase. Overall there were three Bank task managers during project implementation (including the task manager from appraisal, which provided continuity), and the two transitions were handled well. 65. The Bank s supervision was satisfactory during the first phase, defined as from Board approval to the suspension on June 6, Intensive supervision was carried out during this phase, with three regular Bank missions per year, supplemented by procurement and environment/safeguards missions. Significant problems began to be documented in mission reports around February The Bank was proactive in working with the implementing agencies to find solutions, but slow to downgrade the project, doing so only after the suspension had taken effect. The decision to exempt from the suspension the construction of two critical bridges on the Salavisai Commune to Stoung District Road showed commitment to project 17

28 beneficiaries and was consistent with the collaborative approach that had been established during this initial period. 66. The Bank s performance during the second phase, from the suspension to the second restructuring in September 2010, was problematic at two levels. First, the conditions imposed by the Bank for lifting the suspension put in place parallel systems for project implementation. While enabling the Bank to lift the suspension, the required outsourcing of procurement and works supervision undercut the use of government systems and procedures and learning by doing that had been at the core of the project design. The appointment of the IPA and Supervision Engineer took time and the project stalled. The Bank s performance in this regard was unsatisfactory. Second, Bank missions were shorter and somewhat less frequent during this second period, the mid-term review was postponed indefinitely, the project was not restructured beyond the conditions for lifting the suspension, and the performance indicators were not brought into alignment with the reduced available time and funding. The project was upgraded to moderately satisfactory prematurely in August of 2007, primarily because the PIUs had been dismantled (another Bank-imposed condition for lifting the suspension) and preparation of the second year work program had resumed. However as the Bank s supervision team strove to stay engaged throughout and to follow up on the full range of implementation issues (technical, environment, social, financial management, M&E), the Bank s overall performance in Phase 2 was moderately unsatisfactory. 67. The Bank s performance during the third phase, from the second restructuring through the end of the project, improved again to satisfactory. In mid-2010 the project was downgraded to unsatisfactory in recognition that the original outcomes and targets could not be achieved. The project was restructured and extended for one final year on December 31, The restructuring revised the M&E targets downward and identified a set of activities that could realistically be completed within a one year time frame if the project were extended for a final 12 months. The Bank extended the project s closing date on an exceptional basis (as the project was rated unsatisfactory) in recognition of the importance of the remaining civil works to rural communities who still did not have access to an all-weather road. Intensive supervision, especially by staff in the Cambodia field office, helped to ensure that all activities were completed within the extended one-year timeframe. Transition arrangements for the RMMS and some of the policy elements were handled by transferring these activities to the ongoing RAMP. With two phases of supervision rated satisfactory and one phase rated moderately unsatisfactory, the overall rating for quality of supervision is moderately satisfactory. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 68. Quality of entry rated is rated moderately unsatisfactory and quality of supervision is rated moderately satisfactory. As the project overall is rated moderately unsatisfactory, the combined rating for Bank performance is moderately unsatisfactory. 18

29 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 69. The Government s performance during implementation ranged from unsatisfactory during the first two phases of the project, to satisfactory in the final phase. While initially there appeared to be high level support for improving budgetary systems and providing adequate funding for road construction and maintenance, these requisite systems and allocations were delayed. Also delayed were the finalization and endorsement of the Roads Act, which was needed to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the various ministries and agencies with respect to roads. Fiduciary compliance was poor throughout the first half of the project. The first three audit reports were not delivered on time, and procurement irregularities resulted in misprocurement of six contracts and cancellation of corresponding amounts from the Credit. 70. The RGC complied with all conditions to lift the suspension within about seven months and implemented a number of measures to minimize the potential for future corruption. Although implementation did not pick up for another year, fiduciary compliance improved, counterpart funds were available as needed and the works were completed as planned. Planning and budgeting improved in both MPWT and MRD; budget allocations for road maintenance rose steadily and in the later years exceeded the targets set under the project. The Social and Environmental Unit was established within MPWT as planned; and a Financial Management Standard was prepared and implemented. In parallel to the project, the draft Road Law was recently endorsed by the Council of Ministers and is scheduled to be submitted to the National Assembly for approval by September 2012, and a Rural Roads Policy was submitted to the Council of Ministers for endorsement. 71. Despite these positive aspects, the seriousness of the misprocurement and concerns over transition arrangements and the durability of project achievements, particularly for MRD, results in a rating for government performance of moderately unsatisfactory. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 72. The implementing agencies of MPWT and MRD appeared fully committed to the project objectives and promptly began to implement the project. Staff was assigned to the project PIUs, procurement was initiated, workshops and consultations with subproject beneficiaries were held in the provinces, and training of provincial staff was promptly offered. Fiduciary and reporting compliance were more problematic, as progress reports were not submitted, baseline data were not collected, and development of project websites fell behind schedule. Nonetheless, implementation progressed reasonably well until serious procurement irregularities came to light in both ministries. The suspension affected morale at all levels and undercut momentum in particular at the provincial level. The imposition of parallel implementation arrangements complicated implementation, and project implementation stalled. 19

30 73. After the suspension was lifted and the implementation arrangements were clarified, the two implementing agencies, first MRD and then MPWT, resumed implementation of the project. Fiduciary compliance improved, with audit reports produced on time and project progress reports prepared at least on an annual basis. The mandated Good Governance Frameworks were implemented by the two ministries, including civil society organization participation and establishment on a complaint handling mechanism. The websites and related disclosure of information of MPWT-PRIP and MRD-PRIP improved as well. The implementing agencies were instrumental in the second restructuring of the project, including the revision of performance indicators. However, while monitoring and evaluation data were collected on a more regular basis towards the end of the project, the use of such information as a project management tool has yet to gain traction. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 74. Government performance is moderately unsatisfactory and implementing agency performance is moderately satisfactory. As the project is rated unsatisfactory, borrower performance is thus moderately unsatisfactory. 6. Lessons Learned 75. A well formulated sector policy and strategy are essential if gains are to be sustained. The RGC and development partners have invested heavily in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia s roads at the national, provincial, district and local levels. However, commensurate efforts to develop a sector-wide policy and strategy remain fragmented. Questions as to how road services will be provided, managed and financed have yet to be fully resolved. The likely passage of the Roads Law and approval of the Rural Roads Policy are important, but do not fulfill the need for a well formulated policy and strategy to guide the development of the sector, and thereafter ensure its sustainability. The potential exists for RGC to address these needs in a sector-wide engagement in collaboration with the development partners. 76. The role and importance of a road network s missing middle needs to be documented and understood. There is a general understanding, supported by extensive literature on rural roads, that all-weather good quality roads at the subnational level contribute to the improved health and welfare of those served. Although a social survey was carried out during project preparation, no follow-up survey was carried out to identify which elements of PRIP were more or less successful and why. Questions that might have been asked include: Were any unresolved problems encountered during construction? Were the beneficiaries consulted and were their views accommodated? Were residents along the road hired by the contractors, to do what and how much did they earn? To what extent did transport services develop and are they affordable? Informal interviews and other anecdotal information suggest that the project roads met the needs of the population served, but such information cannot take the place of systematic feedback over time. As the intention was to pilot the approach in the four PRIP provinces and thereafter scale up to other provinces, such information could have informed 20

