INVESTMENT INDUSTRY REGULATORY ORGANIZATION OF CANADA MARKET REGULATION SERVICES INC. IN THE MATTER OF: THE MARKET INTEGRITY RULES OF THE

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1 INVESTMENT INDUSTRY REGULATORY ORGANIZATION OF CANADA ON BEHALF OF MARKET REGULATION SERVICES INC. IN THE MATTER OF: THE MARKET INTEGRITY RULES OF THE INVESTMENT INDUSTRY REGULATORY ORGANIZATION OF CANADA AND THE UNIVERSAL MARKET INTEGRITY RULES AND FRANCESCO MAURO AND SCOTT FRASER HARDING NOTICE OF HEARING TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Market Integrity Rules - UMIR (UMIR) Policy 10.8 (Practice and Procedure), Part 9 (Conduct of Hearing) of the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC), and pursuant to UMIR 2.2(2)(b) and UMIR Policy 2.2 of Schedule A.1 to Transition Rule No.1.1, a hearing will be held before a hearing panel of IIROC (the Hearing Panel) on May 3, 2010, at Hotel Le Soleil, 567 Hornby Street, Vancouver, Les Etoiles Room, at 10 am, or as soon thereafter as the hearing can be heard. TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that on June 1, 2008, IIROC consolidated the regulatory and enforcement functions of the Investment Dealers Association of Canada (IDA) and Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS). With respect to conduct of Regulated Persons occurring before June 1, 2008, RS has retained IIROC to provide services necessary for RS to carry out its regulatory functions, pursuant to the Administrative and Regulatory Services Agreement between RS and IIROC. THE PURPOSE OF THE HEARING is to determine whether Francesco Mauro and Scott Fraser Harding (collectively, the Respondents) have contravened the following requirements of UMIR, alleged in the Statement of Allegations annexed as Appendix A hereto. 1 of 15

2 Staff of IIROC alleges that: Count 1: Between December 13, 2006 and January 24, 2007, the Respondents, while Registered Representatives at CIBC World Markets Inc. (CIBC), a Member of the TSX Venture Exchange (TSXV), facilitated and/or executed trades on behalf of two clients, for Evergreen Gaming Corporation (TNA), a listed company on the TSXV, that they knew, or ought to have known, would create, or could reasonably be expected to create, an artificial price for the security contrary to UMIR 2.2(2)(b) and UMIR Policy 2.2, for which they are liable under UMIR 10.4(1). AND TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that if the Hearing Panel finds that the Respondents have contravened the Requirements above, the Hearing Panel may impose one or more of the following orders under UMIR Policy 10.5: 1. a reprimand; 2. a fine not to exceed the greater of: (a) (b) $1,000,000 per contravention of a Requirement; and an amount equal to triple the financial benefit which accrued to the Respondents as a result of committing each contravention. 3. a restriction, suspension or revocation of access to the marketplace for such period and upon such terms and conditions, if any, considered appropriate; and 4. any other remedy determined to be appropriate under the circumstances. AND TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that under UMIR Policy 10.7 the Hearing Panel may assess the expenses incurred by Staff as a result of the investigation and proceedings resulting in the order. AND TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that the Respondents have the right to appear and be heard at the hearing. Under part 9.1 of UMIR 10.8, the Respondents are required to serve a Reply. If the Respondents fail to serve a Reply, or to attend or participate at the hearing, the Hearing Panel may proceed with the hearing on the matter on the date and at the time and place set out in this Notice of Hearing without further notice to the Respondents and in their absence, and the Hearing Panel may accept the facts alleged or conclusions drawn in the Statement of Allegations as having been proven and the Hearing Panel may impose any one or more of the penalties or remedies authorized by UMIR and assess expenses as authorized by UMIR. 2 of 15

3 DATED at Vancouver, this day of, WARREN FUNT Vice President, Western Canada INVESTMENT INDUSTRY REGULATORY ORGANIZATION OF CANADA Suite 2800 Royal Centre 1055 West Georgia Street Vancouver, BC V6E 3R5 To: Francesco Mauro 2778 Willoughby Road West Vancouver, BC V7S 3J2 And to: Scott Fraser Harding 721 Grantham Place North Vancouver, BC V7H 1S9 3 of 15

