The usual disclaimer applies. The opinions are those of the discussant only and in no way involve the responsibility of the Bank of Italy.

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "The usual disclaimer applies. The opinions are those of the discussant only and in no way involve the responsibility of the Bank of Italy."

Transcription

1 Business Models in Banking: Is There a Best Practice? Conference Centre for Applied Research in Finance Università Bocconi September 21, 2009, Milan Tests of Ex Ante versus Ex Post Theories of Collateral using Private and Public Information by Allen N, Berger, W. Scott Frame and Vasso Ioannidou discussion by Francesco Columba The usual disclaimer applies. The opinions are those of the discussant only and in no way involve the responsibility of the Bank of Italy.

2 Summary I What is the economic function of collateral? Two different sets of theories : ex-ante theories: adverse selection problems due information solved thanks to collateral through signaling to asymmetric ex-post theories: frictions motivate collateral in an optimal debt contract to address moral hazard, contract enforcement, costly state verification Empirically i unsettled the relative relevance of the two sets of theories as well as the effect of relationship lending on collateral The paper tests the empirical predictions of the two classes of models discussion by Francesco Columba 2

3 Summary II Empirical test 1 : identification of the effect of the 2 sets of theories studying variation in the incidence of collateral pledges at loan origination Empirical i testt 2: which h one is the empirically ii dominant effect? The ex-ante private information or the ex-post incentive conflict? Results Test 1: consistent with both theories, but ex-ante private information models valid only for borrowers unknown to lenders (short relationships) Test 2: consistent twith testt 1; ex post theories empirically i dominate for firms with longer relationships (where private information is less important) Policy implications: to reduce use of collateral developing credit registries discussion by Francesco Columba 3

4 Relevance of collateral Financial crisis: change in the value of pledged assets correlated across borrowers and amplifies business cycle through pro-cyclical changes in access to credit Key for literature on role of financial frictions leading to procyclicality of financial sector: financial accelerator Effects on loan demand, loan supply, funding and market liquidity, stability of financial intermediaries (Bernanke et al., 1999, Brunnermeier, 2008, Adrian and Shin, 2008, Iacoviello, 2005, Gerali et al. 2009) Originate-to-distribute model; securitisation, retained securitisation; pledgeability in operations with Central Banks. discussion by Francesco Columba 4

5 data and empirical model Bolivian credit registry design: information on outstanding loans, on lenders. alternative measures of unobserved risk (assumed to be not indirectly observed from other sources)? test 1 hinges on assumption that past repayment problems predict future delinquencies (shown in Appendix): how is endogeneity addressed in assessing this relation? discussion by Francesco Columba 5

6 test 1 test 1: observed risk positively associated with incidence of collateral consistently tl with ex-post theories unobserved risk only if interacted with relationship length provides support to ex-ante theories for short relations, when private info is more important both theories hold true or sub-samplingsampling along firm size and loan contract is in favour of ex-post theories (as indicated in robustness checks)? discussion by Francesco Columba 6

7 test 2: test 2 examines relationship between collateral and ex post loan performance effect of collateral on probability of ex post performance is ambiguous with ex post models the positive relationship with collateral could be compensated by the mitigation effect provided by collateral itself with ex ante theories the effect of collateral is negative so if the effect is negative ambiguity on which of the two theories prevails results: collateral is positively associated with ex post defaults consistent with ex post theories, but when interacted with relationship length results change. other ways of disentangling the effect of the two theories effectsof personal guarantees on ex-post loan performance? how is debt restructuring accounted for? discussion by Francesco Columba 7

8 Developments and policy implications Contribution to the literature: not so clear the divide between the two classes of theories Implications for access to credit in terms of quantity and interest rates? Characteristics of credit registries, one size fits all countries? Policy implication: to foster development of credit registries to eliminate the need for costly collateral Welfare analysis? If collateral l is inefficient i why it isused? Are banks lazy? discussion by Francesco Columba 8

Macroprudential Bank Capital Regulation in a Competitive Financial System

Macroprudential Bank Capital Regulation in a Competitive Financial System Macroprudential Bank Capital Regulation in a Competitive Financial System Milton Harris, Christian Opp, Marcus Opp Chicago, UPenn, University of California Fall 2015 H 2 O (Chicago, UPenn, UC) Macroprudential

More information

Tests of Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Theories of Collateral Using Private and Public Information Berger, A.N.; Frame, W.S.; Ioannidou, V.

