Securitization Performance Watch. China

Transcription

1 Securitization Performance Watch China As of Dec. 31, 2016

2 Table of Contents ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION... 2 CHINA STRUCTURED FINANCE CONTACTS... 2 SUMMARY... 3 CREDIT TRENDS... 4 NEW ISSUANCE TRENDS... 8 TRANSACTION PERFORMANCE UPDATE RATING ACTIONS RECENT COMMENTARY ARTICLES

3 ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION China Securitization Performance Watch is a quarterly review of China securitization transactions, particularly the auto loan asset-backed securities and residential mortgage-backed securities issued under the credit asset securitization (CAS) scheme managed by the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and People's Bank of China (PBOC). S&P Global Ratings has compiled the information in this publication using information from the issuers or servicers transactions, public announcements and comments from the regulators and market players, and trustee reports on the website ( of China Central Depository & Clearing Co., Ltd. (CCDC). S&P Global Ratings has endeavored to provide data on a basis that is comparable between transactions. Users of the information in this publication should, however, exercise care, because inconsistencies may exist in the reporting format and performance definition of each of the transaction. CHINA STRUCTURED FINANCE CONTACTS Kate Thomson, Lead Analytical Manager Melbourne kate.thomson@spglobal.com Aaron Lei, Lead Analyst Hong Kong aaron.lei@spglobal.com Jerry Fang Hong Kong jerry.fang@spglobal.com Andrea Lin Taipei andrea.lin@taiwanratings.com.tw Allen Lin Hong Kong allen.lin@spglobal.com Annie Wu Taipei annie.wu@taiwanratings.com.tw 2

4 SUMMARY A slowdown in economic growth and the potential downside risk from a credit-fueled expansion did not restrain new issuance momentum in China's securitization market or hurt the performance of transactions in New issuance totaled RMB858 billion (US$124 billion) in 2016, up 40% from a year earlier. The growth was mainly driven by strong issuance of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and new transactions under the securitization scheme managed by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Also, there was no major deterioration in 2016 in the performance of retail receivables securitized. Auto Loan Asset-Backed Securities The performance of assets in Chinese auto loan asset-backed securities (ABS) remained stable in the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2016, with the cumulative default rate and net losses of auto loan receivables staying low. The short duration of notes and low net losses limit investors' exposure to credit risks. We expect the asset performance of most auto loan ABS in China to be robust for the next 1-2 years, thanks to mild competition in the auto loan industry as well as the stable product offerings and the structural features of the transactions. We believe there is remote credit risk from increased monthly payments because of a rise in interest rates due to the relatively low balance of each loan. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Households' low leverage and increased incomes continued to support debt serviceability. The relatively low loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of mortgages in China also support the obligors' debt-servicing capacity. The cumulative default rate of residential mortgage loans backing RMBS transactions in China is low. Collateralized Loan Obligations The asset performance of collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions could become more turbulent than the retail receivables sector due to their direct exposure to corporate credits that are highly correlated with a macroeconomic slowdown. The more concentrated pools in typical CLO transactions also make it more difficult to manage the risk of deterioration in particular economic sectors and geographic regions, if any. 3

5 CREDIT TRENDS Facing market concern over a slowdown in growth and the risk of a hard landing, the Chinese government has proceeded cautiously. Economic expansion in 2016 was within market expectations. Most economic policies, such as supply side management and economic rebalancing, continued in 2016, though in a milder way; we saw credit creation throughout the year. S&P Global Ratings expects China's GDP growth to moderate to 6.4% in 2017, based on an assumption of no major changes in economic policy. The yields of the most senior tranches of securitized products rose during Q4, reversing the downward trend in the first three quarters of This is the collective effect of tightening money supply in China's banking sector, the U.S. interest-rate hike, and market uncertainty over the policies of new U.S. administration. The rising debt capital market interest rate raises borrowing costs by 0.5%-0.8% from Nov to Feb Chart 1 China Securitized Products Yield Curve (return on the most senior tranche) (%) Months to maturity YTM YTM YTM: Yield to maturity Source: Chinabond Auto Loan ABS We believe the unemployment rate is the key macroeconomic variable affecting the performance of auto loans; loan delinquencies can increase rapidly as job losses rise. In Q4, there was no significant deterioration in the performance of auto loan assets securitized. We are concerned that the performance of assets has not been tested by any real macroeconomic stress, such as a surge in unemployment. 4

