... The Great Depression and the Friedman-Schwartz Hypothesis Lawrence J. Christiano, Roberto Motto and Massimo Rostagno
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1 The Great Depression and the Friedman-Schwartz Hypothesis Lawrence J. Christiano, Roberto Motto and Massimo Rostagno 1
2 Background Want to Construct a Dynamic Economic Model Useful for the Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Large Economy Such as the Euro Area or U.S. 2
3 Background Want to Construct a Dynamic Economic Model Useful for the Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Large Economy Such as the Euro Area or U.S. Would Like a Model That Can be Used to: Identify the Fundamental Shocks Driving Historical Data 3
4 Background Want to Construct a Dynamic Economic Model Useful for the Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Large Economy Such as the Euro Area or U.S. Would Like a Model That Can be Used to: Identify the Fundamental Shocks Driving Historical Data Identify the Mechanisms Responsible for Propagating the Shocks 4
5 Background Want to Construct a Dynamic Economic Model Useful for the Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Large Economy Such as the Euro Area or U.S. Would Like a Model That Can be Used to: Identify the Fundamental Shocks Driving Historical Data Identify the Mechanisms Responsible for Propagating the Shocks Serve as a Laboratory For Evaluating Alternative Strategies for Responding to Shocks. 5
6 Background Want to Construct a Dynamic Economic Model Useful for the Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Large Economy Such as the Euro Area or U.S. Would Like a Model That Can be Used to: Identify the Fundamental Shocks Driving Historical Data Identify the Mechanisms Responsible for Propagating the Shocks Serve as a Laboratory For Evaluating Alternative Strategies for Responding to Shocks. We Expand a Standard Monetary Business Cycle Model to Incorporate Multiple Shocks, Financial Frictions and a Banking Sector. 6
7 Background Want to Construct a Dynamic Economic Model Useful for the Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Large Economy Such as the Euro Area or U.S. Would Like a Model That Can be Used to: Identify the Fundamental Shocks Driving Historical Data Identify the Mechanisms Responsible for Propagating the Shocks Serve as a Laboratory For Evaluating Alternative Strategies for Responding to Shocks. We Expand a Standard Monetary Business Cycle Model to Incorporate Multiple Shocks, Financial Frictions and a Banking Sector. We Use our Model to Address one of the Biggest Policy Questions: 7
8 Background Want to Construct a Dynamic Economic Model Useful for the Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Large Economy Such as the Euro Area or U.S. Would Like a Model That Can be Used to: Identify the Fundamental Shocks Driving Historical Data Identify the Mechanisms Responsible for Propagating the Shocks Serve as a Laboratory For Evaluating Alternative Strategies for Responding to Shocks. We Expand a Standard Monetary Business Cycle Model to Incorporate Multiple Shocks, Financial Frictions and a Banking Sector. We Use our Model to Address one of the Biggest Policy Questions: What Shocks Caused the US Great Depression? 8
9 Background Want to Construct a Dynamic Economic Model Useful for the Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Large Economy Such as the Euro Area or U.S. Would Like a Model That Can be Used to: Identify the Fundamental Shocks Driving Historical Data Identify the Mechanisms Responsible for Propagating the Shocks Serve as a Laboratory For Evaluating Alternative Strategies for Responding to Shocks. We Expand a Standard Monetary Business Cycle Model to Incorporate Multiple Shocks, Financial Frictions and a Banking Sector. We Use our Model to Address one of the Biggest Policy Questions: What Shocks Caused the US Great Depression? What Mechanisms Propagated the Shocks? 9
10 Background Want to Construct a Dynamic Economic Model Useful for the Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Large Economy Such as the Euro Area or U.S. Would Like a Model That Can be Used to: Identify the Fundamental Shocks Driving Historical Data Identify the Mechanisms Responsible for Propagating the Shocks Serve as a Laboratory For Evaluating Alternative Strategies for Responding to Shocks. We Expand a Standard Monetary Business Cycle Model to Incorporate Multiple Shocks, Financial Frictions and a Banking Sector. We Use our Model to Address one of the Biggest Policy Questions: What Shocks Caused the US Great Depression? What Mechanisms Propagated the Shocks? Could the Monetary Authorities have Mitigated the Severity of the Great Depression By Reacting in a Different Way to the Shocks? 10
11 Great Depression is a Perfect Testing Ground for Our Model 11
12 Great Depression is a Perfect Testing Ground for Our Model It Was a Big Deal! 12
13 Great Depression is a Perfect Testing Ground for Our Model It Was a Big Deal! 6 Log, US GNP Years 13
14 Great Depression is a Perfect Testing Ground for Our Model Big Question: What Shocks? 14
15 Great Depression is a Perfect Testing Ground for Our Model Big Question: What Shocks? Exogenous Monetary Contraction in 1920s (Bernanke, Hamilton) 15
16 Great Depression is a Perfect Testing Ground for Our Model Big Question: What Shocks? Exogenous Monetary Contraction in 1920s (Bernanke, Hamilton) Increased Money Demand in Late 1920s (Alexander Field). 16
