The future of Cotai; non-gaming growth potential; MPEL up to Buy

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1 Equity Research The future of Cotai; non-gaming growth potential; MPEL up to Buy Raise 2012 GGR growth to 22% on money velocity stabilization Macau s VIP GGR growth has decelerated to 23% in 1Q12 (3Q11: 52%), driven by slower money velocity amid weaker economic conditions. Recent macro data are mixed with China PMI improving on better US job market but China property prices, as a proxy of wealth creation, are still on a downtrend although at a moderate pace. Barring further macro deterioration, we believe a stabilization in money velocity, additional cage capital to be deployed at Sands Cotai Central (SCC) for April 11 opening and a pickup in visitations would support GGR growth in We raise our 2012E GGR growth forecast to 22% from 12% (19% VIP, 31% mass-market). Should money velocity recover to the 2Q11 level, our analysis implies 33% 2012E GGR growth and 12% upside to our EBITDA forecasts for Macau operators. The stocks appear to have priced in 10%-20% yoy GGR growth in 2012, in our view. Formation of new cluster in Cotai; Strong non-gaming growth The market share trend after Galaxy Macau (GM) s opening confirms the formation of a new cluster in Cotai, where the existing casinos did not lose any share. With SCC doubling the number of hotel rooms, outstripping 21% table additions in Cotai till 2013, we expect improving table efficiency and forecast 48%/26% GGR growth in Cotai in 2012E/13E, vs. 10%/10% in Peninsula. We think both GM and COD, especially the latter for its proximity, should benefit from the spillover effect from SCC s phased opening over the next 1-2 years. On the other hand, we expect SJM and Wynn Macau to lose the most market share. The acceleration of nongaming revenue growth coincided with a pickup in visitation in 2Q11. We see significant growth potential in retail and forecast 25% E retail sales CAGR in Macau, which we believe will benefit Sands China as it is best positioned and support 40% net rental yield on costs for SCC. Maintain Buy(CL) on Sands; MPEL up to Buy; SJM down to Neutral Despite potential near-term profit taking, we reiterate Buy on Sands China (on CL) for its Cotai, mass-market and non-gaming exposure. Upgrade MPEL to Buy from Neutral, which we expect will benefit from SCC s opening along with the stock s undemanding valuation. We downgrade SJM to Neutral from Buy on further market share loss in coming quarters due to the opening of SCC. For Macau gaming stocks under coverage, we revise 2012E-2014E EPS by 2%-95% and 12-m TPs by 1%-35%. SUMMARY OF RATING AND TARGET PRICE CHANGES Price Rating 12-mo TP (LCY) TP Stock 10-Apr New Old New Old +/- % Sands China Buy* Buy* % Galaxy Buy Buy % Melco Crown - ADR Buy Neutral % Melco Crown - HK Buy Neutral % SJM Neutral Buy % Melco Int'l 7.41 Neutral Neutral % MGM China Neutral Neutral % Wynn Macau Sell Sell % * On Conviction List Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Research estimates. VIP GGR SENSITIVITY TO MONEY VELOCITY AND AMOUNT OF CAPITAL RAISED 2012E VIP GGR New cage capital raised (MOP mn) YoY% (10,000) 0 10,000 20,000 30, % 5% 3% 11% 20% 6.5 7% 2% 11% 21% 30% Money 7.5 1% 9% 19% 29% 39% velocity 8.0 2% 12% 23% 33% 44% 9.0 7% 18% 30% 41% 52% Source: Goldman Sachs Research estimates. TOTAL GGR MARKET SHARE BREAKDOWN E 2013E Peninsula 68% 61% 58% Sands Macao 5% 4% 4% SJM - Grand Lisboa 9% 8% 8% SJM - Other casinos 20% 17% 15% StarWorld 9% 8% 7% CityClubs 1% 1% 1% Wynn + Encore 14% 13% 13% MGM 11% 10% 9% Cotai 26% 35% 38% Venetian 9% 8% 7% Plaza 2% 4% 4% Sands Cotai Central 0% 5% 9% COD 9% 9% 9% Galaxy Macau 6% 9% 9% Taipa 5% 4% 4% Altira + Mocha slots 5% 4% 4% Simon Cheung, CFA Goldman Sachs does and seeks to do business with simon.cheung@gs.com Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C. Janet Lu janet.lu@gs.com Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C. companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. For Reg AC certification and other important disclosures, see the Disclosure Appendix, or go to Analysts employed by non- US affiliates are not registered/qualified as research analysts with FINRA in the U.S. The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Investment Research

2 Table of Contents Stock implications 3 Stabilization of VIP gaming revenue growth 4 (1) VIP: Two factors at work money velocity and cage capital 4 (2) Mass-market supported by opening of new casinos 7 (3) Raise our GGR growth forecast to 22% yoy in Future of Cotai; Long-term potential in the non-gaming businesses 13 (1) Spillover effect to benefit existing casinos in Cotai 13 (2) Long-term growth potential from non-gaming segment 19 (3) Approval of Cotai projects 22 We forecast 22% GGR and EBITDA growth in 2012E 24 Sands China (1928.HK, CL-Buy): Best positioned to Cotai theme 30 Melco Crown (MPEL, Buy): Benefit of spillover effect from SCC 32 SJM (0880.HK, Neutral): Market share loss may accelerate again 34 Disclosure Appendix 37 Prices in the body of this report are based on the market close of April 10, 2012 unless stated otherwise. Macau gaming valuation comps Ticker CCY Rating 10-Apr Target price Price on 12-mo Market cap EV/EBITDA (x) 11-13E FCF yield (%) 11-13E P/E (x) ^ 11-13E (US$mn) FY11 FY12E FY13E EBITDA CAGR FY11 FY12E FY13E FCF CAGR FY11 FY12E FY13E EPS CAGR Macau Gaming Operators Sands China 1928.HK HKD Buy* , % n.m % Galaxy Entertainment 0027.HK HKD Buy , % n.a n.a % Melco Crown - ADR MPEL USD Buy , % % % Melco Crown - HK shares 6883.HK HKD Buy , % % % SJM Holdings 0880.HK HKD Neutral , % % % MGM China 2282.HK HKD Neutral , % % % Wynn Macau 1128.HK HKD Sell , % % % Market cap weighted average % % % US Gaming operators Las Vegas Sands LVS USD Buy , % % % MGM Resorts MGM USD Neutral , % % n.a n.a n.a n.m. Wynn Resorts WYNN USD Neutral , % % % Market cap weighted average % % % Other Gaming Operators Genting GENT.KL MYR Buy , % (1.6) n.m % Genting Singapore Plc GENS.SI SGD Buy , % n.m % Genting Malaysia Berhad GENM.KL MYR Neutral , % % % Market cap weighted average % % % * On the Conviction List. ^ EPS has been adjusted for gaming license amortization for Macau gaming operators. For important disclosures, please go to Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 2