6 We believe additional credit risk from increased monthly payments due to a rise in interest rates is remote in China; the risk is contained by generally small loan amounts, short loan tenors, and the fullamortization features of auto loan products. The stable payment delinquency and pool payout trend continued in Q4. The asset loss rate remained low, according to the reported numbers in trustee reports. The low penetration of auto financing (around 25%) and the continued growth in passenger car sales in Q4 provided little incentive to auto financiers to loosen their underwriting quality to compete for business. However, competition and underwriting challenges could arise with the participation of nontraditional financiers, increased vehicle sales to second- or third-tier cities, and financiers entering the used car market. We expect most auto loan ABS transaction to perform robustly for the next 1-2 years, given that competition remains mild in the auto loan industry as well as the stable product offerings and structure features of the transactions. RMBS In our opinion, the slowdown in economic growth in China is an important consideration for loan performance. This is because a macroeconomic correction following a high-growth period will affect obligors' debt-servicing behavior. A recent property price correction could also pose a risk in the case of RMBS. That being said, we believe the full-recourse nature of the loans and the consequences of losing a home after foreclosure will continue to support mortgage performance in China, even during an economic downturn. Chinese households' lower debt leverage and increased incomes will continue to support debt serviceability (chart 2). Lower interest rates and simple mortgage products with most amortizing loans are also strengths, in our view. The relatively low LTV ratios (mostly under 70%) of mortgages in China also support obligors' debt-servicing capacity. The default rate of most RMBS transactions is low. 5

7 Chart 2 Disposable Income Per Capita In Urban Areas Of China RMB 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 Source: National Bureau of Statistics China; compiled by S&P Global Ratings. We expect the default rate and eventual loss of mortgage pools backing Chinese RMBS to remain low during the next 1-2 years. CLOs We believe CLO transactions could face more turbulence in asset performance than the retail receivables sector. CLOs are directly exposed to corporate credits that are highly correlated with macroeconomic slowdown and the more concentrated pools make it more difficult to manage the risk of deterioration in particular economic sectors and geographic regions. We lowered our ratings on a record number of Chinese corporates in the first half of 2016 (chart 3). The slowing rate of rating downgrades in the latter half of 2016 reflects the stabilization in industrial output and producer prices, as well as abundant liquidity for refinancing. We expect the sector to perform better than the general corporate bonds market, given the protection measures in securitization transactions and the selection of higher credit-quality corporate credits upon deal origination. 6

8 Chart 3 Rating And CreditWatch/Outlook Actions For Greater China Corporate Credits H2014 1H2015 2H2015 1H2016 2H Positive Negative Net Note: Rating Actions include downgrades on ratings and revisions on outlooks. 2H--second half. 1H--first half. Source: S&P Global Ratings. 7

9 NEW ISSUANCE TRENDS China Recorded Stronger Structured Finance Issuance In 2016 China's securitization market continued to advance in 2016, reaching RMB858 billion (US$124 billion) of new issuance, up 40% from 2015 (chart 4). This includes new securitization notes issued under the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and People's Bank of China (PBOC)'s credit asset securitization (CAS) scheme and those under the corporate securitization program managed by the CSRC. We expect the market to have around US$140 billion-equivalent new issuance in 2017, up 15% from 2016, with most growth coming from RMBS and nonbank asset securitizations such as lease receivables and trade finance obligations. Chart 4: China Securitization Issuance (RMB billion) 1, *Including issuance under under the CAS pilot program of the CBRC and PBOC, and the corporate securitization program managed by the CSRC Source: Chinabond, WIND; compiled by S&P Global Ratings RMBS Issuance Nearly Doubled In Q4 Following a quick pick up in the first three quarters of 2016, Chinese RMBS issuance further increased in Q4, with an aggregate RMB66.9 billion new RMBS notes sold during the quarter. In 2016, RMBS issuance was already on par with collateralized loan obligation (chart 5), which had dominated structured finance issuance in China before