4 INVESTMENT INDUSTRY REGULATORY ORGANIZATION OF CANADA ON BEHALF OF MARKET REGULATION SERVICES INC. IN THE MATTER OF: THE MARKET INTEGRITY RULES OF THE INVESTMENT INDUSTRY REGULATORY ORGANIZATION OF CANADA AND THE UNIVERSAL MARKET INTEGRITY RULES AND FRANCESCO MAURO AND SCOTT FRASER HARDING STATEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS I. REQUIREMENTS CONTRAVENED 1. Francesco Mauro (Mauro) and Scott Fraser Harding (Harding) (collectively, the Respondents) are alleged to have committed the following contravention: Between December 13, 2006 and January 24, 2007 (the Relevant Period), the Respondents, while Registered Representatives at CIBC World Markets Inc. (CIBC), a Member of the TSX Venture Exchange (TSXV), entered orders and executed trades on behalf of two clients for the shares of Evergreen Gaming Corporation (TNA), a listed company on the TSXV, that they knew, or ought to have known, would create, or could reasonably be expected to create, an artificial price for the security contrary to UMIR 2.2(2)(b) and UMIR Policy 2.2, for which they are liable under UMIR 10.4(1). 2. The text of the relevant Requirements is set out in Schedule A. 4 of 15

5 II. RELEVANT FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OVERVIEW 3. During the course of a non-brokered private placement by TNA, the Respondents entered orders and executed trades for the shares of TNA on behalf of the CEO of TNA and the CEO s wife. 4. The orders were entered when the shares of TNA declined below the unit price of the private placement. The trading by the clients indicates that the trades were executed to restore and maintain the sale price of TNA at a predetermined level. 5. The Respondents knew, or ought to have known, that the execution of the trades would create or could reasonably be expected to create an artificial sale price for the shares of TNA. The Respondents failed to fulfill their gatekeeper obligations and did not make adequate inquiries of the clients about the trading or take any steps to prevent the trading. BACKGROUND 6. CIBC is registered as an investment dealer, is a Participating Organization of the Toronto Stock Exchange (the TSX), is a Member of the TSXV, and therefore, a Participant under UMIR. 7. During the Relevant Period, CIBC employed Mauro as a Registered Representative (Retail), Branch Manager and Officer (Trading Securities) at its West Vancouver Branch. Mauro has been a Registered Representative since During the Relevant Period, CIBC employed Harding as a Registered Representative (Retail) at its West Vancouver Branch. Harding worked as Mauro s assistant at CIBC. 9. Mauro s commission code at CIBC was CAG. Harding entered the orders for Mauro s clients with the CAG commission code. CIBC s West Vancouver Branch did not have a trade desk for the receipt of orders. Harding entered orders with Sanchez Equities, CIBC s internal order entry platform. 10. TNA is a British Columbia incorporated issuer trading on the TSXV. 11. During the Relevant Period, the trades at issue were entered for the account of the CEO of TNA (the CEO Account) and the RRSP account of his wife (the RRSP Account). TNA 12. On April 27, 2006, the TSXV halted trading in TNA shares on TNA s request due to a pending announcement. 13. On May 1, 2006, TNA announced that it entered into an agreement to acquire 83.29% in Washington Gaming Inc. (WGI), and that this acquisition would be financed through the issuance of 64,966,323 shares. 5 of 15

6 14. On June 28, 2006, TNA announced an update to May 1, 2006 announcement. TNA agreed to purchase 100% of WGI in exchange for 78 million shares of TNA. CIBC agreed to act as TNA's sponsor in this transaction. 15. On October 31, 2006, the TSXV announced its acceptance of TNA's reverse takeover of WGI. TNA announced a name change to Evergreen Gaming Corporation, with no change to the trading symbol or share consolidation. TNA was elevated from Tier-2 to Tier-1 status on the TSXV, and trading resumed on November 1, On November 6, 2006, TNA announced the acquisition of two casinos in Washington State through WGI. WGI purchased 100% of the assets of the two casinos for $7.534 million (US). TNA PRIVATE PLACEMENT 17. To finance these acquisitions, on November 6, 2006, TNA announced a private placement of up to 9,500,000 units at per unit. Each unit consisted of one common share and half a share purchase warrant. One whole warrant entitled the holder to purchase one additional common share of TNA for two years, at a price of $1.45 per share in the first year and at a price of $1.75 per share in the second year. TNA also announced a finder s fee in the amount of 2.5% to Member Firms of the TSXV and other qualified parties who located subscribers for the Private Placement. 18. On December 20, 2006, TNA announced a change to the original terms of the private placement. The composition of a unit was modified from one common share and half a share purchase warrant to one common share and one share purchase warrant. One warrant entitled the holder to purchase one additional common share of TNA for two years, at a price of $1.25 per share. 19. The change to the private placement was significant as it: (a) increased the unit s composition; (b) decreased the exercise price for the warrants to $1.25; and (c) could potentially dilute TNA s common shares. 20. On January 25, 2007, TNA announced the closing of the first tranche of the private placement, for a total of 4,427,000 units. The common shares and warrants issued under the private placement were subject to a four-month hold period, expiring May 25, On March 29, 2007, TNA announced the closing of the second and final tranche of the private placement, for a total of 1,424,000 units. The common shares and warrants issued under the private placement were subject to a four-month hold period, expiring 29 July TNA announced that 5,851,000 units were issued in the private placement. 6 of 15