31 new projects and improve the prioritization, targeting and cost-effectiveness of the scaled-up activities over time. 77. Contextual constraints need to be identified and accommodated. The project sought to strengthen the capacity of small to medium-sized contractors and thereby begin the process of moving from force account to the contracting out of maintenance works. While the capacity building elements of PRIP were defined and managed effectively, problems ensued that had more to do with the contracting environment than the technical capacity of individual contractors. The PAD and IFAPER both highlighted a pervasive lack of competitive bidding and transparency in the award of Government-funded works contracts in Cambodia. They also highlighted the lack of a well-defined legal framework within which contractual processes would be carried out. Governance-related problems specific to PRIP arose from the number and size of contracts, plus the inexperience of government ministries and their provincial departments with international procurement standards. These problems were not unique to the road sector and demonstrate the importance of understanding and addressing the broader context within which project activities will necessarily unfold. 78. For M&E frameworks to be useful, they have to employ indicators that are relevant and useful to decision-makers. M&E frameworks can have many functions beyond the documentation of achievements associated with a particular project. At one level they can focus the attention of decision-makers on outcomes as opposed to completion of outputs. At another they can inform planning and management decisions, e.g., to flag the need for additional capacity or funding, to ensure expenditures provide value for money, to monitor construction quality and durability, to locate black spots or unsafe areas, or to document vehicle overloading. The key is to design M&E frameworks that not only meet the needs of the project, but also can support and inform normal business requirements. Data must be easy to collect and analyze, and progress on key indicators should be reported on at regular intervals. 79. Lasting improvements in governance cannot be served by establishment of parallel systems. The Bank-mandated outsourcing of procurement and works supervision to manage corruption was at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive for the following reasons: a) The flip side of independence is lack of knowledge and/or understanding of local conditions; the IPA in particular needed the help of those he was supposed to replace in order to carry out his terms of reference; the first IPA failed to complete the procurement of any contract, and second IPA only after many delays; b) the outsourcing was merely a stop-gap measure that resulted in a loss of opportunity, experience and knowledge-exchange for individuals and groups that had not been part of the problem; it also caused resentment on the part of those whose authority and work had been supplanted but whose inputs were still required in order for the work to be carried out; c) the learning by doing approach that was central to the project design was compromised by the outsourcing requirement; this was unfortunate as capacity-building was fundamental to helping Cambodia move from emergency reconstruction to medium-term solutions; and 21

32 d) the other development partners involved in PRIP and parallel projects did not go along with the outsourcing requirements; as a result the implementing staff had to follow multiple sets of procedures, which gave rise to confusion and lower productivity. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies 80. Borrower s ICR Summary: The Borrower provided a Summary of its ICR, which is included Annex 7. The Borrower s ICR expresses support for the project concept, with its focus on rural transportation and capacity building. Key concerns pertained to (i) the outsourcing of procurement to the IPA and of supervision to the Engineer, as these undercut the stated capacity building aim of the project; (ii) the unrealistic targets set, especially for MRD, and failure to adjust these until the final year of the project; (iii) the need to move from project-specific training to human resource development in the Ministries; (iv) the fact that despite added prominence brought by the project, road maintenance is not yet on a secure institutional basis in either Ministry; and (v) the complexity and confusion arising from the inconsistent requirements of the donors IDA, ADB, AusAID especially after the suspension was lifted. Lessons learned are as follows: In applying short term measures to resolve a significant problem in implementation there is a need to consider the implications that these measures may have on the long term objectives and strategy of the project. Actual rehabilitation costs of tertiary roads at the time of loan approval should have been more thoroughly researched. The LogFrame (or Key Performance Indicators table) should be modified when changes are made to outcome and outputs. In a country where proficiency in English is not common, important documents need to be translated into Khmer to avoid misunderstandings. 81. Borrower Comments on draft ICR: Both MEF and MPWT indicated that they had reviewed the Bank s draft ICR and had no comments. MRD noted that it had received insufficient notification and guidance from the Bank (or from the financial auditors) regarding the portion of the Credit to be refunded as a result of the misprocurement; and, as other donors are more flexible and accommodating, urged the Bank also to be more flexible in policies and procedures when preparing new projects. (b) (c) Cofinanciers n.a. Other partners and stakeholders n.a. 22

33 Annex 1 Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Components Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Estimate Estimate Appraisal (USD millions) (USD millions) Maintenance Management - MPWT % Maintenance Management - MRD % Rehabilitation and periodic maintenance of secondary and provincial roads under MPWT % Rehabilitation and periodic maintenance of tertiary roads under MRD % Capacity building in MPWT % Capacity building in MRD % Policy and strategy development % Community awareness programs % Refund of PPF advances % Total Baseline Cost % Physical Contingencies Price Contingencies Total Project Costs % Front-end fee PPF Front-end fee IBRD Total Financing Required % (b) Financing Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing Appraisal Actual/Latest Estimate Estimate (USD millions) (USD millions) Percentage of Appraisal Borrower % International Development Association (IDA) % 23