Tests of Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Theories of Collateral Using Private and Public Information Berger, A.N.; Frame, W.S.; Ioannidou, V. Tilburg University Tests of Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Theories of Collateral Using Private and Public Information Berger, A.N.; Frame, W.S.; Ioannidou, V. Publication date: 2010 Link to publication Citation

More information

Global Games and Financial Fragility:

Global Games and Financial Fragility: Global Games and Financial Fragility: Foundations and a Recent Application Itay Goldstein Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania Outline Part I: The introduction of global games into the analysis of

More information

Redistributive Monetary Policy

Redistributive Monetary Policy 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 Redistributive Monetary Policy Handout for Jackson Hole Symposium, September 1 st,

More information

Asymmetric information and the securitisation of SME loans

Asymmetric information and the securitisation of SME loans Asymmetric information and the securitisation of SME loans Ugo Albertazzi (ECB), Margherita Bottero (Bank of Italy), Leonardo Gambacorta (BIS) and Steven Ongena (U. of Zurich) 1st Annual Workshop of the

More information

Maturity Transformation and Liquidity

Maturity Transformation and Liquidity Maturity Transformation and Liquidity Patrick Bolton, Tano Santos Columbia University and Jose Scheinkman Princeton University Motivation Main Question: Who is best placed to, 1. Transform Maturity 2.

More information

Economics and Finance,

Economics and Finance, Economics and Finance, 2014-15 Lecture 5 - Corporate finance under asymmetric information: Moral hazard and access to external finance Luca Deidda UNISS, DiSEA, CRENoS October 2014 Luca Deidda (UNISS,

More information

Tests of Ex Ante versus Ex Post Theories of Collateral using Private and Public Information

Tests of Ex Ante versus Ex Post Theories of Collateral using Private and Public Information Tests of Ex Ante versus Ex Post Theories of Collateral using Private and Public Information Allen N. Berger University of South Carolina Wharton Financial Institutions Center CentER, Tilburg University

More information

Tests of Ex Ante versus Ex Post Theories of Collateral using Private and Public Information

Tests of Ex Ante versus Ex Post Theories of Collateral using Private and Public Information Tests of Ex Ante versus Ex Post Theories of Collateral using Private and Public Information Allen N. Berger University of South Carolina Wharton Financial Institutions Center CentER, Tilburg University

More information

Monetary Economics July 2014

Monetary Economics July 2014 ECON40013 ECON90011 Monetary Economics July 2014 Chris Edmond Office hours: by appointment Office: Business & Economics 423 Phone: 8344 9733 Email: cedmond@unimelb.edu.au Course description This year I

More information

Liquidity Insurance in Macro. Heitor Almeida University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign

Liquidity Insurance in Macro. Heitor Almeida University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign Liquidity Insurance in Macro Heitor Almeida University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign Motivation Renewed attention to financial frictions in general and role of banks in particular Existing models model

More information

Strategic Default in joint liability groups: Evidence from a natural experiment in India

Strategic Default in joint liability groups: Evidence from a natural experiment in India Strategic Default in joint liability groups: Evidence from a natural experiment in India Xavier Gine World Bank Karuna Krishnaswamy IFMR Alejandro Ponce World Justice Project CIRANO, November 9-10, 2012

More information

Nobel Symposium 2018: Money and Banking

Nobel Symposium 2018: Money and Banking Nobel Symposium 2018: Money and Banking Markus K. Brunnermeier Princeton University Stockholm, May 27 th 2018 Types of Distortions Belief distortions Match belief surveys (BGS) Incomplete markets natural

More information

THE ECONOMICS OF BANK CAPITAL

THE ECONOMICS OF BANK CAPITAL THE ECONOMICS OF BANK CAPITAL Edoardo Gaffeo Department of Economics and Management University of Trento OUTLINE What we are talking about, and why Banks are «special», and their capital is «special» as

More information

Discussion of Liquidity, Moral Hazard, and Interbank Market Collapse

Discussion of Liquidity, Moral Hazard, and Interbank Market Collapse Discussion of Liquidity, Moral Hazard, and Interbank Market Collapse Tano Santos Columbia University Financial intermediaries, such as banks, perform many roles: they screen risks, evaluate and fund worthy

More information

A Theory of Endogenous Liquidity Cycles

A Theory of Endogenous Liquidity Cycles A Theory of Endogenous Günter Strobl Kenan-Flagler Business School University of North Carolina October 2010 Liquidity and the Business Cycle Source: Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (Journal of Finance, forthcoming)

More information

by Sankar De and Manpreet Singh

by Sankar De and Manpreet Singh Comments on: Credit Rationing in Informal Markets: The case of small firms in India by Sankar De and Manpreet Singh Discussant: Johanna Francis (Fordham University and UCSC) CAFIN Workshop 25-26 April

More information

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LOLR FACILITIES: THE CASE OF ILLIQUID LEVERAGE FOURTEENTH JACQUES POLAK CONFERENCE, IMF, NOVEMBER

