The Lost Generation of the Great Recession

Transcription

1 The Lost Generation of the Great Recession Sewon Hur University of Pittsburgh January 21, 2016

2 Introduction What are the distributional consequences of the Great Recession?

3 Introduction What are the distributional consequences of the Great Recession? 2 dimensions that affect generations differently Large decline in labor income - hurts young

4 Introduction What are the distributional consequences of the Great Recession? 2 dimensions that affect generations differently Large decline in labor income - hurts young Even larger decline in asset prices - hurts old, young can potentially gain from cheaper assets

5 Introduction What are the distributional consequences of the Great Recession? 2 dimensions that affect generations differently Large decline in labor income - hurts young Even larger decline in asset prices - hurts old, young can potentially gain from cheaper assets Long-term consequences of these channels need model to evaluate lifetime welfare consequences of recession

6 This paper Heterogeneous agent life-cycle model with Portfolio over risky and risk-free assets Household borrowing constraints Heterogeneity in income and wealth

7 This paper Heterogeneous agent life-cycle model with Portfolio over risky and risk-free assets Household borrowing constraints Heterogeneity in income and wealth Recession generated by Exogenous decrease in labor income Exogenous increase in uncertainty regarding risky asset

8 This paper Heterogeneous agent life-cycle model with Portfolio over risky and risk-free assets Household borrowing constraints Heterogeneity in income and wealth Recession generated by Exogenous decrease in labor income Exogenous increase in uncertainty regarding risky asset Use model predictions about future prices and allocations to compute lifetime welfare consequences

9 Model findings Young (25-44) suffer the largest welfare losses, equivalent to 7 percent reduction in remaining lifetime consumption

10 Model findings Young (25-44) suffer the largest welfare losses, equivalent to 7 percent reduction in remaining lifetime consumption Young households who held risky assets before Recession were particularly vulnerable, suffering an 8 percent reduction in remaining lifetime consumption Constrained young households unable to smooth consumption or take advantage of cheap assets Heterogeneity is important - average young household is not constrained in the calibrated model

11 Related Literature Asset prices and generations: Li and Yao (2007), Kiyotaki et al. (2010) Welfare over the Great Recession: Glover et al. (2014), Bell and Blanchflower (2011), Elsby et al. (2010), Peterman and Sommer (2014), Menno and Oliviero (2014) Life-cycle heterogenous agent models: Huggett (1996), Conesa et al. (2008), Del Negro et al. (2010), Heathcote et al. (2010) with borrowing constraints: Chambers et al. (2009), Yang (2009), Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2010), Iacoviello and Pavan (2013), Favilukis et al. (2013)

12 Road map Model with no aggregate uncertainty Calibrate model to US 2007 data Great Recession as unanticipated shock Welfare analysis

13 Model

14 Preview of the model Households become economically active at age 20, can live up to 99

15 Preview of the model Households become economically active at age 20, can live up to 99 Choose a portfolio over risky and risk-free assets Heterogeneity generated by initial wealth differences, and idiosyncratic shocks to labor endowment and risky asset returns

16 Preview of the model Households become economically active at age 20, can live up to 99 Choose a portfolio over risky and risk-free assets Heterogeneity generated by initial wealth differences, and idiosyncratic shocks to labor endowment and risky asset returns Young are net buyers, old are net sellers of risky assets Young households typically borrow to finance risky assets

17 Preview of the model Households become economically active at age 20, can live up to 99 Choose a portfolio over risky and risk-free assets Heterogeneity generated by initial wealth differences, and idiosyncratic shocks to labor endowment and risky asset returns Young are net buyers, old are net sellers of risky assets Young households typically borrow to finance risky assets Low wealth, young households more leveraged than others

18 Environment Continuum of finitely lived households Small open economy (exogenous interest rate r) Market clearing risky asset (fixed supply)

19 Demographics Households indexed by i, age denoted by j {1, 2,.., J} ψ j : survival probability from age j to j + 1, (let Ψ j = j 1 a=1 ψ a) Retirement at j = j Newborns endowed with {ω i } wealth

20 Household preferences Preferences are given by J E β j 1 Ψ j u j (c ij ) j=1 c: consumption (numeraire) β: time discount factor