7 TRADING BY CLIENTS IN TNA 22. Between November 1 and December 12, 2006, the shares of TNA did not trade below. During this period, Harding entered 16 buy orders in the RRSP Account. All were passive orders as none traded at the posted offer price at the time of entry. 23. The posted bid price of TNA fell below on December 13, The share price of TNA fell below on December 14, Between December 15, 2006 and January 24, 2007, the shares of TNA traded below on 20 trading days. 26. During the Relevant Period, Harding entered 48 buy orders in the RRSP Account, of which 26 were active orders that traded at or above the posted offer price upon entry. 27. No sell orders were entered for the RRSP Account from November 1, 2006 to January 24, Schedule B identifies 24 buy orders entered by Harding for the RRSP Account during the Relevant Period. 16 orders restored the share price of TNA to at or near after a price decline (the Price Restoration Trades) and 8 orders maintained the share price at from December 19 to 21, 2006 (the Price Maintenance Trades). Price Restoration Trades 29. The Price Restoration Trades were all active trades entered when the price of the previous trades were below. The Price Restoration Trades were also characterized by the following: (a) 15 established the closing price of TNA shares, of which 12 established the closing price at, the same price as the unit price in the Private Placement (b) 14 were entered in the last hour of trading; (c) 6 with a limit price of, traded entirely at the posted offer price of ; (d) 7 with a limit price of, traded entirely at successive prices up to. 30. Schedule B identifies and provides further particulars of the 16 Price Restoration Trades. Price Maintenance Trades 31. The Price Maintenance Trades maintained the price of TNA shares at the level from December 19 to 21, 2006; and coincided with the December 20, 2006 news release announcing the change to the private placement, as described in paragraph On December 19, 2006, after a Price Restoration Trade in the RRSP Account that upticked the share price from $0.95 to, Harding executed trades in the final 30 7 of 15

8 minutes of trading and purchased 22,200 shares in the RRSP Account and these trades maintained the TNA share price at. 33. On December 20, 2006, Harding entered a Price Restoration Trade with less than four minutes remaining in the trading day. It established TNA s closing price at, a $0.07 up-tick from the previous trade. 34. On December 21, 2006, the first trading day after the change to the private placement, Harding executed the session s first trade and purchased 5,800 shares in the RRSP Account that took out the entire posted offer quantity at. Two minutes 30 seconds later, Harding executed a trade in the CEO Account, purchasing 500,000 shares at $1.01. One minute 37 seconds later Harding entered an order in the RRSP Account to buy TNA shares. This order did not trade upon entry, but it improved the posted bid price from $0.91 to. 35. The trades and order in the RRSP Account and CEO Account on December 21, 2006 maintained the price of TNA shares at or greater following the announcement of the change to the private placement. 36. Schedule B identifies and provides further particulars of the 8 Price Maintenance Trades. MAURO S CONDUCT 37. While Mauro did not enter trades personally in TNA for the MS RRSP Account, Harding entered the trades using Mauro s commission code. Mauro was ultimately responsible for the clients trading and was directly responsible for supervising Harding. During the Relevant Period, Mauro was aware that the CEO s wife was purchasing shares of TNA. 38. Mauro had access to a branch trade blotter detailing all trades in the West Vancouver Branch. He also reviewed trades in TNA on a post-trade basis with CIBC s commission report. 39. During the Relevant Period, Mauro considered the CEO s wife to be an insider of TNA. Through a discussion with the CEO s wife, Mauro learned that she intended to purchase up to one million shares of TNA in the RRSP account. Mauro suggested she buy the shares through the private placement, but accepted her explanation that she wanted free-trading shares. 40. Given TNA s illiquidity during the Relevant Period, Mauro ought to have been aware of the potential impact on the market of the proposed trades in the RRSP Account. 41. Mauro knew of both the private placement and the change to the private placement on or around the time of the announcements. Due to the private placement, Mauro decided to place TNA on a branch-level restriction, similar to a new issue financing. It is during this restricted period that the Price Restoration and Price Maintenance Trades were entered. 42. Mauro had a significant number of clients who participated in the private placement, which closed in two tranches. The first tranche was for 4,427,000 units. Mauro s client 8 of 15