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LOLR FACILITIES: THE CASE OF ILLIQUID LEVERAGE FOURTEENTH JACQUES POLAK CONFERENCE, IMF, NOVEMBER UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LOLR FACILITIES: THE CASE OF ILLIQUID LEVERAGE FOURTEENTH JACQUES POLAK CONFERENCE, IMF, NOVEMBER 7 2013 Viral V Acharya and Bruce Tuckman, NYU Stern Lender of last resort When

More information

R&D and innovation expenditures in the crisis. Bronwyn H. Hall University of Maastricht and University of California at Berkeley

R&D and innovation expenditures in the crisis. Bronwyn H. Hall University of Maastricht and University of California at Berkeley R&D and innovation expenditures in the crisis Bronwyn H. Hall University of Maastricht and University of California at Berkeley Outline R&D as an investment and implications for financing R&D Further reading:

More information

Illiquidity and Interest Rate Policy

Illiquidity and Interest Rate Policy Illiquidity and Interest Rate Policy Douglas Diamond and Raghuram Rajan University of Chicago Booth School of Business and NBER 2 Motivation Illiquidity and insolvency are likely when long term assets

More information

Shocks to Bank Lending, Risk-Taking and Securitization, and their role for U.S. Business Cycle Fluctuations

Shocks to Bank Lending, Risk-Taking and Securitization, and their role for U.S. Business Cycle Fluctuations Shocks to Bank Lending, Risk-Taking and Securitization, and their role for U.S. Business Cycle Fluctuations Gert Peersman Ghent University Wolf Wagner Tilburg University Motivation Better understanding

More information

Where s the Smoking Gun? A Study of Underwriting Standards for US Subprime Mortgages

Where s the Smoking Gun? A Study of Underwriting Standards for US Subprime Mortgages Where s the Smoking Gun? A Study of Underwriting Standards for US Subprime Mortgages Geetesh Bhardwaj The Vanguard Group Rajdeep Sengupta Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ECB CFS Research Conference Einaudi

More information

Peer Monitoring via Loss Mutualization

Peer Monitoring via Loss Mutualization Peer Monitoring via Loss Mutualization Francesco Palazzo Bank of Italy November 19, 2015 Systemic Risk Center, LSE Motivation Extensive bailout plans in response to the financial crisis... US Treasury

More information

Bubbles, Liquidity and the Macroeconomy

Bubbles, Liquidity and the Macroeconomy Bubbles, Liquidity and the Macroeconomy Markus K. Brunnermeier The recent financial crisis has shown that financial frictions such as asset bubbles and liquidity spirals have important consequences not

More information

Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What do 23 Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk?

Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What do 23 Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk? Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What do 23 Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk? Gabriel Jiménez Banco de España Steven Ongena CentER - Tilburg University & CEPR

More information

The impact of information sharing on the. use of collateral versus guarantees

The impact of information sharing on the. use of collateral versus guarantees The impact of information sharing on the Abstract use of collateral versus guarantees Ralph De Haas and Matteo Millone We exploit contract-level data from Bosnia and Herzegovina to assess the impact of

More information

IV SPECIAL FEATURES THE IMPACT OF SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES ON BANK CREDIT RISK-TAKING

IV SPECIAL FEATURES THE IMPACT OF SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES ON BANK CREDIT RISK-TAKING B THE IMPACT OF SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES ON BANK CREDIT RISK-TAKING This Special Feature discusses the effect of short-term interest rates on bank credit risktaking. In addition, it examines the dynamic

More information

Financial Innovation and Borrowers: Evidence from Peer-to-Peer Lending

Financial Innovation and Borrowers: Evidence from Peer-to-Peer Lending Financial Innovation and Borrowers: Evidence from Peer-to-Peer Lending Tetyana Balyuk BdF-TSE Conference November 12, 2018 Research Question Motivation Motivation Imperfections in consumer credit market

More information

Discussion of Liquidity risk and financial stability regulation by Lutz and Pichler

Discussion of Liquidity risk and financial stability regulation by Lutz and Pichler Discussion of Liquidity risk and financial stability regulation by Lutz and Pichler Matthieu Darracq Pariès European Central Bank The opinions in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily

More information

Informational Frictions and Financial Intermediation. Prof. Irina A. Telyukova UBC Economics 345 Fall 2008

Informational Frictions and Financial Intermediation. Prof. Irina A. Telyukova UBC Economics 345 Fall 2008 Informational Frictions and Financial Intermediation Prof. Irina A. Telyukova UBC Economics 345 Fall 2008 Agenda We are beginning to study banking and banking regulation. Banks are a financial intermediaries.