21 Household preferences Preferences are given by J E β j 1 Ψ j u j (c ij ) c: consumption (numeraire) β: time discount factor j=1 u j (c ij ) = u( c ij e j ) e j : number of adult equivalents captures the consumption needs of changing household sizes, which are exogenous

22 Household labor income Each period, households receive idiosyncratic endowment shocks z it, which follows a Markov process, with transition matrix Γ Household i of age j with shock z it earns: e z it (1 τ)η j if j < j y ijt = S if j j τ: tax S: retirement benefits

23 Assets Risky asset x Return subject to idiosyncratic shock e ξ, with probability π(ξ) Fixed cost f if x > 0 Price p xt constant in steady state Fixed supply X Risk-free asset b Interest rate r = r s if b 0, r = r b if b < 0 Borrowing constraint: b λp x x

24 Assets Risky asset x Return subject to idiosyncratic shock e ξ, with probability π(ξ) Fixed cost f if x > 0 Price p xt constant in steady state Fixed supply X Risk-free asset b Interest rate r = r s if b 0, r = r b if b < 0 Borrowing constraint: b λp x x Beginning-of-period wealth: a = b(1 + r) + p xt xξ

25 Household problem Given prices, household of age j, wealth a, and labor endowment shock z chooses consumption c, and a portfolio over risk-free bonds and risky assets b, x to solve: V jt (a, z) = max c,b,x u j (c) + βψ j E z,ξ V j+1,t+1(a, z ) subject to: c + p xt x + b y j (z) 1 x >0f + a b λp xt x a = b (1 + r) + p x,t+1 x e ξ c 0, x 0

26 Equilibrium A competitive equilibrium is policy functions of the households {c jt (a, z), b jt(a, z), x jt(a, z)}, prices {p xt}, and distributions {µ jt (a, z)} such that: 1. Given prices, policy functions solve the problem of the households 2. For any j + 1, a, z, µ j+1,t+1 (a, z ) = ψ j Γ z,z π(ξ)1 a =b jt (a,z)(1+r)+p x,t+1x jt (a,z)eξµ jt(a, z) a,z ξ Distribution of new born agents {µ 1t( )} t is given. 3. Market clears: J x jt(a, z)µ jt (a, z) = X j=1 a,z

27 Rest of talk Calibrate model to 2007 Important moments: leverage of young households, wealth distribution Show that the model matches data along important dimensions Shock the model with recession and present welfare analysis

28 Functional forms Preferences ( c ) 1 σ 1 u j (c) = ae j 1 σ, σ = 3 Sensitivity analysis

29 Functional forms Preferences ( c ) 1 σ 1 u j (c) = ae j 1 σ, σ = 3 Sensitivity analysis Period in model: 5 years Idiosyncratic endowment shock process log z t = ρ z log z t 1 + ɛ t, ɛ t N(0, σz 2 ) ρ z = 0.9, σ z = 0.3 consistent with Iacoviello and Pavan (2013), and within range of parameter values widely estimated/used in the literature. Sensitivity analysis

30 Main parameters 4 parameters jointly calibrated to match 4 data targets Variables Moments Data Targets Discount factor β debt / risky assets, ages Risky asset variance σξ 2 95/50 wealth ratio 17.5 Participation cost f risky asset participation 0.81 Expected risky return E(ξ) Total risky assets / labor income 7.48 Risky assets include stocks (direct and indirect), real estate, and non-corporate business

31 Other parameters Variable Value Target/Source Collateral constraint λ 0.80 Chambers et al. (2009) sensitivity Initial wealth graph top 5 25-bins of wealth, endowments {ω i } ages (SCF), the rest=0 Number of cohorts J 16 ages (5 year intervals) Income tax τ 0.16 retirement benefits 40% average wage Retirement j 10 ages Endowment profile {η j } graph Household labor income (SCF 2007) Saving rate r s 0.01 risk-free rate ( ) Lending rate r b 0.03 real mortgage rate ( )

32 Results

33 Steady state Model generates Wealth profile over age Risky asset profile over age Risky asset participation over age Wealth distribution Household leverage consistent with US 2007 household data