3 Stock implications We reiterate our Buy rating on Sands China (on Conviction List) for its Cotai exposure (where we expect it to generate 80% of revenue and 83% of EBITDA in 2012E) and strong positioning in both the mass-market and non-gaming segments. We expect SCC to underpin the market share growth to 24% by 2014E for the group (vs. 18% ytd) and 35% EBITDA CAGR in E. The stock s valuation does not look as compelling as before, but in absence of a new casino opening until 2016 at the earliest, we believe Sands China is well positioned to sustain above-industry GGR and FCF growth in the medium term. We upgrade MPEL to Buy from Neutral. The opening of Galaxy Macau has proven to have little impact on COD s market share in For its proximity to SCC, we expect COD to benefit from the spillover effect and see further improvement in its mass-market table efficiency in coming quarters. Macau Studio City, if approved, could offer additional upside, which is now accounted for at invested cost in our model. Valuation looks attractive at 9.1X 2012E EV/EBITDA and 8.2% FCF yield. We downgrade SJM to Neutral from Buy. Recent signs of market share stabilization have supported 32% share price recovery for SJM in the past three months. However, the experience with Galaxy Macau s opening in 2011 suggests that SJM s market share loss may start to accelerate again in the coming quarters, which is likely to continue into Having converted a few hotel floors into gaming areas in the past 1-2 years, SJM may start to face capacity constraint at Grand Lisboa, which has been SJM s key earnings growth driver. On a positive note, the stock s valuation does not look demanding, trading at 9.7X 2012E EV/EBITDA and 14.9X P/E. We maintain our Buy rating on Galaxy. Galaxy may be more vulnerable to new competition from SCC in the initial months after SCC s opening given their similar market positioning, both targeting the low to mid-end of the mass market segment. We still see room for the company to drive further table efficiency in the medium term, benefiting from the spillover effect from SCC in Cotai. The stock is among the most inexpensive in our coverage universe, trading at 9.5X EV/EBITDA, 12.2X P/E and 6.8% FCF yield in 2012E. We maintain our Neutral rating for MGM China and Sell rating for Wynn Macau. Both companies do not have any presence in Cotai yet and will continue to lose market share in medium term, in our view. Between the two, we prefer MGM China for its less demanding valuation and potential capacity increase upon the completion of VIP rooms on the second floor by the year-end. Exhibit 1: Rating and 12-month target price changes Source: Datastream, Goldman Sachs Research estimates. Ratings Target prices Share price (Apr 10) Potential upside / downside Company Ticker CCY New Old New Old %chg Sands China 1928.HK HKD Buy* Buy* % % Galaxy 0027.HK HKD Buy Buy % % Melco Crown - ADR MPEL USD Buy Neutral % % Melco Crown - HK shares 6883.HK HKD Buy Neutral % % SJM 0880.HK HKD Neutral Buy % % Melco Int'l 0200.HK HKD Neutral Neutral % % MGM China 2282.HK HKD Neutral Neutral % % Wynn Macau 1128.HK HKD Sell Sell % % *On Conviction List Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 3

4 Stabilization of VIP gaming revenue growth (1) VIP: Two factors at work money velocity and cage capital In our sector report Boom or bust? Stocks price in flat 2012 GGR; initiate on MGM China dated October 7, 2011, we noted that the weakening of property market and trade activities in China in the second-half of last year may signal a slowdown in the pace of wealth creation by the mainland Chinese, which may present near-term risk on gaming demand and hence money velocity in Macau s VIP market. Despite Sands China and Galaxy extending more credit (Exhibit 4), Macau s rolling turnover growth has decelerated to 14% in March 2012 from 52% yoy in 2Q11, which we believe is a reflection of the weaker gaming demand and/or longer VIP players debt collection cycles. There is no disclosure on the total cage capital available in Macau, but if we compare Asia Entertainment & Resources Ltd s (AERL) monthly rolling turnover and its cage capital as reported, we calculate that its money velocity or asset turnover has fallen from its peak of 11X in July 2011 to 6.7X in March 2012 (Exhibit 2). Although AERL is not representative of the whole Macau gaming market (it accounts for only 3% of rolling turnover in Macau), the data provide us a read-across for the industry trend. Exhibit 2: AERL s money velocity has fallen from its peak of 11X in July 2011 to 6.7X in March 2012 AERL s money velocity Exhibit 3: Macau s rolling turnover growth has decelerated from 52% yoy in 2Q11 to 14% in March 2012 Macau monthly rolling turnover yoy growth (X) % 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% % % Jun 2010 Jul 2010 Aug 2010 Sep 2010 Oct 2010 Nov 2010 Dec 2010 Jan 2011 Feb 2011 Mar 2011 Apr 2011 May 2011 Jun 2011 Jul 2011 Aug 2011 Sep 2011 Oct 2011 Nov 2011 Dec 2011 Jan 2012 Feb 2012 Mar % Jan 11 Feb 11 Mar 11 Apr 11 May 11 Jun 11 Jul 11 Aug 11 Rolling volume yoy Sep 11 Oct 11 Nov 11 Mass GGR yoy Dec 11 Jan 12 Feb 12 Mar 12 Source: Company data. Source: Company data. Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 4