More information

Intermediary Balance Sheets Tobias Adrian and Nina Boyarchenko, NY Fed Discussant: Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, UC Berkeley

Intermediary Balance Sheets Tobias Adrian and Nina Boyarchenko, NY Fed Discussant: Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, UC Berkeley Intermediary Balance Sheets Tobias Adrian and Nina Boyarchenko, NY Fed Discussant: Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, UC Berkeley Objective: Construct a general equilibrium model with two types of intermediaries:

More information

The lender of last resort: liquidity provision versus the possibility of bail-out

The lender of last resort: liquidity provision versus the possibility of bail-out The lender of last resort: liquidity provision versus the possibility of bail-out Rob Nijskens Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger June 24, 2010 The lender of last resort: liquidity versus bail-out 1 /20 Motivation:

More information

Leverage Across Firms, Banks and Countries

Leverage Across Firms, Banks and Countries Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Bent E. Sørensen and Sevcan Yeşiltaş University of Houston and NBER, University of Houston and CEPR, and Johns Hopkins University Dallas Fed Conference on Financial Frictions and

More information

Monetary Economics. Lecture 23a: inside and outside liquidity, part one. Chris Edmond. 2nd Semester 2014 (not examinable)

Monetary Economics. Lecture 23a: inside and outside liquidity, part one. Chris Edmond. 2nd Semester 2014 (not examinable) Monetary Economics Lecture 23a: inside and outside liquidity, part one Chris Edmond 2nd Semester 2014 (not examinable) 1 This lecture Main reading: Holmström and Tirole, Inside and outside liquidity, MIT

More information

Managing through incentives

Managing through incentives Managing through incentives The economics of dynamic employment relationships Erik Madsen New York University October 24, 2016 What is incentive contracting? 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics 2016 Nobel Prize

More information

The role of asymmetric information

The role of asymmetric information LECTURE NOTES ON CREDIT MARKETS The role of asymmetric information Eliana La Ferrara - 2007 Credit markets are typically a ected by asymmetric information problems i.e. one party is more informed than

More information

Government Guarantees and Financial Stability

Government Guarantees and Financial Stability Government Guarantees and Financial Stability F. Allen E. Carletti I. Goldstein A. Leonello Bocconi University and CEPR University of Pennsylvania Government Guarantees and Financial Stability 1 / 21 Introduction

More information

Optimal monetary and macro-pru policies

Optimal monetary and macro-pru policies Discussion of Kiley and Sim s Optimal monetary and macro-pru policies Oreste Tristani European Central Bank Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Conference on Monetary Policy and Financial Markets, 28

More information

Competition and the pass-through of unconventional monetary policy: evidence from TLTROs

Competition and the pass-through of unconventional monetary policy: evidence from TLTROs Competition and the pass-through of unconventional monetary policy: evidence from TLTROs M. Benetton 1 D. Fantino 2 1 London School of Economics and Political Science 2 Bank of Italy Boston Policy Workshop,

More information

Asymmetric Information and the Role of Financial intermediaries

Asymmetric Information and the Role of Financial intermediaries Asymmetric Information and the Role of Financial intermediaries 1 Observations 1. Issuing debt and equity securities (direct finance) is not the primary source for external financing for businesses. 2.

More information

Inflation targeting and financial stability David Vávra OG Research. 15 June 2011 National Bank of Poland, Warsaw

Inflation targeting and financial stability David Vávra OG Research. 15 June 2011 National Bank of Poland, Warsaw Inflation targeting and financial stability David Vávra OG Research 15 June 2011 National Bank of Poland, Warsaw Inflation targeting and financial stability Questions: A. How to set up the macro prudential

More information

Unconventional Monetary Policy and Bank Lending Relationships

Unconventional Monetary Policy and Bank Lending Relationships Unconventional Monetary Policy and Bank Lending Relationships Christophe Cahn 1 Anne Duquerroy 1 William Mullins 2 1 Banque de France 2 University of Maryland BdF-BdI Workshop - June 9, 2017 1 / 43 Motivation

More information

The Socially Optimal Level of Capital Requirements: AViewfromTwoPapers. Javier Suarez* CEMFI. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, November 2012

The Socially Optimal Level of Capital Requirements: AViewfromTwoPapers. Javier Suarez* CEMFI. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, November 2012 The Socially Optimal Level of Capital Requirements: AViewfromTwoPapers Javier Suarez* CEMFI Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 15 16 November 2012 *Based on joint work with David Martinez-Miera (Carlos III)

More information

Bank Capital, Agency Costs, and Monetary Policy. Césaire Meh Kevin Moran Department of Monetary and Financial Analysis Bank of Canada

Bank Capital, Agency Costs, and Monetary Policy. Césaire Meh Kevin Moran Department of Monetary and Financial Analysis Bank of Canada Bank Capital, Agency Costs, and Monetary Policy Césaire Meh Kevin Moran Department of Monetary and Financial Analysis Bank of Canada Motivation A large literature quantitatively studies the role of financial

