Optimal Spatial Taxation
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1 Optimal Spatial Taxation Are Big Cities Too Small? Jan Eeckhout and Nezih Guner & University College London, Barcelona GSE-UPF & ICREA-MOVE, Autonoma, and Barcelona GSE Wharton November 4, 2014
2 Motivaton Local labor markets (cities): 1. Urban wage premium 2. Location choice (size) determines prices (wages, housing) Ex ante identical agents ex post heterogeneous
3 Motivaton Local labor markets (cities): 1. Urban wage premium 2. Location choice (size) determines prices (wages, housing) Ex ante identical agents ex post heterogeneous Government needs to raise revenue G: Location choice responds to tax rate in local labor market Tax cities differentially? Flat (proportional)? Lump sum? Propose GE model and estimate optimal income tax schedule
4 Motivation Existing Federal Income Taxes Federal Taxes affect workers of same skill differentially 1. Urban Wage Premium 2. Progressive Taxation Average tax rate: 5% points difference at median income:
5 Motivation Existing Federal Income Taxes Federal Taxes affect workers of same skill differentially 1. Urban Wage Premium 2. Progressive Taxation Average tax rate: 5% points difference at median income: Labor Force Wage level Avg. Tax Rate New York 9 million % Asheville, NC 130, %
6 Motivation Existing Federal Income Taxes Federal Taxes affect workers of same skill differentially 1. Urban Wage Premium 2. Progressive Taxation Average tax rate: 5% points difference at median income: Labor Force Wage level Avg. Tax Rate New York 9 million % Asheville, NC 130, % Due to mobility: no redistribution same skills, same utility Focus on taxing ex ante identical agents
7 Motivation Taxes affect identical agents differently across cities In equilibrium: affects location decision Policy Question: Optimal Taxation across local labor markets Are big cites too small/too big?
8 Findings Representative Agent Economy Optimal Ramsey Tax rates in big cities: relatively decreasing in Gvt spending G relatively increasing in concentration of housing wealth For the US, benchmark economy: Optimal tax higher in big cities (but lower than current) Would lead to big relocation and output gain (6.9%) Moderate welfare gain
9 Related Work Literature: Impact of income taxation: Wildasin (1980), Glaeser (1998), Kaplow (1995), Knoll-Griffith (2003) Quantitative: Albouy (2009), Albouy-Seegert (2010) Main difference: general equilibrium Prices, quantities (housing, consumption, population) are endogenous
10 Model
11 Model J cities, size l j with L = j l j Preferences: u(c, h) = a j l δ j c 1 α h α a j : amenities; lj δ are congestion costs Mobility utility equalization: u(c j, h j ) = u(c j, h j ), j, j Production: y j = A j l γ j w j = A j l γ 1 j Market clearing: j l j = L and h j l j = H j
12 Model Tax Schedule Pre tax income w; after tax income w To estimate US tax schedule (Heathcote-Storesletten-Violante 2012, and Bénabou 2002): w j = λw 1 τ j τ = 0: proportional; τ > 0: progressive; τ < 0: regressive US, estimated τ 0.12 Taxes are used to finance government spending G T G = φ G L : fraction φ is transferred to households
13 Model Housing Production On average: land value 30%, construction 70% of housing land from 25% (small) to 50% (big cities) Housing supply in city j (with K j capital, L j land) H j = B [ ] 1/ρ (1 β)k ρ j + βl ρ j, Representative competitive firm in each city maximizes profits
14 Model Ownership of Housing Housing value: 24% of output Construction cost (17%): foregone consumption Land value (7%): transfer Ownership distribution of housing is key to results Income from land is redistributed to the households: j T j = (1 ψ) r jl j j l j ψ captures concentration of land wealth ψ = 0: households hold perfectly diversified housing portfolio ψ = 1: all housing is held by zero measure landlords
15 Model Ownership of Housing Model housing as an asset traded after policy impact But only at extreme cases Complication for more general setup: heterogeneity 1. Initial distribution matters 2. Trading assets ex post heterogeneity
16 Equilibrium Allocation
17 Equilibrium Allocation The Household Problem Households solve: max u(c j, h j ) = a j lj δ c 1 α j {c j,h j} h α j s.t. c j + p j h j w j + T j + T G p j h j = α( w j + T j + T G ) the indirect utility is: u j = a j [(1 α) 1 α ]( w j + T j + T G ) 1 α l δ α j H α j.
