Document of The World Bank MAY 5, 1993

Transcription

1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Agriculture Operations Division Country Department III South Asia Regional Office Document of The World Bank FOR OMCLAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PAKISTAN 1988 FLOOD DAMAGE RESTORATION PROJECT (CREDIT 2003-PAK) MAY 5, 1993 Rept No This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Name of currency (abbreviation) = Pakistani Rupee (PRs) Appraisal Year (1988): US$1.00 = PRs 18.0 Intervening Years ( ): US$1.00 = PRs 21.1 Completion Year (1991): US$1.00 = PRs 23.8 FISCAL YEAR July 1 to June 30 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 foot (ft) 30.5 centimeters (cm) 1 mile (ml) kilometers (km) 1 acre (ac) hectare (ha) ABBREVIATIONS ADB DCA GOP LCB NWFP PC-i PPAR RMP Asian Development Bank Development Credit Agreement Government of Pakistan Local Competitive Bidding North West Frontier Province Planning Commission Proforma-1 Project Performance Audit Report Resident Mission in Pakistan

3 Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C U.S.A. FOR OMCLAL USE ONLY May 5, 1993 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on PAKISTAN Flood Damage Restoration Project (Cr PAK& Attached is a copy of the report entitled "Project Completion Report on PAKISTAN Flood Damage Restoration Project (Cr PAK)" prepared by the South Asia Regional Office with Part II contributed by the Borrower. The Bank responded promptly to the Government's request for assistance to repair damage caused by the 1988 flood and a quick disbursing credit was approved. The design was based in part on experience gained from similar Bank operations which had responded to earlier flood emergencies. The PCR reports that in general the project was completed as planned, except that some works were substandard. Inadequate supervision by the Bank was a contributing factor. With this qualification, overall project performance is judged as satisfactory. Follow-up activities include a government review (assisted by ADB) of flood protection systems and a separate review by the Government of Sind of their systems. Sustainability depends on the set up of adequate maintenance arrangements. It is intended to audit the project. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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5 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PAKISTAN 1988 FLOOD DAMAGE RESTORATION PROJECT (Cr PAK) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE... i EVALUATION SUMMARY.. ii PARTI Project Identity Background Project Objective and Description Project Design and Organization Project Implementation Project Results Project Sustainability IDA Performance Borrower Performance Project Relationship Consulting Services Project Documentation and Data PARTII PART III Related Bank Loans and Credits This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

6 2. Project Timetable Credit Disbursements Project Implementation A. Physical Achievements B. Consulting Services Project Cost and Financing A. Project Cost B. Project Financing Project Results Status of Covenants Use of Bank Resources A. Staff Inputs (staff weeks) B. Missions Map - IBRD R

7 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PAKISTAN 1988 FLOOD DAMAGE RESTORATION PROJECT (Cr PAK) PREFACE 1. This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the 1988 Flood Damage Restoration Project in Pakistan for which Credit 2003-PAK in the amount of SDR 30.6 million (US$40.0 million equivalent) was made on April 28, The credit closing date was extended once, by six months, to December 31, The credit account was kept open until April 30, 1992, and the last disbursement was made on May 27, 1992, raising the disbursed total to SDR million (82% of the credit). The remaining credit balance of SDR 5.42 million was cancelled. 2. Parts I and ill of the PCR were prepared by an FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program mission'/, which visited Pakistan during February/March 1992, and revised by the Agriculture Operations Division, Country Department IlIl, South Asia Region. Preparation was based on a review of the President's Report (No. P PAK, of March 13,1989) and the legal documents; IDA supervision reports and project files; a draft PCR produced by the project supervisory consultants; field visits to project sites; and discussions with the Borrower's project staff and the supervisory consultants. Part II was prepared by the Borrower. '/ M. Sugimura - mission leader/agronomist; Ms. S. Marzin - agricultural economist; and S. Rajagopal - Irrigation engineer, consultant.

