Wealth inequality, family background, and estate taxation
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1 Wealth inequality, family background, and estate taxation Mariacristina De Nardi 1 Fang Yang 2 1 UCL, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, IFS, and NBER 2 Louisiana State University June 8, 2015 De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 1 / 44
2 The estate tax is very controversial The estate tax is immoral and counter-productive... My office has received hundreds of letters and s from individuals... These people are not rich, but they have worked hard and saved to create an inheritance for their children... Ron Paul, district of Texas. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 2 / 44
3 The estate tax is very controversial The estate tax is immoral and counter-productive... My office has received hundreds of letters and s from individuals... These people are not rich, but they have worked hard and saved to create an inheritance for their children... Ron Paul, district of Texas. I have continuously supported reforming the estate tax, but a complete repeal is fiscally irresponsible, and serves to benefit only mega multi-millionaires while harming our economy... Bart Stupak, district of Michigan. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 2 / 44
4 We study estate taxation reform in a model in which There is realistic wealth inequality. Why? The estate tax hits the rich. We need a model that generates a small number of very rich people. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 3 / 44
5 We study estate taxation reform in a model in which There is realistic wealth inequality. Why? The estate tax hits the rich. We need a model that generates a small number of very rich people. Parental background influences one s lot in life. Why? Individual level: parental background and initial conditions are empirically important (Keane and Wolpin (1997), Heatcote, Storesletten, Violante (2005), Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011), Solon...) De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 3 / 44
6 We study estate taxation reform in a model in which There is realistic wealth inequality. Why? The estate tax hits the rich. We need a model that generates a small number of very rich people. Parental background influences one s lot in life. Why? Individual level: parental background and initial conditions are empirically important (Keane and Wolpin (1997), Heatcote, Storesletten, Violante (2005), Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011), Solon...) Aggregate level: large amount of wealth (both wealth and human capital) transmitted across generations (Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) vs. Modigliani (1988), Gale and Scholz (1994)). De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 3 / 44
7 The economics of the model Bequest motives + inheritance of ability across generations. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 4 / 44
8 The economics of the model Bequest motives + inheritance of ability across generations. How does parental background matter in our framework? It affects one s initial earnings (persistent) and hence lifetime earnings. It affects the bequest that the person is going to receive, hence lifetime resources. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 4 / 44
9 The economics of the model Bequest motives + inheritance of ability across generations. How does parental background matter in our framework? It affects one s initial earnings (persistent) and hence lifetime earnings. It affects the bequest that the person is going to receive, hence lifetime resources. An earnings process that allows for high earnings risk for top earners. (Guvenen et al. (2014) and (2015), DeBacker et al. (2015), Panousi et al. (2015)). De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 4 / 44
10 Strategy and goals Develop a model that matches well: Distribution of wealth. Distribution of of bequests. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 5 / 44
11 Strategy and goals Develop a model that matches well: Distribution of wealth. Distribution of of bequests. Analyze effects of estate taxation on Aggregate capital accumulation. Wealth inequality. Parental background as a source of inequality. Welfare ex-ante and conditional on one s initial earnings. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 5 / 44
12 Strategy and goals Develop a model that matches well: Distribution of wealth. Distribution of of bequests. Analyze effects of estate taxation on Aggregate capital accumulation. Wealth inequality. Parental background as a source of inequality. Welfare ex-ante and conditional on one s initial earnings. Study robustness of results to modeling the bequest motive. Qualitative literature stresses importance of specific bequest motive in affecting results. It is still unclear how we should best model bequest motives. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 5 / 44
13 Literature, wealth inequality Mechanisms that keep the saving rate of the rich high and thus generate wealth inequality. Intergenerational links (bequest motives and trasmission of human capital). De Nardi (2004), De Nardi and Yang (2014), and Nishiyama (2002). High earnings risk for the top earners. Castañeda et al. (2003). Heterogenous patience. Krusell and Smith (1998). Entrepreneurship, borrowing constraints, and risky returns. Quadrini (1999), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 6 / 44