18 Equilibrium Allocation Housing Production The firm maximizes its profits by choosing K j and L j max p j B[(1 β)k ρ K j,l j + βl ρ j ]1/ρ r j L j r K K j j (p j housing price, r j land rental price, r K capital rental price) Set r K = 1. Free entry + FOC s the equilibrium housing supply is [ ( 1 β h j = B (1 β) β r j ) ρ 1 ρ + β ] 1/ρ L j
19 Equilibrium Allocation Worker Mobility Workers must be indifferent between locations j and j Normalize a 1 = 1, so a j = u j = u j [ ( ) ρ α/ρ ( w 1 + T 1 + T G ) 1 α l α δ j (1 β) 1 β β r 1 ρ 1 + β] L α 1 ( w j + T j + T G ) 1 α l α δ 1 [ (1 β) ( ) ρ α/ρ 1 β β r 1 ρ j + β] L α j after using indirect utility and equilibrium housing supply.
20 Quantitative Exercise
21 Quantitative Exercise Benchmark Economy Data Take w j and l j from the data. Set γ = 1, so A j = w j 2013 CPS. 264 MSAs. Age 16+ in labor force The average labor force is 484,373 max: NY, 9.3 million; min: Bowling Green, KY, 37,000 Average weekly wages is $645 max: 70% above mean (Sante Fe, NM); half (Amarillo, TX)
22 Size distribution (Labor Force) Fraction Log (Population)
23 Wage Distribution Fraction Log (Weekly Wages)
24 Quantitative Exercise Benchmark Economy Taxes The relation between after and before taxes w j = λw 1 τ j Use the OECD tax-benefit calculator: λ = 0.85, τ = 0.12 λ: Personal + Soc. Sec.: Robustness, λ = 0.9 and τ: Robustness, τ = and 0.2 w average tax rate 11.4% 15% 25% 32.8% We set φ = 0.5 (half of tax revenue are transfers)
25 Quantitative Exercise Benchmark Economy - Preference Parameters Housing Exp. 24% (Davis,Ortalo-Magné) α = 0.24 λ = Commuting cost elasticity δ = 0.1 Kahn (2010): the joint effect of commuting time (opportunity wage cost) and direct commuting cost (transportation) Asset distribution: ψ = 0.5
26 Quantitative Exercise Benchmark Economy Calibration Need to determine {β, ρ, B, L j, a j }. Select β and ρ such that: 1. average share of land in housing cost is land share [0.15, 0.5] across MSA (Davis-Palumbo (2007), Albouy-Ehrlich (2012)) B such that h = 200 m 2 (average across MSAs) Use observed land area L j (average across MSAs 5000 km 2 )
27 Quantitative Exercise Land Areas Fraction Log (Land, sq km)
28 Quantitative Exercise Benchmark Economy Calibration Find a j from utility equalization Benchmark Economy. Procedure: 1. A j = w j (FOC) and l j from data 2. given λ and τ, find {p j, r j, H j, a j, c j, h j, T j } such that l j s are equilibrium allocations
29 Quantitative Exercise Benchmark Economy Wages (observed) Wages Stamford, CT San Jose, CA Danbury, CT Sumter, Muncie, SC Flint, Las INLaredo, MI Cruces, Brownsville-Harlingen-San TXNM Benito, TX Washington, DC/MD/VA San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA New York-Nor Log (Population)
30 Quantitative Exercise Benchmark Economy Housing Prices Housing Prices Danbury, CT Stamford, CT Muncie, Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX Flint, IN MI Sumter, SC Las Laredo, Cruces, TXNM San Jose, CA San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA Washington, DC/MD/VA New York-Nor Log (Population)
31 Quantitative Exercise Benchmark Economy Amenities Congestion Adjusted Amenities Muncie, IN Sumter, SC Flint, MI Laredo, TX Las Cruces, NM Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX Danbury, CT Stamford, CT San Jose, CA San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA Washington, DC/MD/VA Log (Population) New York-Nor
32 Quantitative Exercise Benchmark Economy Land Share in the Value of Housing Land Share Muncie, IN Flint, MI Sumter, SC Danbury, CT Laredo, TX Las Cruces, NM Stamford, CT Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX San Jose, CA San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA New York-Nor Washington, DC/MD/VA Log (Population)