More information

Microeconomics of Banking Second Edition. Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet. The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England

Microeconomics of Banking Second Edition. Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet. The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England Microeconomics of Banking Second Edition Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England List of Figures Preface xv xvii 1 Introduction 1 1.1 What Is a Bank,

More information

The Federal Reserve in the 21st Century Financial Stability Policies

The Federal Reserve in the 21st Century Financial Stability Policies The Federal Reserve in the 21st Century Financial Stability Policies Thomas Eisenbach, Research and Statistics Group Disclaimer The views expressed in the presentation are those of the speaker and are

More information

A Course in Environmental Economics: Theory, Policy, and Practice. Daniel J. Phaneuf and Till Requate

A Course in Environmental Economics: Theory, Policy, and Practice. Daniel J. Phaneuf and Till Requate 1 A Course in Environmental Economics: Theory, Policy, and Practice PART I: ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT Daniel J. Phaneuf and Till Requate 1. Introduction to the Theory of Externalities 1.1 Market failure

More information

Central bank liquidity provision, risktaking and economic efficiency

Central bank liquidity provision, risktaking and economic efficiency Central bank liquidity provision, risktaking and economic efficiency U. Bindseil and J. Jablecki Presentation by U. Bindseil at the Fields Quantitative Finance Seminar, 27 February 2013 1 Classical problem:

More information

The Role of Soft Information in a Dynamic Contract Setting:

The Role of Soft Information in a Dynamic Contract Setting: The Role of Soft Information in a Dynamic Contract Setting: Evidence from the Home Equity Credit Market Sumit Agarwal Brent W. Ambrose Souphala Chomsisengphet Chunlin Liu Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

More information

Municipal Borrowing Costs and State Policies for Distressed Municipalities

Municipal Borrowing Costs and State Policies for Distressed Municipalities Municipal Borrowing Costs and State Policies for Distressed Municipalities Pengjie Gao, HKUST and University of Notre Dame Chang Lee, University of Illinois at Chicago Dermot Murphy, University of Illinois

More information

Liquidity and Solvency Risks

Liquidity and Solvency Risks Liquidity and Solvency Risks Armin Eder a Falko Fecht b Thilo Pausch c a Universität Innsbruck, b European Business School, c Deutsche Bundesbank WebEx-Presentation February 25, 2011 Eder, Fecht, Pausch

More information

Amplification: conceptual and empirical frameworks

Amplification: conceptual and empirical frameworks Amplification: conceptual and empirical frameworks Jon Danielsson Systemic Risk Centre London School of Economics www.systemicrisk.ac.uk December 15 th 2016 Macroprudential Stress Test and Policies: A

More information

Optimal Credit Market Policy. CEF 2018, Milan

Optimal Credit Market Policy. CEF 2018, Milan Optimal Credit Market Policy Matteo Iacoviello 1 Ricardo Nunes 2 Andrea Prestipino 1 1 Federal Reserve Board 2 University of Surrey CEF 218, Milan June 2, 218 Disclaimer: The views expressed are solely

More information

Institutional Finance

Institutional Finance Institutional Finance Lecture 09 : Banking and Maturity Mismatch Markus K. Brunnermeier Preceptor: Dong Beom Choi Princeton University 1 Select/monitor borrowers Sharpe (1990) Reduce asymmetric info idiosyncratic

More information

Journal of Financial Economics

Journal of Financial Economics Journal of Financial Economics 100 (2011) 85 97 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Financial Economics journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jfec Tests of ex ante versus ex post theories

More information

Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria

Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria Lezione 11 Ruolo degli intermediari: aspetti micro delle crisi finanziarie (asimmetrie informative e modelli di business bancari/ finanziari) 1 0. Outline Scaletta della

More information

The Federal Reserve in the 21st Century Financial Stability Policies

The Federal Reserve in the 21st Century Financial Stability Policies The Federal Reserve in the 21st Century Financial Stability Policies Thomas Eisenbach, Research and Statistics Group Disclaimer The views expressed in the presentation are those of the speaker and are

More information

5 The risk-taking channel

5 The risk-taking channel 5 The risk-taking channel Adrian, Tobias and Hyun Song Shin (2010), The changing nature of financial intermediation and the financial crisis of 2007-09, Annual Review of Economics, (also available as Fed

More information

A Policy Model for Analyzing Macroprudential and Monetary Policies

A Policy Model for Analyzing Macroprudential and Monetary Policies A Policy Model for Analyzing Macroprudential and Monetary Policies Sami Alpanda Gino Cateau Cesaire Meh Bank of Canada November 2013 Alpanda, Cateau, Meh (Bank of Canada) ()Macroprudential - Monetary Policy