14 Literature, wealth inequality and estate taxation Entrepreneurship + altruism: Cagetti and De Nardi (2009). High earnings risk for the top earners + altruism: Castañeda et al. (2003). Abolishing estate taxation: relatively small aggregate and distributional effects. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 7 / 44
15 Model key elements OLG general equilibrium model. Intergenerational transfer of bequests and human capital. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 8 / 44
16 Model key elements OLG general equilibrium model. Intergenerational transfer of bequests and human capital. Exogenous earnings profile (with earnings shocks). Government taxes, expenditure, and social security system. No aggregate shocks nor changes over time (stationary equilibrium). Focus on the 1990s period. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 8 / 44
17 Representative firm Neoclassical production function: F(K;L) = K α L 1 α. Physical capital depreciates at rate δ. Factor prices equal marginal products. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 9 / 44
18 Government Tax rate on labor income: τ l. Tax rate on capital income: τ a. Tax rate on bequest: τ b on estate above exemption level: x b. Government spending: g. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 10 / 44
19 Government Tax rate on labor income: τ l. Tax rate on capital income: τ a. Tax rate on bequest: τ b on estate above exemption level: x b. Government spending: g. Pay-as-you-go system; tax rate of τ s and pension linked to income history P(ỹ). De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 10 / 44
20 Demographics Constant population growth: n. 1 period = 5 years. Generation t-7 (Parents) Generation t Generation t+7 (Children) procreate retire death shock De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 11 / 44
21 Household preferences Discount factor: β. Period utility from consumption: utility from bequest: φ(b k ) = φ 1 [ c 1 σ t 1 σ. (b k +φ 2) 1 σ 1 ]. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 12 / 44
22 Household preferences Discount factor: β. Period utility from consumption: utility from bequest: φ(b k ) = φ 1 [ c 1 σ t 1 σ. (b k +φ 2) 1 σ 1 ]. Gross bequest model: set b k = b g. Net bequest model: set b k = b n = b g τ b max(b g x b,0). De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 12 / 44
23 Household earnings process Deterministic age-efficiency profile: ǫ t. Shocks: zt i,ar(1) process, as Castañeda et al. (2003). Three levels from PSID. Fourth level: high earnings, high volatility state. PSID captures dynamics well for most of population but misses really high earners, who also face high earnings volatility. Model for levels of z i t Total productivity: y i t = e zi t +ǫt De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 13 / 44
24 Household earnings process Deterministic age-efficiency profile: ǫ t. Shocks: zt i,ar(1) process, as Castañeda et al. (2003). Three levels from PSID. Fourth level: high earnings, high volatility state. PSID captures dynamics well for most of population but misses really high earners, who also face high earnings volatility. Model for levels of z i t Total productivity: y i t = e zi t +ǫt Labor productivity inheritance process: z j 1 = ρ hz i 8 +νj, ν j N(0,σ 2 h ) De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 13 / 44
25 Household s recursive problems Household s State Variables t : Age. a : Net worth from previous period. z : Current earnings shock. ỹ : Annual accumulated earnings, up to a social security cap, ỹ c, used to compute Social Security payments. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 14 / 44
26 Household s recursive problems Household s State Variables t : Age. a : Net worth from previous period. z : Current earnings shock. ỹ : Annual accumulated earnings, up to a social security cap, ỹ c, used to compute Social Security payments. S p : Parental state variables S p = (a p,z p,ỹ p ). De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 14 / 44
27 Household s recursive problems Household s State Variables t : Age. a : Net worth from previous period. z : Current earnings shock. ỹ : Annual accumulated earnings, up to a social security cap, ỹ c, used to compute Social Security payments. S p : Parental state variables S p = (a p,z p,ỹ p ). Three cases Working age agents without parents (already inherited) Working age agents with parents alive Retired agents De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 14 / 44
28 Working age agents who have already inherited { V I w(t,a,z,ỹ) = max c,a U(c)+βE [ V I (t +1,a,z,ỹ ) ]}, (1) c +a = (1 τ l )wy τ s min(wy,5ỹ c )+[1+r(1 τ a )]a,(2) a 0, (3) ỹ = [ (t 1)ỹ +min(wy/5,ỹ c ) ] /t, (4). De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 15 / 44
29 Working age agents with parents alive V w (t,a,z,ỹ,s p ) = max c,a subject to { U(c)+βp t+7 E [ V w (t +1,a,z,ỹ,S p) +β(1 p t+7 )E [ V I w(t +1,a +b n/n,z,ỹ ) ]}, c +a = (1 τ l )wy τ s min(wy,5ỹ c )+[1+r(1 τ a )]a, (5) a 0, ỹ = [ (t 1)ỹ +min(wy/5,ỹ c ) ] /t, (7) { [ (t ỹ p +6)ỹp +min((wy = p /5,ỹ c ) ] } /(t +7) if t < 3 (8) otherwise ỹ p b n = b n(s p ), De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 16 / 44 (6) (9)
30 Retired agents V r (t,a,ỹ) = max c,a subject to {U(c)+βp t V r (t +1,a,ỹ)+(1 p t )φ(b k ) }, (10) a 0, (11) c +a = [1+r(1 τ a )]a+(1 τ l )P(ỹ) (12) De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 17 / 44
