Manulife Global Bond Fund 7 Fund Information (29 Sep 2017) (Sep 2017) Unit NAV RM

Transcription

1 Page 1 of 5 MANULIFE INVESTMENT FUNDS MANULIFE INVESTMENT FUNDS Manulife Global Bond Fund 7 Fund Information (29 Sep 2017) (Sep 2017) Unit NAV RM Fund Size RM 5.58 million Investment Objective Units in circulation 5.70 million The Manulife Global Bond Fund 7 is a tranche of the Manulife Global Bond Fund Series; which invests fully in Singapore Dollar denominated underlying Fund namely the Franklin Templeton Investment Funds Templeton Global Bond Fund A (Mdis) SGD-H1 (the Underlying Fund ). The Underlying Fund aims to maximise total investment returns consisting of a combination of interest income, capital appreciation and currency gains by investing principally in a portfolio of fixed or floating rate debt securities and debt obligations issued by government or government-related issuer worldwide. Investment Strategy Launch Date 27 January 2014 Financial Year End December 31 Management Fee 1.00%p.a. Dealing Daily Top Five Holdings of the Underlying Fund Korea Treasury Bond, senior note, 2.00%, 3/10/21 Government of Mexico, senior note, M, 5.00%, 12/11/19 Nota Do Tesouro Nacional, 10.00%, 1/01/23 Government of Indonesia, senior bond, FR56, 8.375%, 9/15/26 Letra Tesouro Nacional, Strip, 1/01/ % 3.74% 3.05% 2.28% 2.24% The Underlying Fund seeks to achieve its objective by investing principally in a portfolio of fixed or floating-rate debt securities (including noninvestment grade securities) and debt obligations issued by government or government-related issuers worldwide. The Underlying Fund may also, in accordance with the investment restrictions, invest in debt securities (including noninvestment grade securities) of corporate issuers. The Underlying Fund may also purchase debt obligations issued by supranational entities organized or supported by several national governments, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or the European Investment Bank. The Underlying Fund may also utilise financial derivative instruments for investment purposes. These financial derivative instruments may be dealt on either regulated markets or over-the-counter, and may include, inter alia, swaps (such as credit default swaps or total return swaps), forwards and cross forwards, futures contracts (including those on government securities), as well as options. Use of financial derivative instruments may result in negative exposures in a specific yield curve/duration, currency or credit. The Underlying Fund may also invest in securities or structured products where the security is linked to or derives its value from another security or is linked to assets or currencies of any country. The Underlying Fund may hold up to 10% of its net assets in securities in default. The Underlying Fund may purchase fixed income securities and debt obligations denominated in any currency, and may hold equity securities to the extent that such securities result from the conversion or exchange of a preferred stock or debt obligation. Fund Performance Since Launch (27 January 2014 to 29 September 2017) 40.0% 35.0% 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% 5.0% Jan 14 Aug 14 Mar 15 Oct 15 May 16 Dec 16 Jul 17 MGBF7 Benchmark Highest and Lowest Unit Price Since Launch Unit Price (RM) Date Highest Lowest Apr Feb-16 Performance Table Performance 1 Month 6 Months YTD 1 Year 3 Years Since Inception Manulife Global Bond Fund 7 JP Morgan Global Government Bond Index* 0.13% -2.26% -1.90% 3.57% -0.50% -0.43% 14.24% -0.96% 19.55% 33.45% 23.80% 30.83% Note: Fund's performance is calculated on NAV to NAV. This is strictly the performance of the investment fund, and not to be treated as the gross premium/contribution of the investment-linked product. The above returns are net of fund management charges and taxes. Past performance is not indicative of future rerults. The benchmark is in MYR terms. *Source : Morningstar

2 Market Review # The US Federal Reserve (Fed) kept rates unchanged (range of 1.00% to 1.25%) during the quarter, while remaining on track for a rate hike in December and announcing its intentions to begin unwinding its balance sheet in October. Fed Chair Janet Yellen commented on the strength of the US economy and household spending, while indicating that the committee expects inflation to stabilise around its 2% target over the medium term. The comments appeared a bit more hawkish than markets had been expecting, as Yellen emphasised the need to normalise policy while indicating that recently subdued inflation was not as much of a concern. Overall, we expect US Treasury yields to continue rising as the Fed unwinds its balance sheet and tightens policy, while inflation pressures build on exceptional strength in the US labour market. A number of currencies strengthened against the US dollar during the third quarter, notably the Brazilian real, Colombian peso, euro and Australian dollar. However, the US dollar broadly strengthened agains a number of global currencies during September, reversing the weakening trend that had persisted throughout much of Europe largely remained in a state of optimism during the quarter, driven by the cyclical upswing in eurozone growth as well as recent political refortifying since French President Emmanuel Macron s victory in May. However, Angela Merkel s win in the German election in September came with new uncertainties around forming a coalition with the FDP (Free Democrats) and the Greens, and dissolving the grand coalition between her centre-right CDU (Christian Democratic Union) party and the SPD (Social Democrats). Overall, we continue to see ongoing risks to the political cohesion across Europe as populist movements continue to influence the political discourse. The euro continues to be vulnerable to unresolved structural and political risks across Europe, in our view. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) and European Central Bank (ECB) continued with their quantitative easing (QE) programmes during the quarter as short-term yields in Japan and the eurozone remained negative. We expect the euro and Japanese yen to weaken on widening rate differentials with the US. Rising US Treasury yields should produce a more effective environment for the BOJ to actively deploy additional monetary accommodation that weakens the yen. In Europe, we expect the ECB to continue with monetary accommodation through 2017, as it has indicated. ECB President Mario Draghi has indicated the ECB will announce a new schedule for additional QE tapering in October. Nonetheless, Draghi continued to indicate that overall monetary accommodation is still needed for the near term, with eventual policy normalising still several quarters away. Across emerging markets, rate environments were generally idiosyncratic, as Indonesia and Brazil saw declining yields in the 10-year range of their yield curves, while India, Colombia and Mexico saw a modest rise. Overall, we continue to see a number of local-currency markets that we believe are undervalued, particularly in places like India, Indonesia, Mexico and Colombia. We also see attractive riskadjusted yields in places like Brazil and Argentina. On the whole, we continue to expect select currencies to appreciate over the medium term, particularly in countries with economic resilience and relatively higher, maintainable rate differentials. Market Overview # We expect US Treasury yields to rise and recent US-dollar weakness to reverse as the Fed moves towards tightening policy while US inflation pressures pick up. We also expect the Fed s balance sheet unwinding to put upward pressure on yields. Several major buyers of US Treasuries have pulled back from the US Treasury market in recent years, including foreign governments and central banks in Asia, notably the People s Bank of China. Major oil producing countries have also pulled back, becoming net borrowers instead of net lenders as they were when oil prices were above US$100 per barrel. The Fed will now be added to that list of diminishing demand, as it unwinds its US Treasury positions at a pace of US$6 billion per month, raising that pace by US$6 billion every three months until reaching a pace of US$30 billion per month. It will also unwind its mortgage-backed security purchases at a pace of US$4 billion per month, increasing that pace by US$4 billion every three months until reaching a pace of US$20 billion per month. Recent indications from the Fed project a rate hike in December, three rate hikes in 2018 and a trend towards a policy rate of 2.75% in The Fed will be the first central bank to unwind QE, likely followed by the ECB at a later stage. This unprecedented balance sheet unwinding could theoretically go smoothly with few disruptions, but in practicality we think that is unlikely. Uncertainties in the markets would likely put further pressure on bond valuations, in our view. On the whole, we continue to expect inflation pressures to rise with resilience in the US economy and exceptionally strong US labour markets. We have seen wage pressures pick up in specific pockets of the economy, and we expect those pressures to accelerate. Policy constraints on immigration have also been pressuring wages in various labour sectors. Additionally, financial sector deregulation has the potential to accelerate credit activity, stimulate investment and accelerate the velocity of money, which would further drive inflation. Fiscal expansion could similarly add to inflation dynamics. A number of potential Trump administration policies may fuel growth and add to existing inflation pressures, in our view. Even though there have been some high-profile setbacks on health care and tax reform, the administration has been pushing ahead with financial deregulation. Lending activity has picked up as banks have drawn down reserves and second tier lending has risen. These activities can fuel the economy and boost inflation, but also can accelerate the pace at which we eventually get to an overheated economy and ultimately to a contraction. The US economy has been growing above potential in an environment of full employment for several quarters additional stimulus at this late stage of the current expansion raises the potential for overcapacities. In the major developed economies, we anticipate continued monetary accommodation and low rates in Japan and the eurozone while rates rise in the US those increasing rate differentials should depreciate the yen and euro against the US dollar, in our opinion. Japan now has its monetary policies in a good place to essentially allow the Fed to do the work of depreciating the yen for them. During much of 2016, no matter what the BOJ did, the Fed s actions (or lack of action) determined the rate differentials and the currency