More information

The effect of macroprudential policies on credit developments in Europe

The effect of macroprudential policies on credit developments in Europe Katarzyna Budnik Martina Jasova European Central Bank The effect of macroprudential policies on credit developments in Europe 1995-2017 Joint European Central Bank and Central Bank of Ireland research

More information

Quantitative Significance of Collateral Constraints as an Amplification Mechanism

Quantitative Significance of Collateral Constraints as an Amplification Mechanism RIETI Discussion Paper Series 09-E-05 Quantitative Significance of Collateral Constraints as an Amplification Mechanism INABA Masaru The Canon Institute for Global Studies KOBAYASHI Keiichiro RIETI The

More information

On Shareholder vs. Stakeholder finance

On Shareholder vs. Stakeholder finance On Shareholder vs. Stakeholder finance Giovanni Ferri University of Bari - Italy Helsinki, 24 Sept 2009 Finnish Co-operative Movement 110 years: Celebratory Conference Partly based on G. Coco & G. Ferri

More information

PART II-FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (INTERMEDIARIES)

PART II-FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (INTERMEDIARIES) Boğaziçi University Department of Economics Money, Banking and Financial Institutions L.Yıldıran PART II-FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (INTERMEDIARIES) What do banks and other intermediaries do? Why do they exist?

More information

The I Theory of Money

The I Theory of Money The I Theory of Money Markus Brunnermeier and Yuliy Sannikov Presented by Felipe Bastos G Silva 09/12/2017 Overview Motivation: A theory of money needs a place for financial intermediaries (inside money

More information

ASSET PRICES IN ECONOMIC THEORY 1

ASSET PRICES IN ECONOMIC THEORY 1 26 1 Ing. Silvia Gantnerová, National Bank of Slovakia Asset prices, though not a goal or instrument of monetary policy, are nonetheless important for its realization, since they are a component of its

More information

Stocks and corporate bonds not the most important sources of funds for business

Stocks and corporate bonds not the most important sources of funds for business Stocks and corporate bonds not the most important sources of funds for business Stocks and corporate bonds not the most important sources of funds for business Indirect finance through financial intermediaries

More information

Credit Shocks and the U.S. Business Cycle. Is This Time Different? Raju Huidrom University of Virginia. Midwest Macro Conference

Credit Shocks and the U.S. Business Cycle. Is This Time Different? Raju Huidrom University of Virginia. Midwest Macro Conference Credit Shocks and the U.S. Business Cycle: Is This Time Different? Raju Huidrom University of Virginia May 31, 214 Midwest Macro Conference Raju Huidrom Credit Shocks and the U.S. Business Cycle Background

More information

Chapter 2 Theoretical Views on Money Creation and Credit Rationing

Chapter 2 Theoretical Views on Money Creation and Credit Rationing Chapter 2 Theoretical Views on Money Creation and Credit Rationing 2.1 Loanable Funds Theory Versus Post-Keynesian Endogenous Money Theory In what appears to be an adequate explanation to how money is

More information

THE IMPACT OF THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS ON BANK LOAN INTEREST RATES AND GUARANTEES

THE IMPACT OF THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS ON BANK LOAN INTEREST RATES AND GUARANTEES ISSN 1974-4110 WP-EMS Working Papers Series in Economics, Mathematics and Statistics THE IMPACT OF THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS ON BANK LOAN INTEREST RATES AND GUARANTEES Giorgio Calcagnini, (U. Urbino)

More information

Life Below Zero: Bank Lending Under Negative Policy Rates

Life Below Zero: Bank Lending Under Negative Policy Rates Life Below Zero: Bank Lending Under Negative Policy Rates Florian Heider European Central Bank & CEPR Farzad Saidi Stockholm School of Economics & CEPR Glenn Schepens European Central Bank December 15,

More information

Notes on Financial Frictions Under Asymmetric Information and Costly State Verification. Lawrence Christiano

Notes on Financial Frictions Under Asymmetric Information and Costly State Verification. Lawrence Christiano Notes on Financial Frictions Under Asymmetric Information and Costly State Verification by Lawrence Christiano Incorporating Financial Frictions into a Business Cycle Model General idea: Standard model

More information

Macroeconomic Models with Financial Frictions

Macroeconomic Models with Financial Frictions Macroeconomic Models with Financial Frictions Jesús Fernández-Villaverde University of Pennsylvania December 2, 2012 Jesús Fernández-Villaverde (PENN) Macro-Finance December 2, 2012 1 / 26 Motivation I

More information

Wholesale funding runs

Wholesale funding runs Christophe Pérignon David Thesmar Guillaume Vuillemey HEC Paris The Development of Securities Markets. Trends, risks and policies Bocconi - Consob Feb. 2016 Motivation Wholesale funding growing source

