Experience from the INEX 5 exercise on interfaces between Accident Management and Emergency Preparedness and Response

Transcription

1 Experience from the INEX 5 exercise on interfaces between Accident Management and Emergency Preparedness and Response Olvido Guzmán OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Division of Radiological Protection & Human Aspects of Nuclear Safety Technical Meeting on the Implementation and Integration of Accident Management Guidelines and Interface with Emergency Preparedness and Response, September 2017, IAEA, Vienna

2 Overview NEA activities in EPR and INEX 5 overview Accident Management and EPR in INEX 5 On-site/off-site decision-making interfaces Use of decision-aiding tools Communication and information exchange Post-FKH actions tested in INEX 5 Capabilities assessment Protective actions Simultaneous occurrence of radiological/natural event INEX 5 International Workshop CNRA/CSNI/CRPPH: Forum on Decision Making Associated with Severe Accidents 31 May 2017

3 Decision-making during emergency: complex issue with multiple interfaces Protection decisions in emergency situations are generally not taken by RP specialists. Protection decisions are taken by stakeholders. In emergency situations the role of the RP expert is to provide protection recommendations to stakeholders who will be making decisions: Governments: off-site protective actions Emergency workers: Information and protection Licensees: on-site accident management Affected Populations: lifestyle The RP Expert makes recommendations as to how protection can be optimised, taking into account the prevailing circumstances that will or could cause exposure to ionising radiation. 3

4 The work of the CRPPH in EPR The Emergency Management Cycle Stakeholder Involvement (especially on recovery) International EPR Exercises (INEX) Extensive work after Chernobyl SAM of Workers (ISOE) Fukushima Improvement of national EM (WPNEM) Food Safety

5 INEX History & Key Topics Since 1993, the OECD-NEA develops, organises, evaluates and analyses the International Nuclear Emergency Exercise (INEX) series exercises to address best practices and identify areas for improvement in nuclear/radiological emergency management systems. 5

6 INEX 5 Concept Table-top exercise addressing EM aspects of Notification, Communication & Interfaces (NC&Is) related to Catastrophic Events involving Radiation or Radiological Materials NOT a real-time exercise, NOT intended nor designed to test any international conventions 6

7 INEX 5 Objectives Country objectives to be added Test and investigate the adequacy of national arrangements (including national coordination and communication), and where appropriate international arrangements, for NC&I and obtaining and managing international resource support to respond to a severe contamination event; Review and share information on approaches to notification & communication processes in order to identify good practice and to allow review and improvement of local, national and international arrangements; Identify key areas and approaches to international coordination and communication in order to provide a basis for improvements in international emergency management systems

8 INEX 5 Topical Areas Decision-making on notification and communication strategies, including issues in: optimisation (technical, economic and social factors) international communication and coordination Public information and communication National and international support (personnel, equipment, etc.)

9 INEX 5 Scenario Single generic scenario based on a potential radiological event that escalates to an actual radiological event that is further impacted by natural disaster requiring/involving international interfaces. FOCUS Decision making in uncertain circumstances Early availability and sharing of information Accident assessment considerations based on limited, uncertain information How to improve emergency communications How to address incoming trade Based on a large scale NPP event, exacerbated by a natural disaster and radiological release of significant levels to affect trans-boundary locations. State/National emergency response organizations make decisions and initiate actions based on minimal or non-existent technical data. Neighbouring countries, IAEA, WHO & WMO request information (countries without NPPs, to consider participating with neighboring countries w/ NPPs for receiving & requesting information) 9

10 INEX 5 Participation 22 Countries participating 2 Groups playing regionally

11 INEX 5 events timeline

12 ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND EMERGENCY PREPARDNESS AND RESPONSE IN INEX 5

13 On-site and off-site interfaces in decisionmaking process - notification Robust arrangements for notification amongst INEX 5 players: In all cases the body responsible for determining the event classification is the operator of the NPP (12/12 responses). The time for making notification is up to 1 hour as declared in the questionnaires and in all cases shall be made without delay and as soon as possible ( ASAP ). In all cases the event is primarily notified to relevant services on-site and to the relevant authorities, i.e. safety authorities and/or emergency centres.

14 On-site and off-site interfaces in decisionmaking process - notification 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% Recipients of the emergency notification in INEX 5 0% Local Agencies NPP HQ Regulators Others All players identify and establish priorities of notification according to the national procedures, policies and protocols. Next step: starting the relevant response mechanism (crisis centre, on-site/off-site plan) - 75% of responses. Consideration of protective actions at these level found in 31% of responses - 5 countries.

15 Use of decision-aiding tools 59% of players have used the decision-aiding tool for the scenario development (13 players): RODOS (5), SW ESTE (3), RASCAL (2), Usage of national based tools, both for the dose assessment, dispersion modelling and general decision aiding; ADAMO, AMS, ARMS, ARGOS, CURIE, ECOSYS, HOTSPOT, HYSPLIT, NARAC, Radiation Dose Assessment System, RIMPUFF, SW RTARC, TAMOS.