valuations. When the Fed lowered expectations for rate hikes in March 2016, that move essentially washed out the effectiveness of any easing policies from the BOJ. The same can now be true in the reverse the BOJ does not have to change anything in its current policy stance to get the depreciation it seeks if the Fed now resumes raising rates at a more meaningful pace. Additionally, the BOJ is nowhere close to a stage where it can taper its QE programme, as the country continues to battle deflation. Thus ongoing QE is expected for quite some time. Despite the eurozone being in a cyclical upswing, we continue to have a negative view on the euro not only because of ongoing monetary accommodation, but also because of populist risks. ECB President Mario Draghi has indicated a desire to eventually normalise rates but has also recently said that the eurozone continues to need monetary accommodation. Optimism for the eurozone appeared to be at a peak during the summer that belied the unresolved structural and political risks within the union, in our view. However, the euro notably weakened after the 24 September German elections, as Angela Merkel s win came with new uncertainties. A number of investors seemed to conclude during the summer months that Emmanuel Macron s victory over Marine Le Pen in the French presidential election meant we no longer needed to be concerned for populist risks in the eurozone. But overall, the eurozone at large is still vulnerable to an exogenous shock, in our view. Eurosceptic movements are likely to be an ongoing issue in Europe until the underlying causes are mitigated. Unfortunately, the factors that have generated populism (i.e., immigration issues, the refugee crisis and terrorism) and given rise to candidates such as Le Pen in France and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands do not show signs of diminishing, in our opinion. We have recently focused on countries that are less externally vulnerable and more domestically driven, and that have demonstrated their resilience to potential increases in trade costs. Select emerging markets that have higher rate environments and domestically oriented economies are likely to fare better in a rising-rate environment than countries with low yields and more externally driven economies, in our view. In Asia, we currently prefer countries with strong domestic drivers that are less leveraged to China, such as India and Indonesia, while we have moved away from economies that are more externally dependent, such as Malaysia. In Latin America, we are focused on countries that have turned away from previous failed experiments with populism, such as Brazil and Argentina, and are now moving towards more orthodox policies with credible monetary policy, proactive business environments and outward-looking trade. We also see attractive valuations in countries like Mexico and Colombia that have maintained sound policy discipline while broadening their economies beyond commodities. China s economy remains in a soft landing, but ongoing rebalancing is needed for the long term. The near-term picture looks fairly stable, in our assessment, but we have concerns for two or three years down the road as China s pace of growth now depends on almost five times as much credit to generate one unit of GDP as it took in the surge of post-global financial crisis growth, starting in The Chinese authorities appear aware of this, but it remains to be seen if they can effectively manage a slowdown in credit. We have seen a number of policies wind down, but we do not expect a hard landing at this point. However, if China has not reduced its credit dependence in a couple years and we get an exogenous shock, such as a recession in the US, then China s ability to intervene to stimulate its economy will be substantially less effective than it was during the last US recession. These risks warrant ongoing monitoring, but the near-term picture appears to support a continued moderation in growth and not a hard landing. Our philosophy is grounded in a focus on long-term fundamentals and patience. We believe that while markets can deviate from fundamentals in the shorter term, they tend to reflect them over the medium to long term. Thus we seek to identify and exploit the imbalances we see in the market and position for the directional trends we see going forward, ahead of inflection points. Our oftentimes contrarian viewpoint also allows us to find potential investment opportunities particularly during periods of volatility and panic, where we can exploit market mispricing. # Underlying Fund Disclaimer: This report is prepared for information purposes only and Manulife Insurance Berhad ( Manulife ) does not guarantee its accuracy, completeness, correctness or timeliness for any particular purpose. Manulife reserves the right to change any information without giving any notice. The performance of the fund is not guaranteed and the value of investment and their derived income may increase or decrease. Past performance is not a guide to future performance. In the event of exceptional circumstances, such as high volume of sale of investment within a short period of time, the Company reserves the right to defer or suspend issuance or redemption of units. The fund manager is Manulife Asset Management Services Berhad. Page 2 of 5