34 Component 1: Maintenance Management Annex 2. Outputs by Component The maintenance management component was to: (a) support installation and operation of road maintenance management systems (RMMS) at the national level of MPWT and MRD, and their respective provincial departments; and (b) carry out annual programs of routine maintenance on maintainable roads. With respect to (a), RMMS are still under development in both ministries, with much of the focus on collection of basic data. MPWT has the Location Referencing and Condition Survey (LCRS) of its entire network, but the data are not being updated systematically. The LCRS was intended to feed into MPWT s Road Management Decision Support System (RMDS), but for various reasons the system is not being used. MRD is currently working on an inventory of all rural roads under its jurisdiction. A road management system for rural roads, ROMAPS, was developed by a consulting firm under a PHRD grant; however the system is proprietary and MRD lacks the money to pay servicing fees. Instead, MRD is working to develop a simplified system of its own based on ACCESS (Microsoft Office). At project end, the systems were not being used to prepare prioritized maintenance plans. Further development of the road asset management system of MPWT is being pursued under RAMP. With respect to (b), the appraisal target for MPWT was to routinely maintain 300 km of roads in the four provinces. This target was exceeded by about 150%, and by project end MPWT was routinely maintaining about half of the national and provincial roads in the four project provinces (about 735 km out of 1639) on an annual basis. MRD s appraisal target of 300 km was exceeded by about 100%, and by project end, MRD was maintaining about 602 km of tertiary roads, out of about 800 roads under its responsibility in the four provinces, annually. Component 2: Rehabilitation and Periodic Maintenance. The first and second civil works programs were completed in 2007 and 2011, respectively. By the end of the project MPWT had rehabilitated km of secondary national and provincial roads, or 88 percent of the original target of 300 km. In addition, MPWT had constructed six wooden, bridges on PR 210 (now NR 64), five concrete bridges and one bailey bridge on PR 213 (funded by RGC under PRIP). By the end of the project MRD had rehabilitated 84 km of rural roads, or about 29 percent of the original target of 300 km, plus two bridges, two causeways and many culverts. Specific achievements are as follows: In Kampong Thom Province, 17 km of laterite road sections were rehabilitated from Salavisay commune to Stoung District which now provides a connection of 39 km of rehabilitated road section funded by the government, with access to NR 6; In Preah Vihear Province, the Svaypat to Sdao road was rehabilitated using funds from both the IDA and the Government: the first section of SBST road (8 km) was built using IDA funds; and the second section of 18 km of road linking Sdao commune, was rehabilitated by the Government. In addition, 26 km of road section was rehabilitated with RGC funds to link Prast Brakhan ancient temple to Sangkom 24

35 Thmei District. In total, 52 km of road were rehabilitated to link NR64 and the ancient temple. In Siem Reap Province, one section of SBST road (29 km) from Angkor Chum to Varin; and 12 km of laterite road near Popel - Sophy village were rehabilitated (year 2 program), providing a link to NR 6 and access to Siem Reap city and other towns. In Oddar Meanchey Province, 13 km of SBST road were rehabilitated (year 1 program), providing easy access to Siem Thmor District and Oddar Meanchey provincial town via the 48 km of road built by the Visvakam (the military engineering force). An additional 5.5 km of laterite road were rehabilitated (year 2 program) from Prasat Lbaeuk to Prasat. Component 3: Capacity Building in MPWT and MRD Various training modalities were used to carry out the capacity building in the two ministries: training at school (English language, computers, etc.); short courses around particular technical topics (road design, quality control, road asset management, labor-based training and management, environmental and resettlement monitoring, cultural heritage, road safety, financial management, procurement, good governance website development); workshops; training of trainers (especially for environmental safeguards and contractor training); learning by doing (theory learning and application on site); and study tours. In total, the project contributed to training of about 450 staff from MPWT and 215 staff from MRD in various sectors, plus a number of community representatives (who were organized to supervise the works in their areas). The training was not restricted to the four provinces; representatives of all provinces were invited, as well as others who had a role in roads and/or traffic management, including the police. Component 4: Policy and Strategy Development (US$0.20 million) This component comprised five sub-components: (i) integrated planning and budgeting of roads; (ii) least cost life-cycle standards; (iii) use of appropriate technology; (iv) mainstreaming of road maintenance; and (v) institutional reform. Both MPWT and MRD have undertaken the following reforms that are increasing their efficiency: a. Integrated planning and budgeting: The project contributed to the development of a three year rolling program for public investment and to train many staff of the two ministries in planning and budgeting. As a result, the planning and budgeting have improved, but plans and budgets are still prepared manually. b. Least cost life-cycle standards: All project roads were selected using cost and benefit or cost effectiveness analysis based on road traffic volume, and social and environmental safeguards impact. Beneficiaries were involved in the selection of all roads. c. Use of appropriate technology: Labor-based appropriate technology (LBAT) was introduced by the project (training was provided to some contractors) but the approach was not used beyond the introduction, as road standards were increased 25

36 to a level where LBAT was less suitable. Reportedly there also were few villagers interested in carrying out the work during the rainy season. d. Mainstreaming of road maintenance: The budget allocated for both periodic and routine maintenance (MPWT and MRD maintenance programs) increased annually. e. Institutional reform: A key aspect of institutional reform carried out under the project entailed the implementation of the government s decentralization and deconcentration policy. While the Provincial departments already had some capacity to prepare work plans and budgets, the project provided the opportunity for them to receive procurement and financial management training based on World Bank/international guidelines. Under PRIP, MPWT also established a Social and Environmental Unit, which prepared uniform standards and forms. Two publications -- Final Standard Guidelines for Implementation of Social Safeguards and Final Standard Guidelines for Environmental Safeguards -- were finalized in and made available in Khmer and English. In addition, a Financial Management Standard for the Ministry was prepared and rolled out under the project (2009). Component 5: Community Awareness Programs. The awareness activities and community participation were fully implemented by PRIP. The following activities were supplemented by Bank supervision of social safeguards and by training and other capacity building activites carried out in the course of the project: Road Safety Awareness Program: In anticipation of greater traffic volumes and speeds, MPWT and MRD organized community awareness meetings and workshops for their staff and for the communities living along the roads of the project. These focused on tips and measures to ensure the safety of children and livestock and to prevent accidents. To design and implement the Road Safety Law, MPWT and MRD worked closely in organizing and carrying out various forums and campaigns. HIV/AIDS Awareness Program: The HIV/AIDS awareness program was implemented through the civil works contracts. More than 15,000 people from local communities were educated on preventive measures regarding HIV/AIDS. Mines and Unexploded Ordnance Risk and Clearance Awareness Program: This activity was fully completed during the implementation of the first year civil works program. No accidents were reported during project implementation. 26