9 participation was 3,817,000 units, and involved 56 of the 60 subscribers. The second tranche was for 1,424,000 units. Mauro s client participation was 1,182,000 units, and involved 35 of the 40 subscribers. Mauro also had a potential benefit of 2.5% for each unit subscribed. In addition, Mauro s wife held a significant equity position in TNA (1,150,000 shares), during the Relevant Period. 43. Mauro received training at CIBC in manipulative and deceptive activities, and specifically the motivations for this conduct. He also had access to compliance policies and procedures outlining potentially manipulative and deceptive trading. 44. Based on the facts described above, Mauro ought to have been concerned about the propriety of insiders of the issuer entering purchase orders during a distribution and ought to have had a heightened concern about the possibility of manipulation by those with an interest in the outcome of the distribution. 45. In addition based on his review of the trading, Mauro knew, or ought to have known, that the execution of the trades would create or could reasonably be expected to create an artificial sale price for the shares of TNA. HARDING S CONDUCT 46. During the Relevant Period, Harding considered the CEO s wife to be an insider. He knew of the timing of orders for the RRSP Account because he entered the orders. He knew or ought to have known that the RRSP Account pattern of order entry changed from a strictly passive pattern to a more active one, coinciding with a price decline in TNA below the level. 47. Harding knew both of the private Placement and the change to the private placement on or around the time of the announcements. Due to the private placement, Harding treated TNA as restricted at the West Vancouver Branch, similar to a new issue financing. It is during this restricted period that he entered the Price Restoration and Price Maintenance Trades. 48. Harding had discussions with Mauro as to the appropriateness of the RRSP Account trades in the context of the private placement. These discussions should have alerted him to question the effect of the timing and price of the trades. 49. Harding was aware of the impact of the trades. His order entry practice at CIBC included reviewing market details, such as the bid/offer, volume of shares traded, market depth, and the potential impact of executing a trade. Furthermore, he discussed with Mauro the need for the RRSP Account trades to be within the context of the market. 50. Harding received training at CIBC in manpulative and deceptive activities, and specifically the motivations for this conduct. He also had access to compliance policies and procedures outlining potentially manipulative and deceptive trading. 51. Based on these facts, Harding knew, or ought to have known, that the execution of the trades would create or could reasonably be expected to create an artificial sale price for the shares of TNA. 9 of 15

10 ACTIONS TAKEN BY CIBC 52. CIBC Compliance, concerned by trades in TNA by Mauro s clients, commenced an internal investigation in January As a result, CIBC terminated both Mauro and Harding in February In its Uniform Termination Notices, CIBC indicated Mauro and Harding were terminated due to failure to fulfill Universal Market Integrity Rules Gatekeeper Rule. CIBC filed a gatekeeper report with Market Regulation Services (RS), outlining the trading activity at CIBC. III. CONCLUSION 54. The purpose of UMIR 2.2 and Policy 2.2 is to protect the marketplace from manipulative and deceptive trading activity and artificial pricing, which undermine the integrity of the marketplace and erode investor confidence. 55. The Respondents failed to fulfill their gatekeeper obligations to be aware of, and alert to, manipulative and deceptive activities. As experienced traders, the Respondents knew, or ought to have known, that the order entry and trade execution would create or could reasonably be expected to create an artificial price for the security. The Respondents failed to take appropriate actions in response to the trading. July 31, 2009 INVESTMENT INDUSTRY REGULATORY ORGANIZATION OF CANADA Suite 2800 Royal Centre 1055 West Georgia Street Vancouver, BC V6E 3R5 Telephone (604) Facsimile (604) of 15