10 Chart 5 China Securitization Issuance By Sector (RMB million) 350, , , , , ,000 50,000 - CLO Auto ABS RMBS NPL Other Source: Chinabond, Shanghai Clearing House; compiled by S&P Global Ratings. Repeated issuance from some issuers contributed to the rapid growth of RMBS offerings in Q4. China Construction Bank Corp. and Bank of China Ltd. launched a total of five transactions in Q4, accounting for more than 70% of new issuance volume during the period. China's housing provident funds, which were active during the first half of 2016, did not issue any new notes during the quarter. Issuance Momentum Of Auto Loan ABS Remains Strong The issuance momentum of China's auto loan ABS remained strong in Q4. Auto loan ABS issuance has grown rapidly in China compared with the stabilized issuance in the U.S. and Europe. A record 20 auto loan securitization transactions totaling RMB60 billion of receivables were securitized in This represents a 41% increase in issuance volume from a year earlier. The number of new transactions almost doubled during the same period. 9

11 Chart 6 China Auto Loan ABS Transactions: Receivables Securitized (RMB mn) Volkswagen Finance (China) Co., Ltd. Toyota Motor Finance (China) Co., Ltd. SAIC-GMAC Automotive Finance Co,.Ltd. SAIC Finance Co,.Ltd. Ping An Bank Co., Ltd. Mercedes-Benz Financial Jincheng Bank Co.,Ltd. GAC-SOFINCO Automobile Finance Co.,Ltd. Ford Automotive Finance (China) Ltd. Dongfeng Peugeot Citroen Auto Finance Dongfeng Nissan Finance Co., Ltd. China Minsheng Banking Corp. Ltd. China Merchants Bank BMW Automotive Finance (China) Co., Ltd. Beijing Hyundai Auto Finance Co.,Ltd. 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25, Source: Chinabond; compiled by S&P Global Ratings. We witnessed repeated issuance of Chinese auto loan ABS in Most issuers are captive auto finance companies related to various manufacturers. Seven auto loan companies issued at least two transactions in 2016 (chart 6). We believe the continued issuance is due to the funding needs of auto captive finance companies and the underlying demand for autos. The repeated issuance shows that auto loan companies regard securitization as a regular source of funding. Comparing Auto ABS Markets In The U.S., Europe, And China S&P Global Ratings in February published a report comparing auto loan ABS in China and other developed markets (see "Exploring The Differences And Similarities Of Auto ABS In China And Other Developed Markets", published Feb.8, 2017). According to the article: Retail auto loan ABS issuance in the U.S. totaled about US$67 billion in 2016, with roughly 58% (US$39 billion) backed by prime receivables, while overall auto ABS issuance was more than US$90 billion. In Europe, auto ABS issuance was about US$30 billion, including retained transactions, all backed by what are considered prime receivables. China's auto loan ABS issues, as of Q4, are backed only by borrowers classified as prime. 10

12 China's auto ABS deals are nearly all backed by new vehicles, while in the U.S. and Europe they generally contain a mix of new and used vehicle loans. Unlike in the U.S. market, there is sometimes only one international credit rating agency utilized in China. Most European deals have two or more agencies providing ratings, but a small percentage have one. The coupon/yield for the Chinese, U.S., and European deals are shown in chart 7. U.S. prime A3 classes (typically two- to three-year weighted-average lives) averaged about swaps plus 40 basis points (some were as tight as swaps plus 17 bps-18 bps), while 'BBB' rated class spreads generally priced in the swaps plus 225 bps-250 bps range. The senior classes in European deals have priced at one-month EURIBOR (or GBP LIBOR) plus a spread of 23 bps-95 bps (Europe is mostly a floatingrate note market for auto ABS when placed with investors; retained deals typically have fixed coupons to avoid the costs from the fixed-floating swaps unless otherwise needed). With currently negative benchmark rates, coupons/yields on the European deals are quite low. On the other hand, China's deals saw their most senior classes price, on average, at the one-year prime lending rate minus 115 bps, and the class Bs were at prime minus 30 bps. Chinese issuance appears to offer the most yield, but has reflected the market's debt rate and requires international investors to enter in currency swap transactions to convert interest and principal out of RMB. On the other hand, most bond products in Europe have been receiving European Central Bank buying support, creating what is an overall tighter bond yield environment. Chart 7 Chinese, U.S., And European Auto Loan ABS Coupon/Yield On Senior Classes (%) China U.S. Europe Source: S&P Global Ratings, J.P. Morgan Securities Plc, Bloomberg, and Chinabond. 11