17 Great Depression is a Perfect Testing Ground for Our Model Big Question: What Shocks? Exogenous Monetary Contraction in 1920s (Bernanke, Hamilton) Increased Money Demand in Late 1920s (Alexander Field). Deposit Withdrawals (Fear of Bank Closures and Dollar Devaluation). 17
18 Great Depression is a Perfect Testing Ground for Our Model Big Question: What Shocks? Exogenous Monetary Contraction in 1920s (Bernanke, Hamilton) Increased Money Demand in Late 1920s (Alexander Field). Deposit Withdrawals (Fear of Bank Closures and Dollar Devaluation). Stock Market Collapse. 18
19 Great Depression is a Perfect Testing Ground for Our Model Big Question: What Shocks? Exogenous Monetary Contraction in 1920s (Bernanke, Hamilton) Increased Money Demand in Late 1920s (Alexander Field). Deposit Withdrawals (Fear of Bank Closures and Dollar Devaluation). Stock Market Collapse. Institutional Changes, Especially New Deal (Cole and Ohanian). 19
20 Great Depression is a Perfect Testing Ground for Our Model Big Question: What Shocks? Exogenous Monetary Contraction in 1920s (Bernanke, Hamilton) Increased Money Demand in Late 1920s (Alexander Field). Deposit Withdrawals (Fear of Bank Closures and Dollar Devaluation). Stock Market Collapse. Institutional Changes, Especially New Deal (Cole and Ohanian). What Propagation Mechanisms? 20
21 Great Depression is a Perfect Testing Ground for Our Model Big Question: What Shocks? Exogenous Monetary Contraction in 1920s (Bernanke, Hamilton) Increased Money Demand in Late 1920s (Alexander Field). Deposit Withdrawals (Fear of Bank Closures and Dollar Devaluation). Stock Market Collapse. Institutional Changes, Especially New Deal (Cole and Ohanian). What Propagation Mechanisms? Stock Market Collapse (Mishkin, Romer). 21
22 Great Depression is a Perfect Testing Ground for Our Model Big Question: What Shocks? Exogenous Monetary Contraction in 1920s (Bernanke, Hamilton) Increased Money Demand in Late 1920s (Alexander Field). Deposit Withdrawals (Fear of Bank Closures and Dollar Devaluation). Stock Market Collapse. Institutional Changes, Especially New Deal (Cole and Ohanian). What Propagation Mechanisms? Stock Market Collapse (Mishkin, Romer). Nominal Wage and Debt Rigidities (Irving Fisher, Bordo et al). 22
23 Great Depression is a Perfect Testing Ground for Our Model Big Question: What Shocks? Exogenous Monetary Contraction in 1920s (Bernanke, Hamilton) Increased Money Demand in Late 1920s (Alexander Field). Deposit Withdrawals (Fear of Bank Closures and Dollar Devaluation). Stock Market Collapse. Institutional Changes, Especially New Deal (Cole and Ohanian). What Propagation Mechanisms? Stock Market Collapse (Mishkin, Romer). Nominal Wage and Debt Rigidities (Irving Fisher, Bordo et al). Banking System (Friedman and Schwartz). 23
24 Great Depression is a Perfect Testing Ground for Our Model Big Question: What Shocks? Exogenous Monetary Contraction in 1920s (Bernanke, Hamilton) Increased Money Demand in Late 1920s (Alexander Field). Deposit Withdrawals (Fear of Bank Closures and Dollar Devaluation). Stock Market Collapse. Institutional Changes, Especially New Deal (Cole and Ohanian). What Propagation Mechanisms? Stock Market Collapse (Mishkin, Romer). Nominal Wage and Debt Rigidities (Irving Fisher, Bordo et al). Banking System (Friedman and Schwartz). Policy Mistakes at Fed (Friedman and Schwartz, Cecchetti). 24
25 What We Do, and What We Find Incorporate Various Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms into a Single Dynamic General Equilibrium Model. 25
26 What We Do, and What We Find Incorporate Various Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms into a Single Dynamic General Equilibrium Model. Combine the Model with Data from 1920s and 1930s. 26
27 What We Do, and What We Find Incorporate Various Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms into a Single Dynamic General Equilibrium Model. Combine the Model with Data from 1920s and 1930s. Determine Which Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms Were Crucial. 27
28 What We Do, and What We Find Incorporate Various Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms into a Single Dynamic General Equilibrium Model. Combine the Model with Data from 1920s and 1930s. Determine Which Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms Were Crucial. Results: A Liquidity Preference Shock is Important in Contraction Phase 28
29 What We Do, and What We Find Incorporate Various Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms into a Single Dynamic General Equilibrium Model. Combine the Model with Data from 1920s and 1930s. Determine Which Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms Were Crucial. Results: A Liquidity Preference Shock is Important in Contraction Phase (Surprise!) 29
30 What We Do, and What We Find Incorporate Various Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms into a Single Dynamic General Equilibrium Model. Combine the Model with Data from 1920s and 1930s. Determine Which Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms Were Crucial. Results: A Liquidity Preference Shock is Important in Contraction Phase (Surprise, consistent with Alex Field?) 30
31 What We Do, and What We Find Incorporate Various Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms into a Single Dynamic General Equilibrium Model. Combine the Model with Data from 1920s and 1930s. Determine Which Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms Were Crucial. Results: A Liquidity Preference Shock is Important in Contraction Phase (Surprise, consistent with Alex Field?) Financial Frictions Somewhat Important for Investment 31
