How Tight Are the Screws?

Transcription

1 How Tight Are the Screws? Conditions and Sanctions for the Unemployed in the OECD, Carlo Knotz in collaboration with Moira Nelson Lund University September 18, 2015 International Conference on Welfare Reform, Canberra 1 / 28

2 Motivation What we know about support for the unemployed: How much you get and for how long you get it (Korpi and Palme 2008; Nelson 2010; Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto 2014; van Mechelen et al. 2011) How much is spent on labor market programs (training, subsidies, placement services) (OECD.Stat; Eurostat) 2 / 28

3 Motivation What we know about support for the unemployed: How much you get and for how long you get it (Korpi and Palme 2008; Nelson 2010; Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto 2014; van Mechelen et al. 2011) How much is spent on labor market programs (training, subsidies, placement services) (OECD.Stat; Eurostat) What we did not know (much) about so far: What you have to do while you receive benefits......and when you have to accept work and leave the dole queue (see e.g. Clasen and Clegg 2007; Venn 2012) 2 / 28

4 Benefit conditions, Australia 1944 Unemployment and Sickness Benefit Act (No. 10) of / 28

5 Benefit sanctions, Australia 1944 Unemployment and Sickness Benefit Act (No. 10) of / 28

6 The dataset 5 / 28

7 Information on: 1. The definition of suitable employment Occupational protection Geographical mobility requirements Wage protection Other criteria 2. Job-search & reporting requirements/jobseeker plans 3. Sanctions Refusals of employment Voluntary unemployment Failures to report/conduct job-searches 6 / 28

8 Coverage 22 core-oecd countries Generally Longer time-series for most countries Exceptions: Switzerland (1982), Netherlands (1986), S. Korea (1996) United States incidence of rules by state Belgium post-2012 (UI devolved to regions) 7 / 28

9 Source material 1. Based on primary sources (historical legislation, regulations, guidelines, policy manuals) 2. Existing scholarly material was used to cross-check the findings 3. External country-experts (at least one per country) were asked to check detailed summaries of the developments in each country 8 / 28

10 Key trends 9 / 28

11 Two important findings 1. Conditions and sanctions for the unemployed have clearly become stricter in many ways 2. Less well-known development: more precise rules 10 / 28

12 Occupational protection.6 No Protection Temporary Protection Unlimited Protection.5 Share of countries Year 11 / 28

13 Job-search requirements.8 No requirement Undefined intervals At least every 6 months Share of countries Year 12 / 28

14 Individual action plans.8 JSA at least partially/voluntary JSA compulsory for all claimants.6 ET Choices (MA, 1983) Share of countries Year 13 / 28

15 Sanctions for a (first) refusal of employment Effective Non-Payment Period (Weeks) Median Mean Year 14 / 28

16 Stepwise sanctioning rules.6 Second Refusal Third Refusal Repeated Refusals Share of countries Year 15 / 28

17 The big picture 16 / 28

18 The activation turn Strictness score Strictness of conditions Strictness of sanctions Overall conditionality Year 17 / 28

19 Conditions, 1980 vs Conditions (2012) KOR Conditions (1980) 18 / 28

20 Sanctions, 1980 vs Sanctions (2012) KOR Sanctions (1980) 19 / 28

21 Stricter conditionality, lower unemployment? 20 / 28

22 Main findings (preliminary!) Stricter conditions are correlated with lower unemployment rates Stricter sanctions are correlated with higher unemployment rates 21 / 28

23 Unemployment & conditions Unemployment rate (avg. 1980/2012) Strictness of conditions (avg. 1980/2012) 22 / 28

24 Unemployment & sanctions Unemployment rate (avg. 1980/2012) Strictness of sanctions (avg. 1980/2012) 23 / 28

25 Long-term unemployment & conditions Long-term unemployment rate ( 12 months) Strictness of conditions 24 / 28

26 Long-term unemployment & sanctions Long-term unemployment rate ( 12 months) (avg. 1980/2012) Strictness of sanctions (avg. 1980/2012) 25 / 28

27 Summary 1. Rules have become stricter, but that is not the entire story 2. Most unemployed will arguably not be affected by these policies (stronger effect on long-term unemployed) 3. Implementation matters & stricter is not necessarily better (sanctions!) 26 / 28

28 Many thanks! Contact/paper with more info: 27 / 28

29 References Clasen, Jochen and Daniel Clegg Levels and levers of conditionality: measuring change within welfare states. In Investigating Welfare State Change: The Dependent Variable Problem in Comparative Analysis, ed. Jochen Clasen and Nico A. Siegel. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar pp Korpi, Walter and Joakim Palme The Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP). Stockholm: Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University. Nelson, Kenneth Social assistance and minimum income benefits in old and new EU democracies. International Journal of Social Welfare 19(4): Scruggs, Lyle, Detlef Jahn and Kati Kuitto Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 2. Version Storrs & Greifswald: University of Connecticut & University of Greifswald. van Mechelen, Natascha, Sarah Marchal, Tim Goedemé, Ive Marx and Bea Cantillon The CSB-Minimum Income Protection dataset (CSB-MIPI). CSB Working Paper 11/05. Venn, Danielle Eligibility Criteria for Unemployment Benefits: Quantitative Indicators for OECD and EU countries. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers / 28