31 Exogenous Parameters Parameters Value Demographics n annual population growth 1.2% p t survival probability see text Preferences γ risk aversion coefficient 1.5 Labor earnings ǫ t age-efficiency profile see text ρ h AR(1) coef. of prod. inherit. process 0.40 σh 2 innovation of prod. inherit. process 0.37 De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 18 / 44
32 Exogenous parameters Parameters Value Production α capital income share 0.36 δ depreciation 6.0% Government policy τ a capital income tax 20% P(ỹ) Social Security benefit see text τ s Social Security tax 12.0% De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 19 / 44
33 Labor income process 4 earnings states: low, middle, high, and super-high, [1.0, 3.15, 9.78, 1, 061] (from Castañeda et al.) De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 20 / 44
34 Labor income process 4 earnings states: low, middle, high, and super-high, [1.0, 3.15, 9.78, 1, 061] (from Castañeda et al.) Transition matrix for lowest three grid points based on PSID. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 20 / 44
35 Labor income process 4 earnings states: low, middle, high, and super-high, [1.0, 3.15, 9.78, 1, 061] (from Castañeda et al.) Transition matrix for lowest three grid points based on PSID. Pick remaining six elements of our 4x4 transition matrix Q y. Percentile (%) Gini SCF All models Table : Percentage of earnings in the top percentiles. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 20 / 44
36 Transition matrix for Q y The transition matrix for Q yh Labor income process Initial prob. distribution of earnings: [65% 33% 2% %]. Fraction of sup-rich income goes up to 0.04% at age 60. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 21 / 44..
37 Benchmark: remaining parameters to match Gross No Bequest Parameters Benchmark Bequests Motives β discount factor φ 1 bequest utility φ 2 bequest shifter 1095K 1376K τ b estate tax 21.43% 21.30% 62.94% x b estate exem 756K 786K 745K τ l labor tax 19.20% 19.20% 19.20% Gross No Bequest Moment Data Benchmark Bequests Motives Wealth/output Bequest/wealth % 0.88% 0.88% 0.58% 90th perc. bequests % estates taxed 2.0% 1.92% 1.92% 2.04% Estate tax/output 0.33% 0.33% 0.33% 0.32% Gvt spending/output 18% 18.00% 18.00% 18.00% Match effective estate taxation. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 22 / 44
38 Calibration of various models Re-calibrate gross bequest motive model to target same moments. No bequest motive model, calibrate what it can match. Bequest/wealth ratio too low (0.58 compared to 0.88%). Does not generate very large estates observed in the data. Estate tax rate is 64%. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 23 / 44
39 Wealth inequality Models with bequest motives fit distribution of wealth well. Percentile (%) Gini SCF Benchmark Gross bequests No beq. motives Table : Percentage of total wealth held by households in the top percentiles. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 24 / 44
40 Gini by age Models with bequest motives closer to observed Gini by age Gini benchmark gross bequest motives 0.55 no bequest motives data SCF 1998 data from Huggett (1996) age De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 25 / 44
41 Tax incidence Wealth Percentile Age Capital tax Labor tax Estate Tax Total tax 0-1% % % Table : Percentage of the total for a given tax paid by a selected wealth percentile. Labor income tax burden is more evenly distributed than the capital income tax. Estate tax burden is the most unevenly distributed. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 26 / 44
42 Family background Parental background is very important. Moving to parent s earnings Parent s earnings 1st 2nd 3rd Bequests only 2nd rd th Bequests + human capital inheritance 2nd rd th Table : Asset compensation required for moving from a parental background level to another, normalized as a fraction of average income. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 27 / 44
43 Policy experiments Benchmark (net bequest motive) Vary two key margins of estate taxation: Marginal tax rate τ b. Estate tax threshold x b. Adjust Capital income τ a. Labor income tax τ l. Gross bequest motive. Fully altruistic dynastic models. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 28 / 44
44 Policy experiments Study the effects of each reform on Aggregate capital and output. Wealth inequality. Importance of parental background. Welfare. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 29 / 44
45 Aggregate Effects, Adjusting the Capital Income Tax τ b x b τ a K Y r wage Net bequest model, changing the estate tax rate % +0.71% +0.25% K 20.0% K 18.7% -0.59% -0.21% K 17.0% -0.53% -0.19% Net bequest model, changing estate tax rate and exemption level K 17.4% -0.74% -0.27% estate taxation aggregate capital and income, up to τ b = 50%. Statutory tax policy minimizes aggregate capital among all of the tax configurations that we have tried. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 30 / 44
46 Distributional effects, adjusting the capital income tax Percentile (%) τ b x b τ a Gini Net bequest model, change the estate tax rate K K K Net bequest model, year 2000 statutory estate tax K The share of wealth held by the richest is monotonically decreasing in the estate tax rate. Statutory tax policy reduces wealth concentration. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 31 / 44