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9 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PAKISTAN 1988 FLOOD DAMAGE RESTORATION PROJECT (Cr.2003-PAK) EVALUATION SUMMARY Objectives 1. The objective of the project was to urgently restore selected public infrastructure in all four provinces that had been severely damaged by the 1988 floods. The magnitude of restoration work required and the shortage of budget funds necessitated GOP's appeal to international donors for assistance. IDA responded by approving a SDR 30.6 million (US$40.0 million) emergency credit providing funds for: (i) rehabilitation of irrigation, drainage, flood protection and road infrastructure, including bridges, culverts and other related structures; and (ii) technical assistance (supervisory consultancy services) for project implementation. The project was to be carried out over a 27-month period (October 1988 to December 1990). GOP and the Provincial Governments had selected the administrative units in which schemes to be restored under the IDA credit were located. The credit was to cover 72% of civil works costs and 90% of technical assistance costs. Retroactive financing up to 20% of the credit amount (or US$8 million equivalent) was provided on an exceptional basis for expenditures incurred since October 1, Implementation Experience 2. The IDA credit became effective in June 1989 and was closed on December 31, 1991, after a six-month extension. To accommodate final disbursements, the credit account was kept open until April 30, Disbursement was lower than expected due to reduced costs and depreciation of the Rupee against the US dollar and SDR, and slower mainly due to delayed submission of withdrawal applications and submission of applications without adequate documentation. In early 1991, the civil works disbursement percentage was increased to 89% (with effect from September 1, 1990) as part of the Bank Group's effort to assist borrowers affected by the Gulf war. Despite the closing date extension from June 30, 1991 to December 31, 1991, considered sufficient at the time to complete remaining works, total disbursements amounted to only SDR 25.2 million (82% of the credit), leaving SDR 5.4 million which were cancelled effective May 27, Even though flood damage was identified quickly by the various Provincial implementing agencies, not all works could be carried out immediately. Schemes to be restored within each province were located in different engineering jurisdictions, and the quality of scheme preparation varied depending on the skills available in each jurisdiction. iii

10 Procurement procedures and related documentation requirements of IDA were followed to varying degrees for the same reason, which resulted in delays in scheme clearance and replenishment of special accounts. Project Results 4. In general, the project achieved its objective of restoring flood damaged infrastructure, assisting in economic recovery. A total of 666 schemes were completed, involving irrigation, drainage, and flood protection works, causeways and roads. Actual cost of the schemes was lower than orginally estimated, which was mainly due to the initial inability of project staff to reach certain sites and consequent over-estimation of the damage occurred. In Sind, actual costs were in particular much lower than original estimates. 5. Quality of work varied. Overall standards were good and the supervisory consultants have, in general, contributed to the good quality of workmanship and materials used. However, there have been reports of substandard work in some schemes. From the PCR mission's observations it appears, for instance, that better quality control could have been exercised in the procurement of galvanized iron wires which have been used extensively in the construction of spurs, J spurs and flood protection bunds. 6. No economic or financial rate of return was estimated at appraisal, which is accepted practice in such emergency projects. Since irrigation systems are now functioning again and economic activity has resumed, it can be concluded that the project had a beneficial impact upon the economy, the society and the environment. Project Sustainability 7. A majority of the schemes has been restored to preflood condition as envisaged by the project. Since restoration works were done without extensive review of design parameters, flood frequencies, and river flow hydraulics such as aggradation and degradation of riverbeds, their sustainability depends on the soundness of the judgments made by project engineers. Inadequate staffing and funding of normal maintenance activities would aggravate the situation. It would be appropriate for GOP to undertake a follow-up review of the design of the restored structures and the maintenance program. A review of the flood protection systems in Pakistan is being carried out by GOP with ADB assistance. 8. Effective operation of the flood monitoring and warning system, both within Pakistan and in collaboration with India, is essential for the sustained operation of the restored structures. Findings and Lessons Learned 9. Lessons to be learned from project implementation are that: (i) provision of retroactive financing greatly assisted GOP; (ii) 'emergency response' projects should be supervised more frequently by staff specializing in the appropriate disciplines; (iii) iv

11 borrower personnel should be given short courses in the operation of special accounts and in IDA procurement and disbursement procedures (which was done, but with less than desired effect); (iv) supervisory consultants should be allowed additional staffmonths so that a more detailed inspection of civil works under construction (rather than spot checks and intermittent inspection visits) is possible; (v) field teams in charge of civil works may require training by supervisory consultants or RMP to enhance their competence in checking construction techniques; and (vi) the scattered nature of restoration works which involves different engineering jurisdictions and capabilities should be taken into account in designing special funding arrangements and reimbursement procedures. v

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13 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PAKISTAN 1988 FLOOD DAMAGE RESTORATION PROJECT (Cr.2003-PAK) PART I 1. Project Identity Project Name Credit No. RVP Unit Country Sector Sub-sectors 1988 Flood Damage Restoration Project 2003-PAK South Asia Region Pakistan Agriculture and Transport Irrigation, Drainage and Roads 2. Background 2.1 During 1988, Pakistan suffered two major floods, the first in July/August and the second in September/October. The July/August floods, by the Jhelum and Indus rivers, caused significant damage in Sind, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). In Sind, the Indus river was in high flood at the Guddu (1,162,000 cusecs) and Sukkur barrages (1,118,000 cusecs). A number of flood protection bunds were destroyed by river erosion. The right guide bund of Dadu Moro bridge was almost completely washed away. Below Kotri barrage, the surface loop bund was breached causing extensive inundation of cropped areas. The Daro branch canal was severely damaged. The Sujawal and Battoro branch drains and the Nagan outfall drain were also badly damaged. In Baluchistan, the Pat feeder canal was breached at 61 places. In NWFP, severe flash floods and flooding along the Kabul and Swat rivers affected more than 500 villages. The September/October floods, by the Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej rivers, caused severe damage in Punjab. The Shadara distributary bund was breached causing heavy flooding of the area between Shadara and Kala Shah Kaku. Downstream, the Balloki and Sidhnai headworks were subjected to discharges far in excess of their design capacities, and embankments were breached to save the structures. The Sulaimanki headworks on the Sutlej river faced a similar situation, with the flood waters breaching both abutments and causing widespread damage. 1