32 What We Do, and What We Find Incorporate Various Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms into a Single Dynamic General Equilibrium Model. Combine the Model with Data from 1920s and 1930s. Determine Which Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms Were Crucial. Results: A Liquidity Preference Shock is Important in Contraction Phase (Surprise, consistent with Alex Field?) Financial Frictions Somewhat Important for Investment Not Important Enough to Have a Major Impact on Aggregate Output and Employment 32
33 What We Do, and What We Find Incorporate Various Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms into a Single Dynamic General Equilibrium Model. Combine the Model with Data from 1920s and 1930s. Determine Which Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms Were Crucial. Results: A Liquidity Preference Shock is Important in Contraction Phase (Surprise, consistent with Alex Field?) Financial Frictions Somewhat Important for Investment Not Important Enough to Have a Major Impact on Aggregate Output and Employment (Surprising!) 33
34 What We Do, and What We Find Incorporate Various Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms into a Single Dynamic General Equilibrium Model. Combine the Model with Data from 1920s and 1930s. Determine Which Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms Were Crucial. Results: A Liquidity Preference Shock is Important in Contraction Phase (Surprise, consistent with Alex Field?) Financial Frictions Somewhat Important for Investment Not Important Enough to Have a Major Impact on Aggregate Output and Employment (Surprising!) Increased Market Power of Workers Responsible for Duration of Great Depression. 34
35 What We Do, and What We Find Incorporate Various Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms into a Single Dynamic General Equilibrium Model. Combine the Model with Data from 1920s and 1930s. Determine Which Shocks and Propagation Mechanisms Were Crucial. Results: A Liquidity Preference Shock is Important in Contraction Phase (Surprise, consistent with Alex Field?) Financial Frictions Somewhat Important for Investment Not Important Enough to Have a Major Impact on Aggregate Output and Employment (Surprising!) Increased Market Power of Workers Responsible for Duration of Great Depression. A More Responsive Monetary Policy Could Have Substantially Reduced the Severity of the Great Depression. 35
36 The Great Depression and the Zero Lower Bound on the Interest Rate In Recent Years: Interest In Understanding Monetary Policy in a Low Interest Rate Environment: 36
37 The Great Depression and the Zero Lower Bound on the Interest Rate In Recent Years: Interest In Understanding Monetary Policy in a Low Interest Rate Environment: Can Monetary Policy Resist Deflation and Output Collapse? 37
38 The Great Depression and the Zero Lower Bound on the Interest Rate In Recent Years: Interest In Understanding Monetary Policy in a Low Interest Rate Environment: Can Monetary Policy Resist Deflation and Output Collapse? What Sort of Monetary Policy Can do This? 38
39 The Great Depression and the Zero Lower Bound on the Interest Rate In Recent Years: Interest In Understanding Monetary Policy in a Low Interest Rate Environment: Can Monetary Policy Resist Deflation and Output Collapse? What Sort of Monetary Policy Can do This? Interest Rates Near Zero In Most of the 1930s 39
40 The Great Depression and the Zero Lower Bound on the Interest Rate In Recent Years: Interest In Understanding Monetary Policy in a Low Interest Rate Environment: Can Monetary Policy Resist Deflation and Output Collapse? What Sort of Monetary Policy Can do This? Interest Rates Near Zero In Most of the 1930s Analysis of Monetary Policy in 1930s Must Confront Zero Lower Bound Constraint 40
41 The Great Depression and the Zero Lower Bound on the Interest Rate In Recent Years: Interest In Understanding Monetary Policy in a Low Interest Rate Environment: Can Monetary Policy Resist Deflation and Output Collapse? What Sort of Monetary Policy Can do This? Interest Rates Near Zero In Most of the 1930s Analysis of Monetary Policy in 1930s Must Confront Zero Lower Bound Constraint Policy We Consider Avoids Zero Lower Bound By Committing to Temporarily High Future Money Growth. 41
42 The Great Depression and the Zero Lower Bound on the Interest Rate In Recent Years: Interest In Understanding Monetary Policy in a Low Interest Rate Environment: Can Monetary Policy Resist Deflation and Output Collapse? What Sort of Monetary Policy Can do This? Interest Rates Near Zero In Most of the 1930s Analysis of Monetary Policy in 1930s Must Confront Zero Lower Bound Constraint Policy We Consider Avoids Zero Lower Bound By Committing to Temporarily High Future Money Growth. Credibility Issues (Eggertsson-Woodford, Krugman). 42
43 Previous Quantitative Anlyses of Great Depression Bordo-Choudhri-Schwartz, Could Stable Money Have Averted the Great Contraction?, EJ, Bordo, Erceg and Evans, Money, Sticky Wages, and the Great Depression, AER, McCallum Could a Monetary Base Rule Have Prevented the Great Depression?, JME, Sims, Christopher, The Role of Interest Rate Policy in the Generation and Propagation of Business Cycles: What Has Changed Since the 30s?