3 Investment in the fund is subject to certain risks, including but not limited to: Investment Counterparty Credit Credit-linked Securities Defaulted Debt Securities Derivative Emerging Markets When over-the counter ( OTC ) or other bilateral contracts are entered into, the Underlying Fund may find itself exposed to risks arising from the solvency of its counterparties and from their ability to respect the conditions of these contracts. Credit risk, a fundamental risk relating to all fixed income securities as well as money market instruments, is the chance that an issuer will fail to make principal and interest payments when due. Issuers with higher credit risk typically offer higher yields for this added risk. Conversely, issuers with lower credit risk typically offer lower yields. The Underlying Fund bears the risk of loss of its principal investment, and the periodic interest payments expected to be received for the duration of its investment in the credit-linked security, in the event that one or more of the debt obligations underlying the credit default swaps go into default or otherwise become non-performing. In addition, the Underlying Fund bears the risk that the issuer of the credit-linked security will default or become bankrupt. In such an event, the Underlying Fund may have difficulty being repaid, or fail to be repaid, the principal amount of its investment and the remaining periodic interest payments thereon. Besides, the market for credit-linked securities may suddenly become illiquid which may result in significant, rapid and unpredictable changes in the prices for those securities. In certain cases, a market price for a credit-linked security may not be available or may not be reliable, and the Underlying Fund could experience difficulty in selling such security at a price the Investment Manager believes is fair. The Underlying Fund may invest in debt securities on which the issuer is not currently making interest payments (defaulted debt securities). These securities may become illiquid and the risk of loss due to default may also be considerably greater with lower-quality securities because they are generally unsecured and are often subordinated to other creditors of the issuer. Defaulted securities tend to lose much of their value before they default. Thus, the Underlying Fund's net asset value per Share may be adversely affected before an issuer defaults. In addition, the Underlying Fund may incur additional expenses if it must try to recover principal or interest payments on a defaulted security. For the purpose of efficient portfolio management, the Underlying Fund may, within the context of each Fund's overall investment policy, and within the limits set forth in the investment restrictions applicable to the Underlying Fund, engage in certain transactions involving the use of derivative instruments. The use of derivative instruments and hedging transactions may or may not achieve its intended objective and involves special risks. Performance and value of derivative instruments depend, at least in part, on the performance or value of the underlying asset. Derivative instruments involve cost, may be volatile, and may involve a small investment relative to the risk assumed (leverage effect). Their successful use may depend on the Investment Manager s ability to predict market movements. s include delivery failure, default by other party or the inability to close out a position because the trading market becomes illiquid. Some derivative instruments are particularly sensitive to changes in interest rates. The risk of loss to a Fund for a swap transaction on a net basis depends on which party is obliged to pay the net amount to the other party. If the counterparty is obliged to pay the net amount to the Fund, the risk of loss to the Fund is the loss of the entire amount that the Fund is entitled to receive; if the Fund is obliged to pay the net amount, the Fund s risk of loss is limited to the net amount due. OTC derivative instruments involve a higher degree of risk as OTC markets are less liquid and regulated. The global exposure of the Underlying Fund to financial derivative instruments shall not exceed its total net assets value and as a result the total risk exposure of the Underlying Fund shall not exceed 200% of its net assets value on a permanent basis. All Underlying Fund investments in the securities issued by corporations, governments, and public-law entities in different nations and denominated in different currencies involve certain risks. These risks are typically increased in developing countries and Emerging Markets. Such risks, which can have adverse effects on portfolio holdings, may include: (i) investment and repatriation restrictions; (ii) currency fluctuations; (iii) the potential for unusual market volatility as compared to more industrialised nations; (iv) government involvement in the private sector; (v) limited investor information and less stringent investor disclosure requirements; (vi) shallow and substantially smaller liquid securities markets than in more industrialised countries, which means the Underlying Fund may at times be unable to sell certain securities at desirable prices; (vii) certain local tax law considerations; (viii) limited regulation of the securities markets; (ix) international and regional political and economic developments; (x) possible imposition of exchange controls or other local governmental