Delegation Bugsas Ankara 31. October 2008

Transcription

1 Delegation Bugsas Ankara 31. October 2008 Light Rail Projects Financing Financing Public Transport Infrastructure and Systems: Fundamental Approaches and International Examples of Private Financed Projects Ulrich Luedtke, LRTC GmbH Düsseldorf, October 31 st

2 Public Sector Network Infrastructure e.g. urban transport, urban utility networks, energy, telecommunications Social welfare prior to financial revenues Key features of public infrastructure projects High capital expenditure Long payback cycle & low potential profitability High uncertainties and high social, environmental, political and other risks during construction and operation Strong local monopoly of the operator 2

3 Shifting a public project into the private sector Public Implementation General problems Private Participation Potential benefits developing countries Scarce public funds Lack or delay in financing Insufficient know-how Private capital participation Mobilisation of funds Leveraging public resources advanced economies Insufficient service quality Bureaucracy and project delays, low efficiency Decreasing public funds Higher efficiency & quality Higher profitability + Innovation potential Know-how transfer Fair and open competition 3

4 Private Sector Participation (PSP) Key aspects Shift of risks & responsibilities in public sector projects to private stakeholders Sharing of Revenues: user charges and/or public subsidies Crucial criterion for PSP Involvement of private sector should bring more value for money and social benefits for end users better quality higher capacity more efficiency higher profitability 4

5 PSP Modes - Risks Transfer Service & Works Contracts No or minimum risk transfer All costs are born by public company Private partner becomes contractual payments Management & Maintenance Contracts Operation & Maintenance Concessions Build, Operate, Transfer Contracts Moderate to high volume of risk and responsibility transfer risk allocation in private sector Financing, construction and operational costs can be allocated in private sector Revenues achieved both by public subsidies and/or end-users charges Full privatisation Full risk transfer All costs are born by private company Revenues depend on user charges, no public subsidies Capital assets are owned by public company Capital assets can be owned by private sector over a long time Capital assets are owned by private company Private-Public Partnerships (PPP) zone 5

6 Public-Private Private Partnerships (PPP) Key Features well-balanced risk-sharing between public and private stakeholders on a partnership basis Key Challenge finding the right ratio low risk transfer low efficiency high risk transfer risk of project failure Value for money risk transfer/ efficiency low profitability no value for money high profitability low social acceptance profitability 6

7 PPP Structures for capital delivery projects Turn-Key Traditional Design-Bid-Build Projects are not considered as PPP DBO DBOM Design Build Operate (Maintain) years BOT BOOT Build Operate (Own) Transfer years DBFO Design Build Finance Operate years Full Project Delivery Program Management or Full Project Delivery years Finance Design Build O&M Own Transfer Project Implementation Stages 7

8 PPP Structures risks transfer Political risks Legislative risks Environmental risks Social risks Each risk is allocated by the contract partner who can manage it best These risks are traditionally retained by public sector Full Commercial risks Financing risks Revenue risks Operational risks Constructional risks DBO DBOM BOT BOOT DBFO Full Project Delivery 8

9 PPP Structures - benefits and barriers Benefits Integrated project process Improved risk management and project planning Better life cycle costs Faster project implementation Cost savings and accountability Innovation and know-how transfer Private Financing makes costly projects possible Barriers New method with little accumulated expertise Long tendering process High tendering costs 9

10 PPP Structures finding the right model Key selection criterion Lack of financing DBFO, BOOT and other structures with private capital participation Efficiency & Quality issues BOT, DBOM and other structures with integrated project development Other selection aspects Existing legal framework Existing local practice and historical background Individual client expectations Social, environmental and political issues 10

11 PPP present needs & future challenges Accumulating and Analysing Practical Expertise Working out Standardized Recommendations and Legal Framework Developing Benchmarking Techniques to Assess Added Value for Money in PPP Structures Developing Selection Criteria for the Best PPP Model in Each Case Refining Existing PPP Models and Developing New Innovative Structures 11

12 Copenhagen Mini-Metro Metro Light Metro Line (with ATO) Ørestad Development Corporation (ØDC) is owned jointly by Copenhagen Municipality and the Danish state. ØDC was enjoined with two tasks: to develop the area Ørestad and to build a Metro in Copenhagen. Total cost: 1.5 bn. Principal: - Undeveloped land was given to ØDC (ca. 5.0 x 0.6 km) - ØDC could take up loans for building the Metro - The Metro will raise value of land - ØDC should develop and sell land - Pay back loans The cost will be met by selling land (50%), operation profit from the Metro (30%), in lieu payments of real estate taxes (10 %) and direct payments from the owner not contributing land themselves (10%). It is estimated, that the Metro will be free of dept after 30 years. Operator: Ansaldo Transporti (5 Years, also delivering of vehicles) 12