44 A Quick Look at the Data. The Model. Outline Model Estimation Calibration of Some Model Parameters Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Other Parameters Model Fit. Evaluating Alternative Monetary Policies. 44
45 1 real gnp
46 1 real gnp 0.25 investment 0.65 consumption
47 1 real gnp 0.25 investment 0.65 consumption Total manhours (incl. military)
48 1 real gnp 0.25 investment 0.65 consumption Total manhours (incl. military) GNP deflator
49 1 real gnp 0.25 investment 0.65 consumption Total manhours (incl. military) GNP deflator real M Short term rate
50 1 real gnp 0.25 investment 0.65 consumption Total manhours (incl. military) GNP deflator real M Short term rate real DOW
51 1 real gnp 0.25 investment 0.65 consumption Total manhours (incl. military) GNP deflator real M Short term rate real DOW currency to deposits reserves to deposits
52 1 real gnp 0.25 investment 0.65 consumption Total manhours (incl. military) GNP deflator real M Short term rate real DOW currency to deposits reserves to deposits Spread, BAA and AAA wage
53 Traditional Spending Transmission Real Wage Mechanism Rise in Real Wage Labor Demand Curve Drop in Employment Employment
54 Real Wage Modern Spending Transmission Mechanism No Change in Real Wage Labor Demand Curve (Markup,Capacity utilization,.) Drop in Employment Employment
55 GNP Falls Over 30%, 1929 to 1933 The Data Investment: Falls 80% I/Y Goes From 0.25 (P) to 0.06 (T) Consumption: Falls 25% C/Y initially rises from 0.68 in 1929IV to 0.77 in 1931IV and then falls back to 0.68 in 1933IV Employment: Drops Less than GNP (i.e., Productivity Falls) and Never Fully Recovers Price Deflator: Drops and Never Fully Recovers 45
56 The Data, cont d What Started It? Was it the Fed? Probably Not (Note: M1/P Roughly Constant, R Drops) Whatever it Was, it was Something that Hit Investment Hard Stock Prices Collapsed: Was that What Hurt Investment? Flight to Quality : Banks Accumulate Reserves, Households Accumulate Currency General Economic Uncertainty: Rises Big Time Starting 1931, With Bank Panics. Real Wage Rose Continually: A Reason for the Long Duration of the Depression? 46
57 Model Features Suggested by Examination of Data Need a Good Model of: Investment, Employment, Market Power, Especially for Labor Suppliers. 47
58 Model Features Suggested by Examination of Data Need a Good Model of: Investment, Employment, Market Power, Especially for Labor Suppliers. Need a Model that Allows for Interaction Between Financial Factors and Real Activity. 48
59 Model Features Suggested by Examination of Data Need a Good Model of: Investment, Employment, Market Power, Especially for Labor Suppliers. Need a Model that Allows for Interaction Between Financial Factors and Real Activity. Need Model That Can Come to Terms with Bank Reserves, Currency, Bank Deposits, etc. 49
60 Model Features Suggested by Examination of Data Need a Good Model of: Investment, Employment, Market Power, Especially for Labor Suppliers. Need a Model that Allows for Interaction Between Financial Factors and Real Activity. Need Model That Can Come to Terms with Bank Reserves, Currency, Bank Deposits, etc. Model is a Marriage of Three: Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy, forthcoming, JPE. Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist, Handbook of Macroeconomics, 1999, Credit Market Frictions. Chari-Christiano-Eichenbaum JMCB, 1995, Banking Structure. 50
61 Private Agents in the Model Goods-Producing Firms Intermediate Goods, Final Goods and Capital Goods Entrepreneurs: Own and Rent Out Capital Banks Households Monetary and Fiscal Authorities. 51
62 Final Goods-Producing Firms: Private Agents in the Model Y t = Z 1 0 Y jt 1 λ f,tdj λf,t 52
63 Final Goods-Producing Firms: Private Agents in the Model Y t = Z 1 0 Y jt 1 λ f,tdj λf,t Intermediate ½ Goods-Producing Firms: t K Y jt = jt α (z tl jt ) 1 α Φz t if t Kjt α (z tl jt ) 1 α > Φz t, 0 <α<1, 0, otherwise z t = µ z z t 1. Profits: P jt Y jt Prt k K jt (1 + R t ) W t l jt. Price-setting: with probability 1 ξ p : P jt chosen optimally with probability ξ p : P jt = π t 1 P j,t 1. 53