37 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis As indicated in the main text, an important feature of the project design was that all candidate roads for rehabilitation and periodic maintenance were subject to economic analysis. The selection of road sections for the project was based on a consultative process that was further confirmed by either a cost-benefit analysis for the higher volume roads or a screening process and cost-effectiveness analysis for periodic maintenance of low volume rural roads. A beneficiary survey was also carried out during preparation, the main results of which are summarized in Annex 5. Unfortunately the survey was not repeated at the conclusion of the project, but anecdotal evidence confirms the anticipated improvements in livelihoods (Annex 10). Methodology and Assumptions Screening and Prioritization of PRIP Roads. Facilitated workshops were held in the four provinces, in which participants were asked to screen and prioritize the roads in their area on the basis of the following criteria: accessibility, population served, environmental impact, economic impact, availability of local resources and tourism potential. An inter-provincial workshop was then held to combine these results and select a tentative Phase 1 program. Detailed engineering surveys and economic analyses were then carried out for the proposed Phase 1 roads. Analytical Inputs. For the detailed analyses of roads under consideration for the Phase 1 rehabilitation and improvement program, road works costs were estimated in financial and economic terms (net of taxes), with economic costs in the order of 85 percent of financial cost. Fleet and road user costs were based on a survey from 2001 under the ILO Upstream Project, updated in Siem Reap Province in December 2002 for PRIP. Typical economic unit road user costs, in US$ per 1000 vehicle-km, were developed for different classes of vehicles and roughness levels (IRI). For each road under consideration for rehabilitation or improvement in Phase 1, traffic counts and origin-destination surveys were carried out as follows: a one-week day-time traffic count and origin-destination survey for secondary national and provincial roads and a three-day count for tertiary roads. A smaller sample of nighttime counts was also taken, which suggested nighttime volumes of around 10 percent of daytime traffic levels. Traffic growth rates were based on recent trends by vehicle type. For Siem Reap and Kampong Thom Provinces, the traffic growth rate was considered to vary per vehicle type between 5 and 7 percent for the first five years, 3 to 5 percent for years 6 to 10, and 2 to 3 percent thereafter. For Oddar Meanchey and Preah Vihear provinces, the traffic growth rate was considered to fall between 2 and 6 percent for the first 5 years, and 1 to 3 percent thereafter. Scenarios. All of the roads considered for the Phase 1 rehabilitation and improvement program were unpaved and in poor condition (pictures in Annex 11). The economic evaluation compared a without project alternative with up to three rehabilitation or improvement project alternatives. The main costs included the cost of the civil works and periodic maintenance over the life of the road. The main benefits were directly related to traffic, including savings in vehicle operating costs, and savings in vehicle and passenger and time costs. The economic analysis took into account a construction period of one year, evaluation period of 15 years, cut-off Economic Rate 27

38 of Return (ERR) for inclusion in the project of 12 percent and discount rate of 12 percent. The NPVs of the project first year rehabilitation works amounted to US$14 million and ERR of 35 percent. The NPV of the first year periodic maintenance works amounted to US$0.42 million and ERR of 28 percent. The latter roads exhibited a cost-effectiveness ratio of about US$11 per person; however this was based on the very low per km cost associated with inadequate and/or incomplete designs. Ex-anti Economic Analysis Quantifiable benefits. The ex-anti analysis updated estimated construction costs with actual costs and made certain assumptions about traffic volumes and types of traffic. Current (year 2011) traffic counts were available for only two of the MPWT roads (NR 65 and NR 71). These counts showed traffic levels that were approximately equal or somewhat lower than those assumed at appraisal. However as overall trends show substantial increases in traffic volumes throughout Cambodia including these provinces it is likely that the counts were incomplete and/or influenced by the count location. For MRD roads, traffic counts were taken shortly after completion of each road. These show levels of traffic growth that were higher than expected, with increases of 45 percent in Oddar Meanchey Province, 186 percent in Preah Vihear Province, 352 percent in Siem Reap Province and 358 percent in Kampong Thom Province. The counts include non-motorized and motorized vehicles, with the highest growth in numbers of motor cycles. As the roads were barely passable, if at all, prior to improvement, high levels of traffic growth are reasonable. A comparison of costs, NPVs and ERRs for Phase 1 roads at appraisal and at project close is shown in Table, 3.1 below. For MPWT, six road links yielded a range of NPVs from US$0.025 million to US$8.8 million and ERRs of between 15 percent and 21 percent. These comply with the selection criteria and fall within the same general range as the original estimates for the same roads. The MPWT roads remain economically viable despite the somewhat lower traffic volumes. For MRD, the ex-ante NPVs range from 0.19 to 1.95 million and ERRs between 19 percent and above 50 percent, and also comply with the selection criteria. 28

39 Province SRP SRP OMC OMC KT PV TABLE A3.1: Comparison of Phase 1 Road Segments at Appraisal and at Project Close Road Class SN P P P SN T MPWT Road Links Km Total Cost (US$ m) Cost/km NPV (US$ m) ERR (%) PFS Actual PFS Actual PFS Actual PFS Ex-anti PFS Ex-anti Soutr Nikom Dist Cen (NR6. PK ) to Junction w/ Road Soutr Nikom Dist Cen (NR6. PK ) to Kampong Khleang Samrong & Bos Sbov to Chong Kal District (Chhouk village) Krasang Commune (Kok Spean village) to Chong Kal District (NR68. PK57+000) Kampong Thmor market to ch Rovieng Bridge to Kampong Salau Province Road Class MRD Road Links Km Total Cost (US$ m) Cost/km NPV (US$ m) ERR PFS Actual PFS Actual PFS Actual PFS Ex-anti PFS Ex-anti SRP T Angkor Chum to Varin OMC T Kouk Mon to NR56B KT T Salavisai to Stoung PV T Svaypat (NR#64) to Sdao Source: PRIP Consultants Review Study, MPWT and MRD, Non-quantifiable benefits. Non-quantifiable benefits include social benefits arising from better access to schools, medical facilities and other social services, employment and markets. The importance of these benefits was highlighted in the Social Assessment conducted during preparation (See Annex 5 for a description of the survey design and key characteristics of the population served). Although a follow-up survey was not carried out at the end of the project, informal visits to some of the same areas confirm that the expected positive benefits were realized. These discussions are summarized as follows: Angkor Chum to Varin Road - Svay Sar Commune. Before the road was improved, travel time to town was three hours and cost R 50,000; now travel time is 30 minutes and costs R 10,000. Before the road was improved, rice growers had to bring rice to the market, at a cost of R 500/kg; now the rice broker comes to the village and pays R 1200/kg. Before, no cassava was grown because there were no buyers; now there are large cassava farms. Before, patients had to be transported to the hospital; now an ambulance will come to the patient. Before, villagers could only travel in daylight; now that the mines have been cleared, it is safe to travel after dark. 29