More information

Journal Of Financial And Strategic Decisions Volume 7 Number 3 Fall 1994 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: THE CASE OF BANK LOAN COMMITMENTS

Journal Of Financial And Strategic Decisions Volume 7 Number 3 Fall 1994 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: THE CASE OF BANK LOAN COMMITMENTS Journal Of Financial And Strategic Decisions Volume 7 Number 3 Fall 1994 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: THE CASE OF BANK LOAN COMMITMENTS James E. McDonald * Abstract This study analyzes common stock return behavior

More information

Financial Institutions, Markets and Regulation: A Survey

Financial Institutions, Markets and Regulation: A Survey Financial Institutions, Markets and Regulation: A Survey Thorsten Beck, Elena Carletti and Itay Goldstein COEURE workshop on financial markets, 6 June 2015 Starting point The recent crisis has led to intense

More information

As shown in chapter 2, output volatility continues to

As shown in chapter 2, output volatility continues to 5 Dealing with Commodity Price, Terms of Trade, and Output Risks As shown in chapter 2, output volatility continues to be significantly higher for most developing countries than for developed countries,

More information

Macroeconomics of Bank Capital and Liquidity Regulations

Macroeconomics of Bank Capital and Liquidity Regulations Macroeconomics of Bank Capital and Liquidity Regulations Authors: Frederic Boissay and Fabrice Collard Discussion by: David Martinez-Miera UC3M & CEPR Financial Stability Conference Martinez-Miera (UC3M

More information

Bank Lending Shocks and the Euro Area Business Cycle

Bank Lending Shocks and the Euro Area Business Cycle Bank Lending Shocks and the Euro Area Business Cycle Gert Peersman Ghent University Motivation SVAR framework to examine macro consequences of disturbances specific to bank lending market in euro area

More information

Ex ante moral hazard on borrowers actions

Ex ante moral hazard on borrowers actions Lecture 9 Capital markets INTRODUCTION Evidence that majority of population is excluded from credit markets Demand for Credit arises for three reasons: (a) To finance fixed capital acquisitions (e.g. new

More information

Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial Intermediation Contemporary Financial Intermediation Extended Contents Preface Acknowledgments About the Authors xv xix xxi PARTI THE BACKGROUND 1 A Friendly Conversation 3 Introduction 3 The Conversation: 1991 3 Follow-Up

More information

The Role of Interbank Markets in Monetary Policy: A Model with Rationing

The Role of Interbank Markets in Monetary Policy: A Model with Rationing The Role of Interbank Markets in Monetary Policy: A Model with Rationing Xavier Freixas Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CEPR José Jorge CEMPRE, Faculdade Economia, Universidade Porto Motivation Starting point:

More information

Soft Information in Small Business Lending

Soft Information in Small Business Lending . Soft Information in Small Business Lending Emilia García-Appendini Abstract.- I empirically examine whether banks incorporate information about small firms previous credit repayment patterns into their

More information

New Keynesian Model. Prof. Eric Sims. Fall University of Notre Dame. Sims (ND) New Keynesian Model Fall / 20

New Keynesian Model. Prof. Eric Sims. Fall University of Notre Dame. Sims (ND) New Keynesian Model Fall / 20 New Keynesian Model Prof. Eric Sims University of Notre Dame Fall 2012 Sims (ND) New Keynesian Model Fall 2012 1 / 20 New Keynesian Economics New Keynesian (NK) model: leading alternative to RBC model

More information

06RT17. SME Collateral: risky borrowers or risky behaviour? James Carroll and Fergal McCann

06RT17. SME Collateral: risky borrowers or risky behaviour? James Carroll and Fergal McCann 06RT17 SME Collateral: risky borrowers or risky behaviour? James Carroll and Fergal McCann SME Collateral: risky borrowers or risky behaviour? James Carroll a, Fergal McCann b a Trinity College Dublin;

More information

Review of. Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System by Jean Tirole. Published by Princeton University Press in 2002

Review of. Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System by Jean Tirole. Published by Princeton University Press in 2002 Review of Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System by Jean Tirole Published by Princeton University Press in 2002 Reviewer: Franklin Allen, Finance Department, Wharton School,

More information

Financial Intermediation and Credit Policy in Business Cycle Analysis. Gertler and Kiotaki Professor PengFei Wang Fatemeh KazempourLong

Financial Intermediation and Credit Policy in Business Cycle Analysis. Gertler and Kiotaki Professor PengFei Wang Fatemeh KazempourLong Financial Intermediation and Credit Policy in Business Cycle Analysis Gertler and Kiotaki 2009 Professor PengFei Wang Fatemeh KazempourLong 1 Motivation Bernanke, Gilchrist and Gertler (1999) studied great