64 Private Agents in the Model, cont d Producers of Physical Capital Buy Investment Goods and Old Capital and Make K t+1 : K t+1 =(1 δ) K t + F (I t,i t 1 ). 54
65 Private Agents in the Model, cont d Entrepreneurs Buy K t+1 at end of t and Rent it out in t +1 Borrowing: B t+1 = Q K 0,t K t+1 N t+1 0. Capital Services: K t+1 = u t+1 Kt+1, Capital Utilization costs: a(u t+1 ) K t+1,a 0,a 00 > 0, 55
66 Private Agents in the Model, cont d Entrepreneurs Buy K t+1 at end of t and Rent it out in t +1 Borrowing: B t+1 = Q K K 0,t t+1 N t+1 0. Capital Services: K t+1 = u t+1 Kt+1, Capital Utilization costs: a(u t+1 ) K t+1,a 0,a 00 > 0, Net worth N t+1 = past net worth + earnings from renting capital + market value of physical capital - repayments of past debt to bank. 56
67 Private Agents in the Model, cont d Entrepreneurs Buy K t+1 at end of t and Rent it out in t +1 Borrowing: B t+1 = Q K K 0,t t+1 N t+1 0. Capital Services: K t+1 = u t+1 Kt+1, Capital Utilization costs: a(u t+1 ) K t+1,a 0,a 00 > 0, Net worth N t+1 = past net worth + earnings from renting capital + market value of physical capital - repayments of past debt to bank. total net worth is kept low because random fraction of entrepreneurial wealth is destroyed 57
68 Private Agents in the Model, cont d Entrepreneurs Buy K t+1 at end of t and Rent it out in t +1 Borrowing: B t+1 = Q K K 0,t t+1 N t+1 0. Capital Services: K t+1 = u t+1 Kt+1, Capital Utilization costs: a(u t+1 ) K t+1,a 0,a 00 > 0, Net worth N t+1 = past net worth + earnings from renting capital + market value of physical capital - repayments of past debt to bank. total net worth is kept low because random fraction of entrepreneurial wealth is destroyed entrepreneurs receive a costly state verification contract from the bank 58
69 Entrepreneur of Type ω, Where Eω=1. Bank Households Lend Funds to Banks 59
70 Entrepreneur of Type ω, Where Eω=1. Bank Households Lend Funds to Banks Irving Fisher Debt-Deflation: Exists Because Households Receive Fixed Nominal Return on Time Deposits. 60
71 Private Agents in the Model, cont d Banks: Issue Liabilities (Time Deposits) Used to Finance Entrepreneurs Issue Liabilities (Demand Deposits) Used to Finance Working Capital Loans to Firms D ³ µ t = x b K b α P t zt lt b 1 α ξt E r 1 ξt t t P t 61
72 Private Agents in the Model, cont d Banks: Issue Liabilities (Time Deposits) Used to Finance Entrepreneurs Issue Liabilities (Demand Deposits) Used to Finance Working Capital Loans to Firms Households: Supply Labor, Consume, Hold Demand and Time Deposits X β l t {u(c t+l bc t+l 1 ) z(h j,t+l ) E j t l=0 ³Pt+lC t+l ³ 1 θt+l 1 σq θt+l P t+l C t+l υ t+l M t+l D h t+l 1 σ q } 62
73 Private Agents in the Model, cont d Banks: Issue Liabilities (Time Deposits) Used to Finance Entrepreneurs Issue Liabilities (Demand Deposits) Used to Finance Working Capital Loans to Firms Households: Supply Labor, Consume, Hold Demand and Time Deposits X β l t {u(c t+l bc t+l 1 ) z(h j,t+l ) E j t l=0 υ t+l l = ³Pt+lC t+l Z 1 0 M t+l ³ 1 θt+l 1 σq θt+l P t+l C t+l D h t+l 1 σ q } (h j ) 1 λ w,t dj λw,t, 1 λ w,t <. 63
74 Private Agents in the Model, cont d Monetary and Fiscal Authorities Exogenous Government Spending Requirement. Taxes. 64
75 Private Agents in the Model, cont d Monetary and Fiscal Authorities Exogenous Government Spending Requirement. Taxes. Monetary Policy: Money µ Base Growth Feeds Back on Shocks: M b log t+1 Mt b = µ X µi,t +1 i 65
76 Private Agents in the Model, cont d Monetary and Fiscal Authorities Exogenous Government Spending Requirement. Taxes. Monetary Policy: Money µ Base Growth Feeds Back on Shocks: M b log t+1 Mt b = µ X µi,t +1 i Agnostic About Nature of Monetary Policy Could Be Taylor Rule, McCallum Rule, Something Else... 66
77 Private Agents in the Model Goods-Producing Firms Intermediate Goods, Final Goods and Capital Goods Entrepreneurs: Own and Rent Out Capital Banks Households Monetary and Fiscal Authorities. 67