laws or restrictions; (xi) the increased risk of adverse effects from deflation and inflation; (xii) the possibility of limited legal recourse for the Underlying Fund; and (xiii) the custodial and/or the settlement systems may not be fully developed. Investors in Underlying Funds investing in Emerging Markets should in particular be informed that the liquidity of securities issued by corporations and publiclaw entities in Emerging Markets may be substantially smaller than with comparable securities in industrialised countries. Foreign Currency Since the securities held by the Underlying Fund may be denominated in currencies different from its reference or base currency (USD), the Underlying Fund may be affected favourably or unfavourably by exchange control regulations or changes in the exchange rates between such reference currency and other currencies. If the currency in which a security is denominated appreciates against the base currency, the price of the security could increase. Conversely, a decline in the exchange rate of the currency would adversely affect the price of the security. To the extent that the Underlying Fund seeks to use any strategies or instruments to hedge or to protect against currency exchange risk, there is no guarantee that hedging or protection will be achieved. If currency management strategies are used, it may substantially change the Underlying Fund's exposure to currency exchange rates and could result in losses to the Underlying Fund if the currencies do not perform as the Investment Manager expects. Page 3 of 5

4 Investment in the fund is subject to certain risks, including but not limited to: Investment Interest Rate Securities Liquidity Market Class Hedging Eurozone Low-Rated or Non- Investment Grade Securities risk Sovereign Debt Structured Notes Swap Agreements Distribution As the Underlying Fund invests in debt securities or money market instruments it is subject to interest rate risk. A fixed income security s value will generally increase in value when interest rates fall and decrease in value when interest rates rise. Interest rate risk is the chance that such movements in interest rates will negatively affect a security s value or, in the Underlying Fund s case, its net asset value. Reduced liquidity may have an adverse impact on market price and the Underlying Fund s ability to sell particular securities when necessary to meet the Underlying Fund s liquidity needs or in response to a specific economic event such as the deterioration in the creditworthiness of an issuer. This is a general risk which affects all types of investment. Price trends are determined mainly by financial market trends and by the economic development of the issuers, who are themselves affected by the overall situation of the global economy and by the economic and political conditions prevailing in each country. Because the securities that the Underlying Fund holds fluctuate in price, the value of the Fund s investment in the Underlying Fund will go up and down. The Fund may not get back the amount that the Fund invested in the Underlying Fund. The Underlying Fund Manager may engage in currency hedging transactions with regard to a certain Share Class (the Hedged Share Class ). Hedged Share Classes are designed i) to reduce exchange rate fluctuations between the currency of the Hedged Share Class and the base currency of the Underlying Fund or ii) to reduce the exchange rate fluctuations between the currency of the Hedged Share Class and other material currencies within the Underlying Fund s portfolio. The Underlying Fund may invest in the Eurozone. Mounting sovereign debt burdens and slowing economic growth among European countries, combined with uncertainties in European financial markets, including feared or actual failures in the banking system and the possible break-up of the Eurozone and Euro currency, may adversely affect interest rates and the prices of both fixed income and equity securities across Europe and potentially other markets as well. The performance and value of the Underlying Fund may be adversely affected should there be any adverse credit events (e.g. downgrade of the sovereign credit rating or default or bankruptcy of any European countries) The Underlying Fund may invest in higher-yielding securities rated lower than investment grade. Accordingly, an investment in the Underlying Fund is accompanied by higher degree or credit risk. Below investment-grade securities such as, for example, high-yield debt securities, may be considered a high-risk strategy and can include securities that are unrated and/or in default. Lower-quality, higher yielding securities may also experience greater price volatility when compared to higher quality, lower yielding securities. Investment in Sovereign Debts issued or guaranteed by governments or their agencies and instrumentalities ( governmental entities ) involves a high degree of risk. The governmental entity that controls the repayment of Sovereign Debt may not be able or willing to repay the principal and/or interest when due in accordance with the terms of such debt due to specific factors, including, but not limited to (i) their foreign reserves, (ii) the available amount of their foreign exchange as at the date of repayment, (iii) their failure to implement political reforms, and (iv) their policy relating to the International Monetary