14 2.2 It was estimated that as a result of these floods about one million hectares of irrigated crop land and settled areas were inundated or otherwise adversely affected resulting in large losses to the cotton, rice and sugarcane crops. More than three million people were made homeless and about 500 lives were lost. 2.3 GOP responded quickly, and the Provincial Governments and related federal agencies assembled a comprehensive inventory of damage to public infrastructure (irrigation, drainage, flood protection, roads, railways, communications, schools, hospitals, etc.). This inventory indicated damage to: (a) about 1,500 km of canals, drainage channels and flood protection works in Punjab, three major canal commands in Sind, the Pat feeder canal in Baluchistan, and the Warsak Lift and Mama Khil Jaded canals in NWFP; (b) about 500 km of major flood protection works; (c) over 3,000 km of roads and related structures; (d) 15 sections of railways totalling over 100 breaches of embankments; (e) 2,150 public buildings; and (f) a major telephone and telegraph coaxial cable between Multan and Bahawalpur, and telephone exchange facilities in Lahore. 2.4 Immediately following the floods, GOP and Provincial Governments mobilized relief programs and undertook restoration measures with their own funds. However, the magnitude of restoration work required and the shortage of budget funds resulted in GOP's urgent appeal for international donor assistance in this emergency. IDA responded by instructing a water sector mission visiting Pakistan in October 1988 to assess the damage and need for assistance, and approving the SDR 30.6 million (US$40.0 million) credit for restoration of selected public infrastructure which is the subject of this PCR. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved a parallel project for US$44 million (Loan 957-PAK). Government designated specific administrative units to the IDA and ADB projects. In addition, the Islamic Development Bank offered a loan of US$10 million for the restoration of health, education, railway and telecommunication facilities, but this assistance did not materialize. The IDA and ADB projects, including Government contributions, covered the restoration to their preflood condition of almost all damaged public irrigation, drainage, flood protection and road facilities. Because of the emergency nature of the project, the IDA credit was processed without preparation of an appraisal report (SAR). 3. ProJect Objective and Description 3.1 The main objective of the project was to assist GOP and Provincial Governments in the restoration of selected flood damaged irrigation, drainage, flood protection and road infrastructure in all four provinces. This restoration was to help economic activities to return to normalcy after the disruption by the 1988 floods. As damaged flood protection works leave vast areas vulnerable to floods of even modest levels and damaged irrigation canals would have seriously affected irrigation supplies for the 1988/1989 rabi crops, restoration was to be undertaken as a matter of urgency. 3.2 The project provided for: (i) restoration (civil works) of selected irrigation, drainage, flood protection and road infrastructure, including bridges, culverts and other related structures; (ii) technical assistance (supervisory consultancy services) for 2

15 implementation; and (iii) supervision and administration. It was to be carried out over a 27-month period (October 1988 to December 1990). GOP and the Provincial Governments had selected the schemes to be restored by designated governmental administrative units. The type of works to be executed was as follows: (a) Irrigation system - repair of breaches and canal banks; removal of silt deposited by flood water; repair/reconstruction of control structures, bridges, outlets and irrigation buildings, such as gauge huts, resthouses and offices. (b) Drainage system - desilting of drainage channels, repair/ reconstruction of inlet structures, repair of breaches, and other ancillary works. (c) (d) (e) (f) Flood protection works - repair of breaches and restoration of eroded embankments; repair of hydraulic structures; and restoration of river control spurs. Dams and weirs - restoration of embankments, aprons, spillways and outlet control structures, and stone pitching (Baluchistan only). Barrages - repair of control gate and operating mechanism; reinstatement of stonework protection on guide bunds and in downstream aprons; and restoration of earthworks on guide and marginal bunds. Roads - repairing of flood damaged sections; providing additional culverts and/or drainage vents needed for passing larger flood flows in reconstructed road embankments; and reconstruction of bridges and culverts. 3.3 Technical assistance to be provided through local supervisory consultants was for about 500 staff-months. Project funding for supervision and administration was to be limited to additional personnel and related costs of the coordination units in the Federal Flood Cell and Provincial Flood Damage Restoration Cells. The implementing agencies were to utilize existing staff, facilities and equipment. 3.4 Total project costs were estimated to be US$55.6 million (PRs 1,140 million). The IDA credit of SDR 30.6 million (US$40.0 million equivalent) was to cover 72% of civil works costs and 90% of technical assistance costs. Because of the emergency nature of the work and the critical need for IDA assistance, retroactive financing up to 20% of the credit was approved on an exceptional basis in respect of eligible expenditures incurred since October 1, 1988 (seven months). 3