11 SCHEDULE A EXCERPTS FROM THE UNIVERSAL MARKET INTEGRITY RULES MADE AND ADOPTED AS RULES OF IIROC PURSUANT TO TRANSITION RULE 1.1 SCHEDULE A Manipulative and Deceptive Activities (1) A Participant or Access Person shall not, directly or indirectly, engage in or participate in the use of any manipulative or deceptive method, act or practice in connection with any order or trade on a marketplace if the Participant or Access Person knows or ought reasonably to know the nature of the method, act or practice. (2) A Participant or Access Person shall not, directly or indirectly, enter an order or execute a trade on a marketplace if the Participant or Access Person knows or ought reasonably to know that the entry of the order or the execution of the trade will create or could reasonably be expected to create: (a) a false or misleading appearance of trading activity in or interest in the purchase or sale of the security; or (b) an artificial ask price, bid price or sale price for the security or a related security. (3) For greater certainty, the entry of an order or the execution of a trade on a marketplace by a person in accordance with the Market Maker Obligations shall not be considered a violation of subsection (1) or (2) provided such order or trade complies with applicable Marketplace Rules and the order or trade was required to fulfill applicable Market Maker Obligations. POLICY 2.2. MANIPULATIVE AND DECEPTIVE ACTIVITIES Part 1 Manipulative or Deceptive Method, Act or Practice There are a number of activities which, by their very nature, will be considered to be a manipulative or deceptive method, act or practice. For the purpose of subsection (1) of Rule 2.2 and without limiting the generality that subsection, the following activities when undertaken on a marketplace constitute a manipulative or deceptive method, act or practice: (a) (b) making a fictitious trade; effecting a trade in a security which involves no change in the beneficial or economic ownership; 11 of 15

12 (c) (d) effecting trades by a single interest or group with the intent of limiting the supply of a security for settlement of trades made by other persons except at prices and on terms arbitrarily dictated by such interest or group; and purchasing a security with the intention of making a sale of the same or a different number of units of the security or a related security on a marketplace at a price which is below the price of the last sale of a standard trading unit of such security displayed in a consolidated market display. If persons know or ought reasonably to know that they are engaging or participating in these or similar types of activities those persons will be in breach of subsection (1) of Rule 2.2 irrespective of whether such method, act or practice results in a false or misleading appearance of trading activity or interest in the purchase or sale of a security or an artificial ask price, bid price or sale price for a security or a related security. Part 2 False or Misleading Appearance of Trading Activity or Artificial Price For the purposes of subsection (2) of Rule 2.2 and without limiting the generality of that subsection, if any of the following activities are undertaken on a marketplace and create or could reasonably be expected to create a false or misleading appearance of trading activity or interest in the purchase or sale of a security or an artificial ask price, bid price or sale price, the entry of the order or the execution of the trade shall constitute a violation of subsection (2) of Rule 2.2: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) entering an order or orders for the purchase of a security with the knowledge that an order or orders of substantially the same size, at substantially the same time and at substantially the same price for the sale of that security, has been or will be entered by or for the same or different persons; entering an order or orders for the sale of a security with the knowledge that an order or orders of substantially the same size, at substantially the same time and at substantially the same price for the purchase of that security, has been or will be entered; making purchases of, or offers to purchase, a security at successively higher prices or in a pattern generally of successively higher prices; making sales of or offers to sell a security at successively lower prices or in a pattern generally of successively lower prices; entering an order or orders for the purchase or sale of a security to: (i) (ii) (iii) establish a predetermined sale price, ask price, or bid price, effect a high or low closing sale price, ask price, or bid price, or maintain the sale price, ask price, or bid price within a predetermined range; entering an order or a series of orders for a security that are not intended to be executed; 12 of 15