Fund. Sovereign Debt holders may also be affected by additional constraints relating to sovereign issuers which may include: (i) the unilateral rescheduling of such debt by the issuer and (ii) the limited legal recourses available against the issuer (in case of failure of delay in repayment). The Underlying Fund may invest in Sovereign Debt issued by governments or government-related entities from countries referred to as Emerging Markets or Frontier Markets, which bear additional risks compared to more developed markets due to such factors as greater political and economic uncertainties, currency fluctuations, repatriation restrictions or capital controls, etc.). Structured notes such as credit linked notes, equity linked notes and similar notes involve a counterparty structuring a note whose value is intended to move in line with the underlying security specified in the note. Unlike financial derivative instruments, cash is transferred from the buyer to the seller of the note. Investment in these instruments may cause a loss if the value of the underlying security decreases. There is also a risk that the note issuer will default. Additional risks result from the fact that the documentation of such notes programmes tends to be highly customised. The liquidity of a structured note can be less than that for the underlying security, a regular bond or debt instrument and this may adversely affect either the ability to sell the position or the price at which such a sale is transacted. The Underlying Fund may enter into interest rate, index and currency exchange rate swap agreements for the purposes of attempting to obtain a particular desired return at a lower cost to the Underlying Fund than if the Underlying Fund had invested directly in an instrument that yielded that desired return. Whether the Underlying Fund s use of swap agreements will be successful in furthering its investment objective will depend on the ability of the Investment Managers to correctly predict whether certain types of investments are likely to produce greater returns than other investments. Because they are two party contracts and because they may have terms of greater than seven (7) calendar days, swap agreements may be considered to be illiquid. Moreover, the Underlying Fund bears the risk of loss of the amount expected to be received under a swap agreement in the event of the default or bankruptcy of a swap agreement counterparty. The Fund intends to make distributions on a quarterly basis during the first 5 years from the policy date and annually thereafter until the maturity of the Policy. The Fund has the absolute discretion to determine whether a distribution is to be made. The Fund also reserves the right to review and make changes to the distribution policy from time to time. The ability of the Fund to make periodic income distribution is depending on income payouts by the Underlying Fund. The income distributions made by the Fund may not be in congruent with income payout received from the Underlying Fund due to factors such as expenses, taxes etc. Please note that the Manager of the Underlying Fund has the discretion to make distributions out of capital in the event the income generated by the Underlying Fund is insufficient. Please note that the above is a summary of the investment risks, please refer to policy contract for full details. Page 4 of 5

5 Management on the usage of derivative instruments Franklin Templeton s philosophy on risk management is to ensure risks are: Recognized: The firm seeks to identify and understand risk at the security, portfolio, and operational level. Rational: The firm strives to ensure that risks are intended and a rational part of each portfolio s strategy. Rewarded: The firm applies its best effort to verify that risks assumed provide the potential to commensurate long-term reward. Franklin Templeton s approach is to use a dedicated team of risk management specialists who are independent of the portfolio managers and provide robust analytics and unbiased insight. These specialists are locally positioned in the primary investment management offices, to work consultatively with portfolio teams around the globe. Franklin Templeton has developed a rigorous structure to provide this independent oversight. Senior risk management specialists participate on various committees, dealing with such issues as counterparty risk, pricing and liquidity risk, the use of complex securities or investment techniques, and the vetting of new products. Supporting these efforts are centrally supported platforms for data analytics and modeling, portfolio compliance, and trade monitoring and execution. Disclaimer: This report is prepared for information purposes only and Manulife Insurance Berhad ( Manulife ) does not guarantee its accuracy, completeness, correctness or timeliness for any particular purpose. Manulife reserves the right to change any information without giving any notice. The performance of the fund is not guaranteed and the value of investment and their derived income may increase or decrease. Past performance is not a guide to future performance. In the event of exceptional circumstances, such as high volume of sale of investment within a short period of time, the Company reserves the right to defer or suspend issuance or redemption of units. The fund manager is Manulife Asset Management Services Berhad. Page 5 of 5