40 Angkor Chum to Varin - Charchhouk Commune. Before the road was improved, travel time to town was three hours and cost R 10,000; now travel time is one hour and costs R 7,000. Now they can sell rice, watermelons, beans and cassava. But there is too much traffic. One resident says sleep is interrupted by traffic noise, and there have been accidents (12 in 2011 and 9 in Even with the road, problems remain with drainage, culverts, and they need irrigation systems for agriculture. Road PR Reakreay Commune. Before the road was improved, travel time from commune to village was one hour or more and cost R 30,000; now travel time is less than half an hour and costs R 10,000. Before, no middleman would come to the village to buy rice; now the middleman comes and pays R 1200/km. Before the villagers relied on traditional medicine to help each other; now they can visit health clinics when sick. Before the school drop-out rate was high after 4 th grade (the village school only went to 4 th grade); now they have a secondary school and school attendance is high. But traffic accidents are now a problem, due to high speeds and drunk driving; in one month there were four accidents. Road NR 71: The road condition was extremely poor before the project due to heavy truck traffic from NR 7. After the road was improved, residents experienced a reduction in the cost of transport to NR6 from R 5,000 to R 1,500. Access to markets, health centers and schools significantly improved, but now traffic has increased. Residents noted that road safety has become a concern. Road PR 181. The earth road was impassable even during the dry season. A four hour walk was required to reach the District center of Samrong. Children could not get to school; people died trying to reach a health center; and crops spoiled before they could be sold at market. When motorcycle transportation was available, the cost was 20,000 Riels. After the road was improved, the cost dropped to 2,000 Riel. Girls now go to school, patients can get to the hospital and maternal care in particular has improved. Crops can be sold at market and supplies brought into the area at much lower cost. Road PR 207. The road, which serves 13,000 people, leads to the Tonle Sap River. The road was in poor condition because of heavy truck traffic from NR 6, and travel speeds did not exceed 20 km/hr even during the dry season. After the road was improved, traffic increased and access to markets, clinics and schools is much improved. However the final section of the road to the Commune Center, which would serve about 10,000 people, is still not passable in the wet season. People have to transfer to boats to reach the Commune Center during the rainy season. Salavisai to Stoung. The road, which serves about 2000 people, passes through two communes. Before improvement, only animal cart transport was possible. After the road was improved, the cost to Kampong Thoms dropped from 35,000 to 2-3,000 Riel. Access to markets, schools, clinics and the hospital improved, and traders and NGOs are now coming into the area. School attendance has increased, especially for girls. Population growth of 25 percent along the road reportedly has caused disputes in a few local areas. 30

41 Svaypat to Sdou. The road, which serves about 4000 people, passes through three communes. Prior to construction it took two days to reach the District center, now a few hours. Transport cost has dropped from 40,000 to 15,000 Riel. Traffic volume has increased from no traffic to vehicles per day. The road provides access to markets, and incoming agricultural services as well. A secondary school has opened in the commune, made possible in part by the road. 31

42 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty Lending Pramod Agrawal Consultant Institutional Assessment Rodrigo Archondo-Callao Sr. Highway Engineer ECSS5 Economics Anil Bhandari Sr. Adviser (former) AFTTR Engineer Sally L. Burningham Sector Manager LCSDE TTL/Engineer Chinnakorn Chantra Procurement Specialist EAPPR Procurement Kannathee Danaisawat Financial Management Specialist EAPFM Financial Management Christopher J. De Serio Operations Analyst EASIN Project Administration Boonsri Kim Program Assistant SASDO Alain Labeau Consultant SASFP TTL/Engineer Lars C. Lund Consultant EASVS Environment Christina Malmberg-Calvo Sector Manager PRMPR Economist/institutional assessment Jitrendra J. Shah Lead Environmental Specialist ECSS3 Environment Robert Taliercio Lead Economist EASPR Public Sector Manida Unkulvasapaul Consultant EASVS Environment Mei Wang Sr. Counsel LEGES Lawyer Preethi Wijeratne Financial Management Specialist EAPCO Financial management Lingzhi Xu Sr. Operations Officer ECSH1 Procurement Supervision/ICR Christopher R. Bennett Senior Transport Specialist EASNS Engineer/information technology Veasna Bun Senior Infrastructure Specialist EASTS Engineer/project coordination Sally L. Burningham Sector Manager LCSDE TTL/Engineeri Chinnakorn Chantra Procurement Specialist EAPPR Procurement Wenling Chen Junior Professional Associate AFTTR Operational Support China Chhun Program Assistant EACSF Kannathee Danaisawat Financial Management Specialist EAPFM Financial management Christopher J. De Serio Operations Analyst EASIN Operational Support Daniel R. Gibson Lead Social Development Specialist ECSOQ Social assessment Seida Heng Consultant EAPFM Financial Management Bunlong Leng Environmental Specialist EASTS Environment Roch Levesque Sr. Counsel LEGES Legal Zhi Liu Lead Infrastructure Specialist EASTS Sector policy and coordination Lars C. Lund Consultant EASVS Environment Vanna Nil Social Development Specialist EASTS Social Assessment Maria Margarita Nunez Sr. Highway Engineer LCSTR TTL/Engineer Teresita Ortega Program Assistant EASIN Narya Ou Program Assistant EACSF Ratha Sann Infrastructure Operations Officer EASTS Engineer/project coordination Siele Silue Sr. Transport Specialist EASIN TTL/Engineer Sirirat Sirijaratwong Procurement Analyst EAPPR Procurement Sreng Sok Procurement Specialist EAPPR Procurement Peng Seng Tan Program Assistant EACSF Manida Unkulvasapaul Consultant EASVS Environment Teri Velilla Program Assistant EASIN Chaohua Zhang Lead Social Development Specialist SASDS Social assessment 32

43 (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including travel and No. of staff weeks consultant costs) Lending FY FY FY FY Total: Supervision/ICR FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY Total:

44 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results A well designed Social Assessment Survey was carried out during project preparation, but as indicated in Annex 3, was not repeated after the project to compare results. Informal interviews and anecdotal information confirm that the anticipated improvements from all-weather road access were realized. Overall survey design. The beneficiary survey included a review of secondary data, face-to-face interviews of randomly selected households in 29 (out of 81) villages located along the Phase 1 roads, and a participatory rural appraisal (open-ended group discussions). The latter sought to identify the balance of trade in and out of the villages, a women s map showing the amount of time women spent on essential daily and weekly activities, and a seasonal calendar around dimensions such as road access, food and income shortage, and human and animal wealth. The survey also interviewed representatives of the Kuoy people, an ethnic minority in Preah Vihear Province. Household Survey. The demographic characteristics of the 370 householders interviewed were as follows: 56 percent were women and 44 percent men; 96.5 percent were Khmer, 3.2 percent Kuoy, and 0.3 percent Chinese; Average household size was 5.9 persons; 1,684 children were born to respondents but 12.7 percent had died; 87 percent were married monogamously, 3.2 percent polygamously, 8.6 percent widowed, 1.1 percent divorced; 75 percent of households were headed by males; 25 percent were headed by females; female-headed households had younger members, with 48.2 percent under 14 years compared to the average household with 41.2 percent under 14 years; female-headed households were more vulnerable, with less education, smaller land parcels, and most below the poverty line; most households owned their land, but 89 percent owned less than one hectare; less than 20 percent had land titles (the cost of the title was beyond the means of most households); less than half of households used fertilizer; 4 percent used insecticides. All villages were fairly isolated, with roads in disrepair. People reported they had great difficulty traveling, particularly in the rainy season. They also noted that motorized transport modes ventured into their areas only infrequently. Table A5.1 shows transport modes and travel frequency reported by survey residents. Bicycles and motorcycles were used most frequently throughout the year. Cars, buses and pick-up trucks were used infrequently, more often on a yearly basis. Horse-cart transportation was used in specific areas of Stoung and Baray in Kampong Thom Province. 34

45 Table A5.1 Transport Modes and Travel Frequency (percent) Mode Daily Weekly Monthly Yearly Never Foot Bicycle Ox cart Horse &Cart Koyun Car Pickup truck Bus Motorcycle Source: Social Assessment, March 9, Respondents voiced the following views about the negative impacts associated with the lack of roads: Limited access to prenatal and health clinics had increased child mortality rates from malaria, malnutrition, mine-related injuries and unknown causes; Lack of access to jobs during the rainy season impeded non-farm job opportunities; Education levels were low because neither teachers nor students could reach some areas; Alternative income from sale of surplus vegetables, fishing, trading and cottage industry, was limited by lack of access. 35

46 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (not applicable) 36

47 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR The PRIP was designed as a 3 year project. It started in For various reasons it developed into a 7 year project covering three clearly defined phases. The overall policy context within which the PRIP was designed has changed surprisingly little. The PRIP was conceived as responding to both the RGC s key concerns as expressed in the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) but also to the objectives of the CAS. In particular it supported two key objectives of the CAS which were (i) to support the formulation and implementation of a government-led strategy and corresponding investment programme for reducing poverty and achieving the Cambodia MDGs and (ii) to support with analytical and investment services those under-funded sectors and sub-sectors critical to achieving the Cambodia Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The benefits of the PRIP were seen as being those of the improvement of rural transportation. This was both in relation to the reduction of travel costs and time but also in significant improvements in access to markets, education, information and health. The rehabilitation of the roads was also expected to provide both skilled and unskilled employment. The target beneficiaries were the whole population of the four Provinces. The original detailed indicators, identified for each component of the PRIP, were modified and severely simplified in March It was felt that some of the original indicators required data that was difficult to obtain. Moreover some of the indicators related to the overall economic and social development which it would be difficult to ascribe to the roads only. The first phase of the PRIP covered the period from mid 2004 to mid During this time work was concentrated on the implementation of the so called 1 st year plan. In 2006, the project was suspended by the World Bank for 8 months since the World Bank declared that 6 civil works contracts were mis-procured and various measures were introduced at the behest of the World Bank. A good governance framework was developed for the project and an Action Plan established. An International Procurement Adviser (IPA) - Crown Agents - was recruited. Responsibility for project procurement activities was taken away from the two implementing agencies and passed to the IPA. A Contract Supervision Consultant was recruited to inspect the quality of the civil works and to approve payments. This responsibility had previously been with the MPWT and the MRD who had delegated this responsibility to their provincial offices. In addition a Technical Audit was included in the project activities. The second phase of the PRIP covered the period from the suspension of the project in June 2006 until September Actual implementation of civil works halted in mid 2006 and did not restart until September For the final phase between 2010 and the end of 2011, the project was restructured. This involved the redefinition of target indicators, the development of more effective procedures and the implementation of civil works which were both complementary and supplementary to the 1 st year programme. 37

48 Key factors affecting implementation and outcomes The fact that the project was halted after two years of implementation and then required a period of a further three years before civil works implementation was resumed clearly had a major impact. The outsourcing of procurement was one of the measures included in the action plan set out by the World Bank to raise the suspension. This was a contentious decision. Clearly the Bank felt that the mis-procurement was of such a nature that the two implementing agencies could not, with any confidence, be left with the responsibility. Nevertheless, this was in contradiction of the Bank s stated aim in the PAD to develop the capacity of the MRD, MPWT and its provincial offices to procure civil works. A further measure was to outsource the supervision of works. The original supervision consultants were hired to advise the two ministries and their provincial offices. After the suspension international consultants were hired to act as the Engineer and take responsibility for the supervision of the civil works. A further key factor affecting implementation was related to the targets set in the PAD for the PRIP. In relation to the MPWT these targets were reasonable. For the MRD, the 1 st year programme costs demonstrated that the target figure was inappropriate. Nevertheless the target figure for the programme of the MRD was retained until the restructuring of the project in MRD were in a position of aiming for a target that was unachievable. Assessment of Outcomes For Component 1. The target was the mainstreaming of a management system and routine maintenance being implemented. MPWT has managed to set up a system. However, the data have not been updated and the system is not being used to its full potential for preparing annual maintenance programmes and multi-year road expenditure plans. This is now being implemented under the Rural Access Management Project (RAMP) project. A major component of the RAMP is focused on the full development of MPWT s road management processes, systems and staff capacity in order to undertake an effective road asset management programme. The MRD is using an Excel based programme as a planning tool, but this is not capable of dealing with the entirety of a rural road maintenance management system. MRD has attempted to adapt the ROMAPs system. This system is currently being used by the Rural Infrastructure Project of the MRD. The ownership of this system is held by a firm of consultants. The ROMAPs system is expensive. MRD are not in a position to finance this. So far, therefore, the MRD has been unable to fully develop an effective maintenance management system. For Component 2. The targets for roads to be either rehabilitated or improved by periodic maintenance as set out in the restructuring plan in 2010 have been largely met. The overall condition of the target roads secondary national, provincial and tertiary in Cambodia at the start of the project was generally poor. The majority were impassable in the rainy season. This applied equally in the four PRIP Provinces. The roads have had a major impact in terms of increasing access, reducing travel time and costs and providing connectivity to the higher levels of roads. 38