33 Quantitative Exercise Optimal Taxation Given A j and a j from the benchmark economy, calculate: 1. new equilibrium allocation {l j, c j, h j, T j, H j } 2. prices {p j, r j } for different λ, τ (λ such that revenue neutral) Select τ that maximizes utility
34 Optimal Tax Schedule τ Welfare Gain (%) tau
35 Tax Schedules Actual vs. Optimal Tax Rate Benchmark Optimal Wages
36 Simulation: τ = Change in Labor Force Productivity Change (%) Brownsville-Harlingen-San Muncie, Flint, MI Sumter, IN SC Benito, TX Laredo, Las Cruces, TX NM Danbury, San Jose, CTCA Washington, DC/MD/VA San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA New York-Northeastern NJ Productivity Stamford, CT
37 Simulation: τ = Change in Labor Force Amenities Change Stamford, CT Danbury, CT San Jose, CA Washington, DC/MD/VA San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA New York-Northeastern NJ Flint, MI Sumter, Muncie, SC IN Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX Las Laredo, Cruces, TXNM Amenities
38 Simulation: τ = Change in After-tax Wages Change (%) Flint, MI Brownsville-Harlingen-San Laredo, Las Muncie, Sumter, Cruces, TX IN SC NM Benito, TX San Jose, CA Danbury, CT Washington, DC/MD/VA San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA New York-Northeastern NJ Productivity Stamford, CT
39 Simulation: τ = Change in Housing Prices Change (%) Laredo, Las Flint, Cruces, MI TX NM Brownsville-Harlingen-San Muncie, Sumter, IN SC Benito, TX San Jose, CA Danbury, CT San Washington, Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, DC/MD/VA CA New York-Northeastern NJ Productivity Stamford, CT
40 Outcomes for Selected Cities MSA A a % l % p % c % h Highest A Stamford, CT San Jose, CA Danbury, CT Lowest A Las Cruces, NM Laredo, TX Brownsville, TX Highest a Chicago, IL Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA New York-Northeast NJ Lowest a Danbury, CT Grand Junction, CO Houma-Thibodoux, LA
41 Simulation: τ = City Size Distribution Benchmark Optimal 0 2.0e e e e e+07 Population
42 Aggregate Outcomes Optimal τ = Outcomes Benchmark Optimal τ Output gain (%) 6.92 Population top 5 cities (%) 3.85 Fraction population that moves (%) 1.67 Change in average prices (%) 2.55 Welfare gain (%) 0.026
43 Optimal Spatial Tax
44 Optimal Spatial Tax Constrained Optimal: Ramsey Taxes 2 cities, no gvt. transfers, congestion, amenities, housing prod. The Ramsey planner s problem is: max u j l j {t j } j s.t. A j t j l γ j = G, u j = u j, j l j = L j
45 Optimal Spatial Tax Constrained Optimal: Ramsey Taxes 2 cities, no gvt. transfers, congestion, amenities, housing prod. The Ramsey planner s problem is: max u j l j {t j } j s.t. A j t j l γ j = G, u j = u j, j l j = L j For any ψ, the optimal taxes G such that: for G < G : optimal Ramsey tax higher in big city; for G > G : optimal Ramsey tax lower in big city
46 Constrained Optimal: Ramsey Taxes Role of G G is source of inefficiency (disappears from the economy) G tax more productive city less Productive resources to pay G: efficient from work in big city G optimal urbanization
47 Constrained Optimal: Ramsey Taxes Equal housing bond: ψ = Taxes 100 City Size 200 Output city 1 city city 1 city Y Y G G G G Figure : A. Optimal taxes t 1, t 2 ; B. Population l 1, l 2 ; C. Output. (A 1 = 1, A 2 = 2, L = 100, α = 0.31, ψ = 0)
48 Constrained Optimal: Ramsey Taxes Zero measure landlords: ψ = Taxes 100 City Size 200 Output city 1 city city 1 city Y Y G G G G Figure : A. Optimal taxes t 1, t 2 ; B. Population l 1, l 2 ; C. Ouput. (A 1 = 1, A 2 = 2, L = 100, α = 0.31, ψ = 1)
49 Constrained Optimal: Ramsey Taxes Zero measure landlords When land ownership is concentrated No effect on productivity More people in big cities higher value of land (no value to utilitarian planner) ψ optimal urbanization