16 Communications national Within the NPP phones and satellite phones are dominant (60% and 80% respectively); Same tendency is observed for NPP & local agencies communications (both 71%); For these communications levels the Internet is not used; Other communication means: ERIX, Regetel, Tetra system, SELCA, SELFA, P2000, ASTRID, Marathon Terra On-line Communications System

17 Information Exchange platforms Most popular platforms in INEX 5: USIE, ECURIE and national solutions; Issue highlighted by INEX 5 TS in January; Key role of real time information exchange platforms in improving cross-border coordination; Slovenian MKSID and German ELAN tested and shared with neighboring countries during the regional exercise; Topical session during INEX 5 International Workshop in October.

18 Post-Fukushima Actions tested in INEX 5 18 countries have responded to the question on the post-fukushima actions. Alist of 41 actions was created. 22 of them (constituting 54% of overall number) have been fully or partially tested during INEX 5. Post Fukushima actions exercised in INEX 5 Not tested 37% No answer 10% Fully tested 39% Partially tested 15%

19 Post-Fukushima Actions tested in INEX 5 On-site arrangements: Equipment improvements, increasing the number and availability of mobile equipment; Off-site arrangements: Environmental monitoring enhanced and frequency increased; Other: HWA part 2; Emergency response management reorganization National Plans enhanced; Support emergency center.

20 Prediction of simultaneous occurrence of the radiological and natural event in national plans Before Fukushima accident After Fukushima accident (as of July 2017) 18% YES YES 82% NO 38% NO 63%

21 Capabilities assessment in INEX 5 Challenges for small non nuclear countries!!!! Radiation measurement equipment Environmental monitoring Water and food testing The manpower for coping with large-scale crisis Number of personnel Qualified experts

22 Decision-making under uncertain or unknow circumstances For 76% of countries this kind of situation is foreseen in the EP&R. For 87% of these countries, it is a pre-established approach. Judgment factors considered to evaluate the situation 100% 80% 92.9% 85.7% 85.7% 60% 57% 40% 20% 0% Core Melt Risk Containment integrity Wind direction Other Other: local context as population situation, local situation, weather conditions, day or night, means available, dose rates, Weather prognosis reliability, available capabilities to implement protective actions

23 Cross-border coordination Two cases where alignment of recommendations was exercised but with very different results: Case A In the early phase of a nuclear accident the Dutch authorities in principle will adopt measures decided by the accident country. EPZ flexibility to align is a key factor. Case B Alignment of Croatia with the decision by Slovenia to sheltering under EPZ. But EPZ are different: sheltering in 10 km Croatia: sheltering in 25 km

24 Cross-border coordination The HERCA-WENRA Approach Source: HERCA Sheltering & ITB preparation Source: INEX 5 Slovenia presentation Topical session during INEX 5 International Workshop

25 INEX 5 International Workshop October 2017 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 46, quai Alphonse le Gallo, 92100, Boulogne Billancourt, France

26 Objectives To allow participating countries to identify elements for improving their arrangements for notification, communication and interfaces related to catastrophic events involving radiation or radiological materials; and To exchange experience with other countries that have conducted and evaluated an INEX 5 exercise and other relevant international actors.

27 Programme outline Workshop opening Summary of the INEX 5 evaluation analysis Session 1: Communication and information sharing with other countries and international partners. Focus on real-time communication platforms Session 2: Cross-border and international coordination of protective measures Session 3: Long-term aspects: how to integrate them in exercises Session 4: Connection to the work of other international organisations, platforms, networks Session 5: Key issues in international coordination and communications, and ways forward Workshop Closing

28 Programme committee ZAEHRINGER Matthias (BfS, Germany, WPNEM Chair) MILLIGAN Patricia (NRC, United States, WPNEM Vice-Chair) DE CAIR Sara (EPA, United States, WPNEM Vice Chair) DODEMAN Jean-Francois (ASN, France) DURANOVA Tatiana (VUJE, Slovakia) ROTHER Wolfram (BMUB, Germany) SMITH Veronica (EPA, Ireland) CLOS Adeline (ASN, France) NEA Secretariat SIRC Igor (SNSA, Slovenia) GUZMAN Olvido GALLAY Florence (ASN, France) GUIDO Chiara GERING Florian (BfS, Germany) KOPEC Emilia

29 Registration Registration is now OPEN No registration fee, but pre-registration is required Participation limited to approximately 100 people Page of the workshop :

30 CNRA/CSNI/CRPPH: Forum on Decision Making Associated with Severe Accidents - 31 May 2017 Effective decision making for severe accidents, both in pre-accident planning and in post-accident response, requires collaboration between a variety of different organisations, including plant operators, regulators, technical support organisations, emergency response organisations and stakeholders. Different speakers with different backgrounds and experience provided presentations on their perspectives. Their presentations and the plenary discussion following the break-out discussions gave the participants an overview of some challenges and cross-cutting issues to ensure the decision making process integrates technical information, stakeholder concerns (local, national and international), regulatory viewpoints and governmental responsibilities. Follow-up planned!

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