5 Exhibit 4: Sands China and Galaxy have been extending more credit in 2H11 Gaming operators average gross account receivables Exhibit 5: At 10%-14% penetration, the VIP market does not appear to be saturated Estimates for Macau VIP players penetration rate for varying levels of active agents 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 2H09 1H10 2H10 1H11 2H11 Average AR as % of VIP GGR (2H11) (RHS) No of active agents 15,000 20, % No of VIP players per agent % 14.0% No of VIP players each year 75, ,000 No of high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs) 729, , % China 535, ,000 HK 101, , % Taiwan 93,000 93, % VIP players penetration 8.0% 10% 14% 1,500 1, % 2.6% 2.1% 3.4% 6.0% 4.0% 2.0% 2011 GGR VIP (US$mn) 24,459 24,459 GGR or loss per VIP player (US$mn) Loss per visit (US$mn) Avg no of visits per year Sands China Wynn Macau SJM Galaxy MPEL MGM China 0.0% Source: Company data. Asset turnover and money velocity may stabilize unless macro conditions deteriorate further, in our view Looking into the rest of 2012, we believe the VIP GGR growth trajectory would hinge on two key drivers: Direction of money velocity Money velocity reflects the underlying gaming demand, which is affected by the macro outlook especially in Guangdong, which contributes half of the PRC visitors to Macau. Other factors include the wealth effect from property and stock market valuations, the number of players and the frequency of their visits to Macau. Amount of cage capital To the extent that VIP players are restricted from bringing money out of China due to foreign exchange control, the junkets facilitate the process by extending credit to the players upfront and collecting the money upon their return to their home cities. VIP rolling volume would thus be constrained by the breadth of the junkets capital base, their sources and costs of new funding (e.g., deposits by players, HNWIs, cash advance by casinos). The capital base would also rise over time, as the junkets reinvest the commission earned to drive further business growth. We believe the slowdown of money velocity since 3Q11 reflects the deteriorating macro outlook, which dampens players appetite to gamble. The correction of asset prices in HK/China also has an impact on gaming demand as some players use these hard assets as collateral for credit extension. Recent macro data have been rather mixed. On one hand, better-than-expected US job data and the temporary resolution of the Europe debt crisis supported consumer confidence in developed countries and a modest recovery in China s PMI in March (53.1 from Jan-Feb s average of 50.8) (Exhibit 6). On the other hand, despite local governments various attempts to relax policy measures in the property market, the central government appears firm in its stance to bring property prices down as Premier Wen commented during the National People s Congress meeting in March 2012 that China s property prices are still far from reasonable levels. Barring further deterioration in the macro backdrop, we believe money velocity may stabilize at the current level, the lowest since 2010 (Exhibit 12). VIP GGR growth would hinge on the availability of cage capital. Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 5

6 Exhibit 6: China s PMI has recovered to 53.1 from Jan- Feb s average of 50.8 China s PMI vs. Macau s VIP GGR yoy growth Exhibit 7: Macau s VIP GGR growth is highly correlated with China s property price growth China s property price yoy vs. Macau s VIP GGR yoy growth % 120% 100% Property price index YoY(%) VIP GGR YoY (%) 14% 120% R 2 = % 100% 80% 10% 80% 50 60% 8% 60% 45 40% 6% 40% 20% 4% 20% % -20% -40% 2% 0% 0% -20% May, 2008 Jul, 2008 Sep, 2008 Nov, 2008 Jan, 2009 Mar, 2009 May, 2009 Jul, 2009 Sep, 2009 Nov, 2009 Jan, 2010 Mar, 2010 May, 2010 Jul, 2010 Sep, 2010 Nov, 2010 Jan, 2011 Mar, 2011 May, 2011 Jul, 2011 Sep, 2011 Nov, 2011 Jan, 2012 Mar, % 1Q05 2Q05 3Q05 4Q05 1Q06 2Q06 3Q06 4Q06 1Q07 2Q07 3Q07 4Q07 1Q08 2Q08 3Q08 4Q08 1Q09 2Q09 3Q09 4Q09 1Q10 2Q10 3Q10 4Q10 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 1Q12-40% China PMI (LHS) VIP GGR yoy (RHS) China property price YoY% VIP GGR YoY% Source: NBS, DICJ. Source: NBS, DICJ. Exhibit 8: Guangdong s trade growth is a proxy of factories well-being, a source of wealth creation in the region... Guangdong s trade growth vs. Macau s VIP GGR yoy growth Exhibit 9: so is container port throughput data in PRD Port throughput growth in PRD yoy vs. Macau s VIP GGR yoy growth YoY (%) YoY (%) 140% 50% R 2 = % 40% 100% 30% 80% 20% 60% 10% 40% 0% YoY (%) YoY (%) 120% 30% R 2 = % 20% 80% 10% 60% 40% 0% 20% -10% 20% -10% 0% -20% 0% -20% -30% -20% -20% -40% May-08 Jun-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Feb-09 Apr-09 May-09 Jul-09 Aug-09 Oct-09 Nov-09 Jan-10 Mar-10 Apr-10 Jun-10 Jul-10 Sep-10 Oct-10 Dec-10 Feb-11 Mar-11 May-11 Jun-11 Aug-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Jan-12 Feb-12-40% -40% 1Q07 2Q07 3Q07 4Q07 1Q08 2Q08 3Q08 4Q08 1Q09 2Q09 3Q09 4Q09 1Q10 2Q10 3Q10 4Q10 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 1Q12-30% VIP GGR Growth (%) LHS Exports and Imports (Guangdong) growth (%) RHS VIP GGR Growth (%) LHS PRD throughput growth (%) RHS Source: CEIC, DICJ. Source: CEIC, DICJ. Steady 19% yoy VIP GGR growth in 2012E, helped by new capital raised for SCC As discussed in our May 20, 2011 report Quantify the supply-driven demand from Galaxy Macau opening, Macau s GGR and visitation grew 21%-25% and 9%-12% qoq in the quarter following the opening of large-scale casinos historically (e.g., Wynn Macau in 3Q06, Venetian Macao in 3Q07, MGM in 4Q07 and COD in 2Q09). Other than the novelty effect which attracts more visitations in initial months of opening, we think GGR growth was also driven by capital raised by junkets to fulfill the increase in table capacity offered by the new casino in Cotai, as long as the junkets are making reasonable return sufficient to cover their funding costs and associated expenses (e.g., overhead, bad debt etc). With money velocity stabilizing at 7X-8X, we estimate junkets generate 27% cash return on capital currently, vs. 36% when the money velocity peaked at 10X in mid-2011 (Exhibit 11). This level of return Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 6