More information

Counterparty risk externality: Centralized versus over-the-counter markets. Presentation at Stanford Macro, April 2011

Counterparty risk externality: Centralized versus over-the-counter markets. Presentation at Stanford Macro, April 2011 : Centralized versus over-the-counter markets Viral Acharya Alberto Bisin NYU-Stern, CEPR and NBER NYU and NBER Presentation at Stanford Macro, April 2011 Introduction OTC markets have often been at the

More information

Estimating Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises: An Endogenous Regime-Switching Approach

Estimating Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises: An Endogenous Regime-Switching Approach Estimating Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises: An Endogenous Regime-Switching Approach Gianluca Benigno 1 Andrew Foerster 2 Christopher Otrok 3 Alessandro Rebucci 4 1 London School of Economics and

More information

Rural Financial Intermediaries

Rural Financial Intermediaries Rural Financial Intermediaries 1. Limited Liability, Collateral and Its Substitutes 1 A striking empirical fact about the operation of rural financial markets is how markedly the conditions of access can

More information

A Macroeconomic Model with Financially Constrained Producers and Intermediaries

A Macroeconomic Model with Financially Constrained Producers and Intermediaries A Macroeconomic Model with Financially Constrained Producers and Intermediaries Authors: Vadim, Elenev Tim Landvoigt and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh Discussion by: David Martinez-Miera ECB Research Workshop

More information

The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market

The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market Liran Einav 1 Amy Finkelstein 2 Paul Schrimpf 3 1 Stanford and NBER 2 MIT and NBER 3 MIT Cowles 75th Anniversary Conference

More information

ECON 7500: Advanced Monetary Theory

ECON 7500: Advanced Monetary Theory Econ 7500 Dr. Erturk Spring 2016 Office: OSH 354 Office Hr: W 1 2 or by appt ECON 7500: Advanced Monetary Theory The objective of the course is to provide an in-depth understanding of money and financial

More information

Permissible collateral, access to finance, and loan contracts: Evidence from a natural experiment Bing Xu Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Permissible collateral, access to finance, and loan contracts: Evidence from a natural experiment Bing Xu Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Permissible collateral, access to finance, and loan contracts: Evidence from a natural experiment Bing Xu Universidad Carlos III de Madrid BOFIT, 2016, HELSINKI Introduction Lack of sufficient collateral

More information

BBK3253 Risk Management Prepared by Dr Khairul Anuar

BBK3253 Risk Management Prepared by Dr Khairul Anuar BBK3253 Risk Management Prepared by Dr Khairul Anuar L6 - Managing Credit Risk 23-0 Content 1. Credit risk definition 2. Credit risk in the banking sector 3. Credit Risk vs. Market Risk 4. Credit Products

More information

Credit Market Competition and Liquidity Crises

Credit Market Competition and Liquidity Crises Credit Market Competition and Liquidity Crises Elena Carletti Agnese Leonello European University Institute and CEPR University of Pennsylvania May 9, 2012 Motivation There is a long-standing debate on

More information

Do Low Interest Rates Sow the Seeds of Financial Crises?

Do Low Interest Rates Sow the Seeds of Financial Crises? Do Low nterest Rates Sow the Seeds of Financial Crises? Simona Cociuba, University of Western Ontario Malik Shukayev, Bank of Canada Alexander Ueberfeldt, Bank of Canada Second Boston University-Boston

More information

Business cycle fluctuations Part II

Business cycle fluctuations Part II Understanding the World Economy Master in Economics and Business Business cycle fluctuations Part II Lecture 7 Nicolas Coeurdacier nicolas.coeurdacier@sciencespo.fr Lecture 7: Business cycle fluctuations

More information

Chapter 2. Literature Review

Chapter 2. Literature Review Chapter 2 Literature Review There is a wide agreement that monetary policy is a tool in promoting economic growth and stabilizing inflation. However, there is less agreement about how monetary policy exactly

More information

Economia e Gestione degli Intermediari Finanziari. Set 4. LIUC - Università Cattaneo A.Y. 2017/18 Valter Lazzari

Economia e Gestione degli Intermediari Finanziari. Set 4. LIUC - Università Cattaneo A.Y. 2017/18 Valter Lazzari Economia e Gestione degli Intermediari Finanziari Set 4 LIUC - Università Cattaneo A.Y. 2017/18 Valter Lazzari Bank loans as inside debt Inside debt contract in which creditor has access to information

More information

Impact of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) on the access to finance for business and long-term investments Executive Summary

Impact of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) on the access to finance for business and long-term investments Executive Summary Impact of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) on the access to finance for business and long-term investments Executive Summary Prepared by The information and views set out in this study are those

More information