13 Croydon (D)BFO Low Floor Light-Rail Line Two tender phases: Design / BFO (in fact, one consortium won the design tender, another won BFO tender) BFO-Consortium: Construction: Amey and Sir Robert McAlpine Operator: Centre West Buses Supplier: Bombardier ProRail Finance: Royal Bank of Scotland Track and rolling stock are financed through leases (sale-lease-lease back) The manufacturer (co-shareholder) has concluded a tram maintenance agreement The concession is for 99 years, but the operator (co-shareholder) can be replaced when EU legislation requires periodic tenders for operator services Concession granted by British government; Authority functions delegated to London Transport -> Reorganisation of bus services to a feeder system and fare structure comparable to the rest of London Transport network 13

14 Buenos Aires DBOM Renewal and Extension of Metro system 1991 Tender by the Argentinean State and World Bank 1993 Acceptance of bid of a consortium of majoritarian Argentinean companies Concession contract: Infrastructure remains in possession of the City of Buenos Aires Operation and maintenance are under control of the consortium Operational cost and revenue risk remain to the consortium The consortium is bound by contract to defined investments to the infrastructure during the first 5 years The investments to the infrastructure conduce to upgrade the attractiveness and will lead to an increase of revenues When exceeding a defined gain limit -> Duties to the state 14

15 Bangkok MRT BOT Heavy Metro Line (21 km) Financing: Private investors using a mixed loan configuration Operator: BTSC Bangkok Transit System Company Ltd (Private) Duration of Concession: 30 Years Start of service: 1999 Experience: The operation of Bangkok MRT is profitable. Public payments for the co-financing are not used. The benefit is too low to pay off the credits and interest payments for the mixed loans. Start-up phase with a lower ridership than forecasted absence of public authority led to a lack of integration of all public transport modes (problems with concurrency of bus operators and fare integration meanwhile reduced). 15

16 Hong Kong Metro System and Airport Express Operator: MTRC Mass Transit Railway Corp. is a joint venture with a majority of shares privately owned No direct public subsidies, but where as development rights/ land rights are granted which is a sort of indirect subsidy. Experience: Private bus operators cooperate with the metro system on the level of fare integration (Octopus Card). Modal share of public transport in Hong Kong is about 85 % of all trips resulting from a push and pull strategy (provision of an attractive, comfortable, fast and reasonable priced public transport system and a restrictive framework for car ownership). 16

17 Strasbourg Tramway DBO Low-floor tram network There is a unique institution in France: The Caisse des Dépôts providing financial and management services to French communes. The Caisse is equity investor, credit provider and transport manager (subsidiaries Transdev and Transcet). Thus many of the advantages claimed for private finance and risk sharing can be realised within an essentially public framework. Financing: 930 MF subsidies (State / Municip.) / 830 MF privat Banks Reason of high share of public subsidies: Tramway is central part of a very complex urban planning exercise (closing through traffic, enlarging pedestrian areas, P+R-facilities, bicycle-network etc.). Operator: CTS Compagnie des Transports Strasbourgeous (80 % municipality and departement, 17 % Caisse d. D. / Transcet) Rolling stock supplier: The Britisch (!) subsidiary of the then ABB (later ADtranz) 17

18 Manchester Light Rail System DB(F)O Light Rail network Implementation process in two tender phases: Phase 1: Public funding and finance associated with private concessions -> construction and commercial risk to the private only Phase 2: Private financing of 2/3 of the extension investment Concession by: ALTRAM Ltd. - John Laing (construction) - Ansaldo (vehicles) - Serco (system manager) - 3I (financial institution) Finance (2nd phase): Free use of existing network (phase 1) 32 mio Manchester / British government 10 mio ERDF (European Union) 95 mio ALTRAM ALTRAM is obliged to find an agreement with local bus operators regarding through ticketing. 18

19 Conclusions The share of private sector to public transportation projects often is quite limited because of: Projects are created on a political background Municipality often will / can not abdicate to exert influence on the project. Duration of concession is 20 to 50 years no warranty of political continuity and on the other hand stability of the consortium / operator. Light Rail and metro systems mostly are not in a monopoly position (like water or power), but in concurrency position to other transport means (mostly bus) or private cars. Public authorities are needed for regulation. Public transport often can not be performed profitably without subsidies at least to the infrastructure. 19