7 still justifies their 10%-15% cost of capital, even after taking into account for another potential 5%-10% bad debt risk in the system. What surprised us, and in our view the market, positively over the past few months is the depth and breadth of the VIP market. Our channel checks show that casino operators (e.g., SJM, Wynn Macau) have been receiving ongoing requests to add new VIP tables at their premises, as junkets appear to have no difficulty finding new customers by working with more local agents to further penetrate into inland provinces (e.g., Chengdu, Chongqing). Our channel checks indicate that over half of their VIP players come from provinces outside of Guangdong, vs. 20%-30% a few years ago. This is consistent with our previous analysis which suggests that Macau s VIP market is not saturated yet, i.e., according to our estimate, there are 75, ,000 VIP players in total, implying 10%-14% penetration when compared with 729,000 high-net-worth-individuals (HNWIs) in Greater China (Exhibit 5). Exhibit 10: We estimate it requires US$7.1bn cage capital funded by the junkets themselves to support a monthly rolling volume of US$73bn Relationship between junkets cage capital and rolling chip volume in Macau Total in Macau HK$mn US$mn Comment Rolling turnover in Mar ,855 72,930 Cage capital turn per player 6 6 Each player rolls their chips 6 times on average Average debt repayment period (No of month) Players take around 3-4 weeks to repay the debts to junkets Cage capital required 66,366 8,509 - Funded by casinos 11,044 1,416 Summation of AR by six casinos at end Funded by junkets themselves 55,323 7,093 Top 10 junkets contribute c.90% of the capital Exhibit 11: With money velocity stabilizing at 7X-8X, we estimate junkets generate 27% cash return on capital currently, vs. 36% when the money velocity peaked at 10X in midlast year Scenarios of cash ROIC on junkets cage capital Junkets' cage capital 7,093 7,093 7,093 7,093 7,093 7,093 7,093 Money velocity and cage capital turn Cage capital turn per player Average debt repayment (no of months) Monthly rolling turnover 70,927 60,794 53,195 47,284 42,556 38,687 35,463 % of change 33% 14% 0% -11% -20% -27% -33% Junket commission rate 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% Cash rebate to players 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% Other overhead 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% Spread earned by junkets 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% Monthly EBITDA earned by junkets (US$mn) Annual EBITDA earned by junkets (US$mn) 2,553 2,189 1,915 1,702 1,532 1,393 1,277 Cash return on invested capital 36% 31% 27% 24% 22% 20% 18% (2) Mass-market supported by opening of new casinos In our past reports ( Position for accelerated mass-market growth; Upgrade Sands China dated Oct 4, 2010), we have highlighted our preference for the mass-market over the VIP market, as we see four fundamental reasons that would underpin a 24% mass-market GGR CAGR in E: (1) a rise in leisure spending in China as income growth accelerates. Leisure spending makes up only 7% of disposable income in China, vs. 15% in the US, 23% Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 7

8 in the UK and 20% in Japan in 2010; (2) supply-driven demand due to the opening of new casinos in Cotai; (3) better transportation infrastructure; (4) the mass-market is a larger addressable market vs. the VIP market. After the opening of Galaxy Macau in May 2011, mass-market GGR growth has indeed accelerated from 29% yoy in 1Q11 to 40% yoy in 2H11, driven by a pickup in visitation growth from 5% in 1Q11 to 16% yoy in 2H11, implying a sustainable 20+% yoy increase in per-visitor gaming spending over the past year. Looking into 2012, although the completion of the last four stations of the Guangzhou-Zhuhai Transit have been delayed to 1H2013, the opening of Sands Cotai Central (SCC) on April 11, 2012 should draw more visitations to Macau like what Galaxy Macau and other casinos did in the past during their openings. We forecast Macau s visitation would grow 13% yoy in 2012E, driven by arrivals from PRC (+18% yoy), Hong Kong (+8%) and other destinations (+5%). Coupled with 16% yoy growth in per-visitor spending, we expect Macau s mass market GGR to grow 31% yoy in 2012E. (3) Raise our GGR growth forecast to 22% yoy in 2012 Taking into account the various factors discussed above, (e.g., money velocity, reinvestment return and funding cost of the cage capital, new capital raised, visitations etc), we construct a simple monthly GGR model (Exhibit 12) and raise our estimate for Macau s GGR growth for 2012 with the following assumptions: VIP money velocity or asset turnover to remain steady at 7.5X for the rest of the year, i.e., debt repayment cycle of around 3-4 weeks; 40% of junkets capital financed by debt or players deposit, for which junkets pay 2% interest cost each month; MOP10bn new capital being raised by the junkets or extended by casinos in preparation for new table capacity due to the opening of Sands Cotai Central in mid- April; Junkets earn 0.3% spread on rolling turnover each month; Macau s visitation growth to accelerate from 10% yoy in March to 14% yoy in the rest of the year upon the opening of Sands Cotai Central in April; Per-visitor spending in the mass-market segment to grow 16% yoy for the rest of the year, in line with the trend seen in the past few years. Based on the above, we estimate Macau s GGR would grow 22% yoy in 2012E, including 19% yoy growth in VIP and 31% yoy in mass-market segment (Exhibit 12). By location, we estimate 48% yoy GGR growth in Cotai, driven by the cluster effect after the opening of SCC scheduled on April 11, 2012, vs. 10% yoy in Macau Peninsula. Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 8

9 Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 9 Exhibit 12: Our monthly GGR forecast model MOP mn Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Full Year No of days E 2012 monthly GGR 25,040 24,286 24,989 24,583 28,304 25,106 28,869 28,792 27,870 31,687 27,662 30, ,734 YoY% 35% 22% 24% 20% 16% 21% 19% 16% 31% 18% 20% 29% 22% (1) VIP GGR 17,617 17,376 17,481 17,647 20,265 17,727 20,822 20,457 20,084 22,828 19,453 21, ,011 VIP GGR, YoY 31% 20% 20% 16% 12% 17% 16% 11% 32% 14% 16% 29% 19% Rolling volume 543, , , , , , , , , , , ,489 7,708,950 Rolling volume, YoY 32% 11% 14% 22% 24% 16% 26% 16% 30% 24% 30% 37% 23% Win rate 3.24% 3.09% 2.98% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.02% VIP drivers Cage capital 72,499 74,887 81,045 87,161 88,490 89,555 90,921 92,239 93,510 95,044 96,229 97,585 97,585 New capital raised 5,000 5,000 10,000 Cage capital growth, MoM or YoY 3.3% 8.2% 7.5% 1.5% 1.2% 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 1.6% 1.2% 1.4% 41.2% Money velocity % Debt repayment (No of months) n.a. No. of times players roll their chips n.a. (2) Mass GGR 7,423 6,910 7,508 6,936 8,039 7,379 8,047 8,335 7,786 8,859 8,209 9,293 94,723 Mass GGR, YoY 45% 28% 36% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 31% Mass market drivers Monthly visitation to Macau (person 2,461,640 2,130,977 2,409,952 2,665,832 2,616,928 2,486,883 2,907,988 3,075,723 2,469,955 2,709,373 2,756,252 2,902,119 31,593,621 Monthly visitation to Macau, YoY 19% 2% 10% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 13% Mass spending per visitor 3,016 3,243 3,116 2,602 3,072 2,967 2,767 2,710 3,152 3,270 2,978 3,202 2,998 Mass spending per visitor, YoY 23% 30% 24% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 16% monthly GGR 18,571 19,863 20,087 20,507 24,306 20,792 24,212 24,769 21,244 26,851 23,058 23, ,868 YoY% 33% 48% 48% 45% 42% 52% 48% 57% 39% 42% 33% 25% 42% (1) VIP GGR 13,460 14,459 14,580 15,170 18,120 15,114 18,020 18,356 15,253 20,034 16,742 16, ,766 VIP GGR, YoY 38% 51% 54% 49% 44% 58% 52% 65% 40% 46% 31% 18% 44% Rolling volume 410, , , , , , , , , , , ,335 6,255,594 Rolling volume, YoY 40% 72% 55% 50% 43% 65% 60% 58% 51% 30% 30% 25% 47% Win rate 3.28% 2.87% 2.85% 3.14% 3.32% 2.96% 3.26% 3.12% 2.97% 3.25% 3.35% 3.18% 3.13% (2) Mass GGR 5,111 5,404 5,507 5,337 6,186 5,678 6,192 6,413 5,991 6,817 6,316 7,150 72,102 Mass GGR, YoY 23% 40% 34% 33% 39% 40% 40% 38% 37% 34% 38% 45% 37% Mass market drivers Monthly visitation to Macau (person 2,076,066 2,164,249 2,190,865 2,338,449 2,295,551 2,181,476 2,550,867 2,698,003 2,166,627 2,376,643 2,417,765 2,545,718 28,002,279 Monthly visitation to Macau, YoY 1% 5% 9% 11% 9% 15% 18% 14% 18% 14% 20% 12% 12% Mass spending per visitor 2,462 2,497 2,514 2,282 2,695 2,603 2,427 2,377 2,765 2,868 2,612 2,809 2,575 Mass spending per visitor, YoY 21% 33% 23% 20% 27% 22% 19% 21% 16% 18% 15% 29% 22% Note: Grey shaded areas indicate assumption drivers. Source: DICJ, Goldman Sachs Research estimates. April 11, 2012

10 Exhibit 13: We estimate Macau s GGR growth would grow 22% yoy in 2012E, including 19% yoy growth in VIP and 31% yoy in mass-market segment Macau gaming annual supply & demand forecasts E 2013E 2014E No of devices at year-end VIP tables ,124 1,063 1,279 1,629 1,879 2,017 2,017 2,017 %YoY 82% 12% 89% 99% -5% 20% 27% 15% 7% 0% 0% Mass tables 826 1,089 2,197 3,251 2,954 3,491 3,162 3,423 3,467 3,467 3,467 %YoY 239% 32% 102% 48% -9% 18% -9% 8% 1% 0% 0% Total tables 1,092 1,388 2,762 4,375 4,017 4,770 4,791 5,302 5,484 5,484 5,484 %YoY 180% 27% 99% 58% -8% 19% 0% 11% 3% 0% 0% Slots 2,254 3,421 6,546 13,267 11,856 14,363 14,050 16,056 18,456 18,456 18,456 %YoY 177% 52% 91% 103% -11% 21% -2% 14% 15% 0% 0% Revenue (US$m) VIP tables 3,722 3,603 4,584 6,950 9,194 9,950 16,954 24,459 29,136 33,214 37,865 %YoY 34% -3% 27% 52% 32% 8% 70% 44% 19% 14% 14% Mass tables 1,369 1,989 2,217 2,949 3,658 4,117 5,509 7,522 9,832 12,010 14,504 %YoY 75% 45% 11% 33% 24% 13% 34% 37% 31% 22% 21% Slots ,077 1,425 1,862 2,275 2,723 %YoY 171% 95% 64% 75% 57% 15% 33% 32% 31% 22% 20% Gross gaming revenue 5,172 5,748 7,057 10,347 13,556 14,877 23,540 33,406 40,830 47,500 55,092 %YoY 44% 11% 23% 47% 31% 10% 58% 42% 22% 16% 16% Net win per table per day (US$) VIP revenue per table per day 40,726 29,392 26,687 24,257 21,849 18,517 26,314 32,360 35,116 39,523 44,076 %YoY -24% -28% -9% -9% -10% -15% 42% 23% 9% 13% 12% Mass table revenue per table 5,647 5,457 3,637 2,967 3,230 3,500 4,537 6,260 7,819 9,491 11,462 %YoY -43% -3% -33% -18% 9% 8% 30% 38% 25% 21% 21% Slot revenue per table %YoY 13% 4% -3% -12% 31% 9% 19% 21% 14% 19% 20% Source: DICJ, Goldman Sachs Research estimates. Cage capital can grow 27% per year in theory, driving VIP GGR growth of 20+% We note that as junkets reinvest the commission into their businesses, total cage capital, excluding the MOP10bn newly raised, would amount to MOP88bn at end-2012e, up 27% yoy, in line with the estimated investment return of junket operations (Exhibit 11). In other words, if money velocity remains unchanged at 7.5X and assuming no depletion of capital in the form of bad debt, Macau s VIP gaming market, in theory, can grow 20%-30% per annum as long as the junkets and agents find new players (assuming VIP market penetration remains low). In reality, because money velocity is volatile and affected by different factors as discussed earlier (see Exhibit 2 for AERL s case), VIP GGR growth could deviate from the 20% trend growth, i.e., above trend when money velocity accelerates, or below trend when money velocity decelerates. Our 19% yoy VIP GGR growth forecast in 2012E is driven by our expectation that the deceleration of money velocity in 4Q11 will spill over to Key risks to our forecasts: We identify the key risk factors for our GGR growth forecasts below: Money velocity and new capital raised The shorter the players debt collection cycle, the faster the money velocity and asset turnover, which will underpin stronger GGR growth. More new capital raised allows the junkets to extend more credit to capture the rising demand of the under-penetrated VIP market. As shown in Exhibit 14, if money velocity slows to 5.5X, all else being equal, we estimate Macau s VIP GGR growth would be flat. This analysis also suggests that back in 1H2009 when VIP GGR fell by 20% yoy, not only did money velocity decelerate, some junkets may have lost some of their capital due to bad debt as well. Table cap and affordability issue in mass-market Since 2008, the strong gaming market recovery and the table cap implemented by the Macau government drove table efficiency higher, with mass-market net win per table doubling from US$3,230 to Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 10

11 US$6,260 in As we expect Macau s 18% GGR E CAGR to continue outpacing the 1% table CAGR, we forecast net win per table to rise further to US$11,462 in 2014E. We believe this is well supported by casinos aggressively lifting their minimum bet sizes, especially during weekends. We note that most of the bets on the mass gaming floors start from US$40 or even US$60 per hand. While wages are rising, with average income per capita in Guangdong at US$4,796 last year (average of US$3,806 in China), we are concerned that further rise in the minimum bet would reduce the pool of people who could afford to gamble on tables. Those who cannot afford table games may switch to play at the slot machines. Sands China, for example, plans to launch Electric Table Games (ETG) to tap this mass segment. Hotel capacity in mass-market Aside from table cap, we believe hotel capacity will become an increasingly important driver for mass-market GGR growth in the medium term, as the development of more large-scale integrated resorts with non-gaming facilities in Cotai would drive more multi-day visitors and families. As shown in Exhibit 15, based on our projected 10% annual visitation growth and the existing construction pipeline (excluding any unapproved Cotai project), we estimate Macau s hotel occupancy rate will reach 103% by 2015E (vs. 84% in 2011). We maintain our view that the government will eventually approve the pending Cotai projects to address the potential hotel under-supply situation by then. Exhibit 14: If money velocity slows down to 5.5X, all else being equal, we estimate Macau s VIP GGR growth would be flat Macau total and VIP GGR sensitivity to money velocity and amount of new capital raised 2012E VIP GGR YoY% Money velocity New cage capital raised (MOP mn) (10,000) (5,000) 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30, % 9% 5% 1% 3% 7% 11% 16% 20% % 6% 1% 3% 7% 12% 16% 21% 25% 6.5 7% 2% 2% 7% 11% 16% 21% 25% 30% 7.0 4% 1% 6% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 7.5 1% 4% 9% 14% 19% 24% 29% 34% 39% 8.0 2% 7% 12% 17% 23% 28% 33% 39% 44% 8.5 4% 10% 15% 21% 26% 32% 37% 43% 48% 9.0 7% 13% 18% 24% 30% 35% 41% 47% 52% % 15% 21% 27% 33% 39% 45% 51% 57% 2012E total GGR YoY% New cage capital raised (MOP mn) (10,000) (5,000) 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30, % 1% 4% 7% 11% 14% 17% 20% 23% 6.0 1% 4% 7% 10% 14% 17% 20% 23% 27% 6.5 3% 6% 10% 13% 17% 20% 23% 27% 30% 7.0 5% 9% 12% 16% 19% 23% 27% 30% 34% Money 7.5 7% 11% 15% 18% 22% 26% 30% 33% 37% velocity 8.0 9% 13% 17% 21% 25% 29% 33% 36% 40% % 15% 19% 23% 27% 31% 35% 39% 43% % 17% 22% 26% 30% 34% 38% 42% 47% % 19% 24% 28% 32% 37% 41% 45% 50% Note: in calculating GGR's sensitivity to money velocity and amount of capital raised, we assume no change to mass market GGR. Source: Goldman Sachs Research estimates. Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 11

12 Exhibit 15: We estimate Macau s hotel occupancy rate will reach 103% by 2015E (vs. 84% in 2011) Detailed hotel room breakdown by casino operator and location Operators Hotel E 2013E 2014E 2015E SJM Grand Lisboa SJM Ponte Galaxy Grand Waldo Galaxy Star World Galaxy Galaxy Macau - - 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200 MPEL Crown Hotel MPEL City of Dreams Crown MPEL City of Dreams Hard Rock MPEL City of Dreams Grand Hyatt SANDS Sands Macao SANDS Venetian Macau 2,841 2,841 2,841 2,841 2,841 2,841 2,841 SANDS Four Seasons SANDS Conrad/Holiday Inn ,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 SANDS Sheraton ,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 Wynn Wynn Macau 600 1,014 1,014 1,014 1,014 1,014 1,014 MGM MGM Grand Macau Others Others 10,964 11,425 11,490 11,490 11,490 11,490 11,490 Total no of hotel rooms 19,216 20,091 22,356 26,156 28,156 28,156 28,156 %YoY 10% 5% 11% 17% 8% 0% 0% Breakdown by location Macau Peninsula 14,338 15,213 15,278 15,278 15,278 15,278 15,278 Cotai 4,662 4,662 6,862 10,662 12,662 12,662 12,662 Taipa Breakdown by location (%) Macau Peninsula 75% 76% 68% 58% 54% 54% 54% Cotai 24% 23% 31% 41% 45% 45% 45% Taipa 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% Breakdown by operators SJM Galaxy 1,059 1,059 3,259 3,259 3,259 3,259 3,259 Melco Crown 1,677 1,677 1,677 1,677 1,677 1,677 1,677 SANDS 3,490 3,490 3,490 7,290 9,290 9,290 9,290 Wynn 600 1,014 1,014 1,014 1,014 1,014 1,014 MGM-Paradise Others 10,964 11,425 11,490 11,490 11,490 11,490 11,490 Avg occupancy rate 72% 80% 84% 84% 87% 94% 103% Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 12

13 Future of Cotai; Long-term potential in the non-gaming businesses Based on past experience, we believe the opening of the two large-scale casinos in Cotai, namely Galaxy Macau and Sands Cotai Central, should draw more visitations and underpin accelerated gaming revenue growth in Cotai relative to Macau Peninsula. While the market view is that the Peninsula casinos will lose market share to the Cotai ones, the debate is still on whether the existing casinos in Cotai would benefit from the spillover effect from Sands Central Cotai (SCC) s opening, or lose market share due to more competition. We will address these issues in this section. We will also look at the long-term growth prospect of Macau s non-gaming markets, as the government strives to diversify Macau s economy and requires more non-gaming facilities in Macau. (1) Spillover effect to benefit existing casinos in Cotai In our May 6, 2011 report Mass-market Part II: What would it take for Macau s GGR to double, we highlighted several observations from the past casino openings, which include (1) supply-driven demand from large-scale casinos; (2) the formation of a new cluster to draw traffic to Cotai; (3) the cannibalization between existing casinos. The industry trends since the opening of Galaxy Macau so far have reinforced these theses in general. To gauge the potential impact of Sands Central Cotai (SCC) scheduled for opening on April 11, 2012, we analyze the market share and table efficiency trends of individual casinos in both VIP and mass-market segments since Galaxy Macau s opening in detail. Our observations are summarized as below (Exhibits 16-18): Visitation growth accelerated, but GGR dragged by slowdown in VIP As with the other large-scale casino launches in the past, supply-driven demand from Galaxy Macau spurred more visitations to Macau, which grew 16% yoy in 2H11, up from +5% yoy in 1Q11. However, GGR growth did not accelerate in a similar manner as in 4Q06 after the opening of Wynn Macau in September 2006, or in 4Q07/1Q08 following the opening of Venetian Macao in August 2007 and MGM Macau in December We believe the slowdown of money velocity in the VIP segment since 3Q11 offset the strong growth in the mass market, causing a drag on the momentum of the overall gaming revenue. A new cluster has formed in Cotai. Peninsula casinos, particularly those outside of the Wynn-Starworld-MGM cluster, lost more market share than the Cotai casinos After the opening of Galaxy Macau in May 2011, the aggregate market share captured by the four Cotai casinos increased by 9.9% from 20.6% in 1Q11 to 30.5% in 4Q11, all of which went to Galaxy Macau, with the other three casinos market shares largely unchanged over the past year. In other words, Galaxy Macau gained most of its market share from the Peninsula casinos. Among the Peninsula casinos, Sands Macao, SJM, and Wynn Macau lost 1.1%, 5.5%, and 1.1%, respectively, while MGM and Starworld s shares were fairly resilient. Those outside of the Wynn-Starworld-MGM cluster (e.g., SJM s third-party promoted casinos, Sands Macao) appeared to have lost more market share. Within Cotai, Venetian Macao was initially the most affected, but its market share has stabilized since mid-2011 If we segregate GGR into the VIP and mass markets, the opening of Galaxy Macau had some impact on the other Cotai casinos, particularly Venetian Macao, in the mass-market segment, where its market share slipped by 1.3% in 2Q11. However, its market share seemed to have stabilized since 3Q11. As for COD, its market share actually improved from 8.9% in 1Q to 9.3% in 4Q11, supported by the company s initiatives to drive the growth in its mass-market segment, in our view. Galaxy has been quite successful in minimizing the cannibalization risk between Galaxy Macau and Starworld When MPEL opened COD in 2Q09, Altira experienced Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 13

14 fairly significant market share losses in the subsequent quarters. Galaxy appears to have done a better job in minimizing the cannibalization risk between Galaxy Macau and Starworld, the latter only lost 0.3% market share in the past year, although our channel checks suggest that Sands China s VIP initiatives in Plaza have started to adversely impact Starworld ytd. Hotel rooms drove noticeable improvement in mass-market table efficiency Although Galaxy Macau only added 300 mass-market gaming tables, representing 6% of the total in the industry, the casino managed to capture an 8.3% mass-market share in 4Q11, which we believe is supported by the offering of its non-gaming facilities, particularly hotel rooms Galaxy Macau now operates 2,200 hotel rooms accounting for 10% of the total in Macau. If we track the table efficiency trend of individual casinos, we find that the completion of more rooms was typically followed by table efficiency improvement in the subsequent 2-3 quarters. This was the case for Wynn Macau where its mass-market net win per table jumped 34% from 3Q10 to 1Q11 after Wynn Encore added 414 hotel rooms to its portfolio, and similarly for Galaxy Macau where its table efficiency surged 31% qoq in 4Q11, after the casino brought 800 more hotel rooms on stream since September 2011 (Exhibit 16). GGR in Cotai grew 65% yoy, vs. 33% for Macau Peninsula in 2011 Overall GGR in Macau grew 42% yoy in The opening of Galaxy Macau helped to draw more traffic and underpin the faster GGR growth in Cotai/Taipa (+65% yoy), vs. Peninsula (+33% yoy). 32% of Macau s GGR was generated in Cotai last year. SCC to capture 9% of GGR by 2013E. Galaxy Macau and COD to be more resilient Based on the above observations, we think the opening of SCC will affect the market and the competitive landscape in the following ways: Visitation growth will likely accelerate but on a more gradual pace over the next 6-12 months Since SCC will be of an even larger scale compared with Galaxy Macau (i.e., 540 tables, 5,800 hotel rooms and 13mn sq ft GFA, vs. 450 tables, 2,200 hotel rooms and 5.9mn sq ft), we believe it will draw more visitations to Macau though on a more gradual pace since the project will be launched by phases with more non-gaming facilities coming on stream later in 2012 or early Overall, we forecast 13% visitation growth in Macau in 2012E. SCC to capture 9% GGR share with 10% tables and 21% hotel rooms by 2013E As mentioned above, the experience with Galaxy Macau suggests that both gaming tables and hotel rooms are instrumental in driving gaming revenue growth for casinos. Although SCC s 540 tables only account for 10% of the total table count in the industry, the 5,800 hotel rooms represent 21% of the 28,156 rooms in Macau by end-2013e. Together with other non-gaming facilities (e.g., retail space, 1 theater, etc.), we believe SCC, if executed well, will be able to achieve 9% GGR market share by 2013E per our estimates. This would however be partly offset by potential cannibalization of Venetian Macao s market share, where Sands China has announced plans to shift 140 tables to SCC. For the group as a whole, we forecast its GGR market share to rise from the run rate of 18% ytd to 24% by 2013E. Galaxy Macau and City of Dreams to benefit from the spillover effect from SCC in the medium term, but Galaxy Macau may initially be more vulnerable to competition With the number of hotel rooms in Cotai almost doubling from 6,862 in 2011 to 12,662 in 2013E outpacing the 10% table growth CAGR, we believe both Galaxy Macau and COD would benefit from the spillover effect from SCC s launch and will likely record improvement in their table efficiency over time. Between the two, Galaxy Macau could be more vulnerable to new competition from SCC in the initial months given their similar market positioning, both targeting the low to mid-end of the mass market segment. Over time, however, the lower table efficiency in mass market (i.e., US$6,381 Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 14

15 in 4Q11, vs. COD s US$9,936 and Venetian Macao s US$7,234) should leave them with more room to improve table efficiency by lifting the minimum bets. As for COD, given its proximity (just across the street) to the new casino, the casino may benefit more directly from the gradual completion of 5,800 new hotel rooms at SCC over the next 1-2 years. In Macau Peninsula, MGM China is less vulnerable to market share loss than SJM and Wynn Macau In Macau Peninsula, we expect Wynn Macau and SJM to lose more market share than MGM China. Wynn Macau has faced capacity constraint since 3Q11 which, we believe, is unlikely to resolve in the near term. The company has also been reluctant to cut its junket commission to maintain its competitiveness against the other operators. As for SJM, the group operates 17 third-party promoted casinos scattered around the city, which we expect to continue losing market share as more new casinos with better aesthetics in terms of gaming and non-gaming facilities come on stream. Having converted several hotel floors into gaming areas over the past year, Grand Lisboa may also start to face capacity issues in our view. On a relative basis, MGM China may be better positioned, as it still has spare table capacity to be utilized upon the completion of the VIP rooms on its second floor by the year-end. Overall, we expect Wynn Macau, SJM and MGM China s market shares to slip from 14%, 29% and 11% in 2011 to 13%, 24% and 9% in 2013E. We expect Cotai s GGR to grow 48%/26% in 2012E/13E, vs. 10%/10% in Peninsula, resulting in a jump in Cotai s market share from 26% in 2011 to 38% in 2013E Upon the completion of SCC Phase 2, 46% of hotel rooms and 43% of gaming tables will be located in Cotai/Taipa by 2013E, up from 24% and 30%, respectively, in We expect the cluster effect to underpin the faster GGR growth of 48%/26% in Cotai in 2012E/2013E, vs. 10%/10% in Macau Peninsula. As a result, GGR contribution from the five casinos in Cotai will rise from 26% in 2011 to 38% in 2013E. Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 15

16 Exhibit 16: Galaxy Macau s mass market table efficiency rose 31% qoq in 4Q11, after it brought 800 more hotel rooms on stream since September 2011 VIP and mass market table efficiency comparison by property 3Q09 4Q09 1Q10 2Q10 3Q10 4Q10 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q E 2013E Galaxy Galaxy Sands Cotai New casino additions L'Arc Oceanus Encore Macau Macau Central Net win per table per day (US$) VIP tables Sands China 16,393 19,279 20,503 23,498 22,367 21,286 24,129 25,684 22,067 25,344 24,632 29,862 35,359 Sands Macao 15,213 16,738 18,174 18,335 15,501 17,664 19,142 19,235 17,245 17,362 18,238 19,515 21,467 Venetian 20,649 24,059 24,152 26,709 27,099 28,406 27,429 37,656 27,214 32,187 31,124 35,792 42,235 Plaza 9,293 14,026 17,364 27,704 26,899 13,099 27,557 13,364 21,124 26,989 24,112 30,140 34,661 Parcels 5&6 36,000 43,920 Wynn Macau 28,616 29,070 29,489 33,998 29,217 40,174 34,855 39,243 36,436 35,351 35,543 38,494 43,113 SJM 25,375 28,451 26,129 30,614 31,310 32,679 30,316 29,251 31,131 32,946 35,173 Grand Lisboa 36,426 43,521 39,258 56,247 53,926 51,249 48,959 43,917 46,728 48,598 51,513 Other casinos 22,900 25,114 23,205 24,914 26,164 28,113 25,555 25,218 26,903 27,706 29,151 Galaxy 21,663 35,507 32,413 38,587 45,526 43,997 48,646 42,879 53,751 54,260 40,715 53,564 59,704 StarWorld 21,663 35,507 32,413 38,587 45,526 43,997 48,646 49,143 63,245 57,649 54,719 59,096 65,006 Galaxy Macau 32,370 45,522 51,322 28,578 48,768 55,108 MPEL 17,391 14,344 19,638 19,332 24,501 24,000 25,446 29,067 31,754 29,033 29,289 31,505 34,976 Altira 13,315 11,551 15,871 16,828 13,871 19,744 22,642 26,926 27,996 23,764 24,149 25,287 28,145 COD 23,913 18,662 25,463 23,204 40,936 28,555 28,076 30,929 34,899 33,261 34,272 36,672 40,339 MGM 34,932 39,905 35,654 41,300 37,310 41,109 45,220 Peninsula 22,123 27,055 26,244 29,743 27,976 32,809 33,048 35,331 34,250 33,871 33,996 36,570 39,873 Cotai/Taipa 17,322 16,806 20,543 22,170 25,439 23,911 26,161 29,762 32,875 34,012 29,032 35,483 40,678 Mass tables Sands China 4,585 5,062 5,263 5,186 5,688 5,921 6,132 5,995 6,488 6,775 6,350 7,699 9,767 Sands Macao 4,681 4,757 4,749 4,904 5,119 5,197 5,470 5,522 5,531 5,707 5,558 6,003 6,903 Venetian 4,579 5,341 5,638 5,365 6,067 6,336 6,523 6,184 6,915 7,234 6,717 8,597 11,005 Plaza 4,103 4,191 4,798 5,144 5,446 6,092 6,223 6,786 7,711 8,286 7,258 9,436 11,323 Parcels 5&6 7,800 10,530 Wynn Macau 5,754 5,246 6,473 6,539 6,990 8,401 9,375 9,517 9,842 11,173 10,571 12,474 14,345 SJM 4,452 4,460 4,789 5,260 6,085 6,198 6,536 6,928 6,438 7,028 7,659 Grand Lisboa 5,441 5,632 5,639 6,044 6,807 7,971 8,001 8,624 7,941 8,576 9,605 Other casinos 4,231 4,198 4,585 5,063 5,888 5,714 6,145 6,501 6,045 6,623 7,127 Galaxy 2,544 2,986 4,088 3,325 4,320 4,459 5,157 4,288 5,149 6,528 3,942 7,746 9,378 StarWorld 2,544 2,986 4,088 3,325 4,320 4,459 5,157 5,156 6,034 6,968 5,834 6,651 7,582 Galaxy Macau 3,728 4,854 6,381 3,312 8,111 9,977 MPEL 2,172 2,665 3,910 4,203 4,467 5,943 7,193 8,235 8,545 9,515 8,499 10,595 13,128 Altira 2,725 3,641 3,944 5,266 5,458 7,057 7,844 6,492 6,559 7,053 7,694 8,145 9,392 COD 2,113 2,556 3,906 4,073 4,346 5,801 7,093 8,537 8,884 9,936 8,621 11,014 13,767 MGM 7,030 7,273 7,030 7,439 7,290 8,374 9,379 Peninsula 4,633 4,562 4,691 4,693 5,070 5,590 6,427 6,537 6,781 7,255 6,804 7,555 8,402 Cotai/Taipa 3,524 4,180 4,926 4,910 5,418 6,185 6,724 6,399 6,790 7,614 6,237 8,830 11,069 Note: Net win per table calculation excludes CityClubs and poker tables. Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 16