13 Nonperforming Loan Issuance Is Still Under Trial Six new securitization transactions backed by nonperforming loans were issued in Q The relatively small issuance size and heavy discounts on asset nominal value upon asset transfer are still relevant in these transactions. All six banks that are permitted to securitize nonperforming loans have launched at least one transaction. In 2016, 14 transactions have been issued, with a total issuance volume of RMB15.6 billion. With the commodities volatility of recent years and increasing corporate leverage amid slowing economies, commercial loans are emerging in nonperforming loan pools in China. Among the 14 nonperforming loan securitization transactions issued in 2016, nine related to commercial loans extended to corporate or trade finance obligations. The inherent volatility of such loans' value was reflected in the large differences of loan-by-loan appraisal value within a transaction's portfolio. The asset transfer price of a nonperforming loan securitization backed by commercial loans typically had a 50%-80% discount from asset book values. The Chinese nonperforming loan market has been successful in selling loans from one bank to other investors in the interbank bond market, bringing in capital market resources to the banking system. It's also an approach for more transparent loan valuation because the market can follow these workouts and create better recovery assumptions for pricing further loan pools. We believe China's nonperforming loan market bears watching because there is plenty of nonperforming loan collateral to finance, and the lessons learned in 2016 should help further issuance in CLO Issuance Lost Its Track In 2016 The issuance of CLOs collateralized by China corporate loans lost steam in The aggregate CLO issuance was down more than 50% from a year earlier. The instances of corporate defaults in China's bond market and the growing market concern over China's high and rising corporate sector debt levels affected investor demand in the sector. Banks also had less incentive to securitize the loans, given the abundant liquidity. 12

14 TRANSACTION PERFORMANCE UPDATE Auto Loan ABS The asset performance of auto loan ABS in China remained stable in The cumulative default rate and cumulative net losses of auto loan receivables have been low to date, according to the publicly disclosed trustee reports (chart 8 and chart 9). Chart 8 China Auto Loan ABS- Asset Cumulative Default Rate (%) Months after transaction close SAIC-GMAC 2008 SAIC 2012 SAIC-GMAC CMB HeXin Dongfeng Nissan 2014 Toyota 2014 GAC-SOFINCO 2014 Ford 2014 Ford Ford BMW 2014 BMW BMW Volkswagen 2014 Volkswagen PingAn CMB SAIC-GMAC SAIC-GMAC Dongfeng Nissan Qi Fu Volkswagen SAIC-GMAC BHAF Mercedes-Benz Ford Jincheng Dongfeng Nissan Dongfeng Peugeot Citroen BMW SAIC-GMAC Volkswagen BHAF Ford Toyota Jincheng Dongfeng Nissan SAIC Volkswagen Mercedes-Benz BMW Note: Data as of Dec. 31, The definition of cumulative default rate may be different from deal to deal. Source: Trustee reports published on Chinabond's website; compiled by S&P Global Ratings. 13

15 Chart 9 China Auto Loan ABS- Asset Net Loss Rate (%) Months after transaction close SAIC-GMAC 2008 SAIC 2012 SAIC-GMAC CMB HeXin Dongfeng Nissan 2014 Toyota 2014 GAC-SOFINCO 2014 Ford 2014 Ford Ford BMW 2014 BMW BMW Volkswagen 2014 Volkswagen PingAn CMB SAIC-GMAC SAIC-GMAC Dongfeng Nissan Qi Fu Volkswagen SAIC-GMAC BHAF Mercedes-Benz Ford Jincheng Dongfeng Nissan Dongfeng Peugeot Citroen BMW SAIC-GMAC Volkswagen BHAF Ford Toyota Jincheng Dongfeng Nissan SAIC Volkswagen Mercedes-Benz BMW Note: Data as of Dec. 31, The definition of cumulative net loss rate may be different from deal to deal. Source: Trustee reports published on Chinabond's website; compiled by S&P Global Ratings. The senior tranche of issued notes typically have a duration of less than 18 months (chart 10), and the mezzanine notes are usually fully redeemed within two years. The short duration of notes limits investors' exposure to credit risks. 14