78 Steps in the Analysis Select Parameter Values for the Model. 68
79 Steps in the Analysis Select Parameter Values for the Model. Parameters that Control Nonstochastic Part of the Model 69
80 Steps in the Analysis Select Parameter Values for the Model. Parameters that Control Nonstochastic Part of the Model Parameters Governing Exogenous Shocks and Monetary Response. 70
81 Steps in the Analysis Select Parameter Values for the Model.. Parameters that Control Nonstochastic Part of the Model Parameters Governing Exogenous Shocks and Monetary Response. Evaluate Model Empirically. 71
82 Steps in the Analysis Select Parameter Values for the Model.. Parameters that Control Nonstochastic Part of the Model Parameters Governing Exogenous Shocks and Monetary Response. Evaluate Model Empirically. Counterfactual Policy Analysis. 72
83 Nonstochastic Parameters Selection of Model Parameters 73
84 Selection of Model Parameters Nonstochastic Parameters Match Various Long-Run Averages 74
85 Selection of Model Parameters Nonstochastic Parameters Match Various Long-Run Averages Use Evidence on the Shocks in the 1920s and 1930s to Parameterize Exogenous Shocks. 75
86 Model Parameters (Time unit of Model: quarterly) Panel A: Household Sector β Discount rate b Habit persistence parameter 0.63 ξ w Probability of Not Reoptimizing Wage in Given Quarter 0.70 Panel B: Goods Producing Sector µ z Growth Rate of Technology (APR) 1.50 ξ p Probability of Not Reoptimizing Price Within Quarter 0.50 δ Depreciation rate on capital α Power on capital in production function 0.36 Panel C: Entrepreneurs γ Quarterly Entrepreneurial Survival Probability µ Fraction of Realized Profits Lost in Bankruptcy F ( ω) Percent of Businesses that go into Bankruptcy in a Quarter 0.80 Var(log(ω)) Variance of log of idiosyncratic productivity parameter 0.07 Panel E: Policy τ Bank Reserve Requirement τ l Tax Rate on Labor Income 0.04 x Growth Rate of Monetary Base (APR)
87 k Steady State Properties of the Model, Versus US Data Variable Model US, US, y i y c y g y N K N ( Equity to Debt ) Percent of Goods Output Lost to Bankruptcy 0.371% Percent of Aggregate Labor and Capital in Banking 1.00% 1% 3 2.5% 5 Inflation (APR) 0.11% -0.6% % 6 78
88 Money Variable Model Monetary Base Velocity M1 Velocity Currency / Demand Deposits Currency / Monetary Base Curr. / Household D. Deposit
89 Shocks Incorporated Into Model Eight Shocks: Monopoly Power of Firms Monopoly Power of Households Demand for Reserves By Banks Two Household Money Demand Shocks Shock to Riskiness of Entrepreneurs Aggregate Technology Shock Shock to Rate of Destruction of Entrepreneurial Wealth 80
90 Parameterization of Shocks Each Shock, Say x t, Has 4 Parameters Representation: x t = ρx t 1 + ε x,t,σ εx Monetary Policy Response: µ xt = ρ µ µ x,t 1 + φε x,t There are 8 4=32Parameters to be Estimated Monetary Policy µ M b log t+1 Mt b = µ X i µi,t +1 81
91 Matrices, A, B Solution to Model z t = A z t 1 + BΨ t. z t ~Core set of 23 Endogenous Variables Ψ t Exogenous Variables, Stacked 1
92 Estimation of Parameters of Exogenous Shock Processes Data Used in Estimation: Net Worth (Measured by Value of the DOW) Inflation log, hours Short Term Interest Rate Output Real Wage Investment Velocity of M 1 Consumption Risk Premium (Baa - Aaa Bond Returns) Currency to Deposit Ratio Bank Reserves to Deposit Ratio 2
93 Data: X t =(log³ Nt+1 P t Y t log ³ Wt P t Y t Stochastic Model log (π t )log(l t ) R b t log(y t ) log( I t Y t )log(v 1 t )log( C t Y t ) P e t log(d c t)log(d r t)) 0 Here, N t+1 Net Worth, Rt Short b Term Interest Rate Vt 1 Velocity of M 1 P e Premium d c Currency to Deposit Ratio d r Reserves to Deposit Ratio Representation of X t : X t = α + τz t + τ s Ψ t + τz t 1 + τ s Ψ t 1. 3
94 State-Observer System State, ξ t ξ t = z t z t 1 Ψ t Ψ t 1. Law of Motion of State: z t+1 z t Ψ t+1 Ψ t = A 0 Bρ 0 I ρ I 0 z t z t 1 Ψ t Ψ t 1 + BD 0 D 0 ˆϕ t+1, ξ t+1 = Fξ t + v t+1. 7