49 The results of the economic re-evaluation confirm that the First Year Works Programme (FYWP) proposed was economically viable. They further confirm the selection of the FYWP as a priority project within the RGC s transport sector investment strategy. As no base line socio economic base line is available, the non quantifiable benefits can only be gauged by visual inspection and discussion with the beneficiaries. However there is considerable evidence to suggest that the economic and social benefits were significant. For Component 3. A considerable amount of training has been carried out by both Ministries as part of this capacity building component. Within the context of the PRIP this has no doubt been effective. Within the context of developing the overall capacity of the Ministries the effectiveness of the training is somewhat more difficult to evaluate. This is due to the general lack of overall policy and strategy in relation to human resource development in the Ministries and the tendency of external donors to finance training specifically in relation to, and uniquely concerned with, specific projects. For Component 4. In 2007 A Road Law was enacted which covered the activities of the MPWT. Whilst not a road policy as such it represented a major step forward in defining the regulatory framework for roads in the country. However a roads policy is still under consideration. In MRD a rural roads strategy was developed in Based on this a policy has been prepared and forwarded to the Council of Ministers, and is currently waiting for approval. For component 5. The PAD assumed that the MRD would adopt the use of Labour Based Appropriate Technology (LBAT) in the project. With hindsight a policy on LBAT adopted in the late 1990s to use infrastructure as a means of creating employment was unlikely to withstand the pressure on it from within technical ministries. The HIV/AIDS programme focused on creating awareness and preventive measures among the construction workers and the residents living along the roads. The training has been very successful and has earned a reputation as one of the most effective programmes conducted so far in the project. Effectiveness Whilst road maintenance is not yet on a secure institutional basis in either Ministry, the PRIP has brought the issue into prominence and has ensured that the maintenance is recognized as a key issue to safeguard the investments being made. In both Ministries serious effort is now being made to fully operationalise road maintenance management systems. The roads rehabilitated and periodically maintained by the PRIP were key elements of the road network in the four Provinces. The secondary national roads that were part of the project provided not only key links in the networks of the four Provinces but also ensured more effective connectivity between contiguous provinces. The provincial and tertiary roads selected also provided, in some cases for the first time, connectivity to the national network and to the provincial capitals for the villagers along their length. 39

50 It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the capacity building programme. A mere listing of courses and participants reached is not a measure of effectiveness. The problem is that there was no comprehensive training needs assessment and little evaluation of the results of the training. The fault for this should not be laid at the door of PRIP. It is more to do with the framework in which the capacity building programmed was implemented. The road sector needs an overall policy and both MPWT and MRD are in the process of establishing this. However given the obvious gap it is surprising that additional support was not provided to the PRIP to assist both the MPWT and the MRD in this regard. The PRIP was extremely effective in improving the livelihoods of the rural population along the roads in the project. This conclusion is based not on the evidence of statistics. This evidence, unfortunately, is not possible because, although a baseline survey (actually named a social assessment) was carried out, no follow up impact study was carried out. Evidence derived from discussions with the commune councils and village chiefs along the roads in the project indicates that travel time and cost was reduced, produce was able to access the market, access for children to schools was easier, particularly for girls, and improved access to health centres and hospitals has reduced the risk of death and long term effects of treatable diseases and accidents. The suspension of the project in 2006 however had serious repercussions on the project. The most positive aspect was that a Good Governance Framework (GGF) and Action Plan were established and this has become embedded in the project and to some extent in the institutional culture of the two ministries. Less positive was the fact that the responsibility for procurement was taken away from the Ministries and put in the hands of an International Procurement Agency (IPA). This created resentment on the part of the Ministries. It also raised questions of World Bank s commitment to developing the capacity of the Ministries. The second measure was to employ a supervision consultant whose responsibility was to act as the Engineer vis a vis the contractors. The argument in favour was that an independent Engineer would be more likely to be objective. The argument against was the same as for the IPA except that the resentment and lack of capacity building now applied also to the provincial departments of the two ministries. The suspension of the project in 2006 for mis-procurement lead to short term measure being taken which were not necessarily in accordance with the overall objective. The outsourcing of responsibility for procurement has had repercussions for the RAMP project. This is funded by three agencies the World Bank, the ADB and AusAid. The World Bank component will be procured by an IPA whilst the ADB and AusAid components will be procured through the MPWT procedures with the support of a procurement adviser financed by the ADB. This split of responsibilities within one project cannot be in the best interests of either the smooth implementation of the project nor of capacity building of the MPWT. 40

51 The treatment of safeguard issues in the project was appropriate for Cambodian conditions and the types of interventions included in the project. Since most of the project components were rehabilitation works within the existing rights-of-way, no significant impact on the physical environment was expected. Risk to the development outcome The main risk to the development outcome is the lack of funding for the maintenance of the improved roads. This would reduce the level of access of the rural population and the benefits provided by the project would be lost. As these roads were assessed as being those which would be of most value to the rural population, they should appear as priorities in the maintenance plans of the province. However this is not guaranteed as the systems for maintenance planning are not fully operational. WB and Borrower performance The World Bank conducted regular supervision missions, averaging two missions per year, with an appropriate skill mix. Most missions made field visits and were able to provide technical and other advice to resolve issues based on actual conditions. In the special circumstance of the suspension of the project from June 2006, the World Bank acted quickly to ensure that the project could restart with the requisite safeguards and action in place by February The Borrower also reacted quickly to the suspension of the project. It set up a committee to investigate the allegations of corruption. The restructuring of the project was part of the process of ensuring that the extension of the project from 2010 to There was resistance to this both from the MEF and the World Bank. Compliments are therefore due to the World Bank task team leader for believing in the capacity and capability of the two Ministries to complete the project. In addition the management in the MPWT as well as that in MRD deserve praise for the achievements produced in the final year of the project. Lessons learned In applying short term measures to resolve a significant problem in implementation there is a need to consider the implications that these measures may have on the long term objectives and strategy of the project. Actual rehabilitation costs of tertiary roads at the time of loan approval should have been more thoroughly researched. The LogFrame (or Key Performance Indicators table) should be modified when changes are made to outcome and outputs. In a country where proficiency in English is not common, important documents need to be translated into Khmer to avoid misunderstandings. 41