34 1200 Household net wealth (A) Net Wealth 1000 thousands of dollars Data Model age data source: SCF 2007

35 1200 Household risky assets (B) Risky Assets 1000 thousands of dollars Data 200 Model age data source: SCF 2007

36 100 Risky asset participation Model 80 Data 60 percent age data source: SCF 2007

37 Wealth distribution Model wealth distribution reasonably similar to the data Better if data and model are truncated at $3 million (98th pctile) 1 (A) Lorenz Curve 1 (B) Lorenz Curve, Truncated cumulative share of wealth Model Data cumulative share of wealth Model Data cumulative share of population (lowest to highest wealth) cumulative share of population (lowest to highest wealth) data source: SCF 2007

38 Household leverage across age cohorts Table: percent of households with leverage 0.3 age model data

39 Household leverage within young households Table: Summary of young household leverage percentile model data

40 Recession One-period recession 1. Shock to labor income distribution graph shift of income distribution such that ages 25-44: 8.8 percent drop ages 45-64: 6.4 percent drop subject to (steady state) income process after one period 2. Increase in uncertainty (to match drop in risky asset prices) data risky asset variance σξ 2 = variance reverts after one period

41 index (steady state = 100) Aggregate income periods after shock

42 index (steady state = 100) Risky asset price periods after shock

43 Young suffer largest welfare losses Table : Welfare gains (percent) age consumption equivalent (remaining lifetime)

44 Young suffer largest decline in risky asset wealth Table : Decline in risky asset wealth (percent) age data model

45 Young suffer largest decline in risky asset participation Table : Decline in risky asset participation (percent) age data model

46 Welfare losses larger for risky asset particpants Table : Welfare gains (percent) age all risky>0 risky=

47 log scale risky assets (thousands of dollars) average age Young are more leveraged Figure 10: Average age by portfolio safe assets (thousands of dollars) log scale

48 log scale risky assets (thousands of dollars) percent Biggest losers: the highly leveraged Figure 9: Welfare gains, ages safe assets (thousands of dollars) log scale

49 log scale risky assets (thousands of dollars) Retired welfare losses smaller Welfare gains, retired safe assets (thousands of dollars) log scale

50 Heterogeneity and borrowing constraints matter Table : Welfare gains (percent) Age (1) (2) Unit: percent (1) baseline (2) counterfactual: drop in average income

51 Heterogeneity and borrowing constraints matter Table : Welfare gains (percent) Age (1) (2) (3) Unit: percent (1) baseline (2) counterfactual: drop in average income (3) counterfactual: relaxed borrowing constraint

52 Heterogeneity and borrowing constraints matter Table : Welfare gains (percent) Age (1) (2) (3) (4) Unit: percent (1) baseline (2) counterfactual: drop in average income (3) counterfactual: relaxed borrowing constraint (4) counterfactual: (2) and (3)

53 Conclusion Developed a model consistent with Age profiles of wealth and risky assets Cross-sectional wealth distribution Household leverage Changes in asset prices Changes in labor income across age groups Results Young suffer the largest welfare losses Heterogeneity and borrowing constraints matter

54 Appendix

55 thousands of dollars Initial wealth endowments 1200 data model bins of wealth, ages parameters

56 120 Age income profile Age income profile 100 thousands of dollars parameters

57 Income Distribution Distribution of income shocks 0.3 steady state middle age recession young recession recession

58 CBOE Nasdaq 100 Volatility Index 100 Stock Martket Volatility Index Stock Martket Volatility Index recession

59 Sensitivity for ρ y, σ y Model recalibrated Income process more persistent slower recovery Young welfare losses even larger Table : consumption equivalent (remaining lifetime) age ρ y = ρ y = σ y = σ y = recession 2 periods 4 periods half-life back

60 Sensitivity for λ back Model recalibrated Young welfare losses remain largest Table : consumption equivalent (remaining lifetime) age λ = 0.8 λ =

61 Sensitivity for σ back Model recalibrated Higher IES smaller welfare losses for all Young welfare losses remain very large Table : consumption equivalent (remaining lifetime) age σ = 2 σ = 3 σ = Unit: percent