95 Observer Equation y t = Hξ t + w t, where H = τ τ ˆτ s b τ s. Estimate by Maximum Likelihood, Given Parameters of Nonstochastic Part. 8
96 Results of Model Fit Overall, Model Fit Seems Reasonable 83
97 Results of Model Fit Overall, Model Fit Seems Reasonable Places Where Model Misses 84
98 Results of Model Fit Overall, Model Fit Seems Reasonable Places Where Model Misses Understates Fall in Labor Productivity Overstates Rise in Real Wage Understates Fall in Consumption. 85
99 Results of Model Fit Overall, Model Fit Seems Reasonable Places Where Model Misses Understates Fall in Labor Productivity Overstates Rise in Real Wage Understates Fall in Consumption. Shocks Seem Reasonable 86
100 Figure 5: Actual and Fitted Data, Converted to Levels Log, real net worth Policy Rate Log, Investment Log, Money Base Premium (APR) Log, Price Level Log, Output Log, M1 Log, Currency to Deposit ratio Log, Hours Worked Log, Real Wage Log, Consumption -0.6 Log, bank reserve to deposit ratio Notes: (i) Dotted, Solid Line - Model, Actual Data. (ii) Results Obtained by First Adding Actual Data Sample Mean to Results Displayed in Figure 4 and then Aggregating to Levels. (iii) Currency-Deposit, Reserves-Deposit Ratio, Premium Reproduced from Figure 4.
101 Figure 7: Estimated Economic Shocks Firm Markup, λ f,t Banking Money Demand Shock, ξ t Money Demand, θ t % dev. from steady state Fraction Fraction ratio to steady state Labor Market Power, ζ t Technology Shock, ε t % dev. from steady state Liquidity Demand, υ t Riskiness of Entrepreneurs, σ t Fraction Financial Wealth Shock, γ t 0.85
102 Liquidity Preference Shock Demand Deposits Drop Working Capital Loans Drop Consumption Drops Liquidity Shock Time Deposits Fall Net Worth Falls Entrepreneur Loans Fall Financial Accelerator Investment Falls Asset Price Falls Output Drops Debt Deflation Price Level Drops Rental Rate Of Capital Falls
103 Response to One-Standard Deviation Innovation to Liquidity Preference, υ t 1.01 Household Currency Relative to SS Household Deposits Relative to SS ratio ratio Household Time Deposits Relative to SS Consumption ratio Percent Interbank Loan Rate Investment APR Percent Output Percent quarters
104 Figure 9: Model Response with Only υ t Shocks, and Data Log, real net worth Policy Rate Log, Investment Premium (APR) Log, Money Base Log, Price Level Log, Output Log, M1 Log, Currency to Deposit ratio -1.8 Notes: Results Correspond to Those in Figure 5, Except Model Simulation Only Includes Estimated υ t Shocks Log, Hours Worked Log, Real Wage Log, Consumption Log, bank reserve to deposit ratio
105 consumption quarters investment quarters percent deviation from unshocked path percent deviation from unshocked path Dynamic Response to a v Shock - benchmark (*) output quarters price of installed capital, in units of C quarters percent deviation from unshocked path percent deviation from unshocked path
106 consumption quarters investment quarters percent deviation from unshocked path percent deviation from unshocked path Dynamic Response to a v Shock - benchmark (*); no entrepreneur (o) output quarters price of installed capital, in units of C quarters percent deviation from unshocked path percent deviation from unshocked path
107 Counterfactual Experiment Identify Alternative Monetary µ Policy Within a Particular Class M b log t+1 Mt b = µ X µi,t +1 i µ it = θ 0 ε i,t + θ 1 ε i,t 1 + θ 2 µ i,t 1 87
108 Counterfactual Experiment Identify Alternative Monetary µ Policy Within a Particular Class M b log t+1 Mt b = µ X µi,t +1 i µ it = θ 0 ε i,t + θ 1 ε i,t 1 + θ 2 µ i,t 1 Trade-off: Immediate Monetary Response 88
109 Counterfactual Experiment Identify Alternative Monetary µ Policy Within a Particular Class M b log t+1 Mt b = µ X µi,t +1 i µ it = θ 0 ε i,t + θ 1 ε i,t 1 + θ 2 µ i,t 1 Trade-off: Immediate Monetary Response Don t Need Much M Not Much Inflation 89