52 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders (not applicable) 42

53 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Cambodia: Enhancing Delivery through Improved Resource Allocation and Institutional Reform; Integrated Assessment and Public Expenditure Review, Report No KH, World Bank and Asian Development Bank, September 8, Cambodia: More Efficient Government Spending for Strong and Inclusive Growth; Integrated Assessment and Public Expenditure Review, Report No KH, World Bank, November 30, Cambodia Provincial and Rural Infrastructure Project Implementation Status Results Reports 1-12, Management Letters and Aide-Memoires, World Bank. Connecting the Ethnic People, a short film of interviews with beneficiaries along PRIP roads, World Bank, March/April Country Assistance Strategy for the Kingdom of Cambodia, Report No , International Development Association and International Finance Corporation, Design and Appraisal of Rural Transport Infrastructure; Ensuring Basic Access for Rural Communities, Lebo and Schelling, World Bank Technical Paper No. 496, Development Credit Agreement (Provincial and Rural Infrastructure Project) between Kingdom of Cambodia and International Development Association, Credit Number 3822-KH, December 31, Development Credit Agreement (Provincial and Rural Infrastructure Project) between Kingdom of Cambodia and International Development Association: Amendments, Credit Number 3822-KH, September 2006, July 2008 and December Estimating the Long-term Impacts of Rural Roads; A Dynamic Panel Approach, Khandker and Koolwal, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. WPS 5867, October 31, Japanese Grant for the Preparation of Provincial and Rural Infrastructure, Grant No. TF026422, June 19, 2001, and Amendment January 15, Ministry of Public Works and Transport and Ministry of Rural Development Implementation Completion Report of Provincial and Rural Infrastructure Project, December National Poverty Reduction Strategy , Kingdom of Cambodia, December Policy for Rural Roads, Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Rural Development, April Provincial and Rural Infrastructure Project: Project Appraisal Document, Report No KH, World Bank, August 13, Provincial and Rural Infrastructure Project Social Assessment, Report Number KH-P071207, Ministry of Public Works and Transport and Ministry of Rural Development, March 9, Road Condition Survey, Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Rural Road Inventory, Ministry of Rural Development, December

54 Annex 10. Transcript of Connecting the Ethnic People A Video of Interviews with PRIP Beneficiaries, March/April 2012 Script Srey Thnoung Village is in a remote part of Preah Vihear Province. More than 90 percent of the villagers are of the Kouy ethnic minority. The village was disconnected until a new road was built in 2005 bringing hope to the villagers. Interview: This road was so difficult. Now it is much easier and it is paved. Interview of a female villager: We carried our wild fruits and walked across the forest to market. There were mines and ammunition on the road. We spent the whole day to walk to the market and come back. We made 2,000 riel. It was so difficult. Now we have a road. If we have bicycles, we will go and come back within a morning. I m so happy now. The new road brings markets and services. Interview of a man in the village. Now services come to our home. Some stuff is brought to our shop. Business people come to buy our crops. Now people grow more and more crops. Interview of a man. The most important thing is now the market comes to us. We can easily sell our crops and livestock. Buyers come to us, unlike before. Our income is much better. Life of the people is better Commune chief. Since we have the road, it is easier for people to take their products to market. Now people are living better. Before they had small houses because they thought they were isolated. Back then, they faced many challenges such as businessmen giving them a low price for rice crops and asking them to bring crops to the market. Now the price is much higher and it makes people more confident to grow more. Since we have the road, NGOs have come and helped them to develop their lives. Like many other minority groups, the people of Srey Thnoung had limited access to education. Most students dropped out after finishing grade 2. They could not afford school because the higher grades were located far from their village and there was poor road access. Interview of a former female student: I stopped my study at grade 2. I went to study at Phnom Dek school too, but I got sick on my first day after the long walk and run to school. The road was not as good as it is now. It had forests and mines. I feel so sorry that I couldn t study. Now, Srey Thnoung has completed both a primary school and a new road that takes the students about 30 minutes by bicycle to get to the secondary school. Interview of the school principal. Before we had only grade 1 and 2 and our school had only a roof but no wall. 50 percent dropped out after finishing grade 3 because the road access to higher school was so difficult. They had to leave at 5:00 a.m., but now they can leave at 6:30 a.m. Now, they can finish primary school here and continue their secondary school in Phnom Dek. At least 80 percent continue their studies. Improved health care. Image Village s scenery and the daily activity of the villagers. Scenery of the new road and traffic, children, people buying and selling, and building new houses. Image of a woman speaking Soeun Khorn, 33, villager Focus on female villager 20 Footage of selling (fish, housing children travel) Mr. Ke Sokha Focus on a man 20 Mr. Prak Youn Children sit under houses, traffic Seng Chheang Commune Chief Focus on Village Chief. Village s scenery: perhaps people buying something from mobile sale persons, small business activities and so on 40 Featuring students traveling on the new road. 30 Morn Sarom, 26, a former female student Image of students riding bicycles Mr. Thoeun Chhoeun Children and teacher performing exercises 44

55 Interview of a commune council member and villager: In the past, when we got sick, we didn t have any place to go for our treatment because the road was so difficult and the village was far from Roveang health center. For example, women delivered babies with a traditional mid-wife. They risked their lives, but they had no choice. We saw some women, as well as new-born babies, die. Since we have a road some organizations have come to provide awareness, they understand the importance of health, particularly for women and children. Husbands bring their wives and children to health centers when they get sick or for pregnancy checkups. The road helps to reduce their time and cost. Maternal mortality and child mortality are dramatically reduced. Introduction Interview: I go to check my pregnancy regularly and I will deliver my baby at the health center. Introduction Interview of the head of the health center. Now all women deliver their babies at our center. This new road makes it much easier. Before when we went to the village, we had to stay overnight there, now we can go and come back in the morning or in afternoon. Before, they didn t come because the road was bad. They worried that their baby may be delivered along the road. It used to take two or three hours to reach here, but now it s just 20 minutes. Road access to Srey Thnoung village is part of the Provincial and Rural Infrastructure Project supported by the World Bank. The project aims at enhancing the livelihood of the peoples in Kampong Thom, Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear, and Siem Reap Provinces by providing sustainable access to markets and essential services. Mrs. Song Khom, commune council member and Srey Thnong villager. Image of a child rolling the walking practice tools. Soeun Khorn, 33 Image of health center and treatment or pregnancy checkup. Mr. You San, Head of Phnom Dek Health Center 20 Feature on road 40 By its closing date on December 31, 2011, the project built kilometers of secondary national and provincial roads, 87 kilometers of rural roads, five concrete bridges, six wooden bridges, one bailey bridge, causeways, and several drainage structures. At least 1059 out of 1932 villages in the project areas are now linked whole country s road network. 45

56 Annex 11. Pictures of Roads Before and After Improvement Preah Vihear Province - Svaypat-Sdao Road Condition before construction After construction and hand-over 46

57 Siem Reap Province - Popel-Sophy Road Condition before construction After construction and hand-over 47

58 Siem Reap Province Angkor Chum-Varin Causeway condition before construction After construction and hand-over 48