16 Chart 10 China Auto Loan ABS- Notes Paydown Ratio (%) Months after transaction close SAIC-GMAC 2008 SAIC 2012 SAIC-GMAC CMB HeXin Dongfeng Nissan 2014 Toyota 2014 GAC-SOFINCO 2014 Ford 2014 Ford Ford BMW 2014 BMW BMW Volkswagen 2014 Volkswagen PingAn CMB SAIC-GMAC SAIC-GMAC Dongfeng Nissan Qi Fu Volkswagen SAIC-GMAC BHAF Mercedes-Benz Ford Jincheng Dongfeng Nissan Dongfeng Peugeot Citroen BMW SAIC-GMAC Volkswagen BHAF Ford Toyota Jincheng Dongfeng Nissan SAIC Volkswagen Mercedes-Benz BMW Note: Data as of Dec. 31, Source: Trustee reports published on Chinabond's website; compiled by S&P Global Ratings. 15

17 RMBS The cumulative default rate for securities backed by residential mortgage loans was low as of Dec. 31, Chart 11 China's Bank-Sponsored RMBS- Asset Cumulative Default Rate (%) Months after transaction close You Yuan Zhao Yuan Qi Fu He Jia Ju Rong Jian Yuan Jing Cheng Zhong Ying Jian Yuan Xin Rong Jian Yuan Jia Mei Chuang Ying He Jia Ju Rong Zhong Ying Su Fu Zhong ying Zhong Ying Qi Fu Jian Yuan Jian Yuan Jian Yuan Note; Data as of Dec.31, The definition of cumulative default rate may be different from deal to deal. Source: Trustee reports published on Chinabond's website; compiled by S&P Global Ratings. The mortgage prepayment rate remained stable. 16

18 Chart 12 China's Bank-Sponsored RMBS- Asset Prepayment Rate (%) Months after transaction close You Yuan Zhao Yuan Qi Fu He Jia Ju Rong Jian Yuan Jing Cheng Zhong Ying Jian Yuan Xin Rong Jian Yuan Jia Mei Chuang Ying He Jia Ju Rong Zhong Ying Su Fu Zhong ying Zhong Ying Qi Fu Jian Yuan Jian Yuan Jian Yuan Note: Data as of Dec. 31, The definition of prepayment rate may be different from deal to deal. Source: Trustee reports published on Chinabond's website; compiled by S&P Global Ratings. 17

19 RATING ACTIONS We assigned ratings to six auto loan ABS in China in All of them are collateralized by pools of consumer loan contracts backed by passenger vehicles. Information listed below is as of the closing date of each transaction. Autopia China Retail Auto Mortgage Loan Securitization Trust Class Rating Amount (mil. RMB) A1 AA (sf) A2 AA (sf) Subordinated NR Driver China three Trust Class Rating Amount (mil. RMB) A AA (sf) 2,632.0 B BBB (sf) Subordinated NR Driver China four Trust Class Rating Amount (mil. RMB) A AA (sf) 2,632.0 B BBB+ (sf) Subordinated NR Autopia China Retail Auto Mortgage Loan Securitization Trust Class Rating Amount (mil. RMB) A1 AA(sf) 1,250.0 A2 AA (sf) 1,310.0 B A- (sf) Subordinated NR Fuyuan Retail Auto Mortgage Loan Securitization Trust Class Rating Amount (mil. RMB) A AA (sf) 2,584.0 B A+ (sf) Subordinated NR Driver China five Trust Class Rating Amount (mil. RMB) A AA (sf) 3,500.0 B BBB (sf) Subordinated NR

20 RECENT COMMENTARY ARTICLES China's Securitization Market Will Sustain Its Stability In 2017, Feb. 26, 2017 Exploring The Differences And Similarities Of Auto ABS In China And Other Developed Markets, Feb. 8, 2017 Sector Review: China's Corporates Hunker Down For Worsening Credit Conditions, Jan. 20, 2017 Global Structured Finance Outlook 2017, Jan. 4, 2017 Global Structured Finance Year In Review: 2016, Dec. 16, 2016 Expecting A Growing Nonperforming Loan ABS Market In 2017, We Comment On Our Approach, Dec. 14, 2016 Industry Credit Outlook: Stable Collateral Performance Supports Asia-Pacific's Securitization Markets, Nov. 16,

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