110 Counterfactual Experiment Identify Alternative Monetary µ Policy Within a Particular Class M b log t+1 Mt b = µ X µi,t +1 i µ it = θ 0 ε i,t + θ 1 ε i,t 1 + θ 2 µ i,t 1 Trade-off: Immediate Monetary Response Don t Need Much M Not Much Inflation Nominal Rate of Interest Drops a Lot 90
111 Counterfactual Experiment Identify Alternative Monetary µ Policy Within a Particular Class M b log t+1 Mt b = µ X µi,t +1 i µ it = θ 0 ε i,t + θ 1 ε i,t 1 + θ 2 µ i,t 1 Trade-off: Immediate Monetary Response Don t Need Much M Not Much Inflation Nominal Rate of Interest Drops a Lot Delayed Monetary Response 91
112 Counterfactual Experiment Identify Alternative Monetary µ Policy Within a Particular Class M b log t+1 Mt b = µ X µi,t +1 i µ it = θ 0 ε i,t + θ 1 ε i,t 1 + θ 2 µ i,t 1 Trade-off: Immediate Monetary Response Don t Need Much M Not Much Inflation Nominal Rate of Interest Drops a Lot Delayed Monetary Response Need More M More Inflation 92
113 Counterfactual Experiment Identify Alternative Monetary µ Policy Within a Particular Class M b log t+1 Mt b = µ X µi,t +1 i µ it = θ 0 ε i,t + θ 1 ε i,t 1 + θ 2 µ i,t 1 Trade-off: Immediate Monetary Response Don t Need Much M Not Much Inflation Nominal Rate of Interest Drops a Lot Delayed Monetary Response Need More M More Inflation Nominal Rate of Interest Drops Less 93
114 Counterfactual Experiment Identify Alternative Monetary µ Policy Within a Particular Class M b log t+1 Mt b = µ X µi,t +1 i µ it = θ 0 ε i,t + θ 1 ε i,t 1 + θ 2 µ i,t 1 Trade-off: Immediate Monetary Response Delayed Monetary Response 94
115 Counterfactual Experiment Identify Alternative Monetary µ Policy Within a Particular Class M b log t+1 Mt b = µ X µi,t +1 i µ it = θ 0 ε i,t + θ 1 ε i,t 1 + θ 2 µ i,t 1 Trade-off: Immediate Monetary Response Delayed Monetary Response Selected Quantities in Baseline and Counterfactual, 1929IV IV Counterfactual Growth, APR Baseline Delayed Response Immediate Response Real Output Inflation Monetary Base M (max R min R)
116 Figure 12: Baseline Estimated Policy (Solid Line) and Counterfactual Policy (Dotted Line) Log, real net worth Log, Price Level Log, Hours Worked Policy Rate Log, Output Log, Real Wage Log, Investment Log, M1 Log, Consumption Premium (APR) Log, Currency to Deposit ratio Log, bank reserve to deposit ratio Log, Money Base
117 Fit A Model to 1920s and 1930s data. Concluding Remarks 96
118 Concluding Remarks Fit A Model to 1920s and 1930s data Liquidity Preference Shock Important in Contraction 97
119 Concluding Remarks Fit A Model to 1920s and 1930s data Liquidity Preference Shock Important in Contraction Increased Worker Bargaining Power Important in Delaying Recovery 98
120 Concluding Remarks Fit A Model to 1920s and 1930s data Liquidity Preference Shock Important in Contraction Increased Worker Bargaining Power Important in Delaying Recovery Financial Frictions: Exacerbate Fall in Investment 99
121 Concluding Remarks Fit A Model to 1920s and 1930s data Liquidity Preference Shock Important in Contraction Increased Worker Bargaining Power Important in Delaying Recovery Financial Frictions: Exacerbate Fall in Investment But, Not Enough to Have a Major Impact on Aggregate Output and Employment 100
122 Concluding Remarks Fit A Model to 1920s and 1930s data Liquidity Preference Shock Important in Contraction Increased Worker Bargaining Power Important in Delaying Recovery Financial Frictions: Exacerbate Fall in Investment But, Not Enough to Have a Major Impact on Aggregate Output and Employment Question: Could the Great Depression Have Been Substantially Mitigated Under an Alternative Monetary Policy? 101
123 Concluding Remarks Fit A Model to 1920s and 1930s data Liquidity Preference Shock Important in Contraction Increased Worker Bargaining Power Important in Delaying Recovery Financial Frictions: Exacerbate Fall in Investment But, Not Enough to Have a Major Impact on Aggregate Output and Employment Question: Could the Great Depression Have Been Substantially Mitigated Under an Alternative Monetary Policy? Answer: Yes. 102
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