16 4. Project Design and Organization 4.1 The project largely followed the design of the previous IDA-assisted project to restore flood damaged infrastructure in Pakistan. The Project Performance Audit Report (PPAR) for the 1976 Flood Damage Restoration Project (Cr. 683-PAK) had concluded that: "employment of qualified local supervisory consultants for projects with a large number of components. project works and agencies involved can provide invaluable on-the-spot control at a level which is impossible through normal IDA supervision". The consulting firm that had performed well in this role under Cr. 683-PAK, was recruited by GOP on a sole-source basis. This feature of the project was instrumental in the smooth and reasonably successful execution of this project. 4.2 At the federal level, the sectors covered by the project are under the authority of the Ministries of Water and Power, and Communications and Works, and the National Highway Board (now National Highway Authority). At the provincial level, the Irrigation and Communications and Works Departments were responsible for implementing the project. Coordination at the federal level was the responsibility of the Federal Flood Cell in the Ministry of Water and Power, and at the provincial level of the Provincial Irrigation Departments. In each Provincial Irrigation Department, a Flood Damage Restoration Cell was established for this purpose, with a full-time coordinator and supporting staff. 4.3 Schemes to be restored were not reviewed by IDA (except those costing over PRs 4 million implemented after the end of the period covered by retroactive financing). They were accepted as submitted by GOP in order to expedite project implementation. Actually, all schemes were not executed on an emergency basis. Hence in retrospect, it would have been preferable to have a quick assessment of the hydraulics of the river systems involved, an evaluation of aggradation problems and maintenance problems which might have aggravated the flooding, and a review of designs taking into consideration advances in technology since the original structures were built. Changes in original design were considered in four cases under the project. These issues have a bearing on the proper functioning and sustainability of the restored structures and hence an indirect impact on the economic performance of related sectors. 5. Project Implementation 5.1 The credit became effective on June 19, 1989 and was closed on December 31, 1991, six months after the original closing date. Disbursement was lower than expected at appraisal due to reduced costs and depreciation of the Rupee against the US dollar and SDR, and slower mainly due to delayed submission of withdrawal applications and submissions with inadequate documentation by the Borrower. In March 1991, the civil works disbursement percentage was increased to 89% (with effect from September 1, 1990) as part of the Bank Group's effort to assist borrowers affected by the Gulf war. In order to allow additional time for the completion of works and the processing of the backlog of reimbursement claims, the credit closing date was extended from June 30, 1991 to December 31, Total disbursements amount to SDR million (82% of the credit), leaving SDR 5.42 million undisbursed, which were cancelled as of May 27, 4

17 1992. Actual project costs are PRs 994 million (about US$44 million equivalent), based on data provided by the supervisory consultants. 5.2 Even though damage to structures was identified quickly by the various implementing agencies, not all works could be executed immediately. Schemes to be restored within each province were located in different engineering jurisdictions. The quality of scheme preparation varied depending on the skills available in each jurisdiction. IDA documentation requirements were also met to varying degrees for the same reason. Schemes were not always prepared with attention to IDA guidelines, and a lot of correspondence was exchanged on the matter between the supervisory consultants and the implementing agencies. This resulted in delays in clearance of reimbursement applications. Remedial measures by GOP following up on interventions by RMP could, perhaps, have eliminated some of these delays. 5.3 Project procurement procedures called for local competitive bidding (LCB) and in some instances, where heavy earthmoving and other machinery was involved, "force account" methods. Tendering procedures similar to those adopted in the Second Irrigation Systems Rehabilitation Project (Cr PAK) were to be used. In the period covered by retroactive financing, in which about two-thirds of all works--including all high priority works--were awarded, there was some relaxation of tendering requirements. During this period, the implementing agencies followed existing Provincial Government procedures for civil works procurement. Such procedures, some of which were not in conformity with IDA guidelines, were followed even after the end of the retroactive financing period, resulting in the exchange of correspondence mentioned above between the agency involved, the supervisory consultants, and RMP. 5.4 IDA had set up different clearance procedures for reimbursement of civil works expenditures based on contract size. Three ranges were adopted: in excess of PRs 4 million, between PRs 500,000 and PRs 4 million, and below PRs 500,000. Contracts in excess of PRs 4 million required prior review by IDA of invitations to bid and proposed awards. Contracts between PRs 500,000 and PRs 4,000,000 were subject to post review with reimbursement made upon submission of all documentation as per IDA guidelines. Expenditures on contracts below PRs 500,000 were to be reimbursed on the basis of Statements of Expenditure (SOEs) with the proviso that full documentation would be made available for review by IDA supervision missions. For force account, the same procedures were to be followed as for contracts below PRs 500,000. Interviews with the different Provincial Coordinators indicated that they would have preferred if a similar classification had been applied to tendering procedures as well, including tender periods of varying length depending on scheme size. However, it appears that IDA procurement requirements (which were waived many times on a case-by-case basis) contributed less to reimbursement delays than PIDs' internal procedures and weakness of the domestic construction industry, and did not delay project implementation. 5.5 Reimbursement applications were, in general, submitted very slowly. Throughout the implementation period, the implementing agencies had a backlog of reimbursements to be claimed. The project brief accompanying RMP's letter to GOP of January 22, 1991, indicated that applications had not been submitted for as much as PRs 340 million even though eligible expenditures had been incurred. It appears that in some 5

18 provinces where money was available from "suspense accounts", the agencies used this facility rather than withdrawing funds from the Special Accounts and GOP allocations, and claiming reimbursement. Most of the expenditures were incurred by field-level staff at Executive Engineers' level or even lower who were not familiar with IDA procurement and disbursement procedures. Once they had made payments to contractors using whichever source was readily available, these officers were basically not interested in following up with the necessary paperwork to obtain reimbursement. In most instances they drew down the Special Accounts to absolute minimum levels before submitting replenishment claims. It appears that in Sind project implementation was delayed due to this process. 6. Project Results 6.1 In general, the project achieved its targets of restoring flood damaged infrastructure, assisting in economic recovery. A total of 666 schemes were executed involving irrigation, drainage, flood protection works, causeways and roads. The breakdown of schemes by province and implementing agency is given in Part IlIl, 4A. Actual cost of the schemes was lower than estimated, which was mainly due to the inability of implementing staff to make detailed cost estimates and the consequent use of conservative estimates of the damage, due to the initial problem of access to some of the damaged schemes. In Sind, actual costs were in particular much lower than original estimates (see Part ll, 5A). 6.2 Quality of work varied from scheme to scheme visited by the PCR mission. However, overall standards were good and the supervisory consultants'staff have contributed to the good quality of workmanship and materials used. However, there have been reports of substandard work in some schemes. More frequent and appropriately staffed supervision missions, and allocation of additional resources to the supervisory consultants would have helped to improve quality control (see para 8.4). The PCR mission saw several gabions with poor quality galvanized wiremesh. Supervisory consultants' engineers informed the mission that good quality galvanized wiremesh was available from suppliers in Karachi, whereas the quality produced by suppliers in Lahore was poor. Following complaints by field officers and a contractor in 1989, the consultants regularly urged procurement officers to obtain required wiremesh from Karachi. The wiremesh in NWFP schemes has already started rusting in many places. Good quality wires were seen in the schemes visited by the mission in Baluchistan. It would appear that better quality control could have been exercised in the procurement of GI wires which have been used extensively in the construction of spurs, J spurs and flood protection bunds. 6.3 No economic or financial rate of return was calculated at appraisal, which is accepted practice in such emergency projects. Since irrigation systems are now functioning properly and economic activity has resumed, it can be concluded that the project had a beneficial impact upon the economy, the society and the environment. 6

19 7. Project Sustainablilty 7.1 With few exceptions, restoration has been carried out to preflood condition as envisaged by the project. In order to build a flood-resistant system, a review of design parameters, flood frequencies, and river flow hydraulics such as aggradation and degradation of riverbeds is required. It is not clear from available documentation how much of the flood damage in 1988 was due to poor maintenance of facilities resulting from inadequate staffing and funding. The PPAR for Cr. 683-PAK reported that "a major factor behind the disastrous 1973 floods and to a lesser extent those of was the inadequate fundina of normal maintenance of flood protection facilities." Interviews with engineers responsible for the maintenance of flood protection works indicated that maintenance staff was inadequate, sometimes one small group being responsible for about 400 km of flood protection works. It would be appropriate for GOP to undertake a follow-up review of the design of restored structures and the maintenance program, and ensure appropriate action. A review of the flood protection systems in Pakistan and the planning of new facilities is being carried out by GOP with ADB assistance under the Flood Protection Sector Project (Ln. 837-PAK). The Government of Sind is also independently reviewing specific systems. The sustainability of project works will ultimately depend on the outcome of these reviews as well as adequate maintenance. 7.2 Effective operation of the flood monitoring and warning systems, both within Pakistan and in collaboration with India, is essential for the sustained operation of the restored structures. Since the flood flows take a considerable time (a few days) to reach the downstream areas most vulnerable to flooding, early warning systems could play a major role in reducing future damage and thus complement the utility of the restored structures. 8. IDA Performance 8.1 IDA responded quickly to GOP's request for assistance by instructing a water sector mission which was visiting Pakistan at that time (October 1988) to assess the flood damage and need for assistance. GOP's consultants prepared a list of schemes to be financed under the IDA credit. On this basis, IDA prepared lending documents to be ready for negotiations expected in December When ADB also offered financing for the same sectors, with the proviso that specific areas be assigned to its operation, GOP requested changes in the list previously submitted to IDA (para 9.1), and IDA revised its appraisal documents accordingly. Actual credit negotiations started on February 27, Because of GOP's critical need for financial assistance, IDA rightly agreed to provide retroactive financing, on an exceptional basis, for expenditures incurred since October 1, 1988, up to a maximum of 20% of the credit (US$8 million). This arrangement assisted GOP greatly. IDA also relaxed criteria for LCB and pre-restoration benchmark surveys for this retroactive financing period of seven months. 7

20 8.3 The Provincial Coordinator of Sind informed the PCR mission that damaged structures in his province were in fact brought back to original design standards rather than to pre-flood condition. IDA has quite rightly been flexible in accommodating this. 8.4 Even though the credit closing date was extended, no supervision missions were mounted by IDA in The two earlier supervision missions comprised an agriculturist and an engineer. A project of this nature would have called for a water resources specialist with civil engineering background to participate in supervision as this would have helped in carrying out important quality checks of completed and ongoing works. It appears that this task was left to the supervisory consultants, but they did not have sufficient staff-months to provide detailed supervision either. 8.5 Lessons learned can be summarized as follows: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) retroactive financing as provided under the credit greatly assisted GOP; 'emergency response' projects should be supervised more frequently by staff specializing in the appropriate disciplines; borrower personnel should be given short training courses in the operation of special accounts and in IDA procurement and disbursement procedures; such courses/seminars were arranged by RMP, but their effect was less than desired because of field staff turnover and deepseated habits in the PIDs; supervisory consultants should be allowed additional staff-months so that a more detailed inspection of civil works under construction (rather than spot checks and intermittent inspection visits) can be done; field teams in charge of civil works may require training by the supervisory consultants or RMP to enhance their competence in checking construction techniques; and the scattered nature of restoration works which involves different engineering jurisdictions and capabilities should be taken into account in designing special funding arrangements and reimbursement procedures. 9. Borrower Performance 9.1 Borrower response to the 1988 floods through quick preparation of the restoration project was good. GOP engaged consultants to review the estimates prepared by the Provincial Governments and federal agencies. Based on this information, the consultants prepared a list of schemes to be financed under the IDA credit. When ADB offered financing for the same purpose, with the proviso that specific areas be 8

21 assigned to its operation, to avoid overlap, GOP requested changes in the list of schemes prepared for IDA financing.'/ Altogether, the rearrangements necessary to accommodate both donors caused processing delay of about two months (para 8. 1), but gained GOP additional US$44 million. The Borrower's performance in completing civil works of all restoration schemes was reasonably satisfactory. In particular, it was noted by the Chief Engineer, Federal Flood Commission (Ministry of Water and Power) in the PCR mission's wrap-up meeting that this was probably the first project where costs have not exceeded the PC_12/ estimates. The quality of construction varied. However, overall standards were good and the supervisory consultants have, in general, contributed to the good quality of workmanship and materials used. The Provincial Coordinators merely functioned as facilitators relaying correspondence between the implementing agencies and the supervisory consultants. They maintained accounts and operated the Special Accounts, as required by the project, but did not play an active role in expediting reimbursement applications and monitoring project disbursements and audits. In some provinces, the supervisory consultants were performing many of the duties of the Borrower's implementing agencies. Regarding tender notice periods, the Provincial Coordinators did not make an attempt to either educate their staff in the procedural requirements of the project or to obtain IDA agreement to the use of local procedures. This resulted in unnecessary delays in disbursement for some of the schemes. 9.2 The required audits were carried out but usually much later than called for in the Development Credit Agreement. The audit reports regularly gave a clean opinion indicating no irregularities on the part of the Borrower. 10. Project Relationship 10.1 The relationship between the Borrower and the Bank was good throughout the implementation of the project. The supervisory consultants had excellent working relationships with both the provincial implementing agencies and the Federal Flood Cell. 11. Consulting Services 11.1 The supervisory consultants were responsible for monitoring progress of work and compliance with the implementation schedule, and assisting in the preparation of reimbursement applications. Initially, they were hampered in the performance of their duties by the non-availability of vehicles. As stated earlier, their services were valuable in the supervision of the widely scattered schemes. Senior personnel of the implementing agencies was frequently transferred. The consultants' engineers helped in maintaining continuity. There have been reports of substandard work in some of the schemes. In 1989, when some structures were damaged by that year's floods, newspaper reports indicated that some of these structures had been restored in a substandard manner a few months earlier. However, the matter was not officially brought to the attention of the 1" EAD telex of December 21, / Planning Commission Proforma-1. 9

22 consultants. The situation could have arisen because the consultants had to spread staff to cover large areas and stay within their budget. Following the above-mentioned newspaper reports, RMP requested IDA to look into the makter during the next supervision mission. However, it appears that this request was not followed up since the next supervision mission did not include a civil engineer specialized in earthwork construction. 12. Project Documentation and Data 12.1 There is no staff appraisal report for this emergency project. Instead, a President's report with a technical annex was prepared. The documentation available with the supervisory consultants was extremely useful in preparing this PCR. Data relevan to PCR preparation were, in general, readily available. 10

23 PART II 1. Project Description and Objectives 1. During the year 1988 Pakistan has been subjected to two major floods; the first in August and the second in late September. The August flood occurred in the Indus and Jhelum rivers. The other tributary rivers also passed high flows simultaneously, the cumulative effect of which generated a very high flood in the Indus at the Guddu, Sukkur and Kotri Barrages. In September/October the flood was caused by heavy rains in the catchment areas of the Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej rivers in India. The flood in River Chenab was high but did not cause any significant damage. 2. The Government of Pakistan (GOP) made a request to the World Bank for emergency assistance to restore public sector infrastructure damaged during the August and September 1988 floods. Simultaneously, the Government of Pakistan retained the services of National Engineering Services Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd (NESPAK) as Supervisory Consultants for providing assistance to Government of Pakistan officials in collecting information on damage to public infrastructure and compiling a report which could form the basis of preparation of the "1988 Flood Damage Restoration Project", and supervising the implementation of the project. 3. The objectives of the Project were to - urgently restore selected public infrastructure in all four Provinces that had been severely damaged by the 1988 floods; - rehabilitate irrigation, drainage, flood protection and road infrastructure, including bridges, culverts, and other related structures; - make emergency repairs of main channels, distributaries and minors to restore the system to its running condition; - restore the canal systems to their pre-flood condition; - repair and reconstruct damaged barrages and their components, spurs, protection works of the barrages and other irrigation facilities to bring them to pre-flood condition; - restore flood protection works, involving repair and reconstruction of flood embankments, spurs and shanks to their original pre-flood level; 11

24 reconstruct roads in a way to quickly restore the traffic flow; and restore pavements to their pre-flood levels and shapes. 2. Project Implementation 4. The IDA credit became effective in June 1989 and was closed on December 31, 1991, after a six-month extension. To accommodate final disbursements, the credit account was kept open until April 30, Disbursement was lower than expected due to reduced costs and depreciation of the Rupee against the US dollar and SDR, and slower mainly due to delayed submission of applications without adequate documentation. 5. A problem which caused delay was the slow takeoff of the project, which is a normal feature of all such projects. Also, the Gulf War started during the Project, but overall progress remained satisfactory. When the project was extended for six months upto December, 1991 because of the Gulf War, the recovery of the initial deposits into the Special Accounts was not delayed and started from January, 1991 as originally planned. Consequently it added to the implementation problem. 6. An agreement between Borrower and the Bank signed on October 23, 1991, to extend the credit closing date upto December 31, 1991, mostly affected project implementation. 7. Even though flood damage was identified quickly by the various Provincial implementing agencies, not all works could be carried out immediately. Schemes to be restored within each Province were located in different engineering jurisdictions, and the quality of scheme preparation varied depending on the skills available in each jurisdiction. Procurement procedures and related documentation requirements of IDA were followed to varying degrees for the same reason, which resulted in delays in scheme clearance and replenishment of special accounts. 3. Project Results 8. The Project successfully achieved its targets in restoring damaged infrastructure and assisting the GOP in rapid economic recovery. The schemes completed involve irrigation, drainage, and flood protection works, causeways and roads. 9. Overall standards were good and the supervisory consultants have, in general contributed to the good quality of workmanship and material used. 10. No separate staff was sanctioned for the Project. Existing staff in the office dealt with the whole project. Funds were adequate to meet the estimated cost of the 12

25 restoration works. This is the first IDA funded project of its kind where contingency/ escalation approved in the PC-I has not been utilized. 11. Results could have been improved if: i) special provisions in the Project had been made to educate the concerned officers; ii) iii) adequate procurement of field transport had been managed right at the start to commence the baseline survey, which was delayed by over six months; better quality control had been exercised in the procurement of galvanized iron wires which have been used extensively in the construction of spurs, J-spurs and flood protection bunds. 4. Project Sustainability 12. The project did not cover any new works. It covered restoration of facilties damaged by the 1988 floods so that these works were brought to their pre-flood condition. The question of 0 & M does not arise in the case of this project. 13. With few exceptions, restoration has been carried out to pre-flood condition as envisaged by the Project. In order to build a flood resistant system, a review of design parameters, flood frequencies, and river flow hydraulics such as aggradation and degradation of river beds is required. A follow up review of the restored structures and maintenance programme must be undertaken and appropriate action in this regard is necessary, as the sustainability of project works will ultimately depend on the outcome of these reviews as well as adequate maintenance. 14. Effective operation of the flood monitoring and warning systems, both within Pakistan and in collaboration with India, is essential for the sustained operation of the restored structures. Since the flood flows take a considerable time (a few days) to reach the downstream areas most vulnerable to flooding, an early warning system could play a major role in reducing future damage and thus complement the utility of the restored structures. 5. Project Design 15. The project designs and components were sound and their sizes were appropriate, which contributed to its success. All the project design aspects were according to field observations, previous design experience and specifications. So, there was no need for modifications. 13

26 6. Bank Performance 16. The Bank's performance may be summarized as follows. - Overall cooperation of the Bank remained highly satisfactory. Efficient release of funds and extension of credit closing date were the chief points of strength and understanding on the part of the Bank. The amounts of initial deposits into the Special Accounts, fixed by IDA, were lower than the optimum requirements of the Provinces, however, a correction was subsequently made. - The Bank mission framed the Project and obtained institution approvals efficiently resulting in signing of the Agreement in the shortest possible time. - During the implementation period, after the Agreement had been signed, IDA arranged Supervisory Missions. In general no delays occurred. 7. Borrower Performance 17. The Borrower managed the Project satisfactorily through: i) Timely appointment of Supervisory Consultants. ii) iii) Proper coordination and arrangements between the Borrower and the Provinces for their participation in the Project. Establishment of Federal and Provincial Coordinators. 18. Despite non-availability of special sanctioned staff for the Project, performance was satisfactory because of the high priority given by the Borrower to the works. For further improvements separate staff should be provided next time. 8. Project Relationship 19. A pleasant relationship existed between the Borrower, the Bank and Consultants, alongwith excellent coordination with the Provinces. Overall, good understanding and better working environment prevailed throughout the Project from its evaluation till its completion. 20. The Borrower's comments on the draft PCR (Parts I and l1l) have been taken into account by the Bank. 14

27 PART III 1. Related Bank Loans and Credits Loan/Credit Purpose Year of Status Comments Title Approval Flood Rehabilitation Emergency assistance to rehabilitate public 1974 Caosed PPAR issued October Program infrastructure damaged by the 1973 flood and (Cr. 466-PAK) finance industrial imports (agriculture-related equipment and spares). Flood Damage Emergency assistance to restore critical 1977 Caosed PPAR issued December Restoration Project infrastructure damaged by the 1976 flood. Dec (Cr. 683-PAK) 2. Project Timetable Item Date Planned Date Revised Date Actual Identification NA. Oct. 7, 1989 l/ Preparation NA. Oct. 7, 1989 l/ Appraisal NA. Oct. 7, 1989 l/ Negotiations Dec l/ Jan / Feb./Mar Board Approval Jan l/ Feb / April 11, 1989 Credit Signature Feb / NA. April 28, 1989 Credit Effectiveness Feb l/ June 15, / June 19, 1989 Credit Closing June 30, 1991 Dec. 31, 1991 Dec. 31, 1991 Credit Completion NA. NA. April 30, 1992 l/ Water Sector mission's aide memoire, dated October 27, / FEPS, December 2, / President's Report dated March 13, 1989 (para 18 and Schedule C, respectively). Comments Identification/Preparation/Appralsal: (i) Appointment of supervisory consultants and establishment of Provincial coordinating cells was to be a condition of negotiations; (ii) retroactive financing (not more than US$15 million) to be permitted for expenditures incurred on project activities since September 1988; and (iii) LCB and/or force account to be used for project civil works. Project processing was delayed about two months because of GOP's interest in also receiving the Asian Development Bank's assistance for restoring flood damaged infrastructure. Negotiations: Appointment of supervisory consultants and establishment of Provincial coordination cells (called Flood Damage Restoration Cells) was made a condition of Board presentation. The eligibility date for retroactive financing--up to US$8 million, or 20% of the Credit--was agreed to be October 1, 1988, and the force account limit was raised from US$10 million to US$12 million. As an exception, it was agreed that a condition of Board presentation would be approval of the PC-Is by the Central Development Working Party and anticipatory (unconditional) approval by the Chairman 15

28 of the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC), rather than ECNEC itself. This condition was met in March Credit Disbursements Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements Appraisal Estimates 1/ FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 - SDR million USS million Actuals 2/ - SDR million USS million Actuals as % of Estimates - SDR USS Date of Final Disbursement: May 27, / President's Report, Appendix III. 2/ LOAAS, june Project Implementation A. Physical Achievements Item Origtnal Target 1/ PC-1 2/ Adual Actual as % of PC-1 Punjab:... of Schemes).(No.. - Irrigation NA Roads NA Sind - Irrigation NA Roads NA NWFP - Irrigation NA Roads NA Baluchistanr - Irrigation NA National Highway Board - Roads NA Total NA / 94 1/ Even though details on number of schemes and civil works quantities such as earthwork, stone masonry and concrete were available, supervision missions used expenditure on civil works as the key indicator for project achievement. 2/ Planning Commission Proforma-1. 3/ Originally 705 schemes were submitted to IDA. Later some schemes were found to be ineligible for IDA rinancing and were dropped. The revised total is