50 Constrained Optimal: Ramsey Taxes Benchmark: ψ = Taxes 100 City Size 200 GDP city 1 city city 1 city city 1 city G G G Figure : A. Optimal taxes t 1, t 2 ; B. Population l 1, l 2 ; C. Ouput. (A 1 = 1, A 2 = 2, L = 100, α = 0.31, ψ = 0.5)
51 Optimal Spatial Tax Unconstrained Optimal The planner chooses the bundles l j, c j, h j to maximize Utilitarian welfare: max c 1 α l j,c j,h j hj α l j j s.t. j c j l j + j K j + G = j j A j l j, h j l j = H j, l j = L. Solution: Equate MU j and MP j (Ramsey: MU, MP across cities) Few in small city: unproductive, large consumption j
52 Optimal Spatial Tax Unconstrained Optimal 100 City Size 0.7 Consumption 24 Output city 1 city city 1 city Y Y G G G G Figure : A 1 = 1, A 2 = 2, L = 100, α = 0.31, u = c 0.8 :
53 Optimal Spatial Tax Lotteries Constrained optimal: utility equal. marginal utility equal. With mobility (Ramsey): tradeoff productivity utility (low G): too little consumption in small cities too little production in large cities Can we implement first best in this economy? Yes, with lotteries (as in labor supply - Rogerson) Maybe not in a static world, but over life cycle But: What with those who live in NY MSA for their whole life? Lottery with zero probability if γ = 1...
54 Optimal Spatial Tax Sensitivity: Equal Taxes 0.7 Taxes 100 City Size 200 GDP city 1, benchmark city 2, benchmark city 1, equal taxes city 2, equal taxes city 1, benchmark city 2, benchmark city 1, equal taxes city 2, equal taxes city 1, benchmark city 2, benchmark equal taxes G G G
55 Sensitivity Analysis Land Ownership I Outcomes Benchmark All bond All landlord ψ = 0.5 ψ = 0 ψ = 1 Optimal τ Output gain (%) Population top 5 cities (%) Fraction population that moves (%) Change in average prices (%) Welfare gain (%)
56 Sensitivity Analysis Land Ownership II Asset distribution to reflect owner occupied housing rate 67% Generates ex post heterogeneity Short cut (but land is not correctly priced!): T j = θ r jl j j + (1 θ) r jl j l j j l j instead of landlords: get equal share of land value in the city as if within city redistribution
57 Sensitivity Analysis Land Ownership II Outcomes Benchmark owner occupied ψ = 0.5 θ = 0.67 Optimal τ Output gain (%) Population top 5 cities (%) Fraction population that moves (%) Change in average prices (%) Welfare gain (%)
58 Sensitivity Analysis Initial Tax Policy λ = 0.9 λ = 0.85 λ = τ Optimal τ Output gain (%) Pop top 5 (%) Pop moves (%) Avg. prices (%) Welfare gain (%)
59 Sensitivity Analysis Fixed Land Area (5000km 2 ) Amenities (Land Variable) Amenities (Land Fixed)
60 Sensitivity Analysis Fixed Land Area (5000km 2 ) Outcomes Benchmark Fixed Land Area Optimal τ Output gain (%) Population change top 5 cities (%) Fraction Population that Moves (%) Change in average prices (%) Welfare gain (%)
61 Sensitivity Analysis No Rebate of Tax Revenue (φ = 0) Outcomes Benchmark No Tax Rebate Optimal τ Output gain (%) Population change top 5 cities (%) Fraction population that moves (%) Change in average prices (%) Welfare gain (%)
62 The Role of Heterogeneity Heterogeneity in: 1. Housing asset holdings 2. Skills: τ US = 0.12? Redistribution heterogeneous agents Role of a city-specific tax
63 Concluding Remarks Federal Taxation can lead to spatial misallocation Taxes location specific optimal Ramsey tax not flat Gvt. spending G tax big city Asset concentration tax big city US benchmark economy, optimal tax: 1. Tax big cities more: τ 0.04 (less than current) 2. Large effects on output (6.9%) and population (1.67%) 3. Small effects on welfare Big GE effects from gvt. spending and ownership structure
64 Optimal Spatial Taxation Are Big Cities Too Small? Jan Eeckhout and Nezih Guner & University College London, Barcelona GSE-UPF & ICREA-MOVE, Autonoma, and Barcelona GSE Wharton November 4, 2014
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