13 (g) (h) (i) entering an order for the purchase of a security without, at the time of entering the order, having the ability or the reasonable expectation to make the payment that would be required to settle any trade that would result from the execution of the order; entering an order for the sale of a security without, at the time of entering the order, having the reasonable expectation of settling any trade that would result from the execution of the order; and effecting a trade in a security, other than an internal cross, between accounts under the direction or control of the same person. If persons know or ought reasonably to know that they are engaging or participating in these or similar types of activities those persons will be in breach of subsection (2) of Rule 2.2 irrespective of whether such activity results in a false or misleading appearance of trading activity or interest in the purchase or sale of a security or an artificial ask price, bid price, or sale price for a security or a related security. Part 3 Artificial Pricing For the purposes of subsection (2) of Rule 2.2, an ask price, bid price or sale price will be considered artificial if it is not justified by real demand or supply in a security. Whether or not a particular price is "artificial" depends on the particular circumstances. Some of the relevant considerations in determining whether a price is artificial are: (c) (d) (e) (a) (b) the prices of the preceding trades and succeeding trades; the change in the last sale price, best ask price, or best bid price that results from the entry of the order on a marketplace; the recent liquidity of the security; the time the order is entered and any instructions relevant to the time of entry of the order; and whether any Participant, Access Person or account involved in the order: (i) (ii) has any motivation to establish an artificial price, or represents substantially all of the orders entered or executed for the purchase or sale of the security. The absence of any one or more of these considerations is not determinative that a price is or is not artificial. 13 of 15

14 Buy Orders SCHEDULE B December 2006: Date (dd/mm/yy) Price of Prev. Trade (Tick) Order Entry Time (ET) Order Details Price) Fill Time (ET) Price(s) of CAG Trades (Tick) 1. 12/13/ (0-) 11:20:22 11:20:22 (0-) 2. 12/14/ (-) 15:32:55 15:32:55 (+.05) 3a. 12/19/ (-) 14:07:43 14:07:43 * (+.05) 3b. 12/19/ (+) 15:31:08 15:31:08 * (0+) 3c. 12/19/ (0+) 15:47:47 $.00 15:47:47 * (0+) 3d. 12/19/ (0+) 15:49:05 15:49:05 * (0+) 3e. * 12/19/ (0+) 15:50:21 15:50:21 (0+) 15:58:38 (0+) 15:59:40 3f. * 12/19/ (0+) 15:58:38 3g. 12/19/ (0+) 15:59:40 * * On 20 Dec., the unit composition of the private placement is amended 4. 12/20/ (0-) 15:56:06 15:56:06 (+.07) 5a. 12/21/ (+) 14:46:10 14:46:10 ** (12/20/06) 5b. ** 12/21/ (+) 14:50: @ (0+) 14:50:53 (-0.01) % Increase from Prev. Trade Sets Closing Price? (Yes/No) 0 No n/a 5.26 Yes PR 5.26 Yes PR 7.53 Yes PR ** These trades occur immediately before and after a purchase of 500,000 shares by Dan Sutherland at 14:48: /22/ (-) 15:57:26 15:57: Yes PR (+.07) 7. 12/28/ (-) 15:22:32 15:22:32 (+.08) 8.70 Yes PR Price Restoration ( PR ) or Price Maintenance ( PM ) January 2007: Date (dd/mm/yy) Price of Prev. Trade (Tick) Order Entry Time (ET) Order Details Price) 1. 01/02/ (-) 15:49: /03/ (-) 15:55:50 Fill Time (ET) Price(s) of CAG Trades (Tick) 15:49:52 (+.05) 15:55:50 $0.99 (+.07) (+.01) % Increase from Prev. Trade 5.26 Yes 7.61 Sets Closing Price? (Yes/No) Price Restoration ( PR ) or Price Maintenance ( PM ) PR 3. 01/04/ (0-) 15:47: Yes PR 15:47:47 $0.99 (+.05) PR 14 of 15

15 4. 01/08/ (-) 15:18: /09/ (-) 15:04:59 (+.01) 15:18:49 $0.98 (+.06) $0.99 (+.01) (+.01) 15:04:59 $0.98 (+.06) $0.99 (+.01) (+.01) Yes Yes PR /10/ (0-) 15:17:08 15:17:08 $0.98 (+.06) $0.99 (+.01) $0.99 (0+) (+.01) 8.70 Yes PR /11/ (-) 15:53:15 15:53:15 $0.98 (+.06) $0.99 (+.01) (+.01) 8.70 Yes PR /17/ (0-) 15:57:27 $ /19/ (+) 15:54: /23/ (+) 15:58:28 $ /24/ (0-) 15:57:50 $ :57:27 $1.03 (+.07) 15:54:18 $0.99 (0+) (+.01) 15:58:28 $0.95 (0+) $0.99 (+.04) 15:57:50 $0.93 (0-) $0.97 (+.04) $0.98 (+.01) $0.99 (+.01) 8.70 Yes PR 7.29 Yes PR No PR Yes PR Yes PR 15 of 15