47 Importance of parental background effects Moving to parent s earnings Parent s earnings 1st 2nd 3rd Benchmark 2nd rd th Net bequest model, year 2000 statutory estate tax 2nd rd th Born to a family with the 4th parental background less important. Other group of people are barely affected. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 32 / 44
48 Welfare effects, going to year 2000 statutory estate tax Initial Earnings Fraction All 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Gaining Partial equilibrium Net bequest motive, capital income tax General equilibrium Net bequest motive, capital income tax PE: Majority of the population gains (> 95%). PE: Average gains for 1st, 2nd, 3rd productivity levels, loss for 4th. GE: wage rate welfare loss. interest rate welfare gain of the savers. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 33 / 44
49 Aggregate effects, comparing capital and labor income tax τ b x b r wage τ a K Y Net bequest model, changing capital income tax K K Net bequest model, changing labor income tax K K Very similar effects on the aggregates with capital and labor income tax adjustments. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 34 / 44
50 Distributional effects, comparing capital and labor income tax Percentile (%) τ b x b τ a Gini Net bequest model, changing capital income tax K K Net bequest model, changing labor income tax K K Very similar effects on inequality with capital and labor income tax adjustments. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 35 / 44
51 Importance of parental background, comparing capital and labor income tax Moving to parent s earnings Parent s earnings 1st 2nd 3rd Benchmark 2nd rd th Net bequest model, changing capital tax 2nd rd th Net bequest model, changing labor tax 2nd rd th Very similar effects on the importance of parental background with capital and labor income tax adjustments. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 36 / 44
52 Welfare effects, going to year 2000 statutory estate tax Initial Earnings Fraction All 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Gaining Partial equilibrium Net bequest motive, capital income tax Net bequest motive, labor income tax General equilibrium Net bequest motive, capital income tax Net bequest motive, labor income tax GE: Cutting labor income tax is much better for most from a welfare standpoint. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 37 / 44
53 Aggregate effects, comparing net and gross bequest motives τ b x b r wage τ a K Y Net bequest model, changing capital income tax K K Gross bequest model, changing capital income tax K K Very similar effects on the aggregates with utility from net and gross bequests. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 38 / 44
54 Distributional effects, comparing net and gross bequest motives Percentile (%) τ b x b τ a Gini Net bequest model, year 2000 statutory estate tax K Gross bequest model, year 2000 statutory estate tax K Very similar effects on inequality with utility from net and gross bequests. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 39 / 44
55 Importance of parental background effects, comparing net and gross bequest motives Moving to parent s earnings Parent s earnings 1st 2nd 3rd Benchmark Net bequest model, year 2000 statutory estate tax 2nd rd th Gross bequest model, year 2000 statutory estate tax 2nd rd th Very similar effects on the importance of parental background with gross and net bequest models. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 40 / 44
56 Welfare Effects, going to year 2000 estate statutory taxation Initial Earnings Fraction All 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Gaining General equilibrium Net bequest motive, capital income tax Net bequest motive, labor income tax Gross bequest motive, capital income tax Gross bequest motive, labor income tax Rich people with wealth in the utility function lose less. Fraction gaining and overall welfare higher when labor tax is lowered as estate tax is increased. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 41 / 44
57 Comparison with the literature Models with completely altruistic agents: Cagetti and De Nardi (2009), Castañeda et al. (2003) Similar results: abolishing estate taxation leads to: % of aggregate capital % of aggregate output percentage point in wealth by the richest 1%. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 42 / 44
58 Tax burden Effects, going to year 2000 statutory Wealth Percentile Age Capital tax Labor tax Estate tax Total tax Benchmark 0-1% % Changing the capital income tax 0-1% % Changing the labor income tax 0-1% % Estate tax revenue by the richest 1% increases substantially. Total tax increase as well, especially when adjusting labor tax. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 43 / 44
59 Conclusions Changing the estate tax rate, and in particular output and wealth. inequality. role of family background. Welfare gains and benefits depend on tax used to balance the government budget constraint. Aggregate, distributional, and parental background effects are very small, but the welfare effects from redistribution are large. Results surprisingly robust to bequest motive assumed + mechanisms driving wealth inequality. De Nardi and Yang